Is not invoking supernaturalism a reason to reject religion?

[harvey1]

HughDP stated here:

Specifically what, in fact, is outside the realms of science? If the combination of constants required to get our universe is rare, then one of the most logical assumptions is that it would take a number of attempts to hit on that combination. Either there is nothing extraordinary about the combination of constants in our universe, or the number of attempts at getting this combination is large, or - as you suggested - it's just incredibly lucky. I'd be surprised if it was the latter, but if it is and if it's within the realms of science, then so what? Still no need to invoke anything supernatural. I think we need more than extraordinary coincidence to invoke the supernatural. If one day scientists declare that our universe is totally impossible, then we'd have to consider the supernatural to make the impossible possible, but I think we're a long way off that point now, don't you? My point is that there's still a lot of science to do. Scientists do not have all the answers, but much work is being done to find them. They haven't all given up their jobs and become Elvis impersonators instead yet. I think we're considering the idea of a Creator way too early in our history.

So, my question is the following: Is postulating a Creator to account for the amazing facts of the world (e.g., the physical constants seeming to be extremely coincidental to the universe's becoming) necessarily invoking a supernatural explanation, and is a Creator explanation for these features premature given our current knowledge of science?

[HughDP]

If a platonic object (i.e., proposition, law, wavefunction, etc.) exists, then in my view this is a strong argument for a realist interpretation of Tarski's T-schema. Let me go back to the issue with Tarski's satisfaction relation:

The two standard truth definitions are at first glance not definitions of truth at all, but definitions of a more complicated relation involving assignments a of objects to variables:

a satisfies the formula F.

In fact satisfaction reduces to truth in this sense: a satisfies F if and only if taking each free variable in F as a name of the object assigned to it by a makes F into a true sentence.

By referring to Everett's many worlds interpretation of a wavefunciton, instead of F, you've just made this:

[worlds M] satisfies the wavefunction [Phi]

Now, if you don't go in that direction, then in that case you have no definition of your formula F (or [Phi]). You only have a non-causal relation:

only a exists and only formula F exists

There's no reason why a and F exist, or why they are related. Supposedly, if "a" exists, A, B, C, D, E, G, ..., Z could all exist rather than F. There must be a reason why (a, F) have this pairing and no other combination will do.

Yes, and the reason could be probabilistic along the lines of Hartle and Hawking's paper or Everett's many worlds interpretation. This feels more 'natural' to me and the existence of a timeless metaspace populated with a wave function and 'Platonic' numbers as a 'brute fact' seems to me to no harder to justify logically than a metaspace populated by God.

In terms of the moment of creation - that 10^-34 of a second where a 4-d universe emerges - one can replace God with a Platonic metaspace and justify it with the same logic. If the theist says "what defines the Platonic laws?", the atheist can just as easily reply with "what defines God?".

The answer that I think is the only logical possibility is Tarski's satisfaction relation fits this bill. Thus, S(a,F) provides a reason why a and F must belong to each other.

However, Tarski's satisfaction relation is a semantic term (i.e., a relation that implies the existence of cognition), and therefore God is a primitive in our Universe that must exist because the lack of this satisfaction relation would still imply the existence of this satisfaction relation.

Or perhaps that it's best to avoid Tarski in such matters. As I pointed out earlier, I can only see the benefits of his logic when we're trying to relate an already known metalanguage to an object language. What we appear to be doing here is defining the metalanguage itself.

This situation holds for any platonic world having causal connection with a phenomenal world such as our own. Hence, God exists.

Well it could hold, of course. That's the benefit of arguing from a theistic position: God is so all-encompassing an entity that He could be the explanation for anything and everything. But I think it's a complex solution: even a 'brute fact' pure chance solution seems somehow simpler and more elegant to me.

Harvey, in the course of this thread I've read more supplementary stuff about 'creation' than I can possibly take in, some of it involving mathematics that goes beyond my meagre abilities.

None of them appeal to me entirely, be they theistic or otherwise. I wondered why this was and I think it's because I simply don't know. That might sound exactly where I was at the start (it is) but now at least my not knowing is as a result of knowing more!

[harvey1]

There's no reason why a and F exist, or why they are related. Supposedly, if "a" exists, A, B, C, D, E, G, ..., Z could all exist rather than F. There must be a reason why (a, F) have this pairing and no other combination will do.

Yes, and the reason could be probabilistic along the lines of Hartle and Hawking's paper or Everett's many worlds interpretation. This feels more 'natural' to me and the existence of a timeless metaspace populated with a wave function and 'Platonic' numbers as a 'brute fact' seems to me to no harder to justify logically than a metaspace populated by God.

The probablistic nature of the laws doesn't change the Tarskian requirement at all:

[worlds M] probabilistically satisfies the wavefunction [Phi]

As far as a brute fact is concerned, my point is that the plantonic reference does not buy you anything. You could just drop [Phi] completely, and just say:

[worlds M] exists and [Phi] is a fictional portrayal of [worlds M]

One can argue that if there is an M, then it has to be organized in a certain way, and that certain way happens to be [Phi]. All the mathematics and laws of physics originate from M. So, I don't think platonism buys you anything other than more overhead than you can justify. That is, [Phi] doesn't do anything in this setting since you already have a brute fact of M, and [Phi] doesn't play any role in that brute fact, so you might as well eliminate it (otherwise you have another brute fact of an extraneous [Phi] that exists but has no causal efficacy--it just dangles "out there").

In terms of the moment of creation - that 10^-34 of a second where a 4-d universe emerges - one can replace God with a Platonic metaspace and justify it with the same logic. If the theist says "what defines the Platonic laws?", the atheist can just as easily reply with "what defines God?".

Once we set God=satisfaction principle, this question is along the same lines as "what causes causation?" The question itself assumes the very phenomena that you want explained. To be more explicit, your question can be re-worded as "what satisfies the satisfaction relation?" The answer: nothing satisfies the satisfaction relation since any existent thing inherently requires a satisfaction relation to be an existent thing.

Replacing a satisfaction relation (God) with a platonic metaspace doesn't work, because as I said, you need a satisfaction relation to have a (causally efficacious) platonic metaspace.

Or perhaps that it's best to avoid Tarski in such matters. As I pointed out earlier, I can only see the benefits of his logic when we're trying to relate an already known metalanguage to an object language. What we appear to be doing here is defining the metalanguage itself.

Well, that's the point. The platonic world (e.g., a wavefunction) in someway is needed for M to exist, but we need an answer to why there exists this platonic world. Without that answer, we might as well just say M alone exists. What the platonic world does is give us the ability to reduce the Universe further to some fundamental fact that cannot but be true because the lack of that concept involves the concept. In this way, we can answer the age old question, "Why is there something instead of nothing?" The answer is that something is required to exist because of this metalanguage. If we ask why is there a metalanguage, then we reach our fundamental fact which we know cannot but be true. Since this requires Tarskian realism--especially of the satisfaction relation--we ought to commit to theism since this is the only explanation which gives a rational answer to the universe. Since we ought to be committed to a rationalist approach, we can accept theism as a necessary perspective. Hence, we are led to strong theism.

Well it could hold, of course. That's the benefit of arguing from a theistic position: God is so all-encompassing an entity that He could be the explanation for anything and everything. But I think it's a complex solution: even a 'brute fact' pure chance solution seems somehow simpler and more elegant to me.

But, the brute fact solution is irrational. It commits you to a position that there's magic and that the Universe is ultimately irrational and could do anything magical at any moment. I reject that view, and therefore I'm a theist.

None of them appeal to me entirely, be they theistic or otherwise. I wondered why this was and I think it's because I simply don't know. That might sound exactly where I was at the start (it is) but now at least my not knowing is as a result of knowing more!

In order for me to accept that kind of position as epistemically responsible, someone would have to show me a way out of the dilemmas that I posed to you. I personally find all of this very elementary, so I'm not sure why it strikes anyone as odd that we can claim knowledge. Surely there are many facts of the world that we claim as knowledge when there is a conceivable world that "exists" where we are proven wrong (e.g., there are other minds than ourselves). I think we need to move away from a position that agnosticism is a superior answer to all problems that beset us when, in my opinion, an agnostic stance is to say that irrational schemes are on equal footing to rational schemes. I reject that as epistemically irresponsible.

However, be that as it may, the atheist is not an agnostic. An atheist claims knowledge and comes down on the wrong side of the argument. The agnostic is wrong for not commiting to a rational explanation over an irrational explanation, and an atheist is wrong for committing to an irrational explanation over a rational explanation. I suppose agnosticism is less wrong, but still wrong.

[HughDP]

Once we set God=satisfaction principle, this question is along the same lines as "what causes causation?" The question itself assumes the very phenomena that you want explained. To be more explicit, your question can be re-worded as "what satisfies the satisfaction relation?" The answer: nothing satisfies the satisfaction relation since any existent thing inherently requires a satisfaction relation to be an existent thing.

Replacing a satisfaction relation (God) with a platonic metaspace doesn't work, because as I said, you need a satisfaction relation to have a (causally efficacious) platonic metaspace.

Yes it does work. One is simply replacing God with a set of principles which exist in the same timeless metaspace in which you suggest God exists. The only difference is that a set of principles doesn't purport to be a 'personality'.

God is defined in such a way as to be able to initiate a universe: any 'something' can be defined in exactly the same way, using the same logic. The difference is that the 'something' does not necessarily have all the other attributes assigned to a personal God; the 'something' exists to initiate a universe which then evolves as a closed system.

Furthermore, the 'something' may possibly tie in with what we already know about such things as quantum gravity and the probability aspects of QM, making it all the more elegant.

You can call that 'something' pantheism if you wish, but I'd say the link is tenuous.

In order for me to accept that kind of position as epistemically responsible, someone would have to show me a way out of the dilemmas that I posed to you.

I just did. Replace God with a set of principles that require as much explanation as God does. If that doesn't work, then God doesn't work. You can demand no more explanation about them than you can for God. The difference is that we could be led to this set of principles from what we learn about our own universe. Of course we may never be able to probe metaspaces and such or even place it on any viable theoretical basis, in which case the idea must be abandoned.

However, be that as it may, the atheist is not an agnostic. An atheist claims knowledge and comes down on the wrong side of the argument. The agnostic is wrong for not commiting to a rational explanation over an irrational explanation, and an atheist is wrong for committing to an irrational explanation over a rational explanation. I suppose agnosticism is less wrong, but still wrong.

Well I'm afraid I'll disappoint you a bit more. I am agnostic but I will say that I greatly favour the atheistic explanation of creation in the long run. My agnosticism is based around two principles:

(1) In real terms it's hardly important. How the universe began is unlikely to affect me in general day-to-day life. I totally reject the idea of a God in judgement over me, so it'll make no difference whether I believe or not anyway.

(2) Agnosticism (in terms of Creation) leaves my ideas open to falsification, so I'm allowing for the tiny possibility of something that might realistically be termed as pantheism.

One can argue that if there is an M, then it has to be organized in a certain way, and that certain way happens to be [Phi]. All the mathematics and laws of physics originate from M. So, I don't think platonism buys you anything other than more overhead than you can justify. That is, [Phi] doesn't do anything in this setting since you already have a brute fact of M, and [Phi] doesn't play any role in that brute fact, so you might as well eliminate it (otherwise you have another brute fact of an extraneous [Phi] that exists but has no causal efficacy--it just dangles "out there").

Or perhaps that it's best to avoid Tarski in such matters. As I pointed out earlier, I can only see the benefits of his logic when we're trying to relate an already known metalanguage to an object language. What we appear to be doing here is defining the metalanguage itself.

Well, that's the point. The platonic world (e.g., a wavefunction) in someway is needed for M to exist, but we need an answer to why there exists this platonic world. Without that answer, we might as well just say M alone exists. What the platonic world does is give us the ability to reduce the Universe further to some fundamental fact that cannot but be true because the lack of that concept involves the concept. In this way, we can answer the age old question, "Why is there something instead of nothing?" The answer is that something is required to exist because of this metalanguage. If we ask why is there a metalanguage, then we reach our fundamental fact which we know cannot but be true.

No harvey, I don't buy that. The only thing you seem to be prepared to accept as a 'fundamental fact' is God.

Since this requires Tarskian realism--especially of the satisfaction relation--we ought to commit to theism since this is the only explanation which gives a rational answer to the universe. Since we ought to be committed to a rationalist approach, we can accept theism as a necessary perspective. Hence, we are led to strong theism.

Harvey, forget the word 'God' and look at what you have defined. You have defined a means by which the universe comes into being which, you claim, begs no further questioning. Remove from that the idea of personality, the idea of personal interaction in our own universe, the idea of divine judgement, the idea of answering prayers, the idea of floods, miracles and whatever .... what are you left with? You're left with a set of principles that you have justified to your satisfaction by your logic that can be responsible for Creation. But is that God?

[QED]

Harvey, forget the word 'God' and look at what you have defined. You have defined a means by which the universe comes into being which, you claim, begs no further questioning. Remove from that the idea of personality, the idea of personal interaction in our own universe, the idea of divine judgement, the idea of answering prayers, the idea of floods, miracles and whatever .... what are you left with? You're left with a set of principles that you have justified to your satisfaction by your logic that can be responsible for Creation. But is that God?

Been there, tried that. In all fairness, Harvey has written that he does not believe in a "Personal" God. We agree that this is the only realistic view to take given the overwhelming amount of suffering that is manifest in the world. There are however other things that Harvey will explain as being the product of a universal conscience -- judgment and susceptibility to petition. These things seem hopelessly remote from any form of verification so it seems that we are left with the familiar measure of faith. However, the idea that we migth have arrived at Pantheism at this point seems odd judging by this particular Pantheist Credo. I'm probably missing something embarrassingly obvious!

[harvey1]

In all fairness, Harvey has written that he does not believe in a "Personal" God.

Just as a matter of clarification, I have quoted Augustine in saying that God is not a person in any traditional sense. That is, in my view, God does not carry on linear thoughts in time like a person, rather God has Thoughts that interact with our universe. Those thoughts can answer prayers and even relate to us personally in ways that no human could possibly do, so in that sense God is personal. This shouldn't be confused with the notion that God is sitting around watching events on earth and doing nothing while people are experiencing severe pain.

[harvey1]

Replacing a satisfaction relation (God) with a platonic metaspace doesn't work, because as I said, you need a satisfaction relation to have a (causally efficacious) platonic metaspace.

Yes it does work. One is simply replacing God with a set of principles which exist in the same timeless metaspace in which you suggest God exists. The only difference is that a set of principles doesn't purport to be a 'personality'.

I think that the term "God" is confusing things a bit since what I'm talking about in this instance is a satisfaction relation. If you don't have a satisfaction relation, then all that is left is Humean causation where there's just a brute fact constant conjunction between cause and effect. Going back to [Phi], the worlds, M, are not to be seen as satisfying the [Phi] structure, rather M and [Phi] are only associated with each other as a brute fact. What Tarski did with his satisfaction relation was to reduce truth from a brute fact to a satisfaction relation that could be further reduced. So, if M satisfies [Phi], that is to say that there is some components (i.e., baby universes) in M that collectively satisfy the equation [Phi]. In your version of the Universe that does not contain a satisfaction relation (but contains platonic structures), there would be an infinite number of mathematical truths (i.e., platonic structures), but they are all ad hoc in their relation to the World. In my version of the Universe, all of these mathematical structures are reducible to a basic principle, and this basic principle cannot but be true because there is no possible alternative that exists where this basic principle is not true.

God is defined in such a way as to be able to initiate a universe: any 'something' can be defined in exactly the same way, using the same logic. The difference is that the 'something' does not necessarily have all the other attributes assigned to a personal God; the 'something' exists to initiate a universe which then evolves as a closed system.

The satisfaction relation is defined so that you can have a complex meta-logic for the Universe but is all reducible to just one fact--a fact that cannot but be true. I don't think any "something" can be defined to do this unless it were Tarksi's satisfaction principle.

Furthermore, the 'something' may possibly tie in with what we already know about such things as quantum gravity and the probability aspects of QM, making it all the more elegant.

I'm not following you. Any and all equations of physics that are said to be causally efficacious (i.e., the laws cause something to happen) are utilizing the satisfaction relation. For example, every physics equation has the following format: S(a, G): state space "a" (probablistically) satisfies equation "G," therefore "a" is what it is because "G" obtains.

Replace God with a set of principles that require as much explanation as God does. If that doesn't work, then God doesn't work. You can demand no more explanation about them than you can for God. The difference is that we could be led to this set of principles from what we learn about our own universe. Of course we may never be able to probe metaspaces and such or even place it on any viable theoretical basis, in which case the idea must be abandoned.

But, you are using satisfaction as a way of showing why state space "a" is what it is because principle G exists. If you wish to use Humean causation to do away with the satisfaction relation, then you have no need of the platonic structures (as Hume himself had no need of platonic structures). That's because there's an ad hoc relation between "a" and "G," and therefore "G" doesn't actually bring about "a." "a" exists in its own right and "G" has no causal effect on "a." So, "G" can be dismissed as a mental heuristic useful for calculations but having no intrinsic reality (i.e., nominalism). So, why succumb to platonism in that case?

Well I'm afraid I'll disappoint you a bit more. I am agnostic but I will say that I greatly favour the atheistic explanation of creation in the long run.

Noooo!!! (Just kidding. )

If we ask why is there a metalanguage, then we reach our fundamental fact which we know cannot but be true.

No harvey, I don't buy that. The only thing you seem to be prepared to accept as a 'fundamental fact' is God.

I accept God as a fundamental fact because that is what satisfaction is. I don't see a way around this fundamental fact, so why put my head in the sand and try to act like God doesn't exist?

...forget the word 'God' and look at what you have defined. You have defined a means by which the universe comes into being which, you claim, begs no further questioning. Remove from that the idea of personality, the idea of personal interaction in our own universe, the idea of divine judgement, the idea of answering prayers, the idea of floods, miracles and whatever .... what are you left with? You're left with a set of principles that you have justified to your satisfaction by your logic that can be responsible for Creation. But is that God?

I think so. Satisfaction doesn't just apply to [Phi], but it would apply to everything that exists as a result of [Phi] (assuming [Phi] is the physical reason for our universe). Therefore, just being mental beings we have thoughts and these thoughts would be comprehended by this satisfaction relation of the Universe. If the satisfaction relation is intent on satisfying structures that are true (i.e., structures having the splendor of truth namely beauty), then events which make for a meaningless (ugly) world would only have a temporary existence. Structures that are inherently beautiful, would be saved in an eternal storage as structures that are true (i.e., satisfied or judged). God's judgments must be true, and therefore I would conclude that the path of the universe will ultimately result in a Judgment Day of sorts.

[QED]

I feel the need to remind us once more that satisfaction is a concept that applies to both physical (mechanical) and mental constructs.

[harvey1]

I feel the need to remind us once more that satisfaction is a concept that applies to both physical (mechanical) and mental constructs.

What do you mean?

[HughDP]

I think that the term "God" is confusing things a bit since what I'm talking about in this instance is a satisfaction relation. If you don't have a satisfaction relation, then all that is left is Humean causation where there's just a brute fact constant conjunction between cause and effect. Going back to [Phi], the worlds, M, are not to be seen as satisfying the [Phi] structure, rather M and [Phi] are only associated with each other as a brute fact. What Tarski did with his satisfaction relation was to reduce truth from a brute fact to a satisfaction relation that could be further reduced. So, if M satisfies [Phi], that is to say that there is some components (i.e., baby universes) in M that collectively satisfy the equation [Phi]. In your version of the Universe that does not contain a satisfaction relation (but contains platonic structures), there would be an infinite number of mathematical truths (i.e., platonic structures), but they are all ad hoc in their relation to the World.

Harvey, I haven't a clue how this is relevant. As I've said, I have no faith in Tarskian constructs in relation to events such as the ones we're discussing and I see no precedent for their use in relation to either the philosophy or the science surrounding creation. I do not believe they can determine truth because we cannot know at the outset what is true on the 'meta' side of the Tarskian constructs. If we knew that, we could then find out what is true on the 'object' side. But we don't know the truths on the 'meta' side - those are what we're actually trying to establish.

What we are looking for, as I see it, is an uncaused cause. A way to avoid an infinite regress of causes. Therefore - assuming this universe is caused - we're looking for a timeless, metauniversal principle which allows this universe to begin.

I favour something along the lines of the observer-independant universal wavefunction and the probabilities of it spawning a 4D spacetime such as the one we see in our universe. But I really don't know. These are just hypotheses I've read from physicists that sound reasonable to me because they're based on ideas that already seem to work in the quantum world. They are different though, not least because they have to have some way to operate in metaspace.

But that's the physics. The philosophy surrounds the nature of how and where these 'principles' exist.

What I suggested to you was that these principles simply replace God. God is these principles. I'm placing these 'principles' - or 'characteristics' if you prefer - on the same footing as God and endowing them with the same powers of creation.

If you want to make it simpler still, ignore the wavefunction ideas - maybe I'm setting myself at a disadvantage by looking for explanations of these principles in the first place; maybe I should just give up with that line. Imagine instead a direct swap out of the word God in your own theories and change it to the word 'principles' and we'll take it from there. The resulting task would be to decide whether or not these principles constitute God.

So far these principles have one task: to somehow allow for the creation of a 4D spacetime. By Occam's Razor that's all they should have to do as the universe, once created, can then evolve on its own.

As I see it, a set of principles that allows for creation and only for creation does not constitute God unless we class that as (very) weak pantheism.

I accept God as a fundamental fact because that is what satisfaction is. I don't see a way around this fundamental fact, so why put my head in the sand and try to act like God doesn't exist?

Quite. If God is a set of principles which allow for creation!

I think so. Satisfaction doesn't just apply to [Phi], but it would apply to everything that exists as a result of [Phi] (assuming [Phi] is the physical reason for our universe). Therefore, just being mental beings we have thoughts and these thoughts would be comprehended by this satisfaction relation of the Universe. If the satisfaction relation is intent on satisfying structures that are true (i.e., structures having the splendor of truth namely beauty), then events which make for a meaningless (ugly) world would only have a temporary existence. Structures that are inherently beautiful, would be saved in an eternal storage as structures that are true (i.e., satisfied or judged). God's judgments must be true, and therefore I would conclude that the path of the universe will ultimately result in a Judgment Day of sorts.

Hmm. Well I guess this is where we'll have to head if we want to prove these principles are in fact God. Personally I see the universe as a closed system that, once instigated, can continue without any outside influence. Then again I would though, wouldn't I? If I agreed with you there'd be no fun to be had at all!

[harvey1]

Harvey, I haven't a clue how this is relevant. As I've said, I have no faith in Tarskian constructs in relation to events such as the ones we're discussing and I see no precedent for their use in relation to either the philosophy or the science surrounding creation. I do not believe they can determine truth because we cannot know at the outset what is true on the 'meta' side of the Tarskian constructs.

But, we in fact do know that the Tarskian construct is true. Let me give you an example:

"a satisfies F if and only if: there is a satisfaction relation S such that S(a,F)"

a: non-metric topological state of the Universe (i.e., nothing)

F: "there is nothing"

Hence: the non-metric topological state of the Universe satisfies "there is nothing" if and only if: there is a satisfaction relation S such that S(nothing, "nothing")

Note: This above condition is true: This condition obtains

Now, let's assume that Tarskian construct is false:

a does not satisfy F

a: non-metric topological state of the Universe (i.e., nothing)

F: "there is nothing"

Hence: the non-metric topological state of the Universe does not satisfy "there is nothing"

Note: This condition is false: This condition does not obtain

In this second example, I assumed the Tarskian construct is false, but the conclusion is false because the condition does obtain. So, there is no way possible for the Tarskian construct to be false. It must be true because the falsity of "a satisfying F" requires that "a satisfy F."

Based on this fact, there are many other facts that are based on this fact obtaining. Whola! We have our metalanguage existing for all true statements that can possibly exist, and all we started with was nothing at all.

If we knew that, we could then find out what is true on the 'object' side. But we don't know the truths on the 'meta' side - those are what we're actually trying to establish.

As you can see, we establish those truths on the "meta" side by coming across a statement that cannot be false (e.g., "there is nothing" iff there is nothing)

What we are looking for, as I see it, is an uncaused cause. A way to avoid an infinite regress of causes. Therefore - assuming this universe is caused - we're looking for a timeless, metauniversal principle which allows this universe to begin.

The principle cannot be contingent, since if it were contingent then it is necessary that the principle is contingent, and that would be a necessary fact. (i.e., necessary(contingent principle). I suppose we could say that the if the principle were contingent, then it is a contingent fact that the principle is contingent, but this sets up another infinite regress since we now have necessary(continginent(contingent principle)). The infinite regress is avoidable by the method that I demonstrated which is that the "lack of the structure" deduces to there being the structure which we tried to do without (namely, ~"a satisfies F" -> "a satisfies F")

I favour something along the lines of the observer-independant universal wavefunction and the probabilities of it spawning a 4D spacetime such as the one we see in our universe. But I really don't know. These are just hypotheses I've read from physicists that sound reasonable to me because they're based on ideas that already seem to work in the quantum world. They are different though, not least because they have to have some way to operate in metaspace.

As I mentioned in my last post, the physical Universe M satisfies principle F, and therefore you aren't getting rid of a Tarskian notion of satisfaction. The only way to get rid of it is if you used a Humean notion of causation, which is that there exists M and it just so happens there exists F. However, if there exists M, then why is it relevant that there exists F? Hume would say that F does not necessitate M, but that is contrary to the platonic notion that you want us to accept, namely that a principle does necessitate the Universe M. Since the Humean notion doesn't work for a platonic notion, there's no reason to advocate a platonist notion. This leaves you with a Tarskian notion where the Universe satisfies a F-ness requirement.

What I suggested to you was that these principles simply replace God. God is these principles. I'm placing these 'principles' - or 'characteristics' if you prefer - on the same footing as God and endowing them with the same powers of creation.

Yes, I understand that. Your principles=F. F does not remove the satisfaction relation. Only Humean causation can remove the satisfaction relation, and if you do that, as I explained, there is no reason to introduce F. All you need is M. But, in that case, M is of mystical origin and there is no cause for M. It's irrational, and therefore we ought to reject this concept on justified epistemological grounds.

If you want to make it simpler still, ignore the wavefunction ideas - maybe I'm setting myself at a disadvantage by looking for explanations of these principles in the first place; maybe I should just give up with that line. Imagine instead a direct swap out of the word God in your own theories and change it to the word 'principles' and we'll take it from there. The resulting task would be to decide whether or not these principles constitute God.

I think what's confusing is that I'm not saying F=God. I'm saying that the satisfaction relation is God. Principles (i.e., a proposition) can't act in the place of a satisfaction relation since propositions/principles (F) themselves must relate to worlds (M). The way they relate is through this satisfaction relation. You need a relation. That relation either has to be Humean (i.e., a constant conjunction), or a Tarskian satisfaction relation (i.e., necessity). Since you using principles to establish necessity, you have elected to use a Tarskian satisfaction relation. Hence, your use of principles refers to God in every circumstance where you show that principles necessitate a universe (or probablistically necessitate a universe).

So far these principles have one task: to somehow allow for the creation of a 4D spacetime. By Occam's Razor that's all they should have to do as the universe, once created, can then evolve on its own.

Here is your demonstrated use of necessitation. That's why I say you are using the satisfaction relation in your argument as "God=dumb principles." If you use satisfaction, then you are using a term that involves semantics (i.e., cognition). Hence, God.

Well I guess this is where we'll have to head if we want to prove these principles are in fact God.

It doesn't matter if the principles are simple or complex, it's the satisfaction relation that entails God.

Personally I see the universe as a closed system that, once instigated, can continue without any outside influence. Then again I would though, wouldn't I? If I agreed with you there'd be no fun to be had at all!

Well, I'm not expecting us to agree, but it would be rather disappointing if we didn't at least "test the waters" of our views to their natural limits. The universe can't be a closed system if it is a causal effect of some principle. The causal efficacy of a outside principle on the universe makes the universe an open system. That is, if the principle were contingent (let's just say hypothetically), then it could contingently be something different tomorrow. In that case, there would be ramifications on the universe since the principle which sustained the universe has changed, and therefore this causal dependency would naturally affect the universe.

In my view, since God satisfies the laws that cause the universe to operate as it does, God is a sustainer of the universe. If God satisfied differently laws, then our universe would be immediately changed since our universe is no longer operating with the same laws as before.