Subjective Morality

[The Tanager]

I started this post out of another discussion with Divine Insight. DI has made some arguments for morality being subjective. I'm still trying to get the terminology straight.

If morality is not absolute, then it can only be subjective. A matter of opinion.

We need to get our terms straight when talking about our human morality. I agree with you concerning 'subjective' being a matter of opinion. Objective, then, would mean not being a matter of opinion. Just like the shape of the earth is not a matter of opinion. X is good or bad for everyone.

Absolute vs. situational is a sub-issue concerning objectivism. The absolutist would say X is good or bad for everyone (and thus objectivism) no matter the situation. The situationalist would say X is good or bad for everyone but qualified by the situation.

In this phrasing, morality can be objectivist without being absolute. Now, I don't care if these are the terms we agree upon or not, but there must be some term for each concept I've presented. If you want to use "absolute" for "objective" above, that's fine. But you've got to tell me what two terms you want to use for what I termed the "absolute vs. situational" sub-issue.

[William]

[Replying to post 110]

Bust Nak: I was equating them

William: Okay. Thanks for clarifying that for me Bust Nak.

[The Tanager]

So I argue that morality as a human subjective construct is actually the very same thing as subjectivism. So while you would like to imagine a philosophical distinction, I claim that in reality there can be no such meaningful distinction.

I used the phrase (a) "human subjective opinions concerning 'moral' issues," which is different than (b) "morality as a human subjective construct" (which I agree is subjectivism), different not only in wording but also in concept. In the same way, (a) "human subjective opinions concerning the shape of the earth" is different than (b) "the shape of the earth as a human subjective construct." You have seemed to argue (not in these exact words) that (a) is evidence for (b). I don't see why. If it is not, then there is no evidence for subjectivism or objectivism at this point, although I do believe the universal human intuition that morality is an objective kind of thing should push one from agnosticism to objectivism until a defeater (possibly atheism) came along.

But now you're cheating yourself.

You are appealing to a "physical reality" as an argument for objective morality that has no physical reality.

In other words, you are fully accepting that the earth physically exists. And then trying to argue that this would then force subjectivism to become "physical subjectivism" (Your phrase from your quote above).

But how is that argument supposed to work? You're pointing to a physical earth in an attempt to make a case for a physical objective morality that you cannot point to.

...

I am not arguing for an objective shape of the earth (or objective morality) in the particular thoughts you are responding to here. By itself, my critique would be an argument for agnosticism. I am using something we both know is an objective fact (from scientific-based reasoning not offered) to show the bankruptcy of the principle you are using to argue that subjectivism has evidence behind it. That principle is faulty.

Also, you talk about human intuition against the Holocaust. But apparently all humans were convinced that it was wrong. Have you forgotten about the fact that the Holocaust itself was carried out by humans? Why would those humans have carried out such deeds if they intuitively felt that what they were doing was wrong?

I am not saying the universal human intuition is that the Holocaust was wrong. I'm saying that people on both sides of moral issues have the initial intuition that they are right (about a multitude of the moral issues one could talk about), rather than the intuition that they are doing something akin to stating what ice cream flavor they like.

Sure it does. What you are claiming is that there exists a consistent objective morality that all humans are born to intuitively know. That would absolutely require that an objective morality exists. How else would it make any sense?

I did not claim that. I claimed that humans have the intuition that their subjective opinions pick out objective truths.

Human outrage over seeing other humans harmed is fully explained via subjective empathy. All the human is doing is imagining what it would subjectively feel like to be in the victim's place. That's enough to spark subjective rage toward the perpetrator.

No objective morality required.

I'm not saying that if subjectivism is true, then people could not feel outrage on something like this. I'm also not saying a subjectivist can't feel outrage, I'm saying it is inconsistent with their belief. To feel that "I'd hate to be in that situation" and to say that "therefore, no one should do it to another" are two different things. Subjectivism is consistent with the first statement, but not the second.

I take the position that we don't even need the category of "morality" that category itself is a human subjective construct.

You might argue, "But wait! Are you suggesting that humans shouldn't consider what might be right or wrong?"

No, not at all. I would suggest the first thing we need to do is trash the term 'morality' and start using a more secular term like 'ethics'.

Why? Because the very term 'morality' has already been crucified and nailed to the cross of the Bible.

I could not care less about the terms used, as long as the concepts are understood.

If we're talking about 'ethics' and someone brings up a topic like polygamy, it's far easier to ask, "Why should that even be an ethical question?". And then people would need to start coming up with reasons why they feel that polygamy should be considered to be unethical.

I do not know what you mean here. What kind of question do you think it is, if not an ethical one? I'm not arguing that it is unethical, I'm just wondering how saying that there is nothing wrong with it is not also giving an answer to an ethical question.

You have already suggested that all humans are born with the same moral intuitions. But why should that be the case if there is no "designer" of humans?

Assuming you get the point about what moral intuition I'm talking about, I would say that if there is no designer, then we should expect more people who initially intuit, and act consistently with, morality being subjective. I don't think we have that. I don't think that's a proof against subjectivism being true but, all else being equal, makes objectivism more plausible than subjectivism. As I've already said, if atheism is true, then I think subjectivism is the most plausible position to take.

So since human subjective opinions are all we have to work with why not create an ethical system based on that?

It's not going to be perfect, and it can never be objective. But it can be based as much as possible are practical arguments. That's the best we can do.

It will come down to who has the majority of power and will be justified by argument (and not necessarily sound ones). All one can do is hope that those in power agree with you or, at the least, leave you well enough alone.

[The Tanager]

Because these things are morally wrong, i.e. contrary to a subjectivist's personal taste.

There's some ice cream tastes out there, I imagine, that are contrary to your personal taste. If not, change the food item. Are you saying that those people are morally wrong? They are contrary to your personal taste. If you think they are morally wrong, then why do you look at the abusive priest differently than you look at the one who loves that disgusting ice cream flavor (or other food item)?

[Bust Nak]

There's some ice cream tastes out there, I imagine, that are contrary to your personal taste. If not, change the food item. Are you saying that those people are morally wrong? They are contrary to your personal taste.

Perhaps we can coin a new term along the lines of "tastefully wrong?"

If you think they are morally wrong, then why do you look at the abusive priest differently than you look at the one who loves that disgusting ice cream flavor (or other food item)?

Because they are different topics. i.e the same reason why I look at those who loves disgusting ice cream flavors differently to how I look at said disgusting ice cream.

Food taste is about how I feel about the food, not the people of eat them.
Morality is about how I feel about people's behavior, not the people who do them.
Incidentally, I also greatly dislike immoral people, which is about how I feel about people.

[Divine Insight]

I used the phrase (a) "human subjective opinions concerning 'moral' issues," which is different than (b) "morality as a human subjective construct" (which I agree is subjectivism), different not only in wording but also in concept.

I don't accept that these are different concepts. I hold that (b) cannot exist without (a), and that (a) automatically gives rise to the existence of (b).

I see any technical semantic differences here basically be meaningless. You can obviously argue that by definition (a) is just defined as the opinions while (b) is a broader view that classifies those opinions into a meaningful system of morality. But I would argue that these differences are nothing more than semantic differences that humans create in an effort to try to categorize and clarify what they are trying to describe. But the bottom line is that (b) could not exist without (a), and the mere existence of (a) gives rise to (b).

So trying to argue that these represent two independent concepts seems to me to be an attempt to split hairs that won't even produce any meaningful results. (b) will forever be completely dependent on the existence of (a), and the mere existence of (a) necessarily gives rise to the existence of (b).

So I don't see where anything could be gained by trying to split these concepts into two different concepts that aren't clearly interdependent.

In the same way, (a) "human subjective opinions concerning the shape of the earth" is different than (b) "the shape of the earth as a human subjective construct.

You begin your above statement with "In the same way," but then proceed to describe a situation that isn't even remotely the same.

The Earth is a physical body in our physical world. Therefore why would anyone claim that (b) should be true in this case?

In this case we can observe and determine the shape of the earth independent of human subjective opinions. But this can't be done with morality. So there is no comparison here. You words, "In the same way" simply do not apply. There is nothing remotely the same between concepts of morality and the shape of the earth.

" You have seemed to argue (not in these exact words) that (a) is evidence for (b). I don't see why.

Because in the case of human concepts of morality all that has ever been observed is (a). And (a) gives rise to (b). So if (a) exists (and we know that it does), then it should come as no surprise that (b) also necessarily exists.

Therefore (a) is evidence for (b). And (b) is nothing other than the recognition that (a) exists.

If it is not, then there is no evidence for subjectivism or objectivism at this point, although I do believe the universal human intuition that morality is an objective kind of thing should push one from agnosticism to objectivism until a defeater (possibly atheism) came along.

As far as I'm concerned morality as human subjectivism has been well established to exist. There can be no question that it exists.

Whether there might also exist some other external moral objectivism is yet to be determined. Thus far we have seen no indication of the existence of such a thing.

You continue to bring up an ideal of "universal human moral intuition", but I have seen no evidence produced to support this ideal. To the contrary, the real world pretty much confirms that humans do not share a universal moral intuition as they cannot agree on many question of morality. In fact, they can't even agree on which questions should be considered to be moral questions in the first place.

So I see no objective evidence for any "universal human moral intuition". For you to continue to claim that such a thing exists when you haven't shown any evidence to support the ideal isn't going to be very compelling.

I am not arguing for an objective shape of the earth (or objective morality) in the particular thoughts you are responding to here. By itself, my critique would be an argument for agnosticism. I am using something we both know is an objective fact (from scientific-based reasoning not offered) to show the bankruptcy of the principle you are using to argue that subjectivism has evidence behind it. That principle is faulty.

I disagree.

Especially considering the clarity I've just made in this post thus far.

You claim that moral subejctivism is something other than human subjective moral opinions.

Please give your definition for moral subjectism that does not contain a reference to moral subjective opinions.

I claim that these concepts cannot be meaningfully separated and that they are ultimately one in the same thing. (a) give rise to (b) and (b) cannot even exist without (a). Therefore to try to claim that they are two independent concepts is nonsense. (i.e. it makes no sense)

I am not saying the universal human intuition is that the Holocaust was wrong. I'm saying that people on both sides of moral issues have the initial intuition that they are right (about a multitude of the moral issues one could talk about), rather than the intuition that they are doing something akin to stating what ice cream flavor they like.

I don't see where this helps your argument for a universal human moral intuition.

All you've basically suggested here is that all humans intuitively feel that their moral opinions are right. That does not constitute universal human moral intuition

All it says is that humans tend to feel intuitively right about their moral opinions. But it doesn't suggest that human moral intuition is universal.

So this doesn't support a claim of universal human moral intuition.

Sure it does. What you are claiming is that there exists a consistent objective morality that all humans are born to intuitively know. That would absolutely require that an objective morality exists. How else would it make any sense?

I did not claim that. I claimed that humans have the intuition that their subjective opinions pick out objective truths.

To begin with not all humans have that intuition. Many secularists are more than happy to explain to you that they actually think about moral questions and decide moral issues based on what they believe to be rational reasoning. Not based on emotional intuition.

So right off the bat you aren't even talking about a universal human behavior.

And besides, even if all humans allowed their intuitive emotions to drive their opinions on morality it still wouldn't follow that they all have universal moral intuitions.

So if you are no longer arguing for a universal moral intuition, then why not just say so?

Human outrage over seeing other humans harmed is fully explained via subjective empathy. All the human is doing is imagining what it would subjectively feel like to be in the victim's place. That's enough to spark subjective rage toward the perpetrator.

No objective morality required.

I'm not saying that if subjectivism is true, then people could not feel outrage on something like this. I'm also not saying a subjectivist can't feel outrage, I'm saying it is inconsistent with their belief. To feel that "I'd hate to be in that situation" and to say that "therefore, no one should do it to another" are two different things. Subjectivism is consistent with the first statement, but not the second.

I disagree. Seeing someone else being hurt and imagining how that would feel like if you were in their position is fully explained from a subjective perspective. No need to conjure up any imaginary objective concept to explain this.

Having said this we do know of humans who have brain wiring that cause them to be incapable of feeling empathy for others. So one could argue that if there is any objective cause of empathy it would be associated with the wiring of the brain.

But this then becomes an extreme problem for moral objectivists because they would then need to explain why objective morality allows some humans to be born with defective brains.

So this isn't going to help a case for moral objectivism anyway.

I could not care less about the terms used, as long as the concepts are understood.

Agreed! At least we're both on that same page with this.

If we're talking about 'ethics' and someone brings up a topic like polygamy, it's far easier to ask, "Why should that even be an ethical question?". And then people would need to start coming up with reasons why they feel that polygamy should be considered to be unethical.

I do not know what you mean here. What kind of question do you think it is, if not an ethical one? I'm not arguing that it is unethical, I'm just wondering how saying that there is nothing wrong with it is not also giving an answer to an ethical question.

Think of flavored ice cream again. If we say that there is nothing ethically wrong with eating pistachio ice cream are we then saying that it's ethically good to eat pistachio ice cream?

Typically we don't think that way. We simply acknowledge that choosing a flavor of ice simply isn't an ethical question at all.

Why should a question about polygamy be any different? Instead of having to decide whether it's ethically right or ethically wrong, why not just say that it's not an ethical question at all?

Why do some people (mostly theists) have to judge every little thing?

This is the whole problem with the very concept of morality, IMHO.

The very concept of morality causes us to want to judge every little thing as being either good or bad.

It's a concept that is not only useless, but actually it's quite invasive and causes people to want to judge the actions of others in everything they do.

Especially a concept of "objective morality" and even worse when people think they have God on their side because they intuitively feel that God is on their side.

That causes things to become extremely emotional an political which is exactly where we find ourselves today.

Assuming you get the point about what moral intuition I'm talking about, I would say that if there is no designer, then we should expect more people who initially intuit, and act consistently with, morality being subjective. I don't think we have that. I don't think that's a proof against subjectivism being true but, all else being equal, makes objectivism more plausible than subjectivism. As I've already said, if atheism is true, then I think subjectivism is the most plausible position to take.

Given the religious history of humans what else would you expect?

I don't see this as being anything more than the product of human superstitions over centuries. Of course there are going to be more humans going along with religions that have dominated the world.

That's a given. Trying to point to that as any sort of indication of objective morality doesn't work. Especially considering that even religious people have fought Holy Wars against each other, each side intuitively believing that God was on their side (i.e. objective morality was on their side).

If anything I think we should learn from history that this idea of objective morality most certainly isn't the truth of reality.

So since human subjective opinions are all we have to work with why not create an ethical system based on that?

It's not going to be perfect, and it can never be objective. But it can be based as much as possible are practical arguments. That's the best we can do.

It will come down to who has the majority of power and will be justified by argument (and not necessarily sound ones). All one can do is hope that those in power agree with you or, at the least, leave you well enough alone.

I completely and wholeheartedly agree.

Unfortunately that appears to be the reality we're living in.

Would I prefer that there existed an absolute perfect objective morality that ruled the world.

Absolutely!

The problem is that we simply don't see it. There is no evidence that such a thing exists.

Even if you could convince us that such a thing exists what good would that do if you can't also produce it with crystal clarity and without ambiguity?

You certainly don't want to be pointing to any Holy Books. Look at all the horrible things that were done in the name of the Bible. We certainly don't want the Bible to be dictating our morality.

The Bible has been used to condone slavery.,
The Bible has been used to burn innocent people to death at the stake as witches.
The Bible has been used to condemn and in some cases kill gay people.
Some have even argued that the Bible could actually be used to condone the Holocaust.

So where are we going to find this objective morality even if it did exist?

That's a problem in and of itself.

Proving that objective morality exists would be one thing. Producing precisely what it has to say without antiquity would be an entirely different issue. What good is an objective morality if no one knows what it has to say about anything?

You've got your road cut out for yourself.

Not only would you need to make a case for objective morality, but even if you managed to succeed in doing that, you would have nothing if you can't also produce this objective morality in precise detail without ambiguity.

How in the world could you ever hope to do that?

As I will continue to say, if such a thing as objective morality exists, just point to it, and we'll take a look at what it has to say.

And if you can't point to it, then where is there any compelling arguments that it even exists?

[The Tanager]

Because they are different topics. i.e the same reason why I look at those who loves disgusting ice cream flavors differently to how I look at said disgusting ice cream.

Food taste is about how I feel about the food, not the people of eat them.
Morality is about how I feel about people's behavior, not the people who do them.
Incidentally, I also greatly dislike immoral people, which is about how I feel about people.

I'm not sure that I caught your point. Yes, they are different topics, but so are favorite activities, favorite sport teams, etc. It seems that you are treating non-moral preferences in the same way, while treating moral preferences in a completely different way. I'm asking about the special treatment of moral preferences. And so, I'm not sure that last part is incidental at all. Why the difference in how you look at people when they are tastefully wrong on matters of morality versus matters of food taste, hobbies, sports teams, genre of literature, etc.?

[The Tanager]

I don't accept that these are different concepts. I hold that (b) cannot exist without (a), and that (a) automatically gives rise to the existence of (b).

I see any technical semantic differences here basically be meaningless. You can obviously argue that by definition (a) is just defined as the opinions while (b) is a broader view that classifies those opinions into a meaningful system of morality. But I would argue that these differences are nothing more than semantic differences that humans create in an effort to try to categorize and clarify what they are trying to describe. But the bottom line is that (b) could not exist without (a), and the mere existence of (a) gives rise to (b).

So trying to argue that these represent two independent concepts seems to me to be an attempt to split hairs that won't even produce any meaningful results. (b) will forever be completely dependent on the existence of (a), and the mere existence of (a) necessarily gives rise to the existence of (b).

So I don't see where anything could be gained by trying to split these concepts into two different concepts that aren't clearly interdependent.

I agree that (b) cannot exist without (a), but I'm questioning whether (a) automatically gives rise to the existence of (b). The arguing you have presented above is just assertion with no reasoning.

You begin your above statement with "In the same way," but then proceed to describe a situation that isn't even remotely the same.

The Earth is a physical body in our physical world. Therefore why would anyone claim that (b) should be true in this case?

In this case we can observe and determine the shape of the earth independent of human subjective opinions. But this can't be done with morality. So there is no comparison here. You words, "In the same way" simply do not apply. There is nothing remotely the same between concepts of morality and the shape of the earth.

So, you agree that (a) does not give rise to (b) when talking about physical things. Therefore, we know the principle does not always apply. Can you give any positive support for the principle ever applying? You have acted as though the principle is a given with morality, but have provided no rational support for that position.

You continue to bring up an ideal of "universal human moral intuition", but I have seen no evidence produced to support this ideal. To the contrary, the real world pretty much confirms that humans do not share a universal moral intuition as they cannot agree on many question of morality. In fact, they can't even agree on which questions should be considered to be moral questions in the first place.

You continue to miss what I mean there. I'm not talking about applied ethical issues like abortion, slavery, etc. I'm not talking about whether things like getting enough sleep is an ethical question or not. I'm ONLY talking about the initial intuitions that we are right about our ethical judgments.

I don't see where this helps your argument for a universal human moral intuition.

All you've basically suggested here is that all humans intuitively feel that their moral opinions are right. That does not constitute universal human moral intuition.

Because you think I'm arguing for something I haven't been. In post 58 I laid out my positive claims for the first time. This is the part of that post that concerns us here:

"To me, we would be left in agnosticism in our question if it weren't for our common human intuitions about morality. As I observe humankind I think it is natural for humans to think and act as though morality is not a human social construct. We act differently towards child torturers than we do those countries that drive on the other side of the road from us. People have to overcome those natural intuitions to become a consistent subjectivist."

I talk about our common intuitions and then give the specific intuition I'm talking about here, namely, that we treat moral opinions different than other kinds of preferences. We don't treat morality as a social construct.

You then first termed this "universal human moral intuition" in post 63 and misunderstood that I was talking about one specific case of everyone agreeing child torture is wrong. My next post is 84, in which I try to clear what I meant up for you and I've continued the same refrain since then.

I'm suggesting that the simplest and most plausible answer, all else being equal, as to why all humans initially have that particular intuition is that it is true. Just like the simplest and most plausible answer to our trust in our physical senses is that they give us truth about the world. This should be our position until a defeater comes along to contradict the universal human intuition in those cases.

To begin with not all humans have that intuition. Many secularists are more than happy to explain to you that they actually think about moral questions and decide moral issues based on what they believe to be rational reasoning. Not based on emotional intuition.

I am NOT talking about people basing applied ethical beliefs on emotional intuition versus rational reasoning. I'm saying it is rational to trust our initial universal human intuitions (be it about the objectivity of morality or the reliability of our physical senses) until a rational defeater (be it atheism or scientific evidence that we are seeing a mirage) comes along to contradict that.

Given the religious history of humans what else would you expect?

I don't see this as being anything more than the product of human superstitions over centuries. Of course there are going to be more humans going along with religions that have dominated the world.

As I've already said, this happens in secular upbringings as well.

You claim that moral subejctivism is something other than human subjective moral opinions.

Please give your definition for moral subjectism that does not contain a reference to moral subjective opinions.

Asking one to give a definition that does not reference opinions at all completely misunderstands the issue. I have claimed that ethical subjectivism is the belief that there is no objective way to judge one ethical opinion as correct over another. This makes ethical subjectivism more than "human subjective moral opinions."

I'm not saying that if subjectivism is true, then people could not feel outrage on something like this. I'm also not saying a subjectivist can't feel outrage, I'm saying it is inconsistent with their belief. To feel that "I'd hate to be in that situation" and to say that "therefore, no one should do it to another" are two different things. Subjectivism is consistent with the first statement, but not the second.

I disagree. Seeing someone else being hurt and imagining how that would feel like if you were in their position is fully explained from a subjective perspective. No need to conjure up any imaginary objective concept to explain this.

Seeing someone else being hurt and imagining how it would feel if you were in their position are both different from the belief that "no one should harm another in that way." I'm saying that this third thing is inconsistent with subjectivism.

Having said this we do know of humans who have brain wiring that cause them to be incapable of feeling empathy for others. So one could argue that if there is any objective cause of empathy it would be associated with the wiring of the brain.

But this then becomes an extreme problem for moral objectivists because they would then need to explain why objective morality allows some humans to be born with defective brains.

So this isn't going to help a case for moral objectivism anyway.

Are defective eyes an extreme problem for the objectivity of sight? No. Again you are using a principle that is established to be faulty with no positive support for why it is not faulty in the case you want to apply it to.

Think of flavored ice cream again. If we say that there is nothing ethically wrong with eating pistachio ice cream are we then saying that it's ethically good to eat pistachio ice cream?

Typically we don't think that way. We simply acknowledge that choosing a flavor of ice simply isn't an ethical question at all.

But that is because you are talking about taste buds. If someone talks about the way the milk or pistachios are farmed, its effect on workers, the environment, or one's own body, it becomes an ethical question. At that point, both saying there is something ethically wrong with it and that there is nothing ethically wrong with eating it are giving answers to an ethical question as opposed to an aesthetic one.

[Bust Nak]

I'm not sure that I caught your point. Yes, they are different topics, but so are favorite activities, favorite sport teams, etc. It seems that you are treating non-moral preferences in the same way, while treating moral preferences in a completely different way.

I don't think I am and I don't see how I am supposed to be treating moral preferences any differently from sport teams preferences in any fundamental way. Any difference is superficial, it is the same difference between how I treat ice-cream taste differently to sports team taste, different to music taste.

What exactly is the special treatment of moral preferences you are seeing?

And so, I'm not sure that last part is incidental at all. Why the difference in how you look at people when they are tastefully wrong on matters of morality versus matters of food taste, hobbies, sports teams, genre of literature, etc.?

Are there any difference other than the degree of likes and dislikes?

[The Tanager]

I don't think I am and I don't see how I am supposed to be treating moral preferences any differently from sport teams preferences in any fundamental way. Any difference is superficial, it is the same difference between how I treat ice-cream taste differently to sports team taste, different to music taste.

What exactly is the special treatment of moral preferences you are seeing?

Perhaps I misunderstood what you previously said. When you hear of some unknown priest abusing some unknown child, what thoughts do you have?

(1) That priest ought not to abuse that child.
(2) I don't like being abused.
(3) I don't like the feeling I have when hearing about children being abused.
(4) I realize others like abusing children.
(5) There is something wrong with the priest.
(6) Others that I haven't listed.

[Bust Nak]

When you hear of some unknown priest abusing some unknown child, what thoughts do you have?

Pretty good list, I added a couple.

(1) That priest ought not to abuse that child.
(2) I don't like being abused.
(3) I don't like the feeling I have when hearing about children being abused.
(4) I realize others like abusing children.
(5) There is something wrong with the priest.
(6) I don't like the priest.
(7) The priest must be stopped.
(8) The priest must be punished.