Brain / Mind

[InReverse]

Here are some facts (the list should be longer but it can be extended if needed):
-Damage to certain brain areas causes predictable loss of function. There is list with types of agnosias here.
There are also documented cases of damage to functions such as memory formation.(H.M.)
-Split brain patients cannot verbally relate to information presented only to their right hemisphere, but can nonetheless react to it unconsciously. (ref)
-Certain substances alter the function of the brain (by known mechanisms) and also the state of consciousness (alcohol, drugs, anesthetics)

Question: "Is evidence from neuroscience sufficient for one to reject the mind-brain dualism?"
If not, how does one reconcile the facts above (and many others) with the separation between mind and brain. Also, how would you disprove "minds are what brains do".

[scourge99]

No. Flocking is not identical to a collection of birds. Flocking does require a collection of birds. But flocking describes a bunch of birds doing something that manifests as a behavior no individual bird possesses

Flocking is a word which describes the movement of multiple birds. Therefore it is identical to the movement of multiple birds. Consciousness is not identical to the movement of neurons in the brain, as I have demonstrated.

We are discussing emergence. Not whether something is identical. Something is or isn't emergent just because it uses the same verb (E. G., movement) as something else that's emergent. So your response is a non sequitur.

There are a few legitimate ways you can actually address what I've said:
1) challenge my claim that flocking qualifies as an emergent behavior.
2) challenge my claim that consciousness qualifies as an emergent property of brains.
3) challenge the very idea of emergence.

As far as i can tell you've done none of these. Rather, you seem to be confused with what emergence is because you continuous equate it to the term "identical". Which is not what emergence means.

If we cannot conceive of water without water molecules then how did people conceive of water before they learned of atomic theory and water molecules? How do children conceive of water?

Children are not conceiving water without water molecules.


Children might be conceiving water without conceiving water molecules.

The above two sentences are contradictory. Until you can resolve the contradiction your response is incoherent and can't be addressed.

Fine. Then we don't know the brain is sufficient to produce consciousness to the same extent we don't know that mass is sufficient for gravity.

I don't think the two are analogous. Gravity is just a description of observable movement of physical objects, while the mind is an entity with independent extraordinary properties. Your claim is that they are analogous, but you haven't showed it to be true.

I explained how they are analogous. As usual, you snip out parts of my responses where i explain and then make some dismissive remark without addressing what's actually been said.

So here it is again:
Why is it "sufficient" for our purposes to recognize the relationship between mass/gravitation by observation and testing but insufficient for our purposes to recognize the relationship between the brain/mind by observation and testing? This seems exactly like the special pleading i suspected.

According to your logic, we cannot say the brain/mind are related because we can conceive of the mind without a brain. Likewise, we can conceive of gravitation occurring without regard to mass so we cannot say mass and gravitation are related. So on what basis do you accept the relationship between gravitation and mass but not the relationship between brain and mind?

Also, keep in mind that YOU continously try to change the wording from "emergent" or "related" to "identical". I've explicitly stated that if something is "emergent" from something else it does NOT mean they are "identical". Emergent != identical. Trying to equate "identical" with "emergent" would be an equivocation fallacy.

[instantc]

There are a few legitimate ways you can actually address what I've said:
1) challenge my claim that flocking qualifies as an emergent behavior.
2) challenge my claim that consciousness qualifies as an emergent property of brains.
3) challenge the very idea of emergence.

I have been challenging (2), on the following grounds. Emergence is identical to its ingredients. For example, flocking is identical to the movement of multiple birds, water is identical to multiple water molecules etc. However, consciousness is not identical to brain activity and/or movement of neurons, as I have proved logically. Therefore consciousness is not an emergence of brain activity. Philosopher have been wrestling with this conceptual problem for ages and they still do, it cannot be escaped this easily. People who hold the reductionist view do so because of their preexisting narrow physicalist convictions.

If we cannot conceive of water without water molecules then how did people conceive of water before they learned of atomic theory and water molecules? How do children conceive of water?

Children are not conceiving water without water molecules.


Children might be conceiving water without conceiving water molecules.

The above two sentences are contradictory. Until you can resolve the contradiction your response is incoherent and can't be addressed.

No, they are two different things. Instead of trying to break it down to you, I'll just provide you a quotation from the following peer reviewed Oxford journal article, which criticizes Descartes' argument:

"Assume that I can conceive that the evening star exists without the morning star also existing. [Notice that this is not the same as my conceiving that the evening star exists without my conceiving that the morning star exists. Conceiving A without B is not the same as conceiving A without conceiving B"

http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/__data/a ... stance.pdf

[InReverse]

[Replying to post 1 by InReverse]
Are you speaking as though the entire mind were a product of the brain only or do you allow that certain higher functions such as abstract thinking and intuition exist independently?

Yes, I consider all that to be a product of the brain.

I know that by experiments we can affect the consciousness by altering brain activity. We also know that by damaging the brain we also damage the mind. These experiments show that the brain is a necessary physical condition for the mind. Is there any evidence to show that the brain is a sufficient condition for the mind?

It's interesting. Actually the brain is not a sufficient for the mind to exist (at a given time). Sleep is just one example. We cannot currently formulate a sufficiency condition for the mind.

[scourge99]

There are a few legitimate ways you can actually address what I've said:
1) challenge my claim that flocking qualifies as an emergent behavior.
2) challenge my claim that consciousness qualifies as an emergent property of brains.
3) challenge the very idea of emergence.

I have been challenging (2), on the following grounds. Emergence is identical to its ingredients. For example, flocking is identical to the movement of multiple birds, water is identical to multiple water molecules etc. However, consciousness is not identical to brain activity and/or movement of neurons, as I have proved logically. Therefore consciousness is not an emergence of brain activity. Philosopher have been wrestling with this conceptual problem for ages and they still do, it cannot be escaped this easily. People who hold the reductionist view do so because of their preexisting narrow physicalist convictions.

If we cannot conceive of water without water molecules then how did people conceive of water before they learned of atomic theory and water molecules? How do children conceive of water?

Children are not conceiving water without water molecules.


Children might be conceiving water without conceiving water molecules.

The above two sentences are contradictory. Until you can resolve the contradiction your response is incoherent and can't be addressed.

No, they are two different things. Instead of trying to break it down to you, I'll just provide you a quotation from the following peer reviewed Oxford journal article, which criticizes Descartes' argument:

"Assume that I can conceive that the evening star exists without the morning star also existing. [Notice that this is not the same as my conceiving that the evening star exists without my conceiving that the morning star exists. Conceiving A without B is not the same as conceiving A without conceiving B"

http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/__data/a ... stance.pdf

I'll respond to this in full later but I have a quick comment:

I looked at that article you linked to and can't find that quote anywhere in it. Are you sure you linked to the right article?

[instantc]

There are a few legitimate ways you can actually address what I've said:
1) challenge my claim that flocking qualifies as an emergent behavior.
2) challenge my claim that consciousness qualifies as an emergent property of brains.
3) challenge the very idea of emergence.

I have been challenging (2), on the following grounds. Emergence is identical to its ingredients. For example, flocking is identical to the movement of multiple birds, water is identical to multiple water molecules etc. However, consciousness is not identical to brain activity and/or movement of neurons, as I have proved logically. Therefore consciousness is not an emergence of brain activity. Philosopher have been wrestling with this conceptual problem for ages and they still do, it cannot be escaped this easily. People who hold the reductionist view do so because of their preexisting narrow physicalist convictions.

If we cannot conceive of water without water molecules then how did people conceive of water before they learned of atomic theory and water molecules? How do children conceive of water?

Children are not conceiving water without water molecules.


Children might be conceiving water without conceiving water molecules.

The above two sentences are contradictory. Until you can resolve the contradiction your response is incoherent and can't be addressed.

No, they are two different things. Instead of trying to break it down to you, I'll just provide you a quotation from the following peer reviewed Oxford journal article, which criticizes Descartes' argument:

"Assume that I can conceive that the evening star exists without the morning star also existing. [Notice that this is not the same as my conceiving that the evening star exists without my conceiving that the morning star exists. Conceiving A without B is not the same as conceiving A without conceiving B"

http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/__data/a ... stance.pdf

I'll respond to this in full later but I have a quick comment:

I looked at that article you linked to and can't find that quote anywhere in it. Are you sure you linked to the right article?

Sorry, the quote was from this other article on the same subject which I was reading, http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~curd/110WK13.html. Both of them explain the same thing, the Oxford one is better quality though, in case you want to read a thorough take on the conceivability argument.

[keithprosser3]

Flocking is an emergent property of a collection of many birds.

This can be demonstrated by a simulation in which individual 'virtual birds' are programmed with simple behaviours, depending on purely local factors. Such a simulation will exhibit flocking without flocking being explicitly programmed into it - i.e. only individual birds are explicitly simulated, not the entire flock.

However no one has succeeded in producing consciousness by simulating a collection of brain cells. One can assert that consciousness is an emergent property of a collection of brain cells, but assertion is not proof, and is in some cases it is a tacit admission that one is unable to imagine anything else.

However, for a flock simulator to exhibit flocking, the individual birds have to be programmed with the right sort of behaviour - I would presume there are probably many more possible 'bird behaviour algorithms' that don't produce flocking than those that do.

The same is probably true about brains - to produce consciousness we need to implement the 'right sort' of individual brain cell simulation. The notion of emergence on its own doesn't give much clue as to what the 'right sort' of simulation is - it is only an assertion that such as simulation must exist.

We need some sort of theory before we should expect to get consciousness out of a 'neural-net' of simulated brain cells- unless we are going to rely on guess-work, and guessing is a admission of ignorance about consciousness, not a sign of knowledge and understanding.

[scourge99]

Flocking is an emergent property of a collection of many birds.

This can be demonstrated by a simulation in which individual 'virtual birds' are programmed with simple behaviours, depending on purely local factors. Such a simulation will exhibit flocking without flocking being explicitly programmed into it - i.e. only individual birds are explicitly simulated, not the entire flock.

it seems you are proposing a very rigid and narrow version of verification. That unless we can reproduce something then we can't claim to know anything about it. So before the advent of computers when we couldn't create virtual birds, was it irrational to conclude that flocking was emergent?

Also, do you apply this strict criteria to all things like evolution, nuclear fusion in stars, etc, or just to claims of emergence? Why?

I think if you apply this narrow criteria to other things you believe, you will quickly discover you accept many thingd as true that would not satisfy the criteria you put forth.

However no one has succeeded in producing consciousness by simulating a collection of brain cells. One can assert that consciousness is an emergent property of a collection of brain cells, but assertion is not proof, and is in some cases it is a tacit admission that one is unable to imagine anything else.

I've given several reasons to support my claim that consciousness is emergent.

Whats the point in responding to you if you ignore what I say?

debatingchristianity.com/forum/viewtopic.php?p=564080&sid=842953fac035575f40b52f1cf5cf2f4a

However, for a flock simulator to exhibit flocking, the individual birds have to be programmed with the right sort of behaviour - I would presume there are probably many more possible 'bird behaviour algorithms' that don't produce flocking than those that do.

The same is probably true about brains - to produce consciousness we need to implement the 'right sort' of individual brain cell simulation. The notion of emergence on its own doesn't give much clue as to what the 'right sort' of simulation is - it is only an assertion that such as simulation must exist.

Its not an assertion if there is reason and evidence to support it. Perhaps you think the reason and evidence I've presented is insufficient, but you've yet to even address it.

We need some sort of theory before we should expect to get consciousness out of a 'neural-net' of simulated brain cells- unless we are going to rely on guess-work, and guessing is a admission of ignorance about consciousness, not a sign of knowledge and understanding.

I don't buy this all-or-nothing theory of knowledge you present. You seem to be arguing that if we don't know everything about how something works then we can't claim to know anything about it with any certainty. I contend this is not the case, and a greater look into other things you accept as true yet don't know everything or how they work internally directly contradicts this theory you propose.

[scourge99]

There are a few legitimate ways you can actually address what I've said:
1) challenge my claim that flocking qualifies as an emergent behavior.
2) challenge my claim that consciousness qualifies as an emergent property of brains.
3) challenge the very idea of emergence.

I have been challenging (2), on the following grounds. Emergence is identical to its ingredients. For example, flocking is identical to the movement of multiple birds, water is identical to multiple water molecules etc. However, consciousness is not identical to brain activity and/or movement of neurons, as I have proved logically. Therefore consciousness is not an emergence of brain activity. Philosopher have been wrestling with this conceptual problem for ages and they still do, it cannot be escaped this easily. People who hold the reductionist view do so because of their preexisting narrow physicalist convictions.

If we cannot conceive of water without water molecules then how did people conceive of water before they learned of atomic theory and water molecules? How do children conceive of water?

Children are not conceiving water without water molecules.


Children might be conceiving water without conceiving water molecules.

The above two sentences are contradictory. Until you can resolve the contradiction your response is incoherent and can't be addressed.

No, they are two different things. Instead of trying to break it down to you, I'll just provide you a quotation from the following peer reviewed Oxford journal article, which criticizes Descartes' argument:

"Assume that I can conceive that the evening star exists without the morning star also existing. [Notice that this is not the same as my conceiving that the evening star exists without my conceiving that the morning star exists. Conceiving A without B is not the same as conceiving A without conceiving B"

http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/__data/a ... stance.pdf

I'll respond to this in full later but I have a quick comment:

I looked at that article you linked to and can't find that quote anywhere in it. Are you sure you linked to the right article?

Sorry, the quote was from this other article on the same subject which I was reading, http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~curd/110WK13.html. Both of them explain the same thing, the Oxford one is better quality though, in case you want to read a thorough take on the conceivability argument.

The link doesn't work.

Instead of having me read 20+ page long philosophy papers so i can decipher the cryptic concepts and nonstandard definitions you use, isn't it a bit more prudent that you simply explain what you mean?

[keithprosser3]

I'm only talking about consciousness - particularly the way that materialists (I count myself as one) tend to minimize the problems it still poses. I certainly don't think there is any reasonable alternative to monistic materialism - but I am not complacent about it... quite the opposite.

My objection to emergence in this context is that its not explanation, but it sounds like it is being offered as one. If I wasn't so convinced about the correctness of the materialist world-view I wouldn't be so worried, but consciousness refuses to yield its secrets. Recall that there were very few known problems with classical physics in the 19th century.... but those small problems required a whole new paradigm to be developed. Ignore small problems at your peril!

I'll end this post with a clear statement that I am pretty confident that consciousness is indeed an emergent property of complex system of brain cells, and it should be possible to produce an artificial consciousness. But I don't know that is true.

[scourge99]

I'm only talking about consciousness - particularly the way that materialists (I count myself as one) tend to minimize the problems it still poses.

You gave certain criteria that must be met in order to claim to know something is emergent. I explained the problems i found with that criteria.

I certainly don't think there is any reasonable alternative to monistic materialism - but I am not complacent about it... quite the opposite.

If my argument was just an appeal to materialist assumptions, then i would agree that my conclusion is insufficiently supported. But I've provided multiple lines of evidence and reason which converge at my conclusion.

My objection to emergence in this context is that its not explanation, but it sounds like it is being offered as one.

No. Your objection is that identifying something as emergent doesn't explain the details about how it emerges. Which i agree with. But that doesn't mean there aren't sufficient reasons to identify something as emergent.

If I wasn't so convinced about the correctness of the materialist world-view I wouldn't be so worried, but consciousness refuses to yield its secrets. Recall that there were very few known problems with classical physics in the 19th century.... but those small problems required a whole new paradigm to be developed. Ignore small problems at your peril!

I'm not ignoring anything otherwise you could point out specifically what i am ignoring instead if making vague assertions that i am.

Furthermore, classical physics didn't get turned on its head. Classical physics still accurately represents most events we encounter. Its not as though apples started floating into the sky when Einstein developed relativity. This notion of a radical paradigm shifts is a dishonest exaggeration often peddled by religious apologists that crumbles when examined.

I'll end this post with a clear statement that I am pretty confident that consciousness is indeed an emergent property of complex system of brain cells, and it should be possible to produce an artificial consciousness. But I don't know that is true.

I wouldn't claim to know "truth" when it comes to our understanding of the real world. I would claim varying levels of certainty that never reach absolute certainty. As i have argued, i think we have sufficient evidence and reason to be strongly certain that the mind is the product if the brain.