Fine tuning of the Universe

[Mr.Badham]

I'm confused, because it seems like the argument could go both ways.

Either the universe is fine tuned for life, and therefore is full of it, or only Earth is fine tuned for life, and the rest of the universe will have none of it.

I want theists to take a stand right here and say;

The universe is fine tuned, and is full of life.

Or

The Earth is fine tuned, the rest of the universe has none of it.

Then I want you to stake your religiosity on it. If you make the claim, one way or the other, and are shown to be wrong, you will then become an atheist.

If you are not willing to do this, I would like you to proclaim that the argument is bogus, and should never be used.

You have 1 of 3 options;
The universe is full of life.
Only earth has life.
The fine tuning argument is bogus and should never be used.

[instantc]

The fact that life exists at all is obviously a matter of chance, the very rare side-effect of the uncommon juxtaposition of circumstances that sometimes results from the much much more common character of the universe.

In the thousand coin toss experiment, which you neglected to quote or respond to, one expects to find patterns here and there that by themselves would be remarkable, like a dozen heads in a row someplace. A circumstance that would be unusual by itself can be expected to happen by chance in a large random distribution. If it were by design it would occur much more often than by chance.

In the multiverse scenario, which you neglected to quote or respond to, among those universes able to support something that requires complex circumstances to exist, one would expect it to be a rarity in the great majority of such universes. Just like it is a rarity in this universe. Considering that we know without doubt that physical things exist but we do not have any direct evidence of non-physical things, a multiverse comprising all possible physical universes would appear a more likely solution than a non-physical entity designer whose motives are very unclear.

It would appear that the only way to defend the fine-tuning argument is to pretend counter-arguments do not exist.

Ok, so in short you object to the second premise on grounds that 'chance' is a plausible explanation, if we posit the existence of every possible universe. I am in agreement here.

Wouldn't you agree though, that surely a designer, without presuming any specific properties, is a more parsimonious hypothesis than the existence of every single possible universe (which amount to trillions, obviously)?

Your argument that a multiverse is more likely than a creator seems like sheer speculation to me. On what basis do you make such a probability calculation?

That is not quite right. Given only this universe, the existence of life, as rare as it is and requiring rare circumstances, is more explainable by chance than design.

The argument is concerned with the values of the constants, not the existence of life, so I will leave this be.

Insisting the universe is fine-tuned for life is not supportable and betrays the desire to build in the desired conclusion at the beginning.

Why do you keep repeating this, even after I showed that the argument can be run without even mentioning fine-tuning?

The values of the constants and even the existence of this particular set of constants are more explainable by a multiverse than by a creator We know physical things exist. We do not know non-physical things exist.

Notice that none of the premises of the fine-tuning argument require that the designer is 'non-physical'. Thus, this objection simply evaporates.

This is not prolific but maximally parsimonious. It is the natural result of the simple rule that to be is to be possible.

"To be is to be possible"? I don't understand what you mean by this, please explain.

As far as I can see, one designer is more parsimonious than a trillion universes, most of which would involve complete absurdities.

[Ancient of Years]

Excuse the delay please, RL raised its pretty head.

The fact that life exists at all is obviously a matter of chance, the very rare side-effect of the uncommon juxtaposition of circumstances that sometimes results from the much much more common character of the universe.

In the thousand coin toss experiment, which you neglected to quote or respond to, one expects to find patterns here and there that by themselves would be remarkable, like a dozen heads in a row someplace. A circumstance that would be unusual by itself can be expected to happen by chance in a large random distribution. If it were by design it would occur much more often than by chance.

In the multiverse scenario, which you neglected to quote or respond to, among those universes able to support something that requires complex circumstances to exist, one would expect it to be a rarity in the great majority of such universes. Just like it is a rarity in this universe. Considering that we know without doubt that physical things exist but we do not have any direct evidence of non-physical things, a multiverse comprising all possible physical universes would appear a more likely solution than a non-physical entity designer whose motives are very unclear.

It would appear that the only way to defend the fine-tuning argument is to pretend counter-arguments do not exist.

Ok, so in short you object to the second premise on grounds that 'chance' is a plausible explanation, if we posit the existence of every possible universe. I am in agreement here.

Wouldn't you agree though, that surely a designer, without presuming any specific properties, is a more parsimonious hypothesis than the existence of every single possible universe (which amount to trillions, obviously)?

Your argument that a multiverse is more likely than a creator seems like sheer speculation to me. On what basis do you make such a probability calculation?

That is not quite right. Given only this universe, the existence of life, as rare as it is and requiring rare circumstances, is more explainable by chance than design.

The argument is concerned with the values of the constants, not the existence of life, so I will leave this be.

Insisting the universe is fine-tuned for life is not supportable and betrays the desire to build in the desired conclusion at the beginning.

Why do you keep repeating this, even after I showed that the argument can be run without even mentioning fine-tuning?

If we remove the idea of fine-tuning, that is, of there being any purpose for these particular constants and their values, then the situation becomes analogous to the coin toss experiment. Once the coins are tossed there will be a particular configuration of heads and tails. For a large number of coins that configuration will be extremely unlikely. But some extremely unlikely configuration will result entirely by chance for any coin toss. To repeat, despite being highly specific the configuration did not happen by design but by chance. Please note that this is not the first time I explained this.

Without introducing motivation for a particular design (which we have seen does not work well anyway) the configuration of constants/values is indistinguishable from chance. Another possibility is that all laws, constants, values etc. are reducible to a single super-law that is totally compelling as being the only possible law. In that case the (only possible) universe would be a matter of necessity. Personally I do not buy that. Theoretical physicists have mathematically modeled alternate configurations and have not turned up any inconsistencies. Plus it is difficult to imagine a single non-parametric solution that would generate a large number of seemingly arbitrary values.

The values of the constants and even the existence of this particular set of constants are more explainable by a multiverse than by a creator We know physical things exist. We do not know non-physical things exist.

Notice that none of the premises of the fine-tuning argument require that the designer is 'non-physical'. Thus, this objection simply evaporates.

If the hypothetical designer is physical, then it exists in a universe with specific constants and values. Where did that ‘design’ come from? Was that designer physical or non-physical? If physical, then we are headed toward an infinite regress of designers who are physical. To break that chain a non-physical cause must be inserted someplace. But as we will see that raises similar problems of its own. Far from evaporating, the argument is in full force.

This is not prolific but maximally parsimonious. It is the natural result of the simple rule that to be is to be possible.

"To be is to be possible"? I don't understand what you mean by this, please explain.

As far as I can see, one designer is more parsimonious than a trillion universes, most of which would involve complete absurdities.

I am proposing a possible solution to the old question “Why is there something rather than nothing?� It is intended to address both why something exists and why we observe a very specific something as opposed to any other something. I am putting this forward as a more explanatory and less problematic alternative to the traditional creator scenario.

In that traditional scenario, the creator is represented as conscious, intelligent, volitional and purposeful. At least the first three (conscious, intelligent, volitional) appear to be necessary to qualify for the role of designer, and for the design to be intentionally ‘fine-tuned for X’ (if one wishes to include that qualifier) then the last one (purposeful) is also needed.

The obvious question is why the creator should exist. A standard answer is that the creator is the necessary existence. This is often meant in the sense of a creator being necessary to explain the existence of the world, which does not answer the question. Instead let us take it to mean that the entity that happens to be responsible for the existence of the world has the inherent property of necessarily existing, in and of itself, even if it never chose to create anything.

The next question is why this necessary existence should have the properties of being conscious, intelligent and volitional. Clearly these are not properties inherent in existence. A rock exists without having them. In fact the vast majority of the universe (to put it mildly) does not have those properties. So what is it that predisposes the necessary existence to necessarily have those properties that are not necessarily part of existence? Whatever it might be would have to precede the creator. We can then ask why those prior influences exist. And so on.

Although we left out ‘purposeful’ in the previous paragraph, there is also the issue that this alleged creator created (or designed if you wish) a very specific universe. What factors could have led the creator to build this particular universe as opposed to any other one? Even in the postulated absence of motives, there is still the fact of one particular universe being created. Why this one?

Yet the world exists. How come? The idea of necessary existence is an attractive one. But applying it to the traditional style creator leads to problems. One might be tempted to say that the universe exists because it is the necessary existence. But as with the creator idea, an explanation is needed for the specificity of the universe. Why is it exactly the way it is?

As previously stated, the proposed solution is intended to address not only why anything exists but why we observe such specificity. That proposed solution is that everything that can exist does exist. Details to follow.

Implicit in the idea of a necessarily existing entity is the notion of an existential imperative. Something must exist or nothing will exist. That is, something must exist. Yet both the creator and the necessary universe concepts do not explain specificity without invoking pre-existing factors that would themselves require explanation.

The proposed solution is to keep the existential imperative concept (which all scenarios require anyway) but eliminate the problematic specificity issue. In short, all possibilities exist.

Let us refine what we mean by ‘possible’. For something to be possible, it must be coherent, consistent and complete.

Coherent – It must be something in particular. A is A implies that A has some specific definite meaning.
Note: Quantum theory tells us that our naïve everyday intuitions about what a thing is are insufficient to properly understand things. In between observations a quantum is represented by a probability wavefunction. But it is a specific definite wavefunction. A is A works at even the quantum level if we do not insist on naïve understandings.

Consistent – A is not not-A. Contradictions do not exist. This is simply the flip side of A is A and follows directly from it.

Complete – The properties of A are meaningful only within a particular definite context. To say something is heavy or red, for example, assumes that heaviness and redness can be defined in terms of whatever context A resides in.

Anything that is not a definite something (not coherent), implies contradictions (not consistent) and/or is not describable in terms of its context (not complete) cannot reasonably be said to exist.

If all possibilities exist, then how does one reconcile that with the requirement for both coherency and consistency? If, for example, A represents the value of the speed of light, a specific definite value in accordance with the coherency requirement, how can it have all possible values? The answer is that different universes can have different values for the speed of light. (Not all universes even need to have a speed of light at all.)

If all possibilities exist, then how does one reconcile this with the idea of something being describable in terms of a definite context? The answer is that different universes can have different contexts, e.g., laws, constants, values.

Physics today is all about symmetries. Anti-matter was first predicted on grounds of mathematical symmetries then discovered exactly as predicted. Furthermore the principle was discovered to be universal. All particles have anti-particles. Today’s symmetries are highly sophisticated and have successfully predicted not just anti-particles but entirely new particles.

The ultimate in symmetry would be the existence of all possible forms of physics – all coherent, consistent and complete laws, constants and values. The existence of all possible universes is entirely compatible with physics and perhaps even suggested by past experience, the fulfillment of symmetry.

But is simply being possible, as defined above, sufficient to account for the fact of existence? Physics suggests that it could be. Virtual particles are constantly appearing and disappearing throughout space courtesy of Heisenberg Uncertainty. All possible particles are present in this stew. All possible particles, that is, that are allowable by the laws of physics of this universe. All those that are possible, exist spontaneously.

What are the laws that decide if a particular universe as a whole is possible? To exist a universe must be coherent (have defining parameters) consistent (not contain contradictions) and complete (maintain a consistent context). Instead of all possible particles existing spontaneously exactly because they are possible, why not all possible universes existing spontaneously exactly because they are possible?

There will not be any absurd universes around, not if they are coherent, consistent and complete. Lewis’s modal realism has it that any universe that can be imagined exists. The problem with this is that we do not imagine actual real things but only incomplete abstractions. We can imagine a flying pig by taking a mental picture of a pig, sticking mental pictures of wings on it and pasting it onto a mental picture of sky. For there to be a world in which pigs fly there would need to be revisions to biology, aerodynamics and probably other factors. It might be possible for a creature resembling a pig with wings to fly if one is allowed to manipulate the environment at will. But it would not be a flying pig as we imagined it, that is, an earthly pig with wings flying in an earthly environment. Not all imaginable hodgepodges of mental images can be realized in a real world.



That is the idea. As I said earlier it explains both the fact and the nature of existence without the problems of a ‘just so’ creator or a ‘just so’ universe, by simple extrapolation from what we already know about the world. Is it real? Who knows? But it is more reasonable than the creator idea..

[instantc]

If we remove the idea of fine-tuning, that is, of there being any purpose for these particular constants and their values, then the situation becomes analogous to the coin toss experiment. Once the coins are tossed there will be a particular configuration of heads and tails. For a large number of coins that configuration will be extremely unlikely. But some extremely unlikely configuration will result entirely by chance for any coin toss.

Except that while there are a large number of coin tosses, we only observe one universe. In other words, this is the case only if you posit a multiverse theory, which you have not yet justified.

If the hypothetical designer is physical, then it exists in a universe with specific constants and values. Where did that ‘design’ come from? Was that designer physical or non-physical? If physical, then we are headed toward an infinite regress of designers who are physical.

Scientist recognize that in order for an explanation to be recognized the best explanation, we don't need to have an explanation of an explanation. Thus, this kind of speculation is irrelevant for the argument at hand. In order to succeed, the argument only needs to establish that the universe is designed. Whether or not the designer is physical is not addressed by this argument. It's a separate conversation, in which I don't want to engage simultaneously.

So again, in order to succeed, this argument does not need to assume that a non-physical designer exists. For all we know, our universe with its specific constants could be a computer simulation created by advanced scientists. I am not endorsing this, I am just pointing out that the argument does not require the existence of a non-physical creator.

There will not be any absurd universes around, not if they are coherent, consistent and complete. Lewis’s modal realism has it that any universe that can be imagined exists. The problem with this is that we do not imagine actual real things but only incomplete abstractions. We can imagine a flying pig by taking a mental picture of a pig, sticking mental pictures of wings on it and pasting it onto a mental picture of sky. For there to be a world in which pigs fly there would need to be revisions to biology, aerodynamics and probably other factors. It might be possible for a creature resembling a pig with wings to fly if one is allowed to manipulate the environment at will. But it would not be a flying pig as we imagined it, that is, an earthly pig with wings flying in an earthly environment. Not all imaginable hodgepodges of mental images can be realized in a real world.

Right, I did not mean absurd in the sense of being logically inconsistent or anything, but rather, I was referring to possible universes with nothing but a single rock in it flying around and so forth.

However, regardless of whether or not the multiverse theory includes absurdities, I think that one designer is more parsimonious than a trillion universes. I notice that you did not address this.

[wiploc]

If we remove the idea of fine-tuning, that is, of there being any purpose for these particular constants and their values, then the situation becomes analogous to the coin toss experiment. Once the coins are tossed there will be a particular configuration of heads and tails. For a large number of coins that configuration will be extremely unlikely. But some extremely unlikely configuration will result entirely by chance for any coin toss.

Except that while there are a large number of coin tosses, we only observe one universe. In other words, this is the case only if you posit a multiverse theory, which you have not yet justified.

If you toss a bunch of coins one time, you will get an extremely unlikely result. You don't need a multiverse for that.

If someone comes along after the tossing, and says, "That extremely unlikely result proves that you cheated, that you designed the coins to fall in exactly that order," that claim is as indefensible in a universe as in a multiverse.

If the hypothetical designer is physical, then it exists in a universe with specific constants and values. Where did that ‘design’ come from? Was that designer physical or non-physical? If physical, then we are headed toward an infinite regress of designers who are physical.

Scientist recognize that in order for an explanation to be recognized the best explanation, we don't need to have an explanation of an explanation.

Then we stop at evolution or the big bang. We'll take you at your word that--according to your interpretation of science--we don't need any further explanation.

[instantc]

If we remove the idea of fine-tuning, that is, of there being any purpose for these particular constants and their values, then the situation becomes analogous to the coin toss experiment. Once the coins are tossed there will be a particular configuration of heads and tails. For a large number of coins that configuration will be extremely unlikely. But some extremely unlikely configuration will result entirely by chance for any coin toss.

Except that while there are a large number of coin tosses, we only observe one universe. In other words, this is the case only if you posit a multiverse theory, which you have not yet justified.

If you toss a bunch of coins one time, you will get an extremely unlikely result. You don't need a multiverse for that.

Good point. This is also why I think that the second premise of the fine-tuning argument doesn't work.

If the hypothetical designer is physical, then it exists in a universe with specific constants and values. Where did that ‘design’ come from? Was that designer physical or non-physical? If physical, then we are headed toward an infinite regress of designers who are physical.

Scientist recognize that in order for an explanation to be recognized the best explanation, we don't need to have an explanation of an explanation.

Then we stop at evolution or the big bang. We'll take you at your word that--according to your interpretation of science--we don't need any further explanation.

I didn't say that we should stop anywhere.

What the principle that I brought up means is this. Evolution is the best explanation for how the present life came to be. Do we know how the initial life forms came about? Even if we didn't, evolution would still be the best explanation for how the present life developed. This is because in order for something to be recognized as the best explanation, we don't need to have an explanation for that explanation. That is not to say that we should not search for further explanations. This is merely to say that we can, for example, recognize the big bang theory as the best explanation for the universe, even if that raises a further question, namely what caused the big bang, which cannot yet be answered.

[Ancient of Years]

If we remove the idea of fine-tuning, that is, of there being any purpose for these particular constants and their values, then the situation becomes analogous to the coin toss experiment. Once the coins are tossed there will be a particular configuration of heads and tails. For a large number of coins that configuration will be extremely unlikely. But some extremely unlikely configuration will result entirely by chance for any coin toss.

Except that while there are a large number of coin tosses, we only observe one universe. In other words, this is the case only if you posit a multiverse theory, which you have not yet justified.

You misunderstand the coin toss experiment. The record of a thousand coin tosses is a single experiment. That record represents the values of the physical constants. The odds against getting that specific pattern are incredibly large, being a number over 300 digits long. But every thousand coin toss experiment will generate an incredibly unlikely sequence of heads and tails. The question is whether it embodies a significant pattern that would qualify it as possibly designed rather than the result of a sequence of random coin tosses. This has nothing to do with the multiverse idea.

The original question raised by the OP had to do with the universe being fine-tuned for life. In his book On Guard Craig presents this argument:

1. The universe is fine-tuned for life.
2. Fine-tuning can potentially be explained by chance, necessity or design.
3. Not by chance or necessity.
4. Therefore, the fine-tuning of the universe is the result of design.
http://www.reasonsforgod.org/the-best-r ... -argument/

As I previously argued, the extreme rarity of even the conditions needed to support life combined with the utter hostility to life of the truly vast majority of the universe contradicts #1. In the coin toss experiment it would not be surprising to find a dozen heads in a row somewhere in the thousand toss sequence. By itself a dozen consecutive heads would strongly argue that the coin was fixed. But embedded someplace in a thousand random flips it is not at all surprising. The universe is not fine-tuned for life. What life may exist is a rare chance side effect of the nature of the universe. It is no more significant than snowflakes.

This has nothing to do with a multiverse. The multiverse argument is a way of explaining what we observe without recourse to a problematic ‘just so’ creator or a problematic ‘just so’ universe. My argument was over a thousand words long but you dismiss it as “which you have not yet justified�. No counter arguments, no indication that you understood it, no indication that you even read it. It seems we are back to ignoring arguments we do not want to address.

If the hypothetical designer is physical, then it exists in a universe with specific constants and values. Where did that ‘design’ come from? Was that designer physical or non-physical? If physical, then we are headed toward an infinite regress of designers who are physical.

Scientist recognize that in order for an explanation to be recognized the best explanation, we don't need to have an explanation of an explanation. Thus, this kind of speculation is irrelevant for the argument at hand. In order to succeed, the argument only needs to establish that the universe is designed. Whether or not the designer is physical is not addressed by this argument. It's a separate conversation, in which I don't want to engage simultaneously.

So again, in order to succeed, this argument does not need to assume that a non-physical designer exists. For all we know, our universe with its specific constants could be a computer simulation created by advanced scientists. I am not endorsing this, I am just pointing out that the argument does not require the existence of a non-physical creator.

Scientists may be happy with one step at a time answers but this is the Philosophy forum, where we are supposed to be concerned with ultimate answers. Your proposed physical designer does not provide any meaningful answers. Unless you want to argue that it is turtles all the way down. If not then there must ultimately be an ocean that a turtle is swimming in. There is also the matter that we have yet to see an identifiable design.

There will not be any absurd universes around, not if they are coherent, consistent and complete. Lewis’s modal realism has it that any universe that can be imagined exists. The problem with this is that we do not imagine actual real things but only incomplete abstractions. We can imagine a flying pig by taking a mental picture of a pig, sticking mental pictures of wings on it and pasting it onto a mental picture of sky. For there to be a world in which pigs fly there would need to be revisions to biology, aerodynamics and probably other factors. It might be possible for a creature resembling a pig with wings to fly if one is allowed to manipulate the environment at will. But it would not be a flying pig as we imagined it, that is, an earthly pig with wings flying in an earthly environment. Not all imaginable hodgepodges of mental images can be realized in a real world.

Right, I did not mean absurd in the sense of being logically inconsistent or anything, but rather, I was referring to possible universes with nothing but a single rock in it flying around and so forth.

However, regardless of whether or not the multiverse theory includes absurdities, I think that one –designer is more parsimonious than a trillion universes. I notice that you did not address this.

A universe with a single rock flying around in it is in the same category as the flying pig, a mental image isolated from its context. In this world rocks are the result of processes – igneous and sedimentary on Earth - electrostatic binding, thermal fusion and gravitational attraction more generally. These processes in turn derive ultimately from the laws and constants that apply in this universe.

And keep in mind that for this object to be called a rock it would need to be identifiable as such if somehow made available for examination here in this universe. That is, it would need to be composed of some combination of minerals as rocks here are, those composed of combinations of atoms typical of those minerals and recognizable as atoms here and all behaving as they do here.

Is there a set of laws and constants that are coherent, consistent and complete and will result in a universe consisting entirely of a single rock flying around? Why do those atoms exist? Why do only those atoms exist? Why only that many atoms and no others. Why are they in this rock configuration? What kind of laws/constants could lead to the existence of this rock with no precursor events? What accounts for the existence of the space it is flying around in?

If a set of laws and constants that can cause this situation to arise is possible then it is not absurd. But just because something can be imagined does not mean it can exist.

I had previously addressed the parsimony issue but I will again. My multiverse proposal (the one you did not comment on) consists of the single principle that what is possible – coherent, consistent, complete – exists. Multiple discrete universes allow all possibilities to exist without contradictions. Nothing else is needed.

A conscious intelligent volitional creator of a single complicated universe requires not just some form of existential imperative in order to exist but some form of pre-existing factors to have that particular nature and decide to perform that particular act. In short, an unexplained arbitrary ‘just so’ first existence. Plus a principle of existential imperative would be required for a creator to exist as opposed to nothing.

To say that the universe as we see it, in all its massive complexity, just happened without cause is to tell another unexplained arbitrary ‘just so’ story. Plus a principle of existential imperative would be required for the universe to exist as opposed to nothing.

The multiverse proposal requires only a principle of existential imperative, that what is possible exists.

Since life requires unusual and complex conditions, in the typical universe able to support life we would expect it to be quite rare. That is exactly what we see in his universe.

I have presented the core arguments of my case once again for the record. In the past you have ignored my core arguments and when pressed about that point you have misrepresented them. You can deal substantively with what I am actually saying or you can do what you usually do. If the former I will be back. If the latter…

[Mr.Badham]

And not one person was able to make that leap of faith required in the OP.

Therefore I have deemed the argument "BOGUS".

If your belief in God doesn't change whether the universe is full of life or empty...
then the "Fine Tuning Argument" is not your argument.

The fine tuning argument is a strange one to make without proof of life anywhere else. It seems to depend on it's existence. Not just the fact that it could exist.

[instantc]

As I previously argued, the extreme rarity of even the conditions needed to support life combined with the utter hostility to life of the truly vast majority of the universe contradicts #1.

I'm not going to argue about this, as you've got it stuck in your head that by fine-tuning he means something else than what he says he means. In my opinion, those who employ the term in an argument are free to define it as they want, but apparently we are not on the same page with this.

In the coin toss experiment it would not be surprising to find a dozen heads in a row somewhere in the thousand toss sequence. By itself a dozen consecutive heads would strongly argue that the coin was fixed. But embedded someplace in a thousand random flips it is not at all surprising.

I'm still not sure what you mean when you say that the universe is supposed to be analogous to a coin toss experiment. Notice that it's not the case that somewhere in the list of the constants of the universe there's a life-permitting sequence, but rather, if any of the constants were tweaked a tiny bit, life could not exist.

Scientists may be happy with one step at a time answers but this is the Philosophy forum, where we are supposed to be concerned with ultimate answers.

You misunderstood me completely. I'm not suggesting that we should be happy with an explanation and stop there. I am saying that in order for this particular argument to work, it is not necessary to speculate about the nature of the designer, be it physical or non-physical, since that question does not fall within the scope of this argument. That would be the next step. Only if you could show that a physical creator would somehow be contradictory or impossible, then you would be correct to point out that the fine-tuning argument implies the existence of a non-physical designer. The mere fact that a physical designer raises further questions does not mean that it could not fall within the scope of what is meant by a designer in this argument.

Your proposed physical designer does not provide any meaningful answers.

I have not proposed a physical creator, I merely said that it is a possibility, and therefore the fine-tuning argument does not have to distinguish between the physical or non-physical nature of the creator.

I am not interested in giving meaningful answers, I'm merely interested in finding out whether the fine-tuning argument can justify its conclusion, which does not necessitate a meaningful answer.

A universe with a single rock flying around in it is in the same category as the flying pig, a mental image isolated from its context. In this world rocks are the result of processes – igneous and sedimentary on Earth - electrostatic binding, thermal fusion and gravitational attraction more generally. These processes in turn derive ultimately from the laws and constants that apply in this universe.

Ok, that's fne.

I had previously addressed the parsimony issue but I will again. My multiverse proposal (the one you did not comment on) consists of the single principle that what is possible – coherent, consistent, complete – exists.

Well, just because you can formulate it as a consequence of a single proposal does not mean that it is parsimonious. I still don't see how positing the de facto existence of a trillion universes is supposed to be parsimonious.

A conscious intelligent volitional creator of a single complicated universe requires not just some form of existential imperative in order to exist but some form of pre-existing factors to have that particular nature and decide to perform that particular act. In short, an unexplained arbitrary ‘just so’ first existence.

I think you are again reading too much into the argument. The conclusion of the argument is consistent with, for example, the universe being an experiment of advanced scientists (frankly I am more interested in the use of the fine-tuning argument in this context than in Christian apologetics), which would side-step the problems you pointed out above. Surely this would raise further questions, but that does not make it less parsimonious as en explanation to the facts at hand.

[Jashwell]

[Replying to post 98 by instantc]

I have a new objection (that's of particular interest) to "Fine-tuning can potentially be explained by chance, necessity or design." - I think there's at least one category missing. (Incidentally, this objection would not be a problem for the argument - it'd be fairly simple to show that said category is not the case)

What about emergence? It's not quite chance, but it's also not quite necessity, it's basically natural design. (It certainly mimics human design - or perhaps we mimic it.)
Evolution, for instance. It's easy to see how certain fine-tuned parameters could be the product of an evolving system.
Plenty of Computer Algorithms exist that specifically have fine-tuning (optimizing) in mind - see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:O ... nd_methods
An example of fine tuning the x axis to find the maximum y value (temperature refers to a certain variable in the process (effectively how much the cursor jumps), not either axis)

[Ancient of Years]

As I previously argued, the extreme rarity of even the conditions needed to support life combined with the utter hostility to life of the truly vast majority of the universe contradicts #1.

I'm not going to argue about this, as you've got it stuck in your head that by fine-tuning he means something else than what he says he means. In my opinion, those who employ the term in an argument are free to define it as they want, but apparently we are not on the same page with this.

In the coin toss experiment it would not be surprising to find a dozen heads in a row somewhere in the thousand toss sequence. By itself a dozen consecutive heads would strongly argue that the coin was fixed. But embedded someplace in a thousand random flips it is not at all surprising.

I'm still not sure what you mean when you say that the universe is supposed to be analogous to a coin toss experiment. Notice that it's not the case that somewhere in the list of the constants of the universe there's a life-permitting sequence, but rather, if any of the constants were tweaked a tiny bit, life could not exist.

If any of the constants were tweaked a tiny bit, snowflakes could not exist. Or maybe some other kind of snowflakes would exist, maybe with eight arms instead of six. If the constants were shuffled around, something else would exist, maybe even a different kind of life. There are a huge number of possible combinations of the constants. There could be many ‘hot spot’ combinations that would permit complex self-sustaining feedback systems under very uncommon circumstances. Or there might be very interesting results that do not exist in this universe but no describable as ‘life’.

If the coin toss experiment had different results, instead of the example I gave of 12 heads in a row there might be 14 tails in a row somewhere else in the sequence. An event that would be unusual if isolated by itself but not in the overall context and that is pointed out after the fact is not of great significance. If the constants were altered a bit, the unusual configuration disappears and maybe something else unusual appears. So what?

Why does Craig, and theists in general, want to point out the existence of life despite its rarity? Because it fits in with the agenda of a universe creating deity who happens to care about people. Recall the debate I linked earlier where Craig uses this argument as a proof of the existence of God. And it is not just life but intelligent life (us) and the Christian God. Craig (and theists in general) are not agenda-free.

Scientists may be happy with one step at a time answers but this is the Philosophy forum, where we are supposed to be concerned with ultimate answers.

You misunderstood me completely. I'm not suggesting that we should be happy with an explanation and stop there. I am saying that in order for this particular argument to work, it is not necessary to speculate about the nature of the designer, be it physical or non-physical, since that question does not fall within the scope of this argument. That would be the next step. Only if you could show that a physical creator would somehow be contradictory or impossible, then you would be correct to point out that the fine-tuning argument implies the existence of a non-physical designer. The mere fact that a physical designer raises further questions does not mean that it could not fall within the scope of what is meant by a designer in this argument.

Your proposed physical designer does not provide any meaningful answers.

I have not proposed a physical creator, I merely said that it is a possibility, and therefore the fine-tuning argument does not have to distinguish between the physical or non-physical nature of the creator.

I am not interested in giving meaningful answers, I'm merely interested in finding out whether the fine-tuning argument can justify its conclusion, which does not necessitate a meaningful answer.

The OP specifically asked theists a question. An ultimate creator is definitely within the scope of the argument. And since Craig utilizes his ‘conclusion’ in support of a creator God, discussing Craig’s argument in those terms is definitely on topic. The designer in this argument as clearly intended by the OP is a creator deity. You want to arbitrarily restrict the discussion to the point where it become a meaningless triviality, where the designer may not be the Designer intended by either the OP or by Craig and the design may not be intended to have any purpose but still somehow be a design.

I had previously addressed the parsimony issue but I will again. My multiverse proposal (the one you did not comment on) consists of the single principle that what is possible – coherent, consistent, complete – exists.

Well, just because you can formulate it as a consequence of a single proposal does not mean that it is parsimonious. I still don't see how positing the de facto existence of a trillion universes is supposed to be parsimonious.

A conscious intelligent volitional creator of a single complicated universe requires not just some form of existential imperative in order to exist but some form of pre-existing factors to have that particular nature and decide to perform that particular act. In short, an unexplained arbitrary ‘just so’ first existence.

I think you are again reading too much into the argument. The conclusion of the argument is consistent with, for example, the universe being an experiment of advanced scientists (frankly I am more interested in the use of the fine-tuning argument in this context than in Christian apologetics), which would side-step the problems you pointed out above. Surely this would raise further questions, but that does not make it less parsimonious as en explanation to the facts at hand.

Your advanced scientist scenario removes the discussion from the context intended by both the OP and Craig. In the OP/Craig context, it answers no questions. You are welcome to have fun with it. However I am not playing that game but the one the thread was intended to be about.

Concerning parsimony:

I am not positing all possible universes. I am positing one single principle that resolves all of the difficulties with the usual theist designer and non-theist no-designer positions. Parsimony refers not to limiting the resulting output but to limiting the input required.

• Parsimony
  1 a : the quality of being careful with money or resources : thrift
  b : the quality or state of being stingy
  2 : economy in the use of means to an end; especially : economy of explanation in conformity with Occam's razor
  http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/parsimony

In definition 1 the parsimonious person would want to minimize the money or resources expended for a given result or alternatively obtain the maximum result for a given amount of money or resources.

Definition 2 refers to Occam’s razor, which “states that among competing hypotheses that predict equally well, the one with the fewest assumptions should be selected�. (Source}

A conscious intelligent volitional creator of a single complicated universe requires some form of pre-existing factors to have that particular nature and decide to perform that particular act. In short, an unexplained arbitrary ‘just so’ first existence. Plus a principle of existential imperative would be required for a creator to exist in the first place as opposed to nothing.

To say that the universe as we see it, in all its massive complexity, just happened without cause is to tell another unexplained arbitrary ‘just so’ story. Plus a principle of existential imperative would be required for the universe to exist in the first place as opposed to nothing.

The multiverse proposal requires only a principle of existential imperative, that what is possible exists. The other two require that same principle of existential imperative and other unexplained factors. The multiverse requires only one assumption. The others require that same assumption plus other assumptions that are inherently problematic.

The multiverse is not only the most parsimonious, it avoids the problems of the other two, and it is a better explanation for why we see what we see.