Can we speak intelligibly about non-physical entities?

[Ionian_Tradition]

To borrow from Hempel's dilemma, to posit "Physicalism" one must first provide a comprehensive definition of the term "physical". If one asserts that the term "physical" refers to that which is revealed through the various scientific theories which encapsulate our contemporary understanding of the "physical" world (quantum mechanics, general relativity, atomic theory, etc), one has failed to provide an adequate definition of the the term "physical" given that our contemporary understanding of the physical world is demonstrably incomplete. An example of this would be the fundamental conflict existing between the theory of relativity and quantum theory which presently drives the search for a "Grand unified theory". If one asserts that a future "complete physics" will round out our understanding of the physical world in its totality, one has appealed to a circular form of reasoning which states that all phenomena are explicable in terms of physics because a proper understanding of physics is that which explains all phenomena (including abstract thought, which begs the question that abstractions can be understood in terms of physics). Moreover, if one attempts to define the term "physical" in reference to a physics yet to be developed, has one truly said anything meaningful given that one cannot truly know what new physics will emerge? A cursory review of scientific developments made over the course of our species' history does not instill confidence that our "physics of the future" is guaranteed to reflect a physics similar to physics as it is presently known.

Given this, how is it that we can speak intelligibly of "non-physical" entities given that the term itself implies the understanding of that to which the term is antithetical ("physical" entities)? We have seen that we do not yet, and may never, possess a comprehensive understanding of the term "physical", how then can we speak intelligibly of things which are the opposite of that which has yet to be properly defined?


Questions for debate:

1. Can the term "physical" be comprehensively defined so as to provide meaning to the term "non-physical"?

[Ionian_Tradition]

I suppose the same question could apply for the term "supernatural".

[His Name Is John]

I think if we are talking about God (rather than just random 'supernatural events') we must use analogy.

God is wholly other. That means our understanding of 'love', 'joy', 'peace', 'mercy' are mere shadows of the true, 'love', 'joy', 'peace', 'mercy' that God possesses. They hold a similar truth, but they are not quite the same.

Another way we can talk about God is via negativa, by saying what God isn't.

But at this moment I feel as if I have slightly misunderstood the question you are asking. Rather than 'how can we talk about the supernatural' you are asking 'what meaning is there in talking about the supernatural' or something along those lines?

A slight clarification would be appreciated

Sorry if I am being slow.

[Ionian_Tradition]

I think if we are talking about God (rather than just random 'supernatural events') we must use analogy.

God is wholly other. That means our understanding of 'love', 'joy', 'peace', 'mercy' are mere shadows of the true, 'love', 'joy', 'peace', 'mercy' that God possesses. They hold a similar truth, but they are not quite the same.

Another way we can talk about God is via negativa, by saying what God isn't.

But at this moment I feel as if I have slightly misunderstood the question you are asking. Rather than 'how can we talk about the supernatural' you are asking 'what meaning is there in talking about the supernatural' or something along those lines?

A slight clarification would be appreciated

Sorry if I am being slow.

This post is meant to question whether one can speak intelligibly of that which has yet to be properly defined. Terms without meaning produce incoherent statements, thus if we are to say that the term "supernatural" is a meaningful term, we must demonstrate the term "natural" has definitive meaning. Similarly, if we are to claim that a given entity is "non-physical" we must first demonstrate that the term "physical" has been clearly defined. In other words, in order for one to claim that God is "non-physical" or that the "supernatural" exists, one must first concretely define the antithesis of these terms...

So, do you claim that God is "supernatural"? Do you believe this is a meaningful statement? If you do, I ask that you concretely define the term "natural" in light of Hempel's dilemma. Only when you've shown that you understand what the term "natural" entails can you meaningfully say that there exists something beyond it.


With that said, it is also interesting to note that Hempel's dilemma may perhaps provide us good grounds to question the tenability of strong Physicalism/Naturalism. However the reasoning seems to cut both ways in that it renders terms like "supernatural" or "meta-physical" somewhat incoherent in the absence of a comprehensive definition of the terms "natural" & "physical".

[AquinasD]

1. Can the term "physical" be comprehensively defined so as to provide meaning to the term "non-physical"?

There are other definitions of physical/material that might be used. Myself, I understand "material" to include "a potential which might yet be actualized," or in more modern terms, "that it might still change." Something which can no longer change is immaterial.

But then, this is just following from a Thomistic analysis of material cause, something which modern day physicalists or materialists are not meaning to refer to anyway. I don't know. Have fun with your dilemmas.

[His Name Is John]

This post is meant to question whether one can speak intelligibly of that which has yet to be properly defined. Terms without meaning produce incoherent statements, thus if we are to say that the term "supernatural" is a meaningful term, we must demonstrate the term "natural" has definitive meaning. Similarly, if we are to claim that a given entity is "non-physical" we must first demonstrate that the term "physical" has been clearly defined. In other words, in order for one to claim that God is "non-physical" or that the "supernatural" exists, one must first concretely define the antithesis of these terms...

Ok, I get what you are talking about now.

So, do you claim that God is "supernatural"?

Yes.

Do you believe this is a meaningful statement?

Yes.

If you do, I ask that you concretely define the term "natural" in light of Hempel's dilemma. Only when you've shown that you understand what the term "natural" entails can you meaningfully say that there exists something beyond it.

By natural, I would say the physical. The standard natural world, and the laws of nature that rule over them. By supernatural, I mean a being or an action that is brought about by non-physical means.

But that definition might be problematic. I am finding it hard to define physical.

With that said, it is also interesting to note that Hempel's dilemma may perhaps provide us good grounds to question the tenability of strong Physicalism/Naturalism. However the reasoning seems to cut both ways in that it renders terms like "supernatural" or "meta-physical" somewhat incoherent in the absence of a comprehensive definition of the terms "natural" & "physical".

I think it is hard to find a comprehensive definition of almost any statement. Our language is actually horribly inadequate.

There are other definitions of physical/material that might be used. Myself, I understand "material" to include "a potential which might yet be actualized," or in more modern terms, "that it might still change." Something which can no longer change is immaterial.

But then, this is just following from a Thomistic analysis of material cause, something which modern day physicalists or materialists are not meaning to refer to anyway. I don't know. Have fun with your dilemmas.

Are spirits immaterial?

If so how could the Devil change from being an angle of light to Satan?

[Mithrae]

This post is meant to question whether one can speak intelligibly of that which has yet to be properly defined. Terms without meaning produce incoherent statements, thus if we are to say that the term "supernatural" is a meaningful term, we must demonstrate the term "natural" has definitive meaning. Similarly, if we are to claim that a given entity is "non-physical" we must first demonstrate that the term "physical" has been clearly defined. In other words, in order for one to claim that God is "non-physical" or that the "supernatural" exists, one must first concretely define the antithesis of these terms...

So, do you claim that God is "supernatural"? Do you believe this is a meaningful statement? If you do, I ask that you concretely define the term "natural" in light of Hempel's dilemma. Only when you've shown that you understand what the term "natural" entails can you meaningfully say that there exists something beyond it.


With that said, it is also interesting to note that Hempel's dilemma may perhaps provide us good grounds to question the tenability of strong Physicalism/Naturalism. However the reasoning seems to cut both ways in that it renders terms like "supernatural" or "meta-physical" somewhat incoherent in the absence of a comprehensive definition of the terms "natural" & "physical".

Terms like physical and natural are mostly observational, and so by implication terms like 'supernatural' generally refer to what we don't often (if ever) observe. But being observational they're both imprecise and quite limited, and for a couple of years I've agreed with your comments regarding how they might be used in debate or reasoning. More particularly over the last few months it's further sunk in that what we've so far learned about the reality of what we generally call 'physical' actually bears only the vaguest resemblence to what we observe at all! The solid green table we observe is actually mostly empty space which reflects a tiny fraction of the EM spectrum interpretable by our eyes. I've taken to using the term 'stuff' instead, and inasmuch as there's any meaning to it, I'm leaning more towards idealism than to the notion that stuff basically dissimilar to what we experience in our heads has produced our considerable range of mental states.

As far as theism goes, this broad line of reasoning might be applied to the notion of God being 'outside time' - it's hard to conceive of time in a way which wouldn't eliminate events outside of it. The Christian notion of God being distinct from creation (and thus perhaps non-physical, if physical is what we call creation) might have difficulties on other grounds, in the question of whether fundamentally different things can be said to interact, but I'm not sure that it requires a precise definition of what 'creation' encompasses in order to have some meaning.

But I think that mostly, as you've hinted, these are questions which pose difficulties for those who suggest limits on what is, rather than those who suggest something beyond what's observed.

[AquinasD]

Are spirits immaterial?

If so how could the Devil change from being an angle of light to Satan?

Spirits are immaterial.

Satan's whole existence is also atemporal, and consists of a single unified choice to disobey. This manifests itself (to our perception) as individual acts which occur at separate times, but they are all things which happen "at once" as it were. The same with other spirits.

[JohnPaul]

To borrow from Hempel's dilemma, to posit "Physicalism" one must first provide a comprehensive definition of the term "physical". If one asserts that the term "physical" refers to that which is revealed through the various scientific theories which encapsulate our contemporary understanding of the "physical" world (quantum mechanics, general relativity, atomic theory, etc), one has failed to provide an adequate definition of the the term "physical" given that our contemporary understanding of the physical world is demonstrably incomplete. An example of this would be the fundamental conflict existing between the theory of relativity and quantum theory which presently drives the search for a "Grand unified theory". If one asserts that a future "complete physics" will round out our understanding of the physical world in its totality, one has appealed to a circular form of reasoning which states that all phenomena are explicable in terms of physics because a proper understanding of physics is that which explains all phenomena (including abstract thought, which begs the question that abstractions can be understood in terms of physics). Moreover, if one attempts to define the term "physical" in reference to a physics yet to be developed, has one truly said anything meaningful given that one cannot truly know what new physics will emerge? A cursory review of scientific developments made over the course of our species' history does not instill confidence that our "physics of the future" is guaranteed to reflect a physics similar to physics as it is presently known.

Given this, how is it that we can speak intelligibly of "non-physical" entities given that the term itself implies the understanding of that to which the term is antithetical ("physical" entities)? We have seen that we do not yet, and may never, possess a comprehensive understanding of the term "physical", how then can we speak intelligibly of things which are the opposite of that which has yet to be properly defined?


Questions for debate:

1. Can the term "physical" be comprehensively defined so as to provide meaning to the term "non-physical"?

In my opinion, it is impossible to talk about spiritual or "non-physical" entities in any scientific sense because there is no evidence that they even exist, much less any observations or technical descriptions necessary to form useful hypotheses about them. However, if we define "non-physical" as the world of the mind, we certainly can talk about them in the same way we talk about characters or events in a novel or movie. I don't mean in a religious sense, but in a purely objective and critical sense, analyzing their properties, personalities, and actions as given, not just in scripture but in the great masses of tradition, myth, legend, art, and literature available to us. After all, such entities are ubiquitous in our culture and are much more familiar to most people than Relativity Theory or Quantum Physics.

This is probably not the approach intended by the OP, so I will await permission before continuing in this way.

[Haven]

I think if we are talking about God (rather than just random 'supernatural events') we must use analogy.

God is wholly other. That means our understanding of 'love', 'joy', 'peace', 'mercy' are mere shadows of the true, 'love', 'joy', 'peace', 'mercy' that God possesses. They hold a similar truth, but they are not quite the same.

If God is "wholly other," then it means that we cannot speak intelligently about him/her, because he/she is completely beyond our understanding. Even if God exist, all human talk about her/him is literally meaningless.

Another way we can talk about God is via negativa, by saying what God isn't.

But this isn't talking about God, it's talking about what God is not. If one asks me to describe a toaster, and I reply that it's not made of sand, it doesn't have three eyes, and it's not a child, I've said nothing about a toaster. Once again, such talk is at best ineffectual, and at worst utterly devoid of meaning.