Scientism and Theology

[theopoesis]

An Analysis of "Scientism"

I've been asked to present my ideas on what I call "Scientism." I'll do so in three stages. First, I need to present my definition of science and the scientific method. We need to know what science is in order to determine whether all knowledge is scientific. Second, I'll discuss "Scientism" or "Consilience" in an attempt to define the position that I reject. Third, I'll explain reasons why I reject scientism, and reasons why this rejection is linked to debates regarding Christianity. I'll then conclude with how this discussion relates to Christianity and to theology.

Definition of Science

As I understand it, Science and the scientific method is a particular form of knowing that follows particular traits and possesses particular attributes. In brief, these are as follows:

(1) Scientific Methodology: As I was taught it, a fundamental aspect of the scientific revolution was the codification of a scientific methodology consisting of (roughly) four steps: Identify the Problem, Develop a Testable Hypothesis, Test the Hypothesis, Form Conclusions. With repeated testing, the hypothesis can be held with increasing confidence, though it necessarily remains a theory capable of being replaced by a better hypothesis at a later time. This is fairly bread and butter science, so I don't have much of a source here except my high school/college science classes and Wikipedia.

(2) Falsification: One of the main reasons why the scientific method is so valuable is that it offers a hypothesis that can be falsified or proven incorrect. A hypothesis whose predictions do not occur after testing is demonstrated to be false and rejected. For this reason, a hypothesis is only considered valid in the scientific community if it can possibly be falsified. Karl Popper is a good source for this, but again, this is widely accepted as far as I know.

(3) Scientific Community: Jean Francois Lyotard offers an interesting analysis of "scientific" knowledge and "narrative" knowledge in his book The Postmodern Condition. Lyotard suggests that one important aspect of scientific knowledge is the community in which it must occur. To put it simply, scientific methodology implies peer review. This suggests two things. First, there must be "peers" who have attained a roughly equivalent level of scientific expertise. In this specialized world, this implies that discussions of truth concerning the science of _____ must be limited to a specialized group of individuals with expertise in ______. Laity can only contribute to a lesser degree. Second, peer review implies "review." This indicates that peers must be capable of speaking the same language, or understanding one another's research so as to be able to evaluate it. By way of example, consider philosophy in comparison with science. Philosophy in the West has retained a wide divergence of languages/methods; therefore, we can see "continental philosophy" and "analytic philosophy" and so forth. The fundamental language of each is different, but for a "continental" to truly dialogue with an "analytic" philosopher, he or she must step outside of her mental framework into an entirely different framework. Science, in contrast, pushes toward a normative, universal framework for the sake of peer review. Each scientist cannot have his or her own language and background theory. Rather, the community as a whole develops a relatively homogenous theory which then allows all peers to operate within the same framework. In situations where divergent theories exist, they are either hybridized (as in Particle and Wave theory being united in Wave-Particle theory for light) or one theory is abandoned. Two different theories cannot be held for long simultaneously without great strain to the scientific community. This aspect of scientific knowledge is somewhat less well known, but it can be found in the writings of Lyotard, Michael Polanyi, and Thomas Kuhn (among many others).

(4) Autonomy: A final aspect of science is what I label as "autonomy", or as the ceteris paribus (all things equal) criterion. This aspect of science is derived necessarily from the other three aspects of science. In short, it means that the object of study is autonomous or independent from significant influence by the scientist. All things being equal, regardless of the observer, things should play out the same way over and over again. This is deduced for several reasons: First, testing can only be considered valid if the test is thought to reproduce or demonstrate what is hypothesized independently of the tester's intervention. If the hypothesis passes the test only because the scientist caused the test to work through intervention, the scientific method gives us no reason to trust the validity of the hypothesis. Instead, we can only trust the scientists ability to create the outcome he or she desires. Second, falsification is increasingly difficult if there is no experimental autonomy. If all scientists significantly shape the outcomes of their experiments, a failed test does not indicate a failed hypothesis as much as it indicates an inadequate experiment. The scientist could do better the next time around by influencing things the way he or she desired. However, this no longer bears resemblance to falsification. These two reasons (and there are probably others) explain why research typically seeks to minimize the influence of the researcher and maximize the autonomy of the object of study from the influence of that study itself. To be sure, Heisenberg's principle suggests to us that some domains of science are (currently?) outside of the possibility of complete autonomy, but we can at least attempt to minimize our interference. Otherwise, the entire scientific endeavor seems to fail. This would seem to be the most contentious aspect of my definition (and I have not read a direct philosopher of science on the subject). However, the logic behind the claim seems sound, and I have heard statements to this effect in the soft sciences.

This, then, is my definition of science: the pursuit of knowledge by the scientific community through the development of falsifiable hypotheses, repeated autonomous testing, and peer reviewed conclusions.

What is "Scientism"?

If science is just a method of knowing accepted by a certain community according to specific criteria, it seems that science itself is not philosophical as much as it is pragmatic. Science is not something one primarily thinks about or speculates over. Instead, science is something one does. In this respect, Science is decidedly pragmatic. On the other hand, science itself has a foundation which is philosophical in nature. By this, I mean that science has certain epistemological and philosophical commitments (for example there is a commitment to falsification) which are themselves philosophical and pre-scientific. One must justify through philosophy these commitments in order to validate science as a pragmatic pursuit. For this reason we have philosophy of science, which has roots as far back as Aristotle and Galileo up to the present with thinkers like Karl Popper or Imre Lakatos. These thinkers have quite aptly justified the philosophical foundations for science as a pragmatic pursuit.

Quite often a completely valid philosophical perspective finds itself in the hands of advocates who seek to universalize the particularity of a philosophical justification. In this sense, we have nationalism as a universal preference for the concerns of the state over the concerns of the individual, the species, or the corporation. We have feminism as a commitment to universal analysis of all fields from the perspective of feminine interests and perspectives. Thus, it seems at least possible that scientism might exist as a universal commitment to the epistemology and methodology of science. Scientism in this instance would exist when and if the particular philosophical justifications for science had been universalized as justifications (and restrictions) for all human knowledge and method.

What would "scientism" look like? There are several possibilities. First, scientism might be an universalization of method, whereby all pursuits of knowledge would be reduced to scientific pursuits of knowledge through hypothesis, testing, and conclusions in a peer reviewed context. Second, scientism might reduce all knowledge to that which can be falsified. Third, scientism might restrict knowledge to that which exists only in specific communities with academic credibility and shared framework. Fourth, scientism might reduce assume or require all knowledge to be autonomous from the study itself. Of course, there might be combinations of these four variants, and these four aspects might manifest themselves in different degrees.

Now, we have suggested that scientism might exist, but this is a far cry short of demonstrating that scientism does exist. A universalization of the sort that scientism would be is only a problem if there is, in fact, a real universalizing tendency. Here, one could point to theoretical groundwork for scientism, such as E.O. Wilson's Consilience, in which he argues that all human endeavor and knowledge can and should be reduced to scientific analysis. Essentially, Wilson suggests that all other fields of inquiry can be reduced to the study of physics.

Scientism is manifest today in a scope well beyond that of a simple proposal by E.O. Wilson. Forces in various fields of academic study are already transforming themselves according to the principles of science. I'll offer a few brief examples, which will be relevant in future analysis. First is the tendency in the social sciences to move toward scientific methodology. Early work in liberal political thought by Hobbes, Locke, and others was based on deductive logic, historical analysis and/or thought experiments like the "state of nature" analyses. To be sure, some parallels still exist today in the thought of men like John Rawls, but the dominant political science paradigm is that of "rational choice theory" which seeks scientifically and mathematically model election outcomes. Similarly, we see a move in economics toward complete preference for testable models to the exclusion of more basic philosophical discussions on the terms analyzed (as Ricardo and Smith and Marx and Mills were prone to do). In these fields and others, there seems to be a trend toward scientific methodology.

In conjunction with the methodological trend, we can identify a clear bias against non-falsifiable fields ranging from philosophy and theology to the humanities. In general, these subjects are viewed with increasing skepticism, and it is common (especially on these forums) to denigrate non-scientific fields as completely worthless. This is a trend which, from my personal experience, seems to be common in the three universities in which I have taken courses. These trends alone suggest to me that "Scientism" has increasing influence in our culture, and several cultural analyses by Christians and non-Christians indicate the same.

At first glance, these trends seem to be beneficial, and I must admit that my initial encounter with them was quite positive and affirming. However, after more intensive study and analysis, I began to question "scientism" as a valid philosophical posture. I'll begin to explain why...

The Problem with Scientism

Scientism has been challenged on a wide range of fronts from a wide range of sources, including theologians like John Milbank, economists like Donald McKenzie, and scientists like Stephen J. Gould (The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Magister's Pox). The criticisms leveled at scientism can be categorized in the following basic categories: (1) Lack of autonomy; (2) False limits on knowledge; and (3) Priority of non-scientific knowledge. I will address each in detail

(1) Lack of Autonomy: I start with the most contentious point first. I'm verbose (if you hadn't noticed) so I don't want you to grow weary before you get here. You might miss some valid critiques of this perspective. I begin with the assumption that science includes a criterion of autonomy. Again, this means that the object of scientific study is not itself created or significantly influenced by that study. Otherwise, science is not objectively testing the world that exists, but rather is constructively creating that world.

Given recent developments in thought in the fields of sociology and economics, I have reason to believe that when scientism applies the scientific method to social sciences, it cannot fully maintain this autonomy from the object of its study. I'd like to begin by pointing to a book by Donald Mackenzie, Do Economists Make Markets?. Basing his ideas on the linguistic analysis of J.L. Austin, MacKenzie notes that speech is actually a "speech act." In other words, when we speak we do something. This is called "performativity." In terms of economics, MacKenzie (and the other economists in this anthology) suggest that when economists speak about a theory, they actually are doing something performative. Here's how it works: An economist attempts to apply the scientific method to the economy, modeling human behavior and economic transactions in order to develop a mathematical/statistical model to explain these interactions. A model is developed that best approximates reality, and then the model is published. Thus far, this is very similar to science. However, when a scientist publishes her findings on mitosis, cells do not react to the findings. On the other hand, when an economist publishes his findings on markets, the market responds. Investors, brokers, and financial regulators use the most widely accepted model to determine when to buy and sell. If the model says an asset is overpriced, then brokers sell. If the model says an asset is underpriced, brokers buy. Through this process and the gradual acceptance of the theory, an economic model that once only approximated reality suddenly represents reality almost perfectly. However, reality is conforming to the model, not the model to reality. Thus, theory is performative and "scientific" economics is not, in fact, autonomous from markets themselves. MacKenzie studies Options trading primarily (this is cutting edge economics, so it's hard to tell how widespread performativity is). He has clear examples of this cycle of performative options pricing, and the performativity usually lasts until a panic, recession, or scandal, when the model is abandoned for a replacement.

The phenomenon of performativity shouldn't be all that surprising if we pause to reflect on the nature of economics (and other fields in which performativity arguably operates, such as political science). I'm thinking about the work of John Searle in his book The Construction of Social Reality. I'm vague on the details, but as I recall Searle argues that many aspects of human social reality are actually constructed through convention. After all, things like the "body politic" or the "market" or the "nation-state" do not exist as biological or physical realities, per se. Rather, human groups aggregate through consensus and verbal affirmation to "create" a social reality known as "the market" or "the body politic." These institutions only exist through the performative utterances of the people themselves, and through these people's continual compliance with the rules of the reality which they have created. If such entities come into being through performative utterance, it should be no surprise that continual speech in the fields of economics or politics should continue to be performative and constructive of those entities themselves. The findings of MacKenzie or the debate between James Stimpson (Public Opinion in America ) and Lawrence Jacobs (Politicians Don't Pander) suggesting some degree of performativity in politics or economics are entirely logical.

I also want to differentiate between two levels of performativity. In fields such as economics or political science, there are clear individuals with the authority and audience necessary to make dramatic influence on the object of study. Economists have the audience of key decision makers and opinion influencers. Politicians are the same way, but to a lesser degree. In a field like sociology, hardly anyone has the degree of influence needed to shape the object of sociological study completely and immediately. However, if the thought of individuals such as Peter Berger (The Social Construction of Reality) is correct, much of society as we know it is the result of a gradual accumulation of social decisions. One individual (sociologist or otherwise) makes a decision or a declaration about how things are, and through his or her gradual influence, people adopt this decision or declaration no longer as a "hypothesis" or an expression of opinion. Rather, this event is mirrored and repeated until it is custom (how things are done) and eventually culture. If this is correct, there might be short-term performativity, whereby an economic model or political persuasion is "performed" in the marketplace or body politic to "create" a reality that otherwise would not exist. On the other hand, long-term (or slow-acting) performativity would be a gradual process whereby theory, declaration, and hypothesis gradually shapes reality in subtle, but clear, ways. I believe such a trajectory can be traced through the philosophical influence of political liberalism, for example.

What does performativity mean for scientism? First, it suggests that scientific study of social reality cannot be an autonomous, objective matter of hypothesis, test, conclude. Rather, what is studied is actually shaped by study. What is hypothesized might actually cause the test to confirm the hypothesis. If this occurs, what testing means in soft sciences is completely different from what is the case in the hard sciences. To be sure, science still has a place in these fields (in helping identify performativity, for example), but insofar as scientism denies legitimacy to any non-scientific, non-falsifiable knowledge, it fails to recognize the distinction between performativity and description, construction and analysis. Why does this matter? On to point two.

(2) False Limits on Knowledge: In many respects, science is built on a philosophical standpoint which finds its basis in Descartes. The Cartesian system is built upon skepticism and (relative) certainty as a criterion for knowledge, and reduces those things which are neither (relatively) certain nor readily demonstrable to non-knowledge. This is built into science's methodology, and its concern for falsification. If something hasn't been tested to a point of plausible certainty, then it isn't knowledge. If something isn't understood comprehensively enough to be articulated in a way capable of falsification, it isn't knowledge. Such Cartesian certainty has its place in the field of science, but I think it falsely limits knowledge where knowledge is more comprehensive.

I began thinking about such things when I ran into Michael Polanyi's Knowing and Being. Polanyi introduces the idea of "tacit knowledge" as a means of knowing that is distinct from a certain or explicit knowledge. Explicit knowledge would be a form of transferable knowledge that is known comprehensively and with a degree of certainty. For example, a scientific experiment could be understood in all of its minutiae and re-created over and over again for a uniformity and transferable object of analysis. In this way, explicit knowledge often moved from particulars to universals through a (relatively) certain comprehension of how the particulars fit together to form a universal. On the other hand, tacit knowledge often moves from particulars to universals without having a clear means of articulating the particulars, how they fit together, or what they signify. There is certainly little which could explicitly be explained in the form of a hypothesis which was testable or falsifiable. Examples of tacit knowledge are widespread. Language, playing the piano, and dancing all are examples of tacit knowledge. However, Polanyi suggests that another category of tacit knowledge includes propositional ideas (as opposed to skills or abilities) that are apprehended in a comprehensive fashion without the ability to yet understand the particular or explicitly explain the knowledge. Explicit knowledge is understood in an atomistic, deductive fashion, but tacit knowledge is only known holistically and (usually) experientially. Polanyi makes the interesting case that such knowledge is vital in the hypothesis-forming stage of scientific methodology (I find him convincing). Scientism, in seeking to extend a Cartesian model of knowledge through the universalization of scientific methodology, would undermine the validity of such tacit knowledge.

Another aspect of the limitation which science places on knowledge is in denying the positive/normative divide. Typically, a positive analysis is one that considers what is but a normative analysis is one suggesting what ought to be. In politics, for example, rational choice theory is a scientific analysis of voter dynamics, but it is incapable of moving from the realities of this voter dynamic to the necessities of a well governed state. Rational choice ends up positing vote maximization (power) as the only end of political interactions. I once had a political science professor - Jurg Steiner - who dedicated his career to trying to prove within the rational choice framework that non-vote maximizing action occurred. After years of research and publication, he had found once incident that was accepted by a small segment of the academy in his homeland of Switzerland. The point is, science has no room for ideas of what should be. One doesn't tell the moon how it ought to look. One simply constructs a model of its orbit. The only driving factor posited (for those entities which act cognitively) is survivial. Similarly, once political science is subject to scientism, it is reduced to description and survival. Economics in a similar fashion has been reduced in many ways to description and profit maximization (which is for the ultimate end of the firm's survival). Where the lack of acknowledgement of the positive/normative diad becomes problematic is with respect to performativity. If we ignore any intentional prescriptive elements in fields such as political science or economics and instead reduce everything to positive analysis, but if this analysis is performative and makes the world be/exist in a particular way, I don't think we can correctly continue without a care for normative aspects in these fields. The result is an a-moral creation of society itself, a performative creation of the political as a domain of raw power and the economic as a domain of pure desire. Neither situation bodes well for human flourishing; one with respect to war and the other with respect to injustice. I see Muhammad Yunus, for example, in his work on microfinance. He says there cannot be a divide between what is and what ought to be, and he has turned finance on its head with the normative goal of justice and poverty relief as an objective. This goal cannot, technically, be scientifically validated. However, with respect to fields such as political science and economics I believe it is exactly such non-scientific aspects which are needed.

(3) Priority of non-scientific knowledge: Having spoken of these problems, I think the writings of philosophers of science such as Thomas Kuhn become particularly relevant. Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is a well known book, and countless parallels exist among the writings of Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, Michael Polanyi, and Karl Popper (among others). The basic idea concerns Lyotard's notion that science is largely about the scientific community. Kuhn suggests that this community operates according to a specific paradigm during times of "normal science." This paradigm directs which questions are asked (and which are inappropriate), what methodologies are used, and what terms/ideas are used to interpret the outcomes of experimentation. This phenomenon gives the group a conservative nature, such that outlying ideas, results, questions, and methods are often ignored by the community as a whole, or dismissed outright. Only when science reaches a "crisis" are these outliers given a chance to enter the mainstream and direct/influence future research and analysis. In short, if Kuhn and many others are correct, there is a strong tendency toward homogeneity in science itself.

Now suppose that scientism extends this strong demand for homogeneity into other fields. We can perhaps understand the need for homogeneity in the hard sciences. After all, if we had hundreds of different sciences accepting hundreds of different explanations for electric currents, for example, our technologies would largely be incompatible, and our very pursuit of knowledge with respect to electricity would be hindered. We can accept homogeneity as long as it works because we know that electricity works the same in New Zealand, Tajikistan, Botswana, Mississippi and Chile. If a theory works in one place, it should be acceptable in others. If theories are unified, it allows for more efficient progress technologically, and for more coherent discussions on science globally.

Suppose, however, that we allow scientism to push such homogeneity in the soft sciences. First, we have the obvious problem that not all cultures, societies, and humans operate the same way. Biologically, of course, the human body is fairly similar across cultural lines. However, psychologically and culturally there may be a huge difference between an Irish factory worker and a Kenyan tribesman. The nature of the society in which each lives will leave a specific imprint on culture, society, and psychology. Even if we analyze two very similar societies' individuals, say an Irish factory worker and a Russian factory worker, there are likely to be tremendous differences as a result of cultural history, societal ideals, and language.

Given this diversity, scientism has a problem. The same electric current works the same way in the United States and Japan, so we have no problem with a homogenizing tendency in the hard sciences because the object of study is uniform and the benefits of homogeneity are obvious. However, if we extend such scientism in a field such as psychology, we may have problems. Each culture has culturally determined psychopathologies, for example. In Japan the hikikomoro is widely prevalent. In the United States, cutting is much more common. Each society likely has a different answer to the question of "what is health?" with respect to mental health. This normative difference cannot even be addressed by scientism in the field of psychology. In brief, science offers a strong tool to psychology, but reduction of psychology to nothing more than science eliminates the tacit knowledge/skill of the counselor, and the diversity of the individuals counseled. In fact, there is a grave risk of reducing psychology to pharmacology. Homogeneity in physics makes physics more efficient, but in psychology it makes psychology less efficient.

A second problem with the nature of the paradigm and scientism is in respect to the positive/normative divide. Take as an example global capitalism and the "Washington Consensus." Scientific approaches to economics, through a homogenizing tendency, are seeking to globalize a particular market and system of market analysis and participation. In terms of positive analysis (which scientism reduced economics too), this is a valid aspiration. Arguably, in terms of GDP and per capita income, the globalization of capitalism is beneficial from a dollars per person perspective. However, we must recall the issues of performativity and the necessary underlying normative elements of the social sciences. In terms of economics, it seems clear that there is an underlying critical anthropology in economic theory. Smith and Ricardo and Mills and other early economists were aware of this fact. However, after the advent of marginalism and and scientific approaches to economics, this aspect was dropped. To be sure, the "Washington Consensus" still embodies a particular anthropology which envisages individuals as consumers driven primarily by utility maximization under the guise of a specific rational capacity. The market requires such consumption, utility maximization, and rationality. Of course in promoting positivist analysis and policies of global capitalism, the normative anthropology is assumed. Wherever global capitalism is present, there is a tendency to colonize indigenous identity, culture, and society with the normative model of capitalism anthropology. This is the argument of the post-development advocates, at least. And so, the failure to acknowledge the normative elements of a social system leads scientism to create fields of political science and economics which are colonizing in nature, and which have no open discussion of the very principles of this colonial effect. The paradigm itself has priority in creating the social realities in its own image through latent anthropological elements. Where did these anthropological elements come from? Are they vestigial remnants of 18th and 19th century idealism, or are the the arbitrary constructs of a system unconcerned with the normative consequences of its performance? Scientism refuses to address these questions because they are not testable, certain, or falsifiable. And so it proceeds on without a whim to the homogenization of the cultures it comes into contact with. It's the McDonaldization of the world, to use a popular neologism.


Theology as a Resistance to Scientism

The objections I have raised above to scientism need not be specifically Christian. Indeed, they are merely a deployment of the recent discoveries of post-modernity, post-colonialism, post-structuralism, and post-development economics. In a world of posts, it is easy to imagine a world that is post scientism. In many respects, I believe my rejection of scientism would hold even if my faith in Christianity declined. However, if I am honest it must be immediately clear that I reject scientism partly as a result of my own Christian convictions.

Theology is certainly not scientific (certain ambitions of Alister McGrath notwithstanding). It is neither testable nor falsifiable, and it is not dependent upon autonomy. Indeed, to be a theologian one must be intimately connected both with the human nature which is studied in existential theology and theological anthropology, and with the God which is studied in pneumatology, Christology, and the metaphysics of the Trinity. Theology rejects the Cartesian certainty of science and replaces it with the functional equivalent of tacit knowledge. One knows one's own nature tacitly, and though this ontology and existence are not readily communicable, they both are known in a way that shapes an emerging theological anthropology. The doctrines of sin and the image of God are known as much in the tacit knowledge of human nature as unavoidably fallible and potentially great as they are in the propositional statements of Paul. I know myself to be a sinner and yet I know not how to fully communicate this fact. Similarly, a theology of the Trinity is not falsifiable nor testable nor even autonomous. Rather, such a theology is an elaboration of the religious experiences of the universality, immediacy, transcendence, and monadic plurality of God. Such an experience is known as a certainty, and is not communicable nor transferable. Evangelism as communication of a set of propositions ultimately fails. Instead, evangelism leads one to relate to the Gospel-as-Person (Jesus Christ) or it does nothing.

In short, in rejecting scientism I want to be clear that I am not rejecting science. Theology is a different domain from science altogether. In the past (and present) this has often been forgotten, but many Christians have remembered this truth. Rather, in rejecting scientism I am rejecting the claim that all knowledge is known in certainty. Instead, I believe a tacit knowledge is intrinsic in any analysis of the social sciences. When the critical anthropology which I discussed above was made an integral part of the growth of capitalism, it was because of the efficacy of the non-scientific arguments of Locke, Smith, Mills, and others. These arguments were not falsifiable nor certain, but they caried the day and shaped nascent modernism in such a way that all positive promotion of the ideals of modernity today is irreparably a promotion of the ideals of the liberal critical anthropology. In rejecting scientism, I am merely asking that alternate voices and alternate tacit knowledges be given a chance to leave their mark on the positive performance of theory. Why must liberalism be given exclusive rights to defining the ignored normative aspects of the social sciences? Theology is not science, but functionally it is the equivalent of the liberal modern metanarrative. (By the way, liberalism in this sense is not the same as "democrat" or "not-conservative." It is a technical name for a school of thought).

I believe that metanarrative is the driving force behind the social sciences. When performativity occurs, it is the utterance of a narrative held subconsciously by the social scientist. When realities are socially constructed, the grand vision of the society which constructs these realities necessarily shapes them in a fundamental way. Scientism leads to postmodernism in attempting to deny the validity of the meta-narrative as knowledge, and yet scientism perpetuates an un-named meta-narrative through its performativity and through the homogenizing tendencies of the scientific paradigm. A rejection of scientism required admission of this reality, and discussion of the uncertain, nonfalsifiable nature of the metanarrative.

Christianity as a metanarrative will be viewed differently by different groups. To the secularist, theology is the lie upon which western culture was built. It was dismissed as a lie, but it is yet to be replaced with another. This is because much of the ignored metanarrative of modernity is in fact built upon Christian theological assumptions (so say the promoters of Radical Orthodoxy). In this respect, Christians have incentive to call the subconscious narrative to the forefront in order to demonstrate the paradoxes of a post-Christian narrative in the West. Scientism refuses to discuss non-scientific knowledge to construct a new narrative, and it refuses to fully abandon metanarrative insofar as it perpetuates homogenization through the communitarian nature of the paradigm, and insofar as it is performative when directed toward socially constructed entities. Scientism is the gag order on the question of the telos of society, but it is the simultaneous conservative fortification of the existing metanarrative as fact. Yes, to the secularist theology was a lie left abandoned, but to the theologian, scientism is the perpetuation of a heresy and Christianity is the truth upon which truths are built. I'll conclude with a brief note on the nature of this truth.

Theology is about revelation. Theology touches on identity, culture, ethics, justice and personhood in ways that can never be scientific. However, if the reality of the normative is admitted, if tacit knowledge is acknowledged, and if performativity is directed instead of subconsciously promoted, theology will find itself with a voice in a multicultural world. Who is to say that a theologically informed meta-narrative is inferior to a liberal or a marxist or any other metanarrative? Such scientific certainty cannot be known, but the tacit knowledge of each individual, which is developed in an unutterable way, will result in particular metanarratives being accepted. Christianity claims its narrative is given by God. As such, the performance of the narrative is not arbitrary. Instead, as the theoretical aspects of theology are manifest through performativity, the individuals are shaped into the image of God. Theology is a performative co-creation with God. It is the words spoken to help ensure the re-creation of humans and human society into the kingdom of heaven. In rejecting scientism, I do not reject science. Nor do I seek to restore Christendom. Those days are over. However, I do hope that the days of a private religiosity are over as well. Public theology applied only to the Church as one culture among a multi-cultural world is my hope, and the witness possible through such a pilgrim society is, I believe, the Church's call and its only hope of survival. Both the imperialism of the religious right and the accomodationism of the mainstream church are no longer acceptable in the multicultural postmodern world.

[theopoesis]

I wrote a ridiculously long OP to explain this. In brief: constructive or performative aspects, tacit knowledge, and normative aspects.

I dont see how these specifically apply to the fields mentioned, and their role in them.

I know what tacit knowledge is, but I dont know the others.

From the OP:

Given recent developments in thought in the fields of sociology and economics, I have reason to believe that when scientism applies the scientific method to social sciences, it cannot fully maintain this autonomy from the object of its study. I'd like to begin by pointing to a book by Donald Mackenzie, Do Economists Make Markets?. Basing his ideas on the linguistic analysis of J.L. Austin, MacKenzie notes that speech is actually a "speech act." In other words, when we speak we do something. This is called "performativity." In terms of economics, MacKenzie (and the other economists in this anthology) suggest that when economists speak about a theory, they actually are doing something performative. Here's how it works: An economist attempts to apply the scientific method to the economy, modeling human behavior and economic transactions in order to develop a mathematical/statistical model to explain these interactions. A model is developed that best approximates reality, and then the model is published. Thus far, this is very similar to science. However, when a scientist publishes her findings on mitosis, cells do not react to the findings. On the other hand, when an economist publishes his findings on markets, the market responds. Investors, brokers, and financial regulators use the most widely accepted model to determine when to buy and sell. If the model says an asset is overpriced, then brokers sell. If the model says an asset is underpriced, brokers buy. Through this process and the gradual acceptance of the theory, an economic model that once only approximated reality suddenly represents reality almost perfectly. However, reality is conforming to the model, not the model to reality. Thus, theory is performative and "scientific" economics is not, in fact, autonomous from markets themselves. MacKenzie studies Options trading primarily (this is cutting edge economics, so it's hard to tell how widespread performativity is). He has clear examples of this cycle of performative options pricing, and the performativity usually lasts until a panic, recession, or scandal, when the model is abandoned for a replacement.

The phenomenon of performativity shouldn't be all that surprising if we pause to reflect on the nature of economics (and other fields in which performativity arguably operates, such as political science). I'm thinking about the work of John Searle in his book The Construction of Social Reality. I'm vague on the details, but as I recall Searle argues that many aspects of human social reality are actually constructed through convention. After all, things like the "body politic" or the "market" or the "nation-state" do not exist as biological or physical realities, per se. Rather, human groups aggregate through consensus and verbal affirmation to "create" a social reality known as "the market" or "the body politic." These institutions only exist through the performative utterances of the people themselves, and through these people's continual compliance with the rules of the reality which they have created. If such entities come into being through performative utterance, it should be no surprise that continual speech in the fields of economics or politics should continue to be performative and constructive of those entities themselves. The findings of MacKenzie or the debate between James Stimpson (Public Opinion in America ) and Lawrence Jacobs (Politicians Don't Pander) suggesting some degree of performativity in politics or economics are entirely logical.

I also want to differentiate between two levels of performativity. In fields such as economics or political science, there are clear individuals with the authority and audience necessary to make dramatic influence on the object of study. Economists have the audience of key decision makers and opinion influencers. Politicians are the same way, but to a lesser degree. In a field like sociology, hardly anyone has the degree of influence needed to shape the object of sociological study completely and immediately. However, if the thought of individuals such as Peter Berger (The Social Construction of Reality) is correct, much of society as we know it is the result of a gradual accumulation of social decisions. One individual (sociologist or otherwise) makes a decision or a declaration about how things are, and through his or her gradual influence, people adopt this decision or declaration no longer as a "hypothesis" or an expression of opinion. Rather, this event is mirrored and repeated until it is custom (how things are done) and eventually culture. If this is correct, there might be short-term performativity, whereby an economic model or political persuasion is "performed" in the marketplace or body politic to "create" a reality that otherwise would not exist. On the other hand, long-term (or slow-acting) performativity would be a gradual process whereby theory, declaration, and hypothesis gradually shapes reality in subtle, but clear, ways. I believe such a trajectory can be traced through the philosophical influence of political liberalism, for example.

What does performativity mean for scientism? First, it suggests that scientific study of social reality cannot be an autonomous, objective matter of hypothesis, test, conclude. Rather, what is studied is actually shaped by study. What is hypothesized might actually cause the test to confirm the hypothesis. If this occurs, what testing means in soft sciences is completely different from what is the case in the hard sciences. To be sure, science still has a place in these fields (in helping identify performativity, for example), but insofar as scientism denies legitimacy to any non-scientific, non-falsifiable knowledge, it fails to recognize the distinction between performativity and description, construction and analysis.

I think that should help clarify. If it doesn't, I can dig up some quotes from Austin, McKenzie, and tie in a discussion of performative psychology (which is a new field and actually very confusing because there is performative psychology (1) which refers to simulation through acting and performative psychology (2) which refers to taking account of the dual aspects of the human personality: being and becoming).

I am reminded of Michel Foucault's claim that mental institutes functioned socially as means of establishing valid and unallowable modes of being.

Social norms?

More or less.

Psychology defines what is and is not correct mental functioning in a non-scientific way as a means of enforcing the ideal of the society as a whole.

I disagree. It defines what is preferred mental functioning. Psychiatry deals with what is correct and not correct mental functioning. Please correct me if I am wrong.

I'm not sure I understand what you mean by "preferred" mental functioning.

This could be enforced in any number of ways. As one example, consider heteronormativity. Psychology has within it the intrinsic normative claim of what good mental health is, as well as a performative aspect whereby the normative claim is concretized in those who are subject to the systematic application of psychology. This is not to say that there is no scientific basis. Rather, it is to suggest that to limit psychology to the simple scientific aspects it possesses is to eliminate any future discussion of whether our normative framework is valid or validly performed.

You mention heteronormativity, but dont actually apply it. Please elaborate more specifically.

Heteronormativity is the idea that heterosexual ideals are woven into the fabric of social discourse, institutional structures, and knowledge. The challenge of heteronormativity is one of the more well-known examples of performativity, whereby homosexuality was once considered paothological, and wherein child development theories included the need to determine sexual identity, such that "innersex" or "queer" individuals were considered to have failed to properly develop and overcome the challenge of a specific age in determining their sexual roles and identity. This may or may not be the case. I'm not wanting to dive into the homosexuality debate here. What I am trying to suggest is that a priori ideas about gender roles, sexual identity, and correct sexual relationships led to a particular definition of health, the labeling of homosexuality as a pathology, and the trend towards psychologically (or psychiatrically) treating individuals in a way that guided their actions, self-identification, and consciousness toward heterosexual norms. This performativity has been identified and in many respects overthrown, but I am of the opinion that heteronormativity is not the exception, but rather represents a broader trend of performative aspects of psychology.

My point has always been that psychology is not only science, and that where scientism tries to reduce the social sciences to the functional equivalent of the hard sciences is does a disservice to the fields.

Then how come every practitioner of these that I have met, think they are sciences? Is this where your disagreement lies?

I presume that every theologian you've met believed they were speaking truthfully and meaningfully. Yet somehow you have come to reject their opinions. In the same way, I reject the false reduction of the social sciences to the level where they are only sciences.

I see no reason to continue to debate peripheral matters such as whether the autonomy principle applies to multivariable as well as single variable science, or where exactly we draw the line in determining to what extent psychoanalysis is grounded in scientific theory.

The debate is about what is science and what is science. I am trying to figure out what you claim science is. These matters are highly relevant. I am finding what appears to be inaccuracies and only through these examples and elaboration can I figure out if your definition is correct.

Could you please point to inaccuracies in my definition of science? I am saying these things are not only science because of performativity, social construction, and the like and you have not addressed these issues at all. It would seem that determining whether I understand science would depend more on the reasons why I consider these things to be not exclusively scientific rather than on small issues over the definition of psychoanalytic psychology or psychiatry vs. psychology. Regardless of the specificity of terms, if performativity exists as I claim it does, then this has tremendous significance for the scientific nature of the fields discussed.

Even if every tiny detail of psychoanalysis is reducible to scientifically verified fact, we still have the immense problems that I raised in my OP about performativity, the positive/normative divide, and tacit knowledge. Until you begin to discuss these matters, it seems that our discussion will be very unfruitful.

As soon as I understand what those even are, Ill give it a try!

(please feel free to help here)

I'll go ahead and throw in another explanation. J.L. Austin contrasts two forms of speech: performatives and constatives. Constatives are truth claims whose referent exists externally to the statement itself. For example: "That tree has leaves." Either it does, and the sentence is true, or it doesn't, and the sentence is false. On the other hand, a performative is an utterance which creates the reality to which it refers. For example, "I now pronounce you man and wife." The man and wife are wed as a result of the power invested in the speaker by the state of New York, etc. Other examples would be, "I promise to ....." in which the sentence creates the promise. Likewise, "To my son, Bob, I leave my summer home in the Alps." The statement in the will itself does something.

Now, Austin initially was thinking about isolated phrases and sentences, but with the advent of the idea of social constructionism, things changed. How many basic realities in life are merely socially constructed? Ideas like nationality, voting, gender, or social conventions like baseball. None of these exist in the physical world of particles. However, each is constructed through social consensus. Now, if such entities exist through social convention, can we not suggest that persuasive theories about such socially constructed realities are not merely constantive but rather performative? For example, when I say "that rock is granite." It either is, or it isn't. The statement is a constantive. However, if I say, "markets operate in this way" or "Swedes are this sort of people" or "men act like this" my statement actually helps create a social understanding of appropriate market interactions, Swedish identity, or gender. The greater my influence, or the more people that agree with me, the more effective my performative statement is. In this respect, I maintain that the soft sciences are very distinct from the hard sciences. And I'm not alone:





etc.

But again, even in science the criterion of autonomy assumes that the researcher is not one of these unknown variables. The variable of pH might be confounded by gasses, insects, contaminated media, etc but the assumption is that the scientist is not effecting things. If constructionism and performativity are correct, this cannot be true completely in psychology. Therefore, even if we can analyze patterns in which science can explain the specifics of psychological phenomana, we must question the science itself unless we discredit the theories of performativity and constructionism.

I had a talk with one of the statistics professors here at my university today about just this. According to him, there are many tools and statistical techniques that are available which can account for these. No one doubts there can be issues, but we even have the same issues in the hard science which you have no trouble in accepting.

Because I maintain a categorical difference between the two in terms of the nature of the subject matter and the nature of the study itself.

[nygreenguy]

In a field like sociology, hardly anyone has the degree of influence needed to shape the object of sociological study completely and immediately. However, if the thought of individuals such as Peter Berger (The Social Construction of Reality) is correct, much of society as we know it is the result of a gradual accumulation of social decisions. One individual (sociologist or otherwise) makes a decision or a declaration about how things are, and through his or her gradual influence, people adopt this decision or declaration no longer as a "hypothesis" or an expression of opinion. Rather, this event is mirrored and repeated until it is custom (how things are done) and eventually culture. If this is correct, there might be short-term performativity, whereby an economic model or political persuasion is "performed" in the marketplace or body politic to "create" a reality that otherwise would not exist. On the other hand, long-term (or slow-acting) performativity would be a gradual process whereby theory, declaration, and hypothesis gradually shapes reality in subtle, but clear, ways. I believe such a trajectory can be traced through the philosophical influence of political liberalism, for example.

For the economics example, I cant even comment I just dont know enough about the field. For sociology, I think this would have to be much more descriptive, like as in an example. Perhaps well get to one below.

What does performativity mean for scientism? First, it suggests that scientific study of social reality cannot be an autonomous, objective matter of hypothesis, test, conclude. Rather, what is studied is actually shaped by study.

Firstly, isnt the thing studied not changed until after the study? You talk about things being adopted after a study. So what about the original study? Is that invalid? Do you think that because the study changes ones behavior, it eliminates the possibility of replication?

What is hypothesized might actually cause the test to confirm the hypothesis. If this occurs, what testing means in soft sciences is completely different from what is the case in the hard sciences.

How might, specifically, a hypothesis cause the test to confirm the hypothesis? Can you offer a scenario?

I am reminded of Michel Foucault's claim that mental institutes functioned socially as means of establishing valid and unallowable modes of being.

Social norms?

More or less.

I dont think sociology says whats right and whats wrong, but rather describes societies opinion. Sociology doesnt make the rules, it only serves to communicate them.

I disagree. It defines what is preferred mental functioning. Psychiatry deals with what is correct and not correct mental functioning. Please correct me if I am wrong.

I'm not sure I understand what you mean by "preferred" mental functioning.

Psychology is about enhancing the quality of life. People see a therapist to solve personal issues.

For me, as I mentioned before, I have a lot of issues from my childhood that are still with me today and have an effect on my quality of life. The role of the therapist is to see what my problem is, see the cause, and propose a solution.

Going to my therapist at first, she only knew of my current issues. Depression, aggression, fear of death, etc.... Through talking, she found possible causes for my issues and then proposed solutions.

Psychology defines what is and is not correct mental functioning in a non-scientific way as a means of enforcing the ideal of the society as a whole.

So, they dont look at it from a "correct mental functioning" rather as what makes the patient "happy", and I dont think there is ANY enforcing of the ideas of society. That sounds like a pretty terrible therapist to me.

Heteronormativity is the idea that heterosexual ideals are woven into the fabric of social discourse, institutional structures, and knowledge.

Im very familiar with what heteronormativity is, my partner has 2 degrees in gender studies, so I get the rundown on everything! I was merely looking for an applicable example. Perhaps Ill find it below.

The challenge of heteronormativity is one of the more well-known examples of performativity, whereby homosexuality was once considered paothological, and wherein child development theories included the need to determine sexual identity, such that "innersex" or "queer" individuals were considered to have failed to properly develop and overcome the challenge of a specific age in determining their sexual roles and identity. This may or may not be the case. I'm not wanting to dive into the homosexuality debate here. What I am trying to suggest is that a priori ideas about gender roles, sexual identity, and correct sexual relationships led to a particular definition of health, the labeling of homosexuality as a pathology, and the trend towards psychologically (or psychiatrically) treating individuals in a way that guided their actions, self-identification, and consciousness toward heterosexual norms. This performativity has been identified and in many respects overthrown, but I am of the opinion that heteronormativity is not the exception, but rather represents a broader trend of performative aspects of psychology.

I see 2 separate issues here.
1) A failure of science. It was wrong to label psychology as a disease, and how gender roles develop, or how they should develop
2) The fact that performativity does exist in relation to heteronormativity.

I dont see how scientific performativity affects heteronormativity.

Then how come every practitioner of these that I have met, think they are sciences? Is this where your disagreement lies?

I presume that every theologian you've met believed they were speaking truthfully and meaningfully. Yet somehow you have come to reject their opinions. In the same way, I reject the false reduction of the social sciences to the level where they are only sciences.

This is not a valid comparison because dealing with physical natural things is not at ALL like the supernatural.

Could you please point to inaccuracies in my definition of science?

Im still trying to figure out if they are inaccuracies. Your explanation, while long, is not precise. This is why I went into the issue of multiple variables, etc...

I am saying these things are not only science because of performativity, social construction, and the like and you have not addressed these issues at all.

I am still trying to figure the definitions out and what examples of them you have. For issues like psychology, as I stated in my previous posts, we have statistical methods and other methods to limit the influence of the questioner

It would seem that determining whether I understand science would depend more on the reasons why I consider these things to be not exclusively scientific rather than on small issues over the definition of psychoanalytic psychology or psychiatry vs. psychology. Regardless of the specificity of terms, if performativity exists as I claim it does, then this has tremendous significance for the scientific nature of the fields discussed.

Perhaps.

Now, Austin initially was thinking about isolated phrases and sentences, but with the advent of the idea of social constructionism, things changed. How many basic realities in life are merely socially constructed? Ideas like nationality, voting, gender, or social conventions like baseball. None of these exist in the physical world of particles. However, each is constructed through social consensus. Now, if such entities exist through social convention, can we not suggest that persuasive theories about such socially constructed realities are not merely constantive but rather performative? For example, when I say "that rock is granite." It either is, or it isn't. The statement is a constantive. However, if I say, "markets operate in this way" or "Swedes are this sort of people" or "men act like this" my statement actually helps create a social understanding of appropriate market interactions, Swedish identity, or gender. The greater my influence, or the more people that agree with me, the more effective my performative statement is. In this respect, I maintain that the soft sciences are very distinct from the hard sciences. And I'm not alone:

It does make sense now, it also relies on the belief (or assumption) about influence, and how that influences is manifested.

Also, I still have yet to be convinced this cause and effect relationship exists.

Because I maintain a categorical difference between the two in terms of the nature of the subject matter and the nature of the study itself.

No one doubt the differences, and social sciences do present some unique challenges, but this doesnt mean we are unable to account for them.

[theopoesis]

In a field like sociology, hardly anyone has the degree of influence needed to shape the object of sociological study completely and immediately. However, if the thought of individuals such as Peter Berger (The Social Construction of Reality) is correct, much of society as we know it is the result of a gradual accumulation of social decisions. One individual (sociologist or otherwise) makes a decision or a declaration about how things are, and through his or her gradual influence, people adopt this decision or declaration no longer as a "hypothesis" or an expression of opinion. Rather, this event is mirrored and repeated until it is custom (how things are done) and eventually culture. If this is correct, there might be short-term performativity, whereby an economic model or political persuasion is "performed" in the marketplace or body politic to "create" a reality that otherwise would not exist. On the other hand, long-term (or slow-acting) performativity would be a gradual process whereby theory, declaration, and hypothesis gradually shapes reality in subtle, but clear, ways. I believe such a trajectory can be traced through the philosophical influence of political liberalism, for example.

For the economics example, I cant even comment I just dont know enough about the field. For sociology, I think this would have to be much more descriptive, like as in an example. Perhaps well get to one below.

I am much more familiar with performativity in political science and in economics. In particular, economics has demonstrable performativity in the options market. By demonstrable I'm referring to mathematically/statistically modeled examples that are widely discussed/debated. The sociology ideas are essentially from the field of constructionism or constructivism, which is largely in theoretical form and is beginning to be applied in areas like technology studies and sociology of economics. I would recommend Peter Berger's The Social Construction of Reality as a good starting text to understand this sort of thing, but I don't recall a specific example off the top of my head that is pure "sociology". However, given the fact that economic markets are a sociological phenomenon (hence the new field of sociology of the economy) and the fact that the cutting edge research on market performativity is being done by a sociologist (Donald MacKenzie), I think my first example will have to suffice. I spent an entire semester in graduate school studying this options example and its significance to get a grasp of it, so I don't feel the need to spend an equivalent amount of time exploring the models of a second definitive example unless the first is challenged. Perhaps the question is too large, and our areas of expertise too diverse, for us to really get at the heart of the matter.

What does performativity mean for scientism? First, it suggests that scientific study of social reality cannot be an autonomous, objective matter of hypothesis, test, conclude. Rather, what is studied is actually shaped by study.

Firstly, isnt the thing studied not changed until after the study? You talk about things being adopted after a study. So what about the original study? Is that invalid? Do you think that because the study changes ones behavior, it eliminates the possibility of replication?

I think the philosophy of science offered by Thomas Kuhn is important here. According to Kuhn, you have two kinds of science: normal and revolutionary. Revolutionary science overthrows the basic paradigm in favor of a new one, and normal science proceeds with smaller tests, applications, and clarifications of the basic paradigm. As a concrete example, consider Einstein's theory of relativity. Initially, relativity fixed a few problems with Newtonian physics, and as a result of its drastic changes to Newtonian physics it can be considered "revolutionary science." This occurred in 1915. From 1915 until the present, scientists have been operating in the mode of "normal science" (more or less... I'm simplifying here) in seeking to test and confirm general relativity. Therefore, the gravitational redshift was demonstrated in 1925, and fully confirmed in 1976. The search for gravitational waves still continues today (The full story is available here). We certainly can say that general relativity is acceptable to the scientific community, and it poses no problem to science that 95 years have passed since the revolution in physics from Newton to Einstein. The longevity of the theory in no way effects the operation of the universe, so it is not particularly concerning that the theory has been in circulation for so long between hypothesis and full testing results. The same is not true for the social sciences.

Let's turn again to the example of economics that I've given (I'm sorry, but it's the one I've analyzed most thoroughly, so it should make things most clear). The economic "revolution" could be linked to a group of individuals from roughly 1750 - 1850: Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and John Stuart Mill. Smith introduced the idea of the "invisible hand" which was later elaborated as the market mechanism. Ricardo introduced the idea of comparative advantage. And Mill introduced the idea of utility analysis as the basis for economics. Prior to these individual's theories, mercantilism or feudalism remained the dominant economic models, but with these individuals we can point to the beginning of capitalism. These guys didn't present their ideas as "hypotheses" (economics only considered itself scientific much later), but subsequent work in the field has been done to test, apply, and clarify the theory. This is "normal science" in economics. Now, tests today still seek to demonstrate the validity of many of the basic principles introduced from 1750-1850. This is a huge problem because of the social construction and influence of the initial hypothesis. The problem takes three forms: (1) Business leaders, stock traders, and government leaders are trained in the theories which economists are seeking to validate. They raise/lower taxes, buy/sell stocks, and increase/decrease prices all based on the models that economists are trying to validate, precisely because the economists claim that their theories will lead to the best profits and returns for investment. (2) Economists actually create the objects of their study. When the basic assumptions of capitalism were introduced, there were no markets for options or puts or stops or hedge funds or international capital flows. Economists and traders and governments actually created these markets and these assets as a reflection of their basic theories. (3) Specific models for something like the options market are adopted leading to demonstrable conformity to the basic model. Brokers buy when the model says buy, and sell when the model says sell. This is factually demonstrated.

So back to your question: Firstly, isnt the thing studied not changed until after the study? You talk about things being adopted after a study. So what about the original study? Is that invalid? Do you think that because the study changes ones behavior, it eliminates the possibility of replication?

Let's look at the options model example. The model had a significant degree of conformity to the market, but this degree was dramatically increased when the model was adopted by brokers and firms. So in short, yes the model had some validity in the original study if we only look at performativity 3. However, this original validity is itself questionable if we look at performativity 1 and 2. The options market was itself created by brokers and economists (performativity 2) who were themselves trained that the market should operate according to specific principles (performativity 1). An economist then developed a model that roughly modeled the behavior of a market made by capitalist economists and populated by individuals attempting to act in a correct way from the perspective of capitalism. Can we really call such an achievement valid?

What's interesting in economics is that there is a surprising lack of confirmation of basic mechanisms like supply/demand in microeconomic studies (the interactions of individual consumers), but a significant degree of confirmation in macroeconomic studies focusing on stocks, GDP, global capital flows, etc. One possible explanation of this phenomenon is that individual consumers are not fully influenced by the paradigmatic economic models in the way that governments, brokers, or economists are. Furthermore, consumers are constrained by basic biological constraints whereas markets and governments have no such constraints because they are constructed by social consensus and by the work of economists themselves. This very reality is leading to a new "revolutionary" phase in economics with behavioral economics. Only time will tell if this new branch can overcome the problems of performativity and the positive/normative divide.

What is hypothesized might actually cause the test to confirm the hypothesis. If this occurs, what testing means in soft sciences is completely different from what is the case in the hard sciences.

How might, specifically, a hypothesis cause the test to confirm the hypothesis? Can you offer a scenario?

I think I offered one above, but an example would be a hypothesis which is widely accepted and acted upon, but which has yet to have much testing done. With performativity, such a situation might cause a hypothesis to cause the test's confirmation. I discussed economics above, but rational voter theorem in political science might be a good scenerio. Anthony Downs, Kenneth Arrow, and Mancur Olsen laid the groundwork for this field, but so far the models have very limited confirmation in the way of testing. However, rational choice theory is one of two basic models in political science which all political science students and politicians are aware of (the other dominant strain is game theory). So the political system is already taking on the nature that rational voter theorem says it should, even though there have been challenges to the theory from various angles (Bryan Caplan's Myth of the Rational Voter, Ian Shapiro's Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory and Jurg Steiner's Conscience in Politics), and even though there is limited testing confirmation. The basic hypothesis of the model is that politicians seek to maximize votes and power, and that this maximization drives all politics. After the advent of this theory, we see increasing polarization of the parties, increasing micro-marketing in campaigns (Bush was a master of this, as was Obama), and increasing "empty speech" meant to earn votes but doing little else. These variables all seem to suggest that politicians and parties are adopting the rational choice model and leaving behind a framework that has room for normative aspects such as rights, virtue, and collaboration. Per the "expert opinions", politics is becoming a game of numbers/votes, and not a game of issues/philosophies.

Psychology defines what is and is not correct mental functioning in a non-scientific way as a means of enforcing the ideal of the society as a whole.

So, they dont look at it from a "correct mental functioning" rather as what makes the patient "happy", and I dont think there is ANY enforcing of the ideas of society. That sounds like a pretty terrible therapist to me.

This sounds like "person-centered" therapy, which does accept the client's goals as the appropriate goals for counseling. However, if my wife's foundation's of counseling textbook is correct, this is only one of many different models of counseling. I certainly know that the clinical context in which I worked, the patient's goals were not heavily considered. Of course, this was a sexual predator's unit in a prison, so I am certain that it was on one extreme end of the spectrum. I'll grant that this may have biased my perspective. My work in crisis counseling in a hospital was more "person-centered", though there were still particular patterns of grieving that we were told were more healthy, and which we were trained to help direct individuals toward. I don't know. I only have shallow knowledge in psychology. I am much more capable when I speak of performativity in economics or political science. I merely think the principles in one field can be carried fairly easily into any social science.

Heteronormativity is the idea that heterosexual ideals are woven into the fabric of social discourse, institutional structures, and knowledge.

Im very familiar with what heteronormativity is, my partner has 2 degrees in gender studies, so I get the rundown on everything! I was merely looking for an applicable example. Perhaps Ill find it below.

Oops. I feel a bit foolish then,

I see 2 separate issues here.
1) A failure of science. It was wrong to label psychology as a disease, and how gender roles develop, or how they should develop
2) The fact that performativity does exist in relation to heteronormativity.

I dont see how scientific performativity affects heteronormativity.

I think you offer a helpful division here. With recent genetic debates, it seems that much of the problem could be #1. Still, I think there is some performativity here in terms of (1) how the societal norms of sexuality are incorporated into "treatment" which shapes "patients" into the pattern society prefers, and (2) concrete examples of individuals who remain "in the closet", who commit suicide, or who experience increased anxiety as a result of the pressures of society attempting to coerce the individual into a specific pattern of sexuality and gender. Given the clear presence of such individuals, I personally find it reasonable to believe that there are other individuals who do not respond with trauma or double lives, but who acquiesce to society's whims and attempt to remake themselves into socially acceptable forms.

Also, I don't think the performativity is "scientific." Performativity is the very reason why I say psychology is not exclusively scientific. In the example fo heteronormativity, the performance is of a normative ideal of society such that society says, "the male gender normally acts this way", but that word "normally" is only true through society's pressure on males in society to conform them to the norm. Psychology historically incorporated this process into its method, and as long as countertransference exists, and as long as counselors are within a culture themselves I see no way to fully escape the performance of the normative aspects of psychology.

Then how come every practitioner of these that I have met, think they are sciences? Is this where your disagreement lies?

I presume that every theologian you've met believed they were speaking truthfully and meaningfully. Yet somehow you have come to reject their opinions. In the same way, I reject the false reduction of the social sciences to the level where they are only sciences.

This is not a valid comparison because dealing with physical natural things is not at ALL like the supernatural.

This is a completely valid comparison, because things like "markets" or "money" or "identity" or "gender" are socially determined constructs and are not physical entities. Regardless, your initial point was an argumentam ad populam, and as such is dismissible as a logical fallacy.

It does make sense now, it also relies on the belief (or assumption) about influence, and how that influences is manifested.

Also, I still have yet to be convinced this cause and effect relationship exists.

A Basic Timeline:

(1) Options are not Traded in main markets, but are small marginal field
(2) Black-Scholes-Merton model of options is introduced as one of the first major models of options pricing
(3) Chicago Board Options Exchange opens, making options a major asset to be traded. Initial prices were typically 30% - 40% off target. (early 1970s)
(4) Black-Scholes-Merton model is widely distributed as the easiest/quickest model to use for brokers who are short on time. Distribution extends to most major firms through a professional "options service".
(5) Black-Scholes-Merton model reaches a level of 1% residual discrepancies by early 1980s.
(6) Market crash in 1987 leads brokers to abandon Black-Scholes-Merton model. The model no longer fits options pricing.

This seems to me to be a clear example of performativity where a theory is spread to experts who have the ability to influence/create the object of study. I see clear parallels in the numerous fields where the object of study is heavily influenced by that study itself.

[nygreenguy]

. Perhaps the question is too large, and our areas of expertise too diverse, for us to really get at the heart of the matter.

I might agree.

I certainly know that the clinical context in which I worked, the patient's goals were not heavily considered. Of course, this was a sexual predator's unit in a prison, so I am certain that it was on one extreme end of the spectrum. I'll grant that this may have biased my perspective.

I wouldn't say biased. I think it still has the same goal. With sex offenders (I dont like the pejorative term "predators", as most offenders are not predators, but this is a whole different issue) you are trying to cure a legitimately bad actions. I dont think these actions are subjective, like in the homosexuality example before, because of the effect is has on another individual. It is a crime with a victim.

My work in crisis counseling in a hospital was more "person-centered", though there were still particular patterns of grieving that we were told were more healthy, and which we were trained to help direct individuals toward. I don't know. I only have shallow knowledge in psychology. I am much more capable when I speak of performativity in economics or political science. I merely think the principles in one field can be carried fairly easily into any social science.

Im not so sure. Different problems require different approaches.

Oops. I feel a bit foolish then,

Oh dont. The vast majority of the population doesnt know what it is. A valid assumption.

I think you offer a helpful division here. With recent genetic debates, it seems that much of the problem could be #1. Still, I think there is some performativity here in terms of (1) how the societal norms of sexuality are incorporated into "treatment" which shapes "patients" into the pattern society prefers, and

What "treatment"? Therapy? Hasnt most of psychology given up on the idea of forced gender roles, and instead focus on individual happiness?

(2) concrete examples of individuals who remain "in the closet", who commit suicide, or who experience increased anxiety as a result of the pressures of society attempting to coerce the individual into a specific pattern of sexuality and gender.

This is the pressure of society, not sociologists.

Given the clear presence of such individuals, I personally find it reasonable to believe that there are other individuals who do not respond with trauma or double lives, but who acquiesce to society's whims and attempt to remake themselves into socially acceptable forms.

True, everyone wants to be accepted, even if that process means they have to lie to themselves. "Fitting in" is ingrained in our genes, as we are social animals. This is independent of the social scientists.

Also, I don't think the performativity is "scientific." Performativity is the very reason why I say psychology is not exclusively scientific. In the example fo heteronormativity, the performance is of a normative ideal of society such that society says, "the male gender normally acts this way", but that word "normally" is only true through society's pressure on males in society to conform them to the norm

I agree up to here.

Psychology historically incorporated this process into its method,

Perhaps historically, but currently?

and as long as countertransference exists, and as long as counselors are within a culture themselves I see no way to fully escape the performance of the normative aspects of psychology.

countertransference may exist in some circumstances, but this doesnt mean that it can not be dealt with.

This is not a valid comparison because dealing with physical natural things is not at ALL like the supernatural.

This is a completely valid comparison, because things like "markets" or "money" or "identity" or "gender" are socially determined constructs and are not physical entities. Regardless, your initial point was an argumentam ad populam, and as such is dismissible as a logical fallacy.

But the supernatural is not natural (obviously). Ideas, and social constructs can still be analyzed, and have valid meanings. The same can not be said for religion (outside of the historical and cultural aspects of it). People who study the supernatural are essentially experts in nothing. They are no more qualified to comment on god than you or I. Sociology, economics, etc. are actual fields of study and in that field the opinions of the experts matter.

A Basic Timeline:

(1) Options are not Traded in main markets, but are small marginal field
(2) Black-Scholes-Merton model of options is introduced as one of the first major models of options pricing
(3) Chicago Board Options Exchange opens, making options a major asset to be traded. Initial prices were typically 30% - 40% off target. (early 1970s)
(4) Black-Scholes-Merton model is widely distributed as the easiest/quickest model to use for brokers who are short on time. Distribution extends to most major firms through a professional "options service".
(5) Black-Scholes-Merton model reaches a level of 1% residual discrepancies by early 1980s.
(6) Market crash in 1987 leads brokers to abandon Black-Scholes-Merton model. The model no longer fits options pricing.

This seems to me to be a clear example of performativity where a theory is spread to experts who have the ability to influence/create the object of study. I see clear parallels in the numerous fields where the object of study is heavily influenced by that study itself.

Your example above may be true, but you still havent given the clear parallels in other fields. (ones that I may understand)

[fewwillfindit]

In short, I understand you to be saying that the Church needs to be relevant to the culture without becoming the culture, or to be in the world, but not of the world. I wonder though, if in our quest to speak to issues of modernity, especially on college campuses, if the raw Gospel message runs the risk of being diminished or neutered. After all, salvation begins with the hearing of the Gospel, and where there is no Gospel, salvation is rare indeed.

I recognize your point as vitally important. A brief corrective: I don't necessarily seek to be relevant as much as I seek to be the church. To be sure, the church does not exist where the gospel is not preached. However, you are quite correct in saying "salvation begins with the hearing of the gospel." A full ecclesiology takes account of the Biblical language. The Church is a "city on a hill", that society who stands out so distinctively that it is a light not hidden under a bushel. Does such a city exist when a group has merely heard the gospel, or when they have been completely transformed by the gospel in every aspect of their lives? The Church is "one" as Jesus and the Father are one. Does such unity proceed from hearing a shared message, or from sharing a mission of reconciliation, a rebirth into a new group life through the Holy Spirit, and a unity of prayer, support, and discipleship? Likewise, the Church is the body where each person has his or her distinctive role in the edification of the whole. Is this role merely a hearing of the gospel, or a living it out through the redemption and application of your faculties and abilities through the mercy of the Holy Spirit and according to the greater purposes of God?

I am merely suggesting that to be the city on a hill, we must be so culturally distinctive as to actually reside on a hill. I am suggesting that to be "one" we must first reject the modern ideal of the Cartesian individual who is "one" in a way of isolation instead of in a way of communion. I am suggesting that to be the body, we must make use of all talents in all areas, not simply making use of talents with respect to private piety.

Agreed, now that I understand what it is that you are saying.

You've already addressed this, and I agree, but to expand it a bit further, the examples we have today of churches preaching a culturally relevant message are atrocious at best. Joel Osteen comes to mind, as does Rob Bell and Brian McLaren, and of course the ecumenical hybrid "purpose-driven" non-Gospel of Rick Warren. These leaders, in their desire to fill pews, are so over the top with a culturally relevant seeker-sensitive message, that they have mega churches filled to the rafters with unbelievers. They appeal to the tares, and tares is what they get. Osteen is on record, video no less, as saying numerous times that he never mentions the words "sin" and "repentance." Without these foundational aspects of the Gospel, there is no Gospel.

Contrast this with the great preachers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, like Spurgeon and Whitefield, whose raw unadulterated Gospel message drove thousands upon thousands to their knees in repentance under the convicting power of the Holy Spirit, which in turn drove them to the cross. It is unlikely that there were many tares who sat under the preaching of such powerful men of God; at least not twice. No, they preached to the wheat, and wheat is what they got.

I agree completely. But if you look at your history, what was a corollary of the Great Awakenings? Abolitionism, prohibition, free churches, economic reform, and so forth. The preaching of a powerful gospel demands a full rebirth into a new life. Insofar as a person's life extends beyond the personal piety of the soul, the new life extends beyond the personal transformation of accepting the gospel as a message. Full acceptance of the gospel brings us into communion with the Gospel-as-Person: Jesus Christ. When we are "in Christ" we are no longer in the world, so we "throw off the sin that so easily entangles", and we throw down "vain and deceitful philosophies" and we do not live in accordance with the "ruler of this world." If this imagery doesn't speak to the need to have a distinctive culture, I don't know what does.

Again, I agree with you. I was focusing on the beginning aspects of salvation and you are speaking of the continuing aspects of salvation.

As a final note... Whitfield and Spurgeon did not merely preach to the wheat. With God's aid, they grew wheat. It's not merely preaching a message of truth, but growing that message within the congregation through discipleship, distinctive witness, and counter-cultural ethics. And to be counter-cultural (i.e. to be the church), one must have some connection (relevance?) with culture, of which one is the antithesis.

Excellent point. Growing wheat; what a beautiful metaphor. Thanks for that.

Now that said, if I understand you correctly, you are not advocating a culturally relevant message in the sense that the message changes to reflect the culture. Rather, you think that the Church needs to address the issues of our times, and in that sense, it will be more culturally relevant. I do not oppose this, but at the same time, I don't get excited about it either. Just as there is not a Biblical prohibition on doing this, there is also not a Biblical mandate to do it. I am certainly not an advocate of the Church being politically active (and as I read it, neither are you), with the exception of voting our conscience and speaking to moral issues about which we are passionate (abortion, etc.), but at the present I am indifferent to the Church addressing social injustice and globalization, etc.

1 John 3:17 - "If anyone has material possessions and sees his brother in need but has no pity on him, how can the love of God be in him?"

James 1:27 - "Religion that God our Father accepts as pure and faultless is this: to look after orphans and widows in their distress and to keep oneself from being polluted by the world."

Luke 13:20-21 - "What shall I compare the kingdom of God to? It is like yeast that a woman took and mixed into a large amount of flour until it worked all through the dough"

1 Corinthians 9:19-23 - "Though I am free and belong to no man, I make myself a slave to everyone, to win as many as possible. To the Jews I became like a Jew, to win the Jews. To those under the law I became like one under the law (though I myself am not under the law), so as to win those under the law. To those not having the law I became like one not having the law (though I am not free from God’s law but am under Christ’s law), so as to win those not having the law. To the weak I became weak, to win the weak. I have become all things to all men so that by all possible means I might save some. I do all this for the sake of the gospel, that I may share in its blessings."

Colossians 2:8 - "See to it that no one takes you captive through hollow and deceptive philosophy, which depends on human tradition and the basic principles of this world rather than on Christ."

Romans 12:1-2 - " Therefore, I urge you, brothers and sisters, in view of God’s mercy, to offer your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and pleasing to God—this is your true and proper worship. Do not conform to the pattern of this world, but be transformed by the renewing of your mind. Then you will be able to test and approve what God’s will is—his good, pleasing and perfect will."

That's all I'm saying. Just expanded for our context. I don't see how indifference to culture or justice coheres with the Biblical vision.

Yes, of course. I think that we are speaking of two different things when we use the term, "social justice." I tend to recoil at this terminology, as it applies to contemporary American politics, and it is this meaning about which I was speaking. It is a buzz-word in politics these days, and comes loaded with a good amount of baggage.

And I am not indifferent to culture, nor do I think that the Church should be either. My main aversion is mixing politics and religion. The Christian Coalition and Focus on the Family come to mind.

I like what you have to say about the Church being its own culture without being the culture, but don't we have that already? Granted, it is scattered about and not a homogenous unified body, but man; without divine intervention, I cannot see such a logistical feat being even remotely feasible.

I'm very skeptical that we have that when I look around at the church today. In the 400s to the 1600s, if one wanted to learn about linguistics of philosophy, one turned to Augustine and Aquinas. If one wanted to hear the great classics of music, one turned to Handel or Bach. If one wanted to see the most amazing architecture, one turned to the builders of cathedrals. That was a distinctive Christian culture.

Today, when the Church wants to develop its leadership, it turns to the strategies of corporate America. When we want to make worship more "appealing" we adopt the lights and video and entertainment aspects of Hollywood and the radio. The average Christian is theologically illiterate and is shaped by non-Christian ideals such as individualism, consumerism, and democracy. And it's an unavoidable truth that most churches don't speak on many of the things that define daily life for modern individuals.

Divine intervention is precisely what we need, and is precisely what happens in salvation through the work of the Holy Spirit.

Another excellent point. I stand corrected.

But just what is the job of the Church? Isn't it primarily the Great Commission?

Precisely the point. The church exists to make disciples. The disciple is one who "picks up his cross and follows Jesus" into a kingdom where "the first will be last and the last will be first." The Great Commission disrupts the entire social hierarchy. The Church exists to make disciples of all nations. The Church is not to remain captive to any individual nation or culture, but to transcend nations and cultures as the counter-cultural "nation of priests" who invites "barbarian, scythian, or jew" to partake of the blessings of relationship with the triune God. The Church exists to make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. What is Baptism if it is not symbolic of our burial with Christ unto death, and our resurrection to a new Spirit-filled life which foreshadows the bodily resurrection (Romans 6)? What does it mean to be "born again" or to be "made alive together" if that doesn't imply dying to our old way of life and being remade anew so that we are "in Christ" and restored to the image of God? What does such death and rebirth imply if our identity, society, culture, and mindset from our previous life is not abandoned for a new Christian culture? The full gospel is not merely information to be accepted. It is an invitation into a new life of radical discipleship and communion with the Triune God. Such a message necessarily has cultural ramifications.

Again, my focus was on the initial act of salvation and yours was on the ongoing process of discipleship. We are not at odds with each other here.

Perhaps we need a few more Spurgeons and Whitefields and a few less Osteens and Warrens.

Perhaps the Church today is closer to Osteen and Warren than it realizes.

This made me step back and do some serious introspection and surveying of the Church landscape (and of my own life as well), which is the primary reason for my delay in replying. This is a sobering claim, and not to be taken lightly, but upon examination, I believe that you are correct.

I really think you are on to something here, theopoesis. I mean your entire initial reply to me, not just this last quote above. I am a simple man with little influence and even less resources, but it's going to take someone with a mind like yours to help to awaken the Church to its deficiencies, of course through the empowerment of the Holy Spirit.

[theopoesis]

nygreenguy:

I'm sorry for my delayed response. It's been a busy week, but I have enjoyed our conversation. Thank you for taking the time to try to understand my ramblings.

I wouldn't say biased. I think it still has the same goal. With sex offenders (I dont like the pejorative term "predators", as most offenders are not predators, but this is a whole different issue) you are trying to cure a legitimately bad actions. I dont think these actions are subjective, like in the homosexuality example before, because of the effect is has on another individual. It is a crime with a victim.

Just to defend myself and demonstrate my non-pejorative nature, lawsuits had kept all but a few individuals out of treatment. I can't specify the nature of their offenses, but the ones in treatment were without a doubt predatory. No statutory rape here. I usually don't use the term, but you wouldn't know the specifics of what I was referring to, so I felt the need to clarify.

My work in crisis counseling in a hospital was more "person-centered", though there were still particular patterns of grieving that we were told were more healthy, and which we were trained to help direct individuals toward. I don't know. I only have shallow knowledge in psychology. I am much more capable when I speak of performativity in economics or political science. I merely think the principles in one field can be carried fairly easily into any social science.

Im not so sure. Different problems require different approaches.

If the object of the study shares the same potential for malleability, then the difference is less relevant than the similarity.

I think you offer a helpful division here. With recent genetic debates, it seems that much of the problem could be #1. Still, I think there is some performativity here in terms of (1) how the societal norms of sexuality are incorporated into "treatment" which shapes "patients" into the pattern society prefers, and

What "treatment"? Therapy? Hasnt most of psychology given up on the idea of forced gender roles, and instead focus on individual happiness?

I'm speaking of the historical performativity of heteronormativity. This particular performance might have been reduced, but its historically reality seems to be a major theme of queer studies. It's historical presence raises the general suspicion of difficulties with respect to performativity in the social sciences.

(2) concrete examples of individuals who remain "in the closet", who commit suicide, or who experience increased anxiety as a result of the pressures of society attempting to coerce the individual into a specific pattern of sexuality and gender.

This is the pressure of society, not sociologists.

I think it is more of a dual pressure. I've worked with men whose counselors (in their interpretation) had pressured them in a particular direction. Whether such pressure was real, ethical, or even common, it was interpreted in such a way that the individual felt a need to act a certain way with respect to his identity. In this individual's instance, it resulted in an assault on the counseling individual. (This wasn't in a prison context, btw, but in a shelter where the resulting psychological strife seemed to have pushed this poor individual to a point of hopelessness and homelessness).

Given the clear presence of such individuals, I personally find it reasonable to believe that there are other individuals who do not respond with trauma or double lives, but who acquiesce to society's whims and attempt to remake themselves into socially acceptable forms.

True, everyone wants to be accepted, even if that process means they have to lie to themselves. "Fitting in" is ingrained in our genes, as we are social animals. This is independent of the social scientists.

"Fitting in" is in our genes, but the pattern into which we must conform is constructed. Demonstrable sociological processes such as majority and minority influence and social cuing all play a role in this. Figures of authority have been shown to more successfully exert these forms of influence. Hence, a Phd sociologist who teaches classes and then conducts surveys on students for research is molding those students into a pattern through his teaching which he then incorporates into his studies. It's not a dramatic/sudden process, but over generations it can make a huge difference.

Psychology historically incorporated this process into its method,

Perhaps historically, but currently?

To a lesser extent, However, the problem remains that psychology today, even if it has no performativity, is studying people who were molded by the historical performance. If psychology refuses to address the normative question (which it cannot do scientifically), it will simply perpetuate an earlier performance. And this is only if it can successfully completely escape the problem of performativity.

But the supernatural is not natural (obviously). Ideas, and social constructs can still be analyzed, and have valid meanings. The same can not be said for religion (outside of the historical and cultural aspects of it). People who study the supernatural are essentially experts in nothing. They are no more qualified to comment on god than you or I. Sociology, economics, etc. are actual fields of study and in that field the opinions of the experts matter.

This is only true if revelation is either impossible or has never occurred.

A Basic Timeline:

(1) Options are not Traded in main markets, but are small marginal field
(2) Black-Scholes-Merton model of options is introduced as one of the first major models of options pricing
(3) Chicago Board Options Exchange opens, making options a major asset to be traded. Initial prices were typically 30% - 40% off target. (early 1970s)
(4) Black-Scholes-Merton model is widely distributed as the easiest/quickest model to use for brokers who are short on time. Distribution extends to most major firms through a professional "options service".
(5) Black-Scholes-Merton model reaches a level of 1% residual discrepancies by early 1980s.
(6) Market crash in 1987 leads brokers to abandon Black-Scholes-Merton model. The model no longer fits options pricing.

This seems to me to be a clear example of performativity where a theory is spread to experts who have the ability to influence/create the object of study. I see clear parallels in the numerous fields where the object of study is heavily influenced by that study itself.

Your example above may be true, but you still havent given the clear parallels in other fields. (ones that I may understand)

I've given all the examples I have studied enough to confidently discuss: (1) The Black-Scholes-Merton options pricing, (2) rational choice theory, (3) heteronormativity, (4) general economic performativity such as supply/demand, (5) widespread theories incorporating the possibility of performativity such as social constructionism.

Unfortunately, I'm at the end of my knowledge base. I'm sorry I haven't been able to produce a clearer example for you. However, I have discussed examples or theory in political science, psychology, economics, and sociology. This is the best I can do for now. I plan to continue studying this in the future, and it might be my doctoral dissertation.

theopoesis

[Janx]

That was a great read theopoesis.

It's very hard to respond too because it feels like there are no grounding ideas. The concept never really comes together. I think a great start would be providing a definition of “scientism�.

I'll try to give it a shot later

Cheers

[Slopeshoulder]

That was a great read theopoesis.

It's very hard to respond too because it feels like there are no grounding ideas. The concept never really comes together. I think a great start would be providing a definition of “scientism�.

I'll try to give it a shot later

Cheers

FYI, theopoesis left the forum, rather in disgust. He was perhaps our most learned member.
You can probably get a clear definition of scentism from any good philosophical dictionary or encyclopedia. But you won't get a reply from theopoesis.

or go here:
http://www.google.com/search?q=scientis ... 1I7GGLL_en