Arguments and evidence for deism, theism, and miracles

[otseng]

We have agreed to debate the following:

Is there sufficient evidence to conclude the existence of a deistic God?

And if so, is there sufficient evidence to conclude a theistic worldview whereby this God intervenes in human affairs? Specifically, is there evidentiary justification for concluding that some claims of intervention are authentic whereas others aren't.

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A thread has been created for followers of this debate to post comments:
http://debatingchristianity.com/forum/v ... hp?t=24538

[otseng]

Before addressing the first part of your post, I'd like to address this first:

But, if you are arguing for an extra-universal explanation, would you agree then that methodological naturalism is false?

I think I know what you are trying to argue, but I could be wrong. Before I go on a long tirade in response to an argument you weren't actually making, could you elaborate on what you mean?

Methodological naturalism limits any arguments to natural evidence and laws and cannot invoke anything outside of our universe. However, you posit an extra-universal explanation that invokes a cause outside our universe and also laws that are different from those in our universe. So, it seems obvious to me that you must reject methodological naturalism if you posit an extra-universal explanation. Do you agree with this?

[no evidence no belief]

Before addressing the first part of your post, I'd like to address this first:

But, if you are arguing for an extra-universal explanation, would you agree then that methodological naturalism is false?

I think I know what you are trying to argue, but I could be wrong. Before I go on a long tirade in response to an argument you weren't actually making, could you elaborate on what you mean?

Methodological naturalism limits any arguments to natural evidence and laws and cannot invoke anything outside of our universe. However, you posit an extra-universal explanation that invokes a cause outside our universe and also laws that are different from those in our universe. So, it seems obvious to me that you must reject methodological naturalism if you posit an extra-universal explanation. Do you agree with this?

Both myself and the entire scientific community, are eager to seriously consider hypotheses such as the "Big Bounce" the "Multiverse", the "4dimensional star from a different dimension collapsing and the 3-D universe being a 3-d brane, much like our 3-D black holes have 2-D branes", etc. These are all hypotheses that, quote, "invoke a cause outside our universe and also laws that are different from those in our universe". This is clearly, demonstrably, irrefutably the case.

One of the core ideas of string theory, is the assumption that there are countless parallel universes, each with fundamentally different natures and laws. Not everybody believes this, but it's undeniable that scientists are clearly willing to entertain the notion, in direct discordance with your definition of MN (methodological naturalism).

So it's undeniable that the entire scientific community rejects MN as you define it, completely, categorically, and without equivocation. MN as you define it is as antithetical to science as tolerance is to the Westboro Baptist Church.

I most definitely agree with every single astrophysicist who has ever lived, and wouldn't dream of limiting myself to intra-universal explanations for the universe and of excluding extra-universal explanations a priori. Thus, yes, I utterly reject MN as you define it above.

I mean, I don't automatically believe that an extra-universal explanation is correct, just because I'm willing to contemplate it. Of course not. I abide by the general principle you spelled out at the beginning of our debate. If explanation A is supported by evidence and logic to a greater degree than competing explanations, I find it reasonable to tentatively believe it.

[otseng]

I most definitely agree with every single astrophysicist who has ever lived, and wouldn't dream of limiting myself to intra-universal explanations for the universe and of excluding extra-universal explanations a priori. Thus, yes, I utterly reject MN as you define it above.

I don't think my definition is very different from accepted definitions.

Methodological naturalism is the label for the required assumption of philosophical naturalism when working with the scientific method. Methodological naturalists limit their scientific research to the study of natural causes, because any attempts to define causal relationships with the supernatural are never fruitful, and result in the creation of scientific "dead ends" and God of the gaps-type hypotheses. To avoid these traps scientists assume that all causes are empirical and naturalistic; which means they can be measured, quantified and studied methodically.

http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Methodological_naturalism

“[Methodological] naturalism is committed to a methodological principle within the context of scientific inquiry; i.e., all hypotheses and events are to be explained and tested by reference to natural causes and events. To introduce a supernatural or transcendental cause within science is to depart from naturalistic explanations. On this ground, to invoke an intelligent designer or creator is inadmissible.�

http://rationallyspeaking.blogspot.com/ ... gical.html

Modern science relies on methodological naturalism, which means that it doesn’t incorporate any supernatural or religious assumptions and doesn’t seek any religious or supernatural explanations for natural phenomena.

http://atheism.about.com/od/philosophyo ... cience.htm

How would you define methodological naturalism?

I mean, I don't automatically believe that an extra-universal explanation is correct, just because I'm willing to contemplate it. Of course not. I abide by the general principle you spelled out at the beginning of our debate. If explanation A is supported by evidence and logic to a greater degree than competing explanations, I find it reasonable to tentatively believe it.

I'm not assuming you believe in your hypothesis. But, I think it gives greater weight to a hypothesis if one actually believes in it. It's like a defense attorney trying to defend his client if he's not convinced the client is innocent. Even worse is if actually believes he is guilty.

[no evidence no belief]

I most definitely agree with every single astrophysicist who has ever lived, and wouldn't dream of limiting myself to intra-universal explanations for the universe and of excluding extra-universal explanations a priori. Thus, yes, I utterly reject MN as you define it above.

I don't think my definition is very different from accepted definitions.

Methodological naturalism is the label for the required assumption of philosophical naturalism when working with the scientific method. Methodological naturalists limit their scientific research to the study of natural causes, because any attempts to define causal relationships with the supernatural are never fruitful, and result in the creation of scientific "dead ends" and God of the gaps-type hypotheses. To avoid these traps scientists assume that all causes are empirical and naturalistic; which means they can be measured, quantified and studied methodically.

http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Methodological_naturalism

“[Methodological] naturalism is committed to a methodological principle within the context of scientific inquiry; i.e., all hypotheses and events are to be explained and tested by reference to natural causes and events. To introduce a supernatural or transcendental cause within science is to depart from naturalistic explanations. On this ground, to invoke an intelligent designer or creator is inadmissible.�

http://rationallyspeaking.blogspot.com/ ... gical.html

Modern science relies on methodological naturalism, which means that it doesn’t incorporate any supernatural or religious assumptions and doesn’t seek any religious or supernatural explanations for natural phenomena.

http://atheism.about.com/od/philosophyo ... cience.htm

How would you define methodological naturalism?

I have to be honest, I had not come across the term prior to you bringing it up. Upon reading more about it, I have to say that you are right that your definition is a reasonable version of the accepted definition, and yes, I disagree with MN.

MN postulates that one should have an a priori rejection of supernatural (supernatural, as in "miracles", not as in extra-universal, because extra-universal explanations are not rejected by MN), transcendental, paranormal, magical explanations. That is an absurd position to hold.

A scientist should not have an a priori rejection of anything.

The reason why one should reject explanations such as "An intelligence caused the universe to begin existing" or "Mohammed flew into heaven on the back of a winged white horse" or "My aunt can speak to ghosts" is NOT because they happen to belong to a class of subject matter that one happens to have decided a priori to reject.

The reason why one should disbelieve these propositions is the very general principle you presented at the beginning of our discussion: These explanations are NOT supported by evidence and logic to a greater degree than alternatives. In fact, in many cases, evidence and logic are overwhelmingly in favor of alternatives.


There is a crucial difference between presenting an hypothesis, and concluding that the hypothesis is viable.

I think that no hypothesis is unworthy of being presented, and it's highly unscientific to censor thought.

On the other hand, I certainly agree that one cannot accept or reject hypotheses willy-nilly, and that acceptance (however tentative and subject to change) must be grounded in evidence and logic, as you suggested at the onset.

The reason you and I don't believe intelligence was involved in the universe beginning to exist, is that we've concluded that the evidence for that proposition is no stronger than for the antithesis of that proposition, making the belief unviable as per your general principle. It would have been highly unscientific for us to reject the notion that the proposition is open to debate and worthy of exploration. We would have never gotten to this conclusion.

In short, I disagree with MN because I believe that all hypotheses are worthy of consideration in principle, and that no class of claims should be excluded a priori. The fact that no "supernatural, paranormal, occult, magical" explanation has ever been found to have greater evidentiary and logical support than alternatives, is sufficient to operate under the tentative assumption that these kinds of explanations are not viable, subject to periodic revision as new hypotheses are tested and new evidence is discovered. But the lack of evidence and logic support for these kinds of explanations certainly is NOT sufficient to create an axiomatic a priori dogmatic exclusion of a certain type of explanation.

Scientists shouldn't reject, say, voodoo magic a priori. Scientists should honestly consider the evidence and logical arguments in favor of voodoo and in favor of alternatives for at least a few fractions of a second, and based on having agreed to consider the hypothesis, and having pondered the evidence and logic in favor of it and in favor of alternatives, come to the tentative conclusion that voodoo is not a viable explanation as per your general principle. This conclusion should be tentative, and open to potential revision as new evidence comes in.

I mean, I don't automatically believe that an extra-universal explanation is correct, just because I'm willing to contemplate it. Of course not. I abide by the general principle you spelled out at the beginning of our debate. If explanation A is supported by evidence and logic to a greater degree than competing explanations, I find it reasonable to tentatively believe it.

I'm not assuming you believe in your hypothesis. But, I think it gives greater weight to a hypothesis if one actually believes in it. It's like a defense attorney trying to defend his client if he's not convinced the client is innocent. Even worse is if actually believes he is guilty.

I do not believe in the no-intelligence hypothesis, for the same reason you don't (or shouldn't) believe in the intelligence hypothesis: Neither explanation enjoys stronger evidentiary and logical support than alternatives, thus by your general principle neither is viable.

I believe that in the absence of an edge in evidentiary and logical support of one explanation over any other, the only reasonable position is one of agnostic pondering of the problem and active search for evidentiary and logical support one way or the other.

[otseng]

A scientist should not have an a priori rejection of anything.

I think that no hypothesis is unworthy of being presented, and it's highly unscientific to censor thought.

In short, I disagree with MN because I believe that all hypotheses are worthy of consideration in principle, and that no class of claims should be excluded a priori.

But the lack of evidence and logic support for these kinds of explanations certainly is NOT sufficient to create an axiomatic a priori dogmatic exclusion of a certain type of explanation.

Scientists shouldn't reject, say, voodoo magic a priori. Scientists should honestly consider the evidence and logical arguments in favor of voodoo and in favor of alternatives for at least a few fractions of a second, and based on having agreed to consider the hypothesis, and having pondered the evidence and logic in favor of it and in favor of alternatives, come to the tentative conclusion that voodoo is not a viable explanation as per your general principle. This conclusion should be tentative, and open to potential revision as new evidence comes in.

Very good. I agree with this.

Even though methodological naturalism is widely accepted among scientists (and non-scientists), it is a false assumption.

With that out of the way, I'll present some thoughts on your hypothesis of a non-intelligent process.

We are not getting specific. Our only difference is this:

Otseng: Does not yet focus on details of how universe began to exist. Assumes intelligence was involved in process. Let's call this the intelligence hypothesis (IH).

NENB: Does not yet focus on details of how universe began to exist. Assumes intelligence was NOT involved in process. Let's call this the no-intelligence hypothesis (NIH).

One issue is the causal infinite regress problem.

For IH, I would say that god is timeless. That is, there is no concept of time for god. Time was created as an element of our universe. Therefore, there was no cause for God.

How would NIH address the infinite regress problem?

Another issue is contingency.

If a process created our universe, was it by chance or necessity? If it was by necessity, why should our particular universe then have to necessarily arise?

For IH, it was neither. God decided to form the universe.

Another issue is the number of universes.

For IH, God only created one universe.

For NIH, how many universes are there?

[no evidence no belief]

A scientist should not have an a priori rejection of anything.

I think that no hypothesis is unworthy of being presented, and it's highly unscientific to censor thought.

In short, I disagree with MN because I believe that all hypotheses are worthy of consideration in principle, and that no class of claims should be excluded a priori.

But the lack of evidence and logic support for these kinds of explanations certainly is NOT sufficient to create an axiomatic a priori dogmatic exclusion of a certain type of explanation.

Scientists shouldn't reject, say, voodoo magic a priori. Scientists should honestly consider the evidence and logical arguments in favor of voodoo and in favor of alternatives for at least a few fractions of a second, and based on having agreed to consider the hypothesis, and having pondered the evidence and logic in favor of it and in favor of alternatives, come to the tentative conclusion that voodoo is not a viable explanation as per your general principle. This conclusion should be tentative, and open to potential revision as new evidence comes in.

Very good. I agree with this.

Even though methodological naturalism is widely accepted among scientists (and non-scientists), it is a false assumption.

With that out of the way, I'll present some thoughts on your hypothesis of a non-intelligent process.

We are not getting specific. Our only difference is this:

Otseng: Does not yet focus on details of how universe began to exist. Assumes intelligence was involved in process. Let's call this the intelligence hypothesis (IH).

NENB: Does not yet focus on details of how universe began to exist. Assumes intelligence was NOT involved in process. Let's call this the no-intelligence hypothesis (NIH).

One issue is the causal infinite regress problem.

For IH, I would say that god is timeless. That is, there is no concept of time for god. Time was created as an element of our universe. Therefore, there was no cause for God.

How would NIH address the infinite regress problem?

Another issue is contingency.

If a process created our universe, was it by chance or necessity? If it was by necessity, why should our particular universe then have to necessarily arise?

For IH, it was neither. God decided to form the universe.

Another issue is the number of universes.

For IH, God only created one universe.

For NIH, how many universes are there?

You previously admitted that your arguments (internal contradictions, conformance with facts and laws argument, conformance with logic, consistence with what we know is true, falsifiability) in their current form fail to demonstrate that evidence and logic support IH more than its antithesis NIH, and that thus, as per your general principle, IH is not to be considered a viable explanation at this time. I understand that you might be able to think of some internal contradictions in NIH that do not apply to IH, and that you are agreeing to novelty and complexity arising in the absence of intelligence (e.g. evolution) only for the sake of argument at this time. I therefore understand that you may recant your concession in the future, but as of right now, can we consider those previously presented arguments tentatively dispensed with?

If so, let's proceed.

You bring forward three new arguments. The timelessness vs infinite regress argument, the contingency argument, and the number of universes argument. Rather then attempt to address all three at the same time, I would like to address one at a time, if it's ok with you, and start with the timelessness vs infinite regress argument.

Timelessness vs infinite regress argument
The first thing to note is that with this argument you add a new property to "God". You had previously defined God as an intelligent entity with the power to create. Now the definition must be amended thus: An intelligent and timeless/eternal entity with the power to create. Agreed? Unless you object, until your definition of God is further refined, when I say "God", I will mean the concept defined above.

To mirror this new element added to your hypothesis, I will similarly amend mine.

I now posit that the universe was "born" of an antecedent state of affairs the conditions of which remain unspecified except for this: This antecedent state of affairs was timeless/eternal, and devoid of any intelligence or intelligent being. For short, although it's not the most accurate abbreviation, I shall call this antecedent state of affairs "No-God". To be sure, I'm not positing the existence of a non-intelligent being, I'm positing the absence of an intelligent being, with the added element that this reality/dimension/existence/conditions/state of affairs is devoid of intelligence is/was timeless/eternal.

Now, here is my counterargument.

For any being, or for any state of affairs without being in it, to be timeless/eternal is either possible or impossible.

If it's impossible, then both the God scenario and the No-God scenario fail to address the problem of infinite regress.

If it's possible, then both succeed in addressing the problem of infinite regress.

In order for the timelessness vs infinite regress argument to count as evidence/logic in favor of your explanation/hypothesis, you must demonstrate that it's possible for God to be timeless/eternal, but impossible for No-God to be timeless/eternal.

In other words, you must demonstrate that the presence of intelligence is a necessary prerequisite to timelessness.

Do you have any argument with which to make that case?


While you think about that, if it doesn't detract from the main line of argument, I would like to present a mini-argument against the notion that timelessness is possible for God but impossible for No-God. It's an argument you presented: The consistence with what we know to be true argument.

We know it to be true that intelligence is short lived. The longest amount of time we've ever observed an intelligence being continually existing is for 100 years or so. To the contrary, we're able to directly observe that a state of affairs devoid of intelligence can exist for a looooooooong time. Intelligence clearly seems to be fleeting and unstable. Thus to posit that something which we directly observe to be fleeting, unstable, short lived and very very temporary can be eternal, seems to me a greater deviation from what we know to be true, than to posit that inanimate matter/energy can be eternal/timeless.

[otseng]

I therefore understand that you may recant your concession in the future, but as of right now, can we consider those previously presented arguments tentatively dispensed with?

Yes, we can go on.

You bring forward three new arguments. The timelessness vs infinite regress argument, the contingency argument, and the number of universes argument. Rather then attempt to address all three at the same time, I would like to address one at a time, if it's ok with you, and start with the timelessness vs infinite regress argument.

Yes, we can concentrate on one issue at a time.

Timelessness vs infinite regress argument
The first thing to note is that with this argument you add a new property to "God". You had previously defined God as an intelligent entity with the power to create. Now the definition must be amended thus: An intelligent and timeless/eternal entity with the power to create. Agreed? Unless you object, until your definition of God is further refined, when I say "God", I will mean the concept defined above.

Yes, we are adding the property timeless and eternal to god. As a note, there will be additional properties that I'll also be adding in the future as we address additional issues.

I now posit that the universe was "born" of an antecedent state of affairs the conditions of which remain unspecified except for this: This antecedent state of affairs was timeless/eternal, and devoid of any intelligence or intelligent being.

One problem is that you claim a process created our universe. And processes imply time (eg evolution requires the passage of time).

For any being, or for any state of affairs without being in it, to be timeless/eternal is either possible or impossible.

If it's impossible, then both the God scenario and the No-God scenario fail to address the problem of infinite regress.

If it's possible, then both succeed in addressing the problem of infinite regress.

There are two more scenarios:

It's possible with God, but impossible with No-God.

It's possible with No-God, but impossible with God.

In order for the timelessness vs infinite regress argument to count as evidence/logic in favor of your explanation/hypothesis, you must demonstrate that it's possible for God to be timeless/eternal, but impossible for No-God to be timeless/eternal.

My argument is that if a process started this universe, then it must entail time. So, it's impossible for it to be timeless.

We know it to be true that intelligence is short lived.

Biological life is short lived, not necessarily intelligence. A counter to your counter is that artificial intelligence could theoretically "live" a long time inside a computer. So, the issue is not intelligence that has a lifespan, but the lifespan of the entity that has the property of intelligence.

[no evidence no belief]

I therefore understand that you may recant your concession in the future, but as of right now, can we consider those previously presented arguments tentatively dispensed with?

Yes, we can go on.

You bring forward three new arguments. The timelessness vs infinite regress argument, the contingency argument, and the number of universes argument. Rather then attempt to address all three at the same time, I would like to address one at a time, if it's ok with you, and start with the timelessness vs infinite regress argument.

Yes, we can concentrate on one issue at a time.

Timelessness vs infinite regress argument
The first thing to note is that with this argument you add a new property to "God". You had previously defined God as an intelligent entity with the power to create. Now the definition must be amended thus: An intelligent and timeless/eternal entity with the power to create. Agreed? Unless you object, until your definition of God is further refined, when I say "God", I will mean the concept defined above.

Yes, we are adding the property timeless and eternal to god. As a note, there will be additional properties that I'll also be adding in the future as we address additional issues.

I now posit that the universe was "born" of an antecedent state of affairs the conditions of which remain unspecified except for this: This antecedent state of affairs was timeless/eternal, and devoid of any intelligence or intelligent being.

One problem is that you claim a process created our universe. And processes imply time (eg evolution requires the passage of time).

For any being, or for any state of affairs without being in it, to be timeless/eternal is either possible or impossible.

If it's impossible, then both the God scenario and the No-God scenario fail to address the problem of infinite regress.

If it's possible, then both succeed in addressing the problem of infinite regress.

There are two more scenarios:

It's possible with God, but impossible with No-God.

It's possible with No-God, but impossible with God.

Right. Can you present any argument for it being possible with God but impossible with No-God?

In order for the timelessness vs infinite regress argument to count as evidence/logic in favor of your explanation/hypothesis, you must demonstrate that it's possible for God to be timeless/eternal, but impossible for No-God to be timeless/eternal.

My argument is that if a process started this universe, then it must entail time. So, it's impossible for it to be timeless.

Right.
If No-God causing the universe was a process-over-time, then No-God cannot be timeless.

Similarly, if God causing the universe was a process-over-time, then God cannot be timeless.

If on the other hand No-God causing the universe was not a process-over-time (not sure what that would be, but assume for the sake of argument), and thus compatible with timelessness, then No-God can be timeless.

Similarly, if God causing the universe was not a process-over-time, and thus compatible with timelessness, the God can be timeless.

Again, perfect symmetry. I don't know that you're making any inroads here.

To gain the upper hand, you must be able to demonstrate that only an intelligent being can be timeless.

We know it to be true that intelligence is short lived.

Biological life is short lived, not necessarily intelligence. A counter to your counter is that artificial intelligence could theoretically "live" a long time inside a computer.

However long intelligence can exist for inside a computer, it cannot exist for longer than the unintelligent matter/energy that the computer is made of.

So, the issue is not intelligence that has a lifespan, but the lifespan of the entity that has the property of intelligence.

Since intelligence cannot exist for longer than the entity that possesses the intelligence, then of necessity intelligence DOES have a lifespan no greater than the lifespan of the entity possessing the intelligence. It's inevitable.

The more I think about it, the more I realize that with regards to the notion that the cause of the universe is eternal, you aren't just unable to break the symmetry between evidence supporting your hypothesis and evidence supporting mine. In this case I actually gain the advantage.

My No-God hypothesis doesn't just conform with that which we know is true, it also conforms with laws, which was another one of the arguments you presented previously.

It conforms with that which we know is true in that non-intelligence is always observed (without any exception of any kind, ever) to have a longer lifespan than intelligence. Therefore it's less of a stretch to assume that non-intelligence could be eternal than it is to assume that intelligence could be eternal.

To show that it conforms with laws, I'll have to treat the notion of "eternal" and "timeless" separately.

If we think of eternal as "existing in an infinite linear time-line", then known laws point to non-intelligence being more plausible than intelligence. The first law of thermo allows the notion that matter/energy can exist for eternity. On the other hand the 2nd law of thermo requires that entropy increases. Intelligence requires a very high level or order and organization, which of entropic necessity would degrade into disorder and therefore non-intelligence over time. There are problems with the notion of eternity both for God and for no-God (for example, how can we ever get to the point where the universe begins to exist, if there is an eternity preceding it?). The fact is that on top of having all the problems that the No-God hypothesis has, the God hypothesis is further hampered by direct conflict between eternal intelligence and the laws of thermo, whereas the no-God hypothesis isn't.

If we think of the amended God and No-God hypotheses not as involving "eternity" but as involving "timelessness" then the situation is even more lethal to God. Intelligence, of necessity, is a process over time. Time is a necessary component of intelligence. Indeed, it is one of the axis on which intelligence is measured. A computer with a 2.4GHz processor is "more intelligent" than one with a 1.6GHz processor. A person who can calculate the square root of 5883349 in one minute is "more intelligent" than one who can do so in two minutes. The time it takes to complete an IQ test is incorporated into calculating what your IQ score is. If we both do the same IQ test, and we both get the exact same answers but I do it in less time, I will get a higher IQ score.

Furthermore, the very mechanics of intelligence are always observed to require time. Computation is a process over time. Intelligence requires the transfer of information from one area to the other of the medium through which it exists (brain, computer processor). Information cannot move faster than the speed of light, and a piece of hardware has to occupy a finite amount of space, thus for information to travel within the medium must take time.

I mean, a singularity is an example of a timelessness. Can you imagine the structural complexity required for intelligence to emerge, forming inside a singularity such as a black hole? Evidence and logic clearly support the notion that intelligence cannot exist inside a timeless dimension such as a black hole. They support this more than they support the notion that intelligence can exist inside a black hole. I don't think I need to drive the point home any further.

A timeless rock, a timeless hydrogen cloud, a timeless thread of neutrinos, a timeless vacuum, timeless nothingness, etc are conceivable. A timeless intelligent entity is an oxymoron.

Don't get me wrong, a timeless intelligent entity could exist. I cannot prove that it's impossible, but evidence and logic clearly seem to support the notion that timeless intelligence is an absurd proposition.

According to your general principle, I DONT HAVE TO prove my position. In order to deem my position more viable than alternatives, I just have to provide more evidence and logic in support of it than in support of alternatives, and I have.

To recap: When you had defined God just as an intelligent entity, and my counterhypothesis was the absence of an intelligent entity, you failed to show that evidence and logic support your hypothesis more than alternatives.

Now you added timelessness to the equation, and you aren't just failing to provide more evidence and logic in support of your hypothesis than I can provide for mine. No, in this case I am actually demonstrating that my No-God hypothesis is MORE viable than your God hypothesis.

Do you have a counter to this?

If not, would you like to retract the notion that God is timeless, and see how it goes if we give him different properties? (Omnipotence? Benevolence? An appreciation for the smell of burning blood? Dislike of homosexuality?)

[otseng]

My argument is that if a process started this universe, then it must entail time. So, it's impossible for it to be timeless.

Right.
If No-God causing the universe was a process-over-time, then No-God cannot be timeless.

Similarly, if God causing the universe was a process-over-time, then God cannot be timeless.

I've never claimed that God creating the universe was through a process.

If on the other hand No-God causing the universe was not a process-over-time (not sure what that would be, but assume for the sake of argument), and thus compatible with timelessness, then No-God can be timeless.

If No-God is timeless, then you cannot describe creating the universe as a process, unless you want to redefine "process".

Again, perfect symmetry. I don't know that you're making any inroads here.

I don't think there's perfect symmetry, but I'm willing to accept that No-God is eternal for sake of argument.

If we think of eternal as "existing in an infinite linear time-line", then known laws point to non-intelligence being more plausible than intelligence. The first law of thermo allows the notion that matter/energy can exist for eternity. On the other hand the 2nd law of thermo requires that entropy increases.

You can't use laws of thermo to defend your extra-universal explanation since you've already stated that our physical laws do not apply to it.

[no evidence no belief]

My argument is that if a process started this universe, then it must entail time. So, it's impossible for it to be timeless.

Right.
If No-God causing the universe was a process-over-time, then No-God cannot be timeless.

Similarly, if God causing the universe was a process-over-time, then God cannot be timeless.

I've never claimed that God creating the universe was through a process.

If on the other hand No-God causing the universe was not a process-over-time (not sure what that would be, but assume for the sake of argument), and thus compatible with timelessness, then No-God can be timeless.

If No-God is timeless, then you cannot describe creating the universe as a process, unless you want to redefine "process".

Lets not get hung up on words. Our language is a product of our environment. We live in a reality where time, for all practical intents and purposes, is a constant. All our activity is over time. Thus our language reflects that, and is ill-equipped to accurately portray concepts which implicitly involve fluctuating time, timelessness, time beginning to exist, eternity, etc.

I chose the word "process" to describe "the universe going from not existing to existing by virtue of a causal link with God or No-God". I understand that the word "process" is not entirely accurate because "linear time" is implicit to it, and we're using it to describe a potentially timeless or non-linear-time phenomenon. Nonetheless we have to do the best we can with the language we have. If you don't like the word "process", we can use a different one. "Event"? Phenomenon? How about "Not Necessarily Temporal Phenomenon". NNTP?

Again, perfect symmetry. I don't know that you're making any inroads here.

I don't think there's perfect symmetry, but I'm willing to accept that No-God is eternal for sake of argument.

And I am willing to accept for the sake of argument that God is eternal as well.

Can we also agree for the sake of argument that insofar as "timeless" is different from "eternal", then God and No-God are "timeless" as well as, or instead of, "eternal"?

So, you assert that there isn't perfect symmetry between the strength of the evidence and logic in support of God being involved in the NNTP of the universe beginning to exist and the strength of the evidence and logic in support of No-God being involved in the NNTP of the universe beginning to exist.

If your assertion is correct, then you should be able to point to some evidence and/or logic which supports the God hypothesis but does NOT support the No-God hypothesis, or some evidence and/or logic that detracts from the No-God hypothesis without detracting form the God hypothesis.

Furthermore, if your assertion is correct, you should be able to disposeof my arguments showing that evidence and logic support No-God more than God. For simplicity's sake, one of my arguments is this: Intelligence is of necessity a process over time, therefore intelligence in a timeless setting is of necessity less plausible than absence of intelligence in a timeless setting.

If we think of eternal as "existing in an infinite linear time-line", then known laws point to non-intelligence being more plausible than intelligence. The first law of thermo allows the notion that matter/energy can exist for eternity. On the other hand the 2nd law of thermo requires that entropy increases.

You can't use laws of thermo to defend your extra-universal explanation since you've already stated that our physical laws do not apply to it.

Well, you seem to agree that our physical laws don't apply to extra-universal circumstances, yet that gave you no pause whatsoever when you presented the exact same argument from conformity with laws in the failed attempt to support your IH (the prequel to the timeless God/No-God hypothesis).

It seems unfair for you to use an argument in favor of your position, and then rule the exact same argument inadmissible when I use it to support my position.

Anyway...

The conformity with thermo was just one of several arguments I presented for the No-God hypothesis being more supported by evidence and logic than the God hypothesis.

You haven't addressed the others. May I assume that you concede that they are valid, and that we can consider the notion of a "timeless/eternal intelligent entity with the power to create" as dispensed with for now?