Presuppositional Apologetics

[Haven]

Recently, many Christians have become fond of presuppositional apologetics, a method of defending Christianity in which the truth of the Christian worldview is assumed and the apologist seeks to expose the flaws and inconsistencies of other worldviews. Presuppositionalists generally hold to either the Clarkian or Van Tillian approaches, which have minor differences but make the same general assumption that the Bible / Christian god is the basis for all knowledge and that one cannot know anything apart from that foundation.

Critics point this out as logically invalid via the fallacy of begging the question, and feel that presuppositionalism is nothing more than a pointless exercise in circular reasoning. Many atheists refuse to debate presuppositionalists, stating that any such debate is an exercise in futility.

Debate question: What do you think? Is presuppositional apologetics sound? Is it a path to truth? Does it beg the question? Is it simply pointless circular reasoning, or is it an argument which skeptics must take seriously?

[pax]

Parents are the first educators of their children. That the parents instill their own beliefs in their children is a natural occurance. This is proper indoctrination. When the State indoctrinates, then the State has gone way past its intended purpose, which is to protect the lives and the rights of its citizens, one of the primary rights of parents being to educate their own children.

Of course, but they should not teach the law / rules, without teaching the why. That is what I take issue with. The majority of people who leave the Church do so because they don't undertand it or the answers it gives to their questions.

But, wow, it only took one page for this to become a god-bashing thread. I am impressed. Production levels are definitely on the rise. Everybody gets a Christmas bonus this year!

How is this a god-bashing thread?

Maybe I am just a little too sensitive.

Or maybe I just try to nip these things in the bud.

If you tell me it is not turning into a god-bashing thread, then I believe you, and I apologize.

[His Name Is John]

Maybe I am just a little too sensitive.

Or maybe I just try to nip these things in the bud.

If you tell me it is not turning into a god-bashing thread, then I believe you, and I apologize.

I wouldn't have said so. We were just discussing the pros and cons of presuppositional apologetics (and giving examples), and I mentioned how I thought the Church has not done a good job of explaining itself.

If anything you could claim it was beginning to be a religion-bashing thread. Or at least it could have started going that way, but not a god-bashing thread.

[Slopeshoulder]

Good topic.

I don't have the time or expertise to go in to this deeply, but here are a few thoughts:

- presuppositional apologetics doesn't work if it is a fancy name for a circular argument, but if it's located within a some sort of presuppositional axiomatic epistemology it might work.

- in general, I think that apologetics framed as "my worldview is the best" or "here's incontrovertable proof that this is true" are non-starters and ironically and paradoxically buy into the very enlightenment paradigm they seek to defeat. Better to make it intellectually OK to consider a religion and then let people just experience its form of life.

- Van Til and his followers are advancing a very specific and IMO problematic version of christianity: calvinism and biblicism. It's reactionary. Most presuppositionalism came out of the fundamentalist intellectuals who created the calvinistic alternative to princeton after losing the battle. Can it be used for other kinds of Christianity?

- I must say that the relative internal coherence idea that seeks to undermine assorted worldviews is kinda fun, and if updated with derrida and deconstruction it gets more interesting.

- If turned upon oneself, if it leads to forwarding the betterment of itself, great. But my concern it is that it is turned on others and if turned upon itself 'cohererence" could lead to closed totalizing thinking and stasis.

- I'm not a big fan of this, but the yale postliberalism (Frei, Lindbeck, Kelsey, Hauerwas) has some things in common (anti-enlightenment, form of live, internally meaningful) with presuppositionalism, but seems better. Still, they both seem to provide an intellectual gloss for what is too often a type of fundamentalism.

- theopoesis, a member of this forum who shows up sometimes, is your go-to guy on this. he's very learned, smart, reasonable, and he's into it. He gets the hauerwas thing and the van til thing, is a duke grad, a ph.d. candidate, calls himself and evangelical fideist (I think), and is really into patristic era orthodoxy, denies several councils' validity, despises the modern. if you can engage him it'll be good. And he's a nice reasonable debater/discusser with good intent, open mind, and patience. And he knows a lot more about this stuff than I or anyone else does.

- as far as i can tell, presuppositionalism must eventually affirm fideism and as such can't make propositional truth clams that have meaning outside its own community. This leeads to a balkanization which cannot be healthy. The yale guys are against fideism, but i can't see how.

- in my mind, if you take reason seriously, you have choice, either you can go radical orthodox based on a kind of presuppositionalism (which is what theopoesis does) or you can go more mystical and unspoken (which is what I do).

[Flail]

Recently, many Christians have become fond of presuppositional apologetics, a method of defending Christianity in which the truth of the Christian worldview is assumed and the apologist seeks to expose the flaws and inconsistencies of other worldviews. Presuppositionalists generally hold to either the Clarkian or Van Tillian approaches, which have minor differences but make the same general assumption that the Bible / Christian god is the basis for all knowledge and that one cannot know anything apart from that foundation.

Critics point this out as logically invalid via the fallacy of begging the question, and feel that presuppositionalism is nothing more than a pointless exercise in circular reasoning. Many atheists refuse to debate presuppositionalists, stating that any such debate is an exercise in futility.

Debate question: What do you think? Is presuppositional apologetics sound? Is it a path to truth? Does it beg the question? Is it simply pointless circular reasoning, or is it an argument which skeptics must take seriously?

Frankly speaking, I don't know how one could ever get to an actual/factual God with Christian characteristics other than by presupposition. Where would such a God and his 'details' come from if not by outright unapologetic presupposition? The Bible is a classic presuppositional collection of documents and, but for the blatant presuppositions going in, debating its veracity would be a dizzy, circular, never ending question begging exercise.

My favorite Christian presupposition typically arises when the discussions begin to touch on the utterly preposterous claims that the hearsay, second hand Biblical texts are 'first hand accounts/eye witness reports' etc or when we begin to delve into which particular human beings were present to record certain supernatural events or occurrences when no one was present. It is on these occasions that the dreaded 'Holy Ghost' rears His ugly head to set the record straight.

[otseng]

It is on these occasions that the dreaded 'Holy Ghost' rears His ugly head to set the record straight.

Moderator Comment

I understand the point you're trying to make. But your choice of the words "dreaded" and "ugly" has a bit of a flame bait element to it.


______________

Moderator comments do not count as a strike against any posters. They only serve as an acknowledgment that a post report has been received, but has not been judged to warrant a moderator warning against a particular poster.

[Haven]

In my opinion, a stripped-down form of presuppositionalism could function as a variety of foundherentism, in which the axioms of the presuppositional worldview (i.e. Christianity) could serve as the basic foundation, while the entire worldview could be checked for internal coherence. To argue for Christianity, the foundherentist presuppositionalist could show how other worldviews (for example, metaphysical naturalism) are either incoherent or rest on incorrect or unsupported axioms.

In addition to the usual criticisms of foundherentism, the problem for this view is that it relies on too many axioms / expreiential knowledges (i.e., the Christian God, possibly the Bible, etc.) which, in the opinions of most are unjustified as axioms and would require additional external support.

[Mithrae]

I agree (as much as an atheist can agree ), such approaches are fine for "preaching to the converted," but useless when debating a skeptic. I'm certainly not going to accept theism based on a presuppositional approach.

I think the problem is with this approach it presumes that the burden of proof is on atheists, rather than on them. Thus removing the atheists 'proof' means you revert back to Christianity.

I guess you could argue that the burden of proof does fall upon hard atheists, but most people would agree that it falls on the theists, and that the natural position is agnostic atheism.

I don't agree that there is any natural or default position. If there were, why would it not be the ignorance and instinct of our animal forebears, or the animism of early humans? Belief in the laws of nature and the authority of science is certainly not a natural position for example, it's indoctrinated by schools no less than belief in God and the authority of the bible is indoctrinated by churches. That's not to say it's a bad thing, because our scientific understanding of the world tends to offer a great deal in the way of usefulness, consistency and explanatory power: But those are precisely the criteria advocated by presuppositional apologetics, as I understand them (mind you I know little beyond Theopoesis' excellent comments here).

In fact it's worth noting that an aversion to presuppositions - or put differently, the requirement that beliefs be justified by external evidence - is itself a presupposition, or subjective value judgement on the sanctity of knowledge. That's precisely what the requirement for evidence is, after all - an attempt to safeguard the reliability of knowledge - but as far as I'm aware there is no evidence that reliability of knowledge in itself has any merit. The goal that we seek through knowledge (scientific or otherwise) is greater well-being for ourselves, for our family, for our societies and for humanity, not necessarily in that order. But in that light it's hard to deny that belief in things like religion, democracy, liberty, ambition, morals and so on can be beneficial regardless of evidence or objective truth value. Those who question these things on the basis of a requirement for external evidence rather than on their benefit (or otherwise) to the individual or community, in other words, are assigning value to knowledge itself rather than merely its purpose or goal: And that is a presupposition.

Moreover, since it seems impossible for knowledge in itself to have value in a non-theistic world, it's surprising that generally it's non-theists who ask "is this true?" before "is this beneficial?" Not a particularly rational approach, in my opinion.

[theopoesis]

In addition to the usual criticisms of foundherentism, the problem for this view is that it relies on too many axioms / expreiential knowledges (i.e., the Christian God, possibly the Bible, etc.) which, in the opinions of most are unjustified as axioms and would require additional external support.

First, this underlined part is an appeal to popularity, a logical fallacy.

Second, I'm not sure how it was demonstrated that the presuppositions are too numerous. I can understand the desire to limit the presuppositions as much as possible, but for Christianity to have too many presuppositions, one would need to demonstrate precisely how many presuppositions are required for a Christian worldview, as well as demonstrate that an alternative worldview was equal to or better than Christianity as a worldview yet with a smaller number of necessary presuppositions. While is is certainly possible to demonstrate this, I do not yet see where it has been demonstrated (here or elsewhere on the forum).

[Flail]

I agree (as much as an atheist can agree ), such approaches are fine for "preaching to the converted," but useless when debating a skeptic. I'm certainly not going to accept theism based on a presuppositional approach.

I think the problem is with this approach it presumes that the burden of proof is on atheists, rather than on them. Thus removing the atheists 'proof' means you revert back to Christianity.

I guess you could argue that the burden of proof does fall upon hard atheists, but most people would agree that it falls on the theists, and that the natural position is agnostic atheism.

I don't agree that there is any natural or default position. If there were, why would it not be the ignorance and instinct of our animal forebears, or the animism of early humans? Belief in the laws of nature and the authority of science is certainly not a natural position for example, it's indoctrinated by schools no less than belief in God and the authority of the bible is indoctrinated by churches. That's not to say it's a bad thing, because our scientific understanding of the world tends to offer a great deal in the way of usefulness, consistency and explanatory power: But those are precisely the criteria advocated by presuppositional apologetics, as I understand them (mind you I know little beyond Theopoesis' excellent comments here).

In fact it's worth noting that an aversion to presuppositions - or put differently, the requirement that beliefs be justified by external evidence - is itself a presupposition, or subjective value judgement on the sanctity of knowledge. That's precisely what the requirement for evidence is, after all - an attempt to safeguard the reliability of knowledge - but as far as I'm aware there is no evidence that reliability of knowledge in itself has any merit. The goal that we seek through knowledge (scientific or otherwise) is greater well-being for ourselves, for our family, for our societies and for humanity, not necessarily in that order. But in that light it's hard to deny that belief in things like religion, democracy, liberty, ambition, morals and so on can be beneficial regardless of evidence or objective truth value. Those who question these things on the basis of a requirement for external evidence rather than on their benefit (or otherwise) to the individual or community, in other words, are assigning value to knowledge itself rather than merely its purpose or goal: And that is a presupposition.

Moreover, since it seems impossible for knowledge in itself to have value in a non-theistic world, it's surprising that generally it's non-theists who ask "is this true?" before "is this beneficial?" Not a particularly rational approach, in my opinion.

While I would cede your point here to some extent, the scientific process is quite a different matter than the religious belief process. Whereas the former uses hypothesis and evidence, the latter substitutes dogma and ritual; when science arrives, thru testing within the scientific community, to a 'truth', it still leaves the door open, if ever so slightly, for further testing and challenge of the hypothesis or theory. Most religions however, keep that door slammed shut lest doubt 'water down' adherence and diminish memberships. Where doubt is encouraged in science, doubt is viewed as the presence of an 'evil spirit' in many religions. Perhaps this is why we seem stuck in old religions while scientific theory evolves.

[theopoesis]

While I would cede your point here to some extent, the scientific process is quite a different matter than the religious belief process. Whereas the former uses hypothesis and evidence, the latter substitutes dogma and ritual; when science arrives, thru testing within the scientific community, to a 'truth', it still leaves the door open, if ever so slightly, for further testing and challenge of the hypothesis or theory. Most religions however, keep that door slammed shut lest doubt 'water down' adherence and diminish memberships. Where doubt is encouraged in science, doubt is viewed as the presence of an 'evil spirit' in many religions. Perhaps this is why we seem stuck in old religions while scientific theory evolves.

Perhaps this is a simplification of religious doctrine. Consider the doctrine of the Trinity, for example. Arguably, it is rooted in a religious phenomenology and core texts as the evidence from which the theory emerged. (This is not evidence in the sense that it proves the Trinity true, but rather in the sense that it was the raw material from which theology sought to build a system of doctrine). Early trinitarian disputes over this "evidence" concerned the basic premise: can there be one God who is several persons? Modalism and sabellianism said no, orthodoxy said yes. There was logical debate back and forth, and it seems there was progress: Sabellianism lost the day. The next dispute was over whether Jesus had to be fully God. Arius said no, Athanasius yes (to grossly simplify). However, if you read the primary literature, you'll see that Arius and those who shared his view accused the Athanasians of Sabellianism, but Athanasius still rejected Sabellianism as heresy. In other words, there were new debates, new points of doctrine, but always built on previous development: the rejection of earlier flawed theories (in this case Sabellianism). So it proceeds through Nestorianism, Applinarianism, Monothelytism, the filioque controversy, into Joachin of Fiore's quaternity (which was rejected), debates on the trinity in history, etc. Even in the past 50 years we've seen the formulation of new aspects of Trinitarian theology, which are open for debate: Wayne Grudem (an evangelical) who claims the Son was eternally co-equal, but eternally subordinate, and Karl Rahner (a catholic) who claims the "immanent trinity is the economic trinity."

What we see is something akin to science. Basic phenomenal data (although religious experience is not testable or repeatable in the same way as scientific phenomenal data). Elementary theories to explain the phenomenal data, which are then rejected or refined through their plausibility, consistency, and believed facticity (science advances this through testing, theology through logic/philosophy, history/archaeology, ethical and aesthetic application, and textual exegesis). A shared community debating the veracity of the paradigm as a whole (the church and the scientific academy). It's a loose analogy, but better than "truth vs. dogma", "open vs. closed", "dreaded Holy Ghost vs. beloved reason", etc. Science rarely presents such an open door, nor religion such a closed one, as you might suspect.

Perhaps one reason you don't see people abandoning certain theological tenets today is that we don't have new methods of logic to the same degree that we have new methods of science. The same argument that is logically flawed in 300 CE will be logically flawed in 1300 CE and in 2300 CE. The scientific hypothesis that fails in 300 CE can succeed in 2300 CE as a result of new technology.