Atheism, Evolution and Moral Nihilism

[Adamoriens]

It is often argued by atheist and theist alike that evolutionary explanations for morality refute the idea that there are any "spooky" moral facts, and that therefore atheists ought to think there are no moral facts. But nobody on this board (so far as I have observed) has actually made a good argument toward this end. Here is the best I can come up with:

The moral beliefs of humans have been created and conditioned by, apart from cultural factors, the impersonal demands of evolution. Thus we find that our moral beliefs tend to facilitate reproduction and the passing of healthy genetic material onto the next generation. The universal tendency to especially value one's own immediate family, offspring and friends, the protection of children and women (chivalry, perhaps), the (general) disgust for murder, rape and incestuous sex, etc. are all explained by evolution's blind selection for adaptive behaviours. Assuming this is true, we can conclude that our moral beliefs are not sensitive to "spooky" moral facts, but rather to the impersonal pressures demanded by survival. And since knowledge requires a causal connection between facts and beliefs, it follows that none of our moral beliefs are knowledge; they have never tracked facts, only evolutionary pressures.

There are two points I'd like to make here. The first is that this challenge to moral beliefs must be met by theists as well; the evolutionary explanations are impersonal, which means that their success in explaining moral beliefs entails that the idea God has endowed us with reliable moral faculties is less probable (probably false). The second is that both the theist and the atheist can conceivably get around the challenge by positing that evolution happened to select for moral beliefs that actually correlate with moral facts; theists might come out in better shape here.

Any thoughts?

[AquinasD]

I think I understand what you mean. Parents raise their child to become Christian and if the child reacts appropriately the child goes to Heaven. Conditioning. What is the difference between dolphin conditioning and human conditioning?

There's not any difference between conditioning in dolphins and humans. However, parents trying to instill moral values and certain kinds of beliefs does not count as conditioning. There are lots of things in human societies that count as conditioning (praising children who get good grades, disciplining children who break the rules, etc), but then there are many things which conditioning cannot explain (i.e. why humans can understand and speak of the semantical content of words, rather than just being able to respond appropriately).

So your attempt at a reduction of my argument doesn't do anything to demonstrate that the dolphins' behavior in this case can't be thoroughly explained by conditioning.

[spoirier]

I don't see that anything but humans (in our evolutionary line) has had minds.

I do understand that, as you are Catholic and as it is clearly stated in the official credo of the Catholic Church that man is fundamentally different from animals, namely, that only man was created by God in His image, and that the Son of God only came to save humans and not animals (and also, maybe, that Christianity is most emphatically a religion of humility, very careful to not place ourselves, man and the Earth at the center of the universe, unlike most other religions of the world that see animals as having souls too), so this can make it hard for you to figure out the conceptual possibility for things to be otherwise. However, I find pitiful the way you persuade yourself that you gave a justification of this assumption, while all you have done is rephrasing it and playing with words (syntax), without making any serious work of looking for some possibly deeper and more subtle, spiritual and less purely logical criteria (semantics ?) for empirically deciding this claim (because, well, the question whether animals have souls like us is not purely logical, or is it ?)

Indeed, how may it be possible to empirically decide whether an animal has a soul or is a mere material, algorithmic process ?
If you are looking for a purely logical method to analyze observations, well, you'll probably fail to define a criterion for this difference, because, logically, an algorithmic way to process observations would also provide the algorithm that would satisfy it, giving an algorithm the illusion of being concious as measured by this criterion (even though there are limits to this, as expressed for example by the P vs NP conjecture, that can make it unpractical for an algorithm with limited resources to behave in ways satisfying given algorithmically verifiable criteria).
However, there is a higher category of criteria, the very one by which, I think, we intuitively guess that our peer humans are concious like ourselves. That is, a sort of subjective appreciation, or feeling, that they do behave in concious ways, which mere algorithms, even very complex ones, could not properly simulate in the long term.
Still, this higher, non purely logical criterion, can be formalized in logical positivist terms, in the form of the Turing Test.

Now let's try to apply this to the question whether animals are concious. The criterion, then, would be to see what feelings about them can be inspired by a personal experience of living with them for some time. Now, can you please tell: do you have any pet, or other personal experience living with animals ? Or do you know people who did and still feel them as mere objects ?
I recently saw a TV documentary about gorillas, and scientists and other people living with gorillas. Some of these people did report a strong feeling that, somehow, gorillas were people too. What do you think about such reports ?

Humans can perceive and understand semantics, or meaning. Animals cannot. This is not a difference of degree, but of quality.

I'm afraid things rather seem to be the other way round. Animals have feelings, conciousness and intuitive understanding of things (semantics). They just don't have the language skills (syntax) to express these.

Now let's come to the articulation between syntax and semantics:

Syntactical systems are not in-themselves semantical.

I currently work to write a clarified and simplified course on the foundations of mathematics.
This includes a sketch of proof of Gdel's Completeness Theorem:

Theorem. Every axiomatic theory without contradiction has a model (a system of objects described by this theory).

Proof. Write each axiom as a chain of quantifiers applied to a quantifier-free formula.
Replace each there by a new operator symbol K by the rule (x, y, z, A(x,y,z))(x,z, A(x,K(x),z)).
Add one by one to the axioms each closed formula (predicate symbol over terms) consistent with previous axioms. Each getting a Boolean value without contradiction, the set of all closed terms forms a model.

Still I do agree that there is a difference between mind and matter. I just don't think it can be correctly described in terms of the opposition between syntax and semantics.
We might even say that, somehow, the mind is on the side of syntax rather than semantics. As concious beings, we have (or at least some of us have) a good ability to make mathematical theories to understand matter. So, we master the syntax of the understanding of material systems (just another way than the way computers handle formal proofs). But we don't have much more as concerns the semantics. We can work with our perceptions (large but finite quantities of information) but can't really handle infinite systems. We can't even properly understand ourselves as concious beings.

Instead, I'd see the difference between mind and matter as coming from the difference between the concious (non-mathematical) and the mathematical (since "purely physical" objects would ultimately be merely mathematical ones). More details in my metaphysics text.

[Artie]

There are lots of things in human societies that count as conditioning (praising children who get good grades, disciplining children who break the rules, etc), but then there are many things which conditioning cannot explain (i.e. why humans can understand and speak of the semantical content of words, rather than just being able to respond appropriately).

I have read http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantics and I find it quite interesting. But since it appears to be a very complicated subject perhaps you could explain exactly what you mean? Can you name some words we should not be able to understand the semantical content of and why not?

[AquinasD]

Indeed, how may it be possible to empirically decide whether an animal has a soul or is a mere material, algorithmic process ?

At least you are asking a worthwhile question.

I think we have to employ Ockham's razor; unless animals do something that can't be explained in terms of instinct and conditioning, then animals are just analogous machines running a sophisticated but purely syntactical program.

What would be something that defies our expectations of mere animal behavior? Maybe a treatise on metaphysics or ethics that at least demonstrates an understanding of the concepts involved? One which also can't be explained by conditioning (i.e. I teach a parrot to "explain" the harm principle).

Still, this higher, non purely logical criterion, can be formalized in logical positivist terms, in the form of the Turing Test.

I don't think the Turing test is apt. It will, under certain conditions, call certain things minds which are not minds and call certain things which are mind not minds. It's problematic.

I recently saw a TV documentary about gorillas, and scientists and other people living with gorillas. Some of these people did report a strong feeling that, somehow, gorillas were people too. What do you think about such reports ?

Anthropomorphizing.

I'm afraid things rather seem to be the other way round. Animals have feelings, conciousness and intuitive understanding of things (semantics). They just don't have the language skills (syntax) to express these.

Feelings and even some kinds of consciousness are not semantical. My understanding of the sentence 'The sky is blue' is not a particular feeling or even the association of a particular feeling (even though sentences might evoke feelings or have associations with them, i.e. "I love you").

I'm pretty confident that animals have what counts as syntax; it only needs to be something for which a sign serves to communicate an intended response. Consider how the bee will tell other bees where a flower is, or how gorillas intend to communicate dominance.

I currently work to write a clarified and simplified course on the foundations of mathematics.

That's very interesting. I only have a course worth's experience with formal logic, though I am doing some further research and hope to develop a formal logic that can handle self-referential statements.

Still I do agree that there is a difference between mind and matter. I just don't think it can be correctly described in terms of the opposition between syntax and semantics.
We might even say that, somehow, the mind is on the side of syntax rather than semantics.

I find that unlikely. While I would suggest that a concept can only be called a definite concept provided it can be explained in propositions for which the logical form can be expressed, I do think our ideas are prior to our using language and other syntactical systems. Syntactical systems can be very helpful in developing an idea and making it coherent, but the atoms of thought are recalcitrant to pure syntactical expression, since they can only be expressed in terms of logical atoms (i.e. they can't be expressed as the relationship of two or more atoms). In other words, I could state

F

and if it is the case that F isn't equivalent to any composite statement like

P K

then it follows that our knowledge of F isn't gained by appreciating its relation to other propositions. It is a "basic concept," about which we do logic but which our logic is not within.

Instead, I'd see the difference between mind and matter as coming from the difference between the concious (non-mathematical) and the mathematical (since "purely physical" objects would ultimately be merely mathematical ones). More details in my metaphysics text.

I don't think it would be apt to describe matter as being mathematical, rather than merely mathematically describable. Consider the proof that 1 + 1 = 2; what it involves is treating the union of two sets of of one member as one set with two members; but there are only going to actually be a set with two members if there are in fact two individual somethings.

[AquinasD]

I have read http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantics and I find it quite interesting. But since it appears to be a very complicated subject perhaps you could explain exactly what you mean?

The meaning of words, propositions, signs, and the like. For instance "It is snowing" has the same meaning "Il neige" even though both are different signs. You cannot determine that these two phrases should have the same meaning or even the meaning that they do only by analyzing the signs themselves; you'll have to go out in the world and see what people are talking about.

I could teach that "It is snowing" means it is snowing by pointing to you snow that is falling.

Can you name some words we should not be able to understand the semantical content of and why not?

I don't know why that would help...

Actually, it might not even be possible, since in answering your request the meaning of any proffered nonsense word would be "that it doesn't have meaning," which is itself a kind of meaning. I think this just demonstrates that as individuals capable of understanding meaning, we cannot un-understand meaning.

[Artie]

The meaning of words, propositions, signs, and the like. For instance "It is snowing" has the same meaning "Il neige" even though both are different signs. You cannot determine that these two phrases should have the same meaning or even the meaning that they do only by analyzing the signs themselves; you'll have to go out in the world and see what people are talking about.

I could teach that "It is snowing" means it is snowing by pointing to you snow that is falling.

Like you teach a dog that "lie down" means lie down by pushing him down repeatedly until he gets the meaning and lies down by himself when you say lie down? Would that just be conditioning or would the dog understand the meaning of the words and what would be the difference?

[AquinasD]

Like you teach a dog that "lie down" means lie down by pushing him down repeatedly until he gets the meaning and lies down by himself when you say lie down? Would that just be conditioning or would the dog understand the meaning of the words and what would be the difference?

That would be conditioning.

[Artie]

Like you teach a dog that "lie down" means lie down by pushing him down repeatedly until he gets the meaning and lies down by himself when you say lie down? Would that just be conditioning or would the dog understand the meaning of the words and what would be the difference?

That would be conditioning.

What else/more would the dog have to understand for it to be something else/more than conditioning?

[AquinasD]

That would be conditioning.

What else/more would the dog have to understand for it to be something else/more than conditioning?[/quote]

To understand it for what it is, rather than something for which there is a correct response motivated by the expectation of a reward.

[Artie]

That would be conditioning.

What else/more would the dog have to understand for it to be something else/more than conditioning?

To understand it for what it is, rather than something for which there is a correct response motivated by the expectation of a reward.

A puppy and a child starts out the same: Exploring the world automatically to understand it for what it is with no expectation of external reward for doing so. Understanding the world enhances survivability which is the reward. Good grades or a good paycheck is just an external reward system building on the internal reward system that says that the more you understand your environment and the more you can manipulate it for the benefit of yourself and everybody else the more likely you are to survive. The ability to understand symbols and meanings and words is simply a means for individuals to share information with everybody else which enhances survivability.