The Modal Ontological Argument

[For_The_Kingdom]

Before I begin the actual argument, a few terms/concepts must be addressed. One of those concepts involves possible world semantics. What is a “possible world� (PW)?

A PW is a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be true, or could be false…or a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be necessarily true, or necessarily false.

Example: Barack Obama is the President of the United States.

If this statement is true, then there is a possible world at which Barack Obama is President of the United States. However, since Barack Obama could very well NOT be the President of the U.S., then it follows that there is a possible world at which Barack Obama isn’t President of the U.S.

So, in essence, there is a possible world (set of circumstances) at which Barack Obama is the President of the U.S. (and vice versa). In other words, it’s possible.

That being said; let’s turn our attention to the difference between contingent truths, and necessary truths. Contingent truths are circumstances or propositions that could be true, but could also be equally false (such as the example above).

Necessary truths are truths that are either true or false REGARDLESS of the circumstances. So in essence, necessary truths are true in ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS. Good examples of necessary truths are mathematical truths, such as 2+2=4 <--- this is true in all possible circumstances and can never be false under any circumstance.

Next, I’d like to turn the attention to the definition of God. God, at least as defined by Christian theism, is a maximally great being (MGB). By maximally great, we mean that God is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnipresent (present everywhere at any given time), and omnibenevolent (the ultimate source of goodness)…an ultimately, such a being is necessary in its existence (such a being cannot fail/cease to exist).

The four "omni's"that you see above, those are what we'd called "great making properties." A person is considered "great" based on accomplishments, power, influence, character, etc.

Being a maximally great being, all of those great-making properties are maxed out to the degree at which there isn't anything left to add. It is virtually impossible to think of a "greater being" than one that is all-knowing, all powerful, present everywhere, and the ultimate source of goodness.

Now, the Modal Ontological Argument makes a case that it is possible for such a being to actually exist. In other words; there is a possible world at which a MGB exists.

On to the argument..

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

Of course, most of you will agree that it is possible for a MGB to exist. The problem is, once you admit that it is possible for a MGB to exist, you are essentially saying “It is possible for a necessary being to exist�.

Well, if it is possible for a necessary being to exist, then it follows that such a being must ACTUALLY exist. Why? Because a proposition cannot be possibly necessarily true, but actually false (because if the proposition is actually false, then it was never possibly necessarily true).

Again, most of you admit that it is possible for God to exist. Well, if it is possible for God to exist, then God must actually exist, because God’s existence would be one of necessity, and no necessary truth can be possibly true, but actually false.

And under the same token, if it is possible for God to NOT exist, then it is impossible for God to exist. So, God’s existence is either necessarily true, or necessarily false. And again for the third time, at some point in each and every one of your lives, you’ve admitted that it is possible for God to exist.

Therefore, God must exist. And as I close this argument, just for the record, it will take more than you people putting your hand over your ears and shouting “The argument is not valid� or whatever you like to say when a theist bring forth an argument.

You actually have to address the argument (1-5), and explain why any of the premises are false. But I don’t think that you can, can you?

[For_The_Kingdom]

True regardless, not true or false regardless.

Umm, ok...that too. I fail to see how that negated my point or the argument.

Don't overstate your case. God as defined for this argument is maximally great. Don't pretend this is a traditional definition.

It is the traditional definition of the Judeo-Christian God, but that is also irrelevant.

Pretty weird definition of omnibenevolent. I don't see how it helps or hurts your argument, but it's weird.

Because benevolence is a "great-making" property.

Big mistake. Now you'll never get us past the first premise. Plantinga's genius (besides writing in an almost opaque style so that few people could find his errors) was in getting us to agree to

- 1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists

before telling us that that god can't really exist:

- 3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

Still trying trying to figure out where is the "big mistake" that you mentioned.

Because there are possible worlds without gods, we know that no god exists in every possible world.

Not if the first premise is true, which it is, and which you have yet to invalidate.

But we aren't going to say that is possible, because it clearly isn't. Some possible worlds are godless.

Please explain to me a possible world at which a necessary being would NOT exist, if it is possible that he/it existed.

Such worlds are not contradictory, so they are possible.

Such worlds cannot exist. There can be NO POSSIBLE world that would NOT contain the existence of a NECESSARY being.

Therefore no god exists in any possible world. Therefore no MGB exists in any possible world.

Non sequitur.

I love the arrogant tone. You made a stupid argument, easily refutable, and you think we are stupid and inferior for not being persuaded by you nonsense.

Apparently, various opinions exist on the matter.

P1 is false because P3 defines a god who cannot possibly exist in any possible world.

P1 can't be false based upon a premise that precedes it. P3 is dependent upon P1 being true, and not vice versa.

In addition, your argument is easily reversible, as I did (by adding boldface) above. It proves that god does not exist just as easily as it proves he does. Any argument that proves both A and not-A is worthless. Therefore, your argument is worthless. In the scales of persuasion, it weighs nothing.

So basically, "2+2 = 4 just as easily as 2+2 = -4". That is basically what you are saying and if that is the best you've got as a refutation, then I don't want to see the worse.

So now you have two compelling refutations:
1. P1 cannot be true once P3 defines god in a way that makes its existence impossible, and
2. The logic of the argument proves gods nonexistence as easily as it proves gods existence.

That's not putting our hands over our ears and singing that we can't hear you. It is two separate compelling refutations.

If you care about logic, you should never try to use this argument again.

As I said in a previous post, once the MOA is presented to an unbeliever, three things happen shortly thereafter.

1. The skeptic misunderstands the argument

2. The skeptic makes a bogus refutation of the argument, based on the misunderstanding.

3. The skeptic then concludes that the argument is lame, stupid, and a waste of time and goes away patting his/her self on the back, all while having an unjustified feeling of "satisfaction" in their tummy's.

Meanwhile, the actual argument is standing in another universe, completely untouched and unscathed while "straw universes" are continuing to be created around it.

[For_The_Kingdom]

1. It is possible that a maximally great Flying Spaghetti Monster exists.

2. If it is possible that a maximally great Flying Spaghetti Monster exists, then a maximally great Flying Spaghetti Monster exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great Flying Spaghetti Monster in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great Flying Spaghetti Monster exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

5. If a maximally great Flying Spaghetti Monster exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore, a maximally great Flying Spaghetti Monster exists.

*Sigh*.. the being that you call Flying Spaghetti Monster is actually "God", under the disguist of a particular label that a skeptic stapled to it.

This is every bit as valid as the argument in the OP, which is to say it is invalid.
Saint Anselm, or whoever first came up with this bit of nonsense, should be ashamed.

This is Plantiga's version, not Saint Anselm's.

The ontological argument is essentially an argument a priori:
God exists because I say he does.

The 'cheat' in the argument is that one can easily propose that there is something that is 'the greatest,' and be correct. That 'greatest' need not be a god and cannot be something imaginary.

Notice none of the premises of the arguments was addressed. Why? Because each premise is true...so the only thing you can do is attempt to make a counter-argument by replacing "MGB" (God) with some other name, when in fact you are just giving God another manifestation.

God has the power to manifest himself as a FSM if he so desired. See how that works?

[For_The_Kingdom]

That you fail to understand the failure of "it's possible so therefore it is" lets us all know you fail to understand your own argument.

That something's possible does not mean it's real.

*Sigh*...that is the case, with necessary truths.

It's possible I'm Teddy Roosevelt, but I ain't.

But whether or not you are Teddy Roosevelt is not a necessary proposition, is it?

Apples & oranges.

[rikuoamero]

I'd like to point out something. A couple pages back, Kingdom said that William Lane Craig almost never uses the MOA, to which I responded by linking a video where he does just that.
In the middle of the video, an overlay appears, which, when condensed, says that the goal of the argument is to make the atheist say "It is possible god exists".
When I thought about it, this isn't really anything different from the old playground taunt of
"A loser says what?"
"What?"
"Aha! You said what, therefore you admit to being a loser!"

The goal isn't to get the atheist to some sort of new understanding...the goal is to get the atheist to say something.

[Bust Nak]

I don't see why you would need to mess around with "possible worlds," not with the definition of God you provided here:

1) God cannot fail to exist.
2) Therefore God exists.

Wow that was easy to prove! The argument amounts to taking your audience round the park to hide the question begging nature of the premise. You cannot define something into existence.

Dude, it takes more than just merely stating the premises...you actually have to give evidence that support the premises. The premises has to be supported...and in argument, each premises is supported and it all just flows naturally.

Ironically, that's exactly the problem in your argument that I am highlighting. It DOES take more than just merely stating the premises...you DO actually have to give evidence that support the premises. The premises DO have to be supported. That exactly what you've failed to do. You've mere stated the premise that God is a necessity being, you haven't gave any evidence that support that premise, other than to say that's what Christians believe. Which is why I accused you of trying to define God into existence. The problem you've identified in my simplistic 'proof' is the very same problem in the modal ontological argument, which of course is the reason why I made that simplistic 'proof' in the first place, you haven't addressed a word of my counter argument. Don't you see my 'proof' is analogious to yours?

[wiploc]

Big mistake. Now you'll never get us past the first premise. Plantinga's genius (besides writing in an almost opaque style so that few people could find his errors) was in getting us to agree to

- 1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists

before telling us that that god can't really exist:

- 3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

Still trying trying to figure out where is the "big mistake" that you mentioned.

Let's imagine a gumdrop named Jake.

If I ask you whether Jake may exist, you'll likely say yes. Because Jake may exist and may not. So you concede that Jake may exist.

Which means that Jake does exist in some possible world.

And suppose I now say that Jake has some characteristics I didn't mention before. One is that Jake is necessary: If Jake exists in any possible world, he exists in all possible worlds.

Another characteristic is that Jake takes up the entire universe: In any possible world in which Jake exists, there is no room for anything else. Jake is always the only thing in his universe.

And, note, you have already conceded that Jake exists in some possible world! Therefore, he exists in all possible worlds. Therefore nothing exists in the actual world except for a single gumdrop!

Okay, it's a stupid argument, but it's no stupider than the modal ontological argument.

If, before I got you to agree that Jake may exist, I told you about Jake's special characteristics, then you never would have agreed that he might exist. You'd say, "No, since he can't exist in any world unless he exists in every world, and sense he doesn't exist in this world, then we know that Jake doesn't exist in any world."

And you'd be right.

But that refutation works equally well for the god of the modal ontological argument:

1. Since the god is defined as necessary, it cannot exist in any possible world unless it exists in all possible worlds.

2. Since godless worlds are possible (they don't involve logical contradiction), we know that necessary gods do not exist in all possible worlds.

3. Therefore, since these gods are defined as existing in all possible worlds if they exist in any possible worlds, we know they do not exist in any possible worlds.

4. Therefore, we know they don't exist in the actual world.

Planting's trick is to get us to say that god may exist before he defines that god as necessary.

If he defined it as necessary and then asked whether it may exist, we would have to say no.

Because there are possible worlds without gods, we know that no god exists in every possible world.

Not if the first premise is true, which it is, and which you have yet to invalidate.

Godless worlds are not contradictory. Therefore, they are possible. Therefore no god exists in all possible worlds.

P1, therefore, is obviously false.

But we aren't going to say that is possible, because it clearly isn't. Some possible worlds are godless.

Please explain to me a possible world at which a necessary being would NOT exist, if it is possible that he/it existed.

Since godless worlds are possible, necessary gods are not possible. Therefore, necessary gods do NOT exist in every possible world.

Such worlds are not contradictory, so they are possible.

Such worlds cannot exist. There can be NO POSSIBLE world that would NOT contain the existence of a NECESSARY being.

Unless the necessary being doesn't exist. And we know that this one doesn't. You can no more define a necessary god into existence than I can define a necessary gumdrop into existence.

P1 is false because P3 defines a god who cannot possibly exist in any possible world.

P1 can't be false based upon a premise that precedes it. P3 is dependent upon P1 being true, and not vice versa.

[/quote]

Then, by the same logic, Jake the necessary gumdrop can't be false either. My gumdrop argument is exactly as strong as your god argument.

In addition, your argument is easily reversible, as I did (by adding boldface) above. It proves that god does not exist just as easily as it proves he does. Any argument that proves both A and not-A is worthless. Therefore, your argument is worthless. In the scales of persuasion, it weighs nothing.

So basically, "2+2 = 4 just as easily as 2+2 = -4". That is basically what you are saying and if that is the best you've got as a refutation, then I don't want to see the worse.

No, I'm saying that the Modal Ontological Argument is exactly as good at proving that god does not exist as proving that it does. And no argument that proves both X and not-X is any good at all.

[Furrowed Brow]

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

It should also pointed out - if someone has not done already - that the modal ontological argument is only valid in modal system S5 and similar systems with the Euclidean condition on frames in what is called Kripke semantics. The Euclidean condition on frames admits that if world w can access some world v, then any other world accessible from w is also accessible from v. In other words every accessible world is able to access every other world. This is essentially what point 3 relies on to be valid.

A theorem of S5 is an argument in the form <>[]p ->p. In words: a possibly necessity implies actuality. This seems to be at the heart of For_The_Kingdom's defence of MOA. But <>[]p -> p is not a theorem of other competing modal systems like S4 or K.

So what the MOA is seeking is only true of a limited number of modal systems and not a general truth of all modal logics.

System S4 and S5 are both classed as standard modal logics and both are are regarded as plausible.

[jgh7]

I reject this argument on the basis that there is no such thing as a "possible world". There is only one reality and one world: this one. The notion of a possible world is nothing more than an idea in someone's head, it is not reality.

Does this argument still apply to me if I hold the strong stance that there is no such thing as "possible worlds".

[JoeyKnothead]

From Post 102:

That you fail to understand the failure of "it's possible so therefore it is" lets us all know you fail to understand your own argument.

That something's possible does not mean it's real.

*Sigh*...that is the case, with necessary truths.

So we see that in your world, God is a "necessary truth", such that all you can do is dream him into existence with nothing more than possibility. You can't fathom a world without god, so you employ this argument as a cudgel against what is real in this world. And what's real in this world, what is a "necessary truth" in this world, is that the mere possibility of something does not make it so.

Dorothy had Over the Rainbow you have Possibility Makes it True.

They're both notions meant to soothe the forlorn. Soothe those who just can't come to grips with the reality in which they find themselves. Don't think I'm pickin' on folks, being a schizo, I'm indebted to Pink Floyd myself.

But whether or not you are Teddy Roosevelt is not a necessary proposition, is it?

Apples & oranges.

Naw, reality versus possible reality.

It's just that when some theists come against showing God exists in reality, showing God is a "necessary truth", they offer up this goofiness of "it's possible, so don't that just beat all, that means it's real".

The apple of wishful thinking can't compare to the orange of reality.

[wiploc]

I reject this argument on the basis that there is no such thing as a "possible world". There is only one reality and one world: this one. The notion of a possible world is nothing more than an idea in someone's head, it is not reality.

Does this argument still apply to me if I hold the strong stance that there is no such thing as "possible worlds".

You personally can reject the argument on that basis, but that's not an argument that will persuade others. Possible-world-speak is a language, a way of discussing uncontroversial ideas.

For instance, you might say in normal-speak, "If I'd dropped that vase, it would have broken." In possible-world-speak, that same I idea (a perfectly normal idea) would be expressed this way: "There is a possible world in which I dropped the vase and the vase broke."

Nobody believes these possible worlds "exist." Possible-world-speak is just one way of discussing modality: possibility, necessity, impossibility, things that may be or could have been.