If God wants to destroy evil...

[Zarathustra]

God created everything that has been, is, and is going to be in existence. He created the Earth and the Heavens. He created the Lake of Fire in which he casts sinners. He created Good, and He created evil. Does not the old adage says "I have created you, and so can I destroy you"?

If God wanted to, couldn't He, in theory, destroy evil with no need for the battle of the apocalypse?

[TQWcS]

I would like to point out that there is virtually universal agreement among philosophers that the logical problem of evil is no longer a cogent argument. For example, Michael Peterson, a recognized authority on the problem of evil, comments, "The outcome of these and other debates has been so favorable to theists that it is reasonable to say that the logical problem has been laid to rest" ["The Problem of Evil," in A Companion to Philosopher of Religion (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999), 395].

William Alston suggests that in order for atheists to succeed in using evil as evidence against belief in God, they must assume a very bold and unwarranted position. For atheists must argue that they know enough about the world to conclude that a being of infinite wisdom, power, and goodness would not allow evil to exist. Alston rightly notes that it is impossible to have access to this type of knowledge, for only a being like God would be able to make this type of judgment. Similarly, when atheists insist that nothing good is achieved by a specific evil, they would need to know more than what they have access to--for example, the inner attitude and personal development of a human being. Surely no human can make that judgment. Indeed, only God can. Therefore, without access to a God-like knowledge, atheists are not even equipped to use evil as a disproof against God.

[spetey]

I would like to point out that there is virtually universal agreement among philosophers that the logical problem of evil is no longer a cogent argument. For example, Michael Peterson, a recognized authority on the problem of evil, comments, "The outcome of these and other debates has been so favorable to theists that it is reasonable to say that the logical problem has been laid to rest" ["The Problem of Evil," in A Companion to Philosopher of Religion (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999), 395].

It is one thing to declare victory over a problem. It's another to earn it. It's also no good, in this forum (or in argumentation generally), merely to appeal to authority--at least, not when other authorities of comparable expertise are saying otherwise. I for one have never heard of Michael Peterson, and I'm pretty well-informed in the area (though I haven't read everyone who's written on it, surely). He is not a famous philosopher. Alston I've heard of--he's a big name. But he's one of many philsophers with a position in the arena (Rowe, Adams, Mackie et al. are lined up against him; Plantinga et al. line up with him). I assure you it is not a clear majority of philosophers who think the Problem of Evil is a total non-starter. And even if it were, I myself would have to hear a reason why these philosophers thought the PoE is a non-starter, before I changed my mind. I try not to decide positions by taking opinion polls. I try to decide my position by reason. I hope most readers of this forum are the same.

As for the logical problem of evil--classically, that is the position that an all-good, all-powerful entity is incompatible with any evil. But notice I do not make this claim. I make the claim that an all-good, all-powerful entity is logically incompatible with unnecessary evil. I claim, in other words, that this is not the best of all possible worlds. I find this notion as laughable as Voltaire did.

William Alston suggests that in order for atheists to succeed in using evil as evidence against belief in God, they must assume a very bold and unwarranted position. For atheists must argue that they know enough about the world to conclude that a being of infinite wisdom, power, and goodness would not allow evil to exist.

Again, I do not claim that no evil would exist. I allow for the possibility of necessary evil. But it is prima facie plausible--not to say glaringly obvious--that there is far more evil than is necessary, on any count. Now, you can modify the point, as Alston did, to say (in effect) "who are we to say that some evil is unnecessary?" But to deny my premise (2) this way is a mere appeal to faith--"sure it looks like the tsunami was a horrible disaster that no one would wish on anyone, but I just trust that God has arranged all things for the best, and that the tsunami was somehow necessary in order to prevent worse evil later. Our puny minds are just too tiny to understand how kind God was in drowning tens of thousands of children."

Similarly, when atheists insist that nothing good is achieved by a specific evil, they would need to know more than what they have access to--for example, the inner attitude and personal development of a human being. Surely no human can make that judgment. Indeed, only God can. Therefore, without access to a God-like knowledge, atheists are not even equipped to use evil as a disproof against God.

Is the claim that every one of the hundreds of thousands who drowned gained some huge personal revelation while drowning, so that in the end, in retrospect, they would say they were grateful for this drowning? On what grounds would you claim such a wildly implausible thing? (Surely not the ground that God is all-good, the very thing for which you try to argue?) Are you then happy for these people? Do you hope that you too will drown horribly in the near future?

I do not claim that the Problem of Evil is the decisive problem for God. For example, you could simply say that God is indeed not all-good, or not all-powerful. The existence of a such god is compatible with unnecessary evil. I think there are far worse problems for gods of any sort.

I have even said on this forum that I have myself recently heard a decent response--not a good response, mind you, but at least a somewhat plausible one that does not, at bottom, appeal to faith or beg the question. (No theists have pressed this response on this forum, so no one else here seems to think it's very good, either.) But the PoE is still a very serious problem--serious enough that on its grounds alone I think the only reasonable conclusion is that there is no all-good, all-powerful entity. Certainly it's not the kind of problem that can be dismissed with the declaration that "a philosopher in the Society of Christian Philosophers, Michael Peterson, has hey presto declared victory over the Problem of Evil! So we need never think about it again!" If you just want some authority to tell you it's okay to believe what you want to believe anyway, listen to Buchanan or Falwell or whomever.


spetey

[harvey1]

This is not an "ontological" proof--it does not try to prove the existence of something. Even if it counts as "ontological" because it tries to show something doesn't exist, that doesn't imply some extra special burdens.

Spetey, arguments about what can't exist are just as ontological-driven as arguments that try to show what must exist. Look at this way, if I showed that a "no God" world can't reasonably exist, then wouldn't that be an ontological argument for God's existence?

This argument is also not of the formal reductio ad absurdum format.

There is a very small difference here. This argument can be restated in "formal" terms if you like:

1. Premise: An all-good, all-powerful entity exists, there is no unnecessary evil
2. Premise: There is unnecessary evil
3. Conclusion: There exists an all-good, all-powerful entity where the world is in a superposition state of there being no unnecessary evil and there being unnecessary evil at the same time and for the same evil.

Note the absurd conclusion. You cannot have a superposition state where there is no unnecessary evil and there is unnecessary evil since we live in a classical world. Evil is either "unnecessary evil" or it is "necessary evil." This argument changes nothing about the ontological conclusions you wish to draw, in fact, it is the absurd conclusion that you wish people to draw so that they will acknowledge that it is absurd to believe that God exists.

And there are no "cases" for proving or disproving.

Yes, there are cases which can be used to disprove it. First of all, you assume that ontological arguments are valid in the first place to tell us what exists. What if reality could care less what we think is logical? So, right off the bat, you are assuming that ontological arguments are effective. I accept that assumption too, but you should realize that there might be relativists who would never accept it.

Secondly, different cases are situations that apply to how people consider God to be all-good and all-powerful, but do not conform to your notions of unnecessary evil (i.e., equivocating on those terms). There are also cases where the premises are approximately correct or just down-right false, however the belief of an all-good, all-powerful God can still be held to be true even though people will acknowledge that bad things happen to good people. For example:

1. Premise: An all-good, all-powerful entity exists in the Heavenly World, there is no unnecessary evil
2. Premise: There is unnecessary evil in the earthly world
3. Conclusion: There exists an all-good, all-powerful entity in the Heavenly World where there is no unnecessary evil, however there is unnecessary evil here on earth.

In this example, I haven't changed the main terms, I have changed where it means to exist as all-good and all-powerful. In this case, the reductio fails because there is no absurdity. You would have to construct another argument that shows that the first premise of God existing in the Heavenly World is somehow inconsistent with theism.

Again, this is just an example. I don't think it is an appropriate answer to the problem of evil, but it does demonstrate how different cases can be presented that cause the reductio argument to fail to present an absurd conclusion. Without an absurd conclusion, you need other arguments to demonstrate that God cannot exist.

And it is never enough to defeat an argument to suggest that a premise might be wrong. That's just not how arguments work. Otherwise you could defeat any argument (with merely contingent premises) by saying "but the premise might be false! Ah-ha, I have defeated you!"

Spetey, if you are going to present an ontological argument, then you have to play by the rules by which you live. That's why ontological arguments are usually poor arguments. People like it when they win, but they don't like it when they lose. You lose when you can't rule out all reasonable cases. If you want to present a cosmological argument, then the situation changes. Now, we can look at evidence and decide if it is reasonable based on the evidence to believe such and such. That's when the counter must be able to explain the evidence at least as good as the opposing hypothesis. Not so for ontological arguments. Ontological arguments that rely on our ignorance (i.e., what we don't know about God and the Universe) aren't arguments of knowledge, they are arguments of ignorance and must be rejected unless they are valid for every conceivable case that is reasonable to entertain premises and definition of terms that meet the criterion in question (namely, an all-good, all-powerful God).

So first important question, which I'll ask again: do you agree this argument is valid in the formal sense--that is, do you agree that if the premises are true, the conclusion must also be true?

"Must" is too strong of a word. I would say that I would believe them to be true as long as our understanding of the terms are in exact agreement (which they aren't in this case).

If so, you have to give active reason to reject one of the premises, or else accept the conclusion. Compare this argument:

I have to give reasons in principle. That is, I don't have to provide a science of being God to show that such a science is feasible. All I have to do is show in principle that God could have a "science" that regulates what actions are allowable for the divine will. If I am forced to invent that science, then it is unfair since you are making an ontological claim on ignorance and claim success since someone can't produce such a science in detail. However, you cannot provide a science of atheism either, so anytime I make an ontological claim due to your ignorance of a "science" of atheism, then I cannot claim victory because you cannot produce that science. On the other hand, let me be clear, if you cannot provide a reasonable option to my reductio's, even in principle, then you fail to satisfy the reductio and that is reason for theism. (I say this because this issue will come up later when we get into ontological arguments against atheism).

[*] If you are a good person, you do not want to kill all Jews.[*] Hitler wanted to kill all Jews.[*] Therefore, Hitler was not a good person. Here I try to establish that Hitler was not a good person. Now it's possible that (2) false. It's possible that Hitler was framed, that Hitler actually loved the Jews, and he was forced to order their death by some unknown power behind him (like perhaps powerful anti-Semitic space aliens). But this mere possibility does not defeat the argument, right? Put it this way: now that I've pointed out this mere possibility, without giving any reason to think it's true, do you think Hitler must have been a good guy after all?

This argument could be false, and Hitler could still not be a good person. The argument could be false because of premise two, but that doesn't make Hitler a good person. In any case, it's not an ontological argument, so the criteria that it is used to evaluate it will be different. For example, we don't say that Hitler is required by logic not to be what he was in life. He was required to be what he was, because that is what he was. We are trying to establish a definition of Hitler though logic, and not establish some existent property as to what Hitler was required to be in life. If you want to make this argument into an ontological argument, then try changing it to show that Hitler was required by logic to be evil prior to his birth. If you can do that by showing that mere possibility is not relevant to a counterargument, then you'll be on your way to showing how ontological arguments can ignore possibility.

Similarly, the mere possibility that God drowned hundreds of thousands in order to prevent something worse is not enough to defeat my argument. You have to give reason to think that the tsunami prevented something worse, and in general you must give reason to think that the amount of bad things in this world is absolutely minimal, despite all appearances. That is what I'm waiting to hear.

Nope. I have to show in principle how a argument could show that God is required by some higher principle to allow some deterministic evil for some higher reason. I've done that. You're response is that you want the science to prove my claim, but that's ludicrous. I should prove my ontological claim when it is you making the ontological claim here? I'm just stating the facts. I can demonstrate in principle how God might be limited to things like paradoxes, whereas you are saying for fact that God cannot be limited by paradoxes. That's a strong claim, so I ask that you prove it.

[spetey]

It's not always the best thing to do to give reasons for a position to someone attacking it. It's often a complete waste of time.

Maybe if it's an unimportant issue. On important issues I think it's always worthwhile to examine reasons. I have given my reasons for my position, in this thread and elsewhere. I would like to hear what is wrong with my reasons, or else I would like to see you change your mind based on my reasons, or else it seems to me you should confess that you do not believe according to reasons.

Of course you are free to "walk away" at any time. We might suspect that you would walk away because you didn't have answers--but that would be unfair. Only you would know, in your open and honest assessment of the situation with yourself, whether you were walking away because despite erudite appearances I'm obviously too stupid to be able to consider overwhelmingly obvious reasons, or whether it was because you simply didn't have answers to my questions, and you were a bit uncomfortable with that situation.

The problem is, reason is not the objective guide many people seem to think it is.

No? This is a strong position. You should defend that it's okay to believe without reason (believe on "faith") on this thread. No one there has managed to do it, so far. The one thing Harvey and I have agreed on, for example, is that such belief without reason is totally impermissible! But perhaps you can explain why you have a non-reason-giving "objective guide" to your beliefs, but racists (for example) don't.

So why was that tsunami, in particular, necessary, given the existence of human sin? It seems totally unrelated.

The reasons would vary from person to person. For some it was a judgement because they had rejected God long enough; for others it was a merciful deliverance, for those who survived it was no doubt meant to teach them certain things (again depending on the individual needs). I don't know all the reasons, anymore than I know all the people who died, but they all go back to the presence of sin in the world.

And yet suspiciously you are sure there are reasons in each of the hundreds of thousands of cases. You are utterly confident that each person who died deserved to die. Why are you so confident of this? Is it because you assume the very thing you need to prove--that God would never let someone innocent die a painful death?

My point is, your argument rests on the assumption that unnecessary evil exists. I maintain that it doesn't.

I know you maintain this. Can you see why the tsunami (and countless other such tragedies since the beginning of time) seems to tilt things in my favor, on this point? The tsunami at least seemed to the majority of the world as a terrible, needless tragedy. On what grounds do you say it wasn't? On what grounds do you say it, like all else, is the best thing that could possibly have happened?


spetey

[spetey]

Harvey: ugh. I really don't know how to explain this any more patiently.

Look: the fact that you can make up a lot of horrible arguments that look vaguely like mine does not show my argument is bad. Notice your first premises in both cases are not even grammatical, and so fail even to state a proposition. Of course they're bad arguments. So what? I want to know what's wrong with my argument.

It may seem like I'm nitpicking about that grammar. But actually, I think it's very telling that you miss the "if" in these premises, since you seem not to understand the modus tollens form for valid arguments. You call them variously "ontological" and "reductio" and "by case" without seeming to know what these mean. Look, please, at that link. If you insist on saying that there's something special about the format of my argument that is bad, please give a reference next time. I'm sorry to pull expertise on this matter, but I was taking graduate classes in logic as a sophomore in college--having already done standard mathematical logic through Godel's incompleteness results and non-standard models as a first-year. I have taken something over 10 college-level courses in formal logic of various sorts. I do not claim to be an expert on everything, but I know my logic, okay? And this style of argument, modus tollens, is a fundamental piece of reasoning taught to every teen beginning to study "critical reasoning" in colleges across the country. It hardly takes an expert to see its validity. Please, please, look into the matter a bit before you press me again on the logical form of my argument.

Now, if I'm equivocating, then I agree that my argument may not be valid. But I have asked you four times already to explain my equivocation, and what these concepts are ("deterministic evil" and "divine evil") on which you claim I'm equivocating. You haven't answered--you've just asserted that I must be equivocating somewhere. I've even reworded my premises to be more explicit about what I mean by "evil"--pain, suffering, and the like.

Imagine saying that the Hitler argument is no good because it equivocates between "alpha killing" in premise (1) and "beta killing" in premise (2), but being totally unable to explain what these two kinds of killing are, or why I meant alpha killing in one case and beta killing in the other. Would that, do you think, defeat the argument about Hitler being bad? Wouldn't it look a tiny bit suspicious as a response?

And yes, on that Hitler argument: of course the conclusion could be true with false premises. That is not a measure of a good argument. The measure of a deductive argument such as mine is first whether it's valid (whether, if the premises are true, the conclusion must be) and then whether it's sound (whether it's valid and, indeed, the premises are true).

And again, arguments are not the kind of thing that can be "false". This is simply a category mistake, like asking what color 17 is. Only individual propositions (statements, claims, whatever you want to call them) can be true or false.

So whether the conclusion of the Hitler argument could be true with false premises is totally beside the point. I'm asking you: would the mere possibility that Hitler was being bribed by space aliens on its own defeat this argument?

Okay, I won't post again until Wednesday, I promise. But please, Harvey, I ask as a favor between old disputants--do your best not to provoke me this way in the meantime, okay? I would like your response to explain very clearly where my equivocation is, and / or to explain very clearly why the mere possibility of space aliens defeats the argument that Hitler was bad, and / or to give reason to deny one of my premises for the PoE.


spetey

[The Happy Humanist]

I could lead an exemplary life, I could feed more hungry than Mother Teresa, I could resist all temptation to do evil.

You haven't and you couldn't. That's what you need to be concerned about.

Neither could Adam and Eve. That's what I'm concerned about.

They could, they didn't.

I maintain that they could not.

Adam and Eve were allegedly created sinless, but with freewill. They were also created without Knowledge of Good And Evil. So they were given the ability to succumb to temptation, and yet not armed with the faculties necessary for them to resist. A prescription for disaster, of God's own making. Why should Eve have resisted the serpent's cajoling her to eat the apple? She did not know it was evil.

I do not think Adam and Eve could have possibly lived out their entire lives without running afoul of God's rules, when they were invested with absolutely no sense of why they should obey them.

(I'm sure there are theological arguments against this view. There always are. I'm also sure that these arguments will be chock-full of mental gymnastics and philosophical games of Twister, to the degree that they will be invalidated by their own cumbersome unintelligibility.)

God creates imperfect beings, then punishes them for their imperfections.

This has been repeated ad nauseam, and it's as false now as it was the first time.

Humor me. Point me to a refutation.

And religion could be outlawed practically without it ever being official.

The same could be said for atheism. In fact I see that as a whole lot more likely, given the rise of Dominionism. Trust me, we have more to fear from you than you have to fear from us.

I'm not claiming victory, I'm refusing to surrender. You're trying to get me to admit that humanity has come to perceive a moral truth God was blind to, by bringing up slavery. It's not going to work.

So far, I'm afraid it already has, by default.

At least, you hope he can...after all, if your conscience is flawed, your perception of God as the Good Guy may be flawed as well...

I don't use my conscience to determine truth.

Not even moral truth?

Well, I know that "the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse." Since I can't believe you and God, I'll chose God.

I'm sorry, Hannah, but you chose wrong. No human being could have been more sincere in their search for God than I was growing up. You go right ahead and continue believing your God. I know better.

[harvey1]

Look: the fact that you can make up a lot of horrible arguments that look vaguely like mine does not show my argument is bad.

It demonstrates that your argument is based on a format that is easily defeated. You try to make an absurd conclusion (i.e., that the world contains unnecessary evil and a world where we suppose unnecessary evil).

Notice your first premises in both cases are not even grammatical, and so fail even to state a proposition. Of course they're bad arguments. So what? I want to know what's wrong with my argument.

You're lucky that I can even get these posts out in any grammatical form whatsoever. I'm struggling to reply to you with distractions, so this is the best I can manage at this time.

It may seem like I'm nitpicking about that grammar. But actually, I think it's very telling that you miss the "if" in these premises, since you seem not to understand the modus tollens form for valid arguments. You call them variously "ontological" and "reductio" and "by case" without seeming to know what these mean. Look, please, at that link. If you insist on saying that there's something special about the format of my argument that is bad, please give a reference next time.

I'm not criticizing your format as bad, I'm merely pointing out that you've been dupped into thinking that you have offered premises to an argument that are infallible or have somehow transferred the burden of proof to the theist, neither are true.

I'm sorry to pull expertise on this matter, but I was taking graduate classes in logic as a sophomore in college--having already done standard mathematical logic through Godel's incompleteness results and non-standard models as a first-year. I have taken something over 10 college-level courses in formal logic of various sorts.

Good for you! However, your understanding of ontological proofs is still incorrect.

I do not claim to be an expert on everything, but I know my logic, okay? And this style of argument, modus tollens, is a fundamental piece of reasoning taught to every teen beginning to study "critical reasoning" in colleges across the country. It hardly takes an expert to see its validity. Please, please, look into the matter a bit before you press me again on the logical form of my argument.

Spetey, rather than get caught up in grammar, I highly suggest that you pay attention to what the poster is saying in their content. If you cannot manage that small feat of respect of others, then how are you ever going to make something successful come about with those 10 courses in logic?

Now, if I'm equivocating, then I agree that my argument may not be valid. But I have asked you four times already to explain my equivocation

I think I managed a number of responses to this question, and each time you change the subject back to what you see as a "need to look at the dialectic of the argument some more." Each time you revert the topic back to the beginning of the discussion, you fail to respond to my points and ask me to respond all over again to your faulty reasoning that got you in this mess in the first place.

and what these concepts are ("deterministic evil" and "divine evil") on which you claim I'm equivocating. You haven't answered--you've just asserted that I must be equivocating somewhere. I've even reworded my premises to be more explicit about what I mean by "evil"--pain, suffering, and the like.

Yes, I'm afraid I have answered your questions, Spetey. But, you haven't replied to my arguments, just gone back to the beginning of our discussion (at least three times you've done this). So, as a history, here are my answers which you haven't replied to:

For many theists, that brute fact is that God is all-powerful and all-good. Deterministic evil comes into play as a result of this fact. However, this is brute fact. The non-brute fact is that God has choices on how to conquer the evil in a manner that overthrows deterministic evil. The manner that God choose to end deterministic evil means that evil will still take place (i.e., because deterministic evil exists), however that evil is finally put down in a manner that conforms to an all-good, all-powerful God. So, yes, theists can claim that strict determinism of evil as a valid belief just so long as it is something that God did not cause more than there had to be due to some necessary constraints (due to God's existence).

If there is an all-good, all-powerful entity, there is no [divinely] unnecessary evil. There is [deterministic] unnecessary evil [as viewed by humans], such as tsunamis killing innocent children. Therefore there is no all-good, all-powerful entity.

look at the clarifications that I made. The argument is false! The fact that there is deterministic unnecessary evil does not mean there is divinely unnecessary evil... [statement made in the next post]There is deterministic (unavoidable) evil that even God cannot prevent without bringing about paradox. That evil is why there is evil in the World, and it reduces to there being tsunamis and other "short-term" evils.... God cannot control deterministic evil to the point of waiving a magic wand and eliminating it.... The reason for rejecting your argument is in the brackets.... Paradox is the real reason why an all-good, and all-powerful God can co-exist with deterministic evil, and even allow a good deal of evil to exist.... All I need to show that your argument does not stand is a reason that satisfies the conflict in premise 1 and premise 2. How can there be evil with an all-good and all-powerful God, and the answer is very simple (nothing really complex about this "problem" at all). An all-powerful God is one that overcomes evil (i.e., nothing can stop God from accomplishing the divine will), and not one that controls deterministic evil.

Some principles of existence might give God more options as to how the criterion of deterministically necessary evil is dished out throughout the World. For example, the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution law for molecules (i.e., statistical mechanics) states the conditions for an ensembly of molecules, however this law is stated in terms of mean values. It could very well be the case that if God restricts evil here, then a mean value criterion might require the evil that did not occur here to be made up elsewhere. Since many of the laws of physics are statistically-based (e.g., Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution), it cannot be ruled out that deterministic evil is a necessary distribution in the World. Most of the principles that I can think of that could be used to explain paradox can best be described as distributive type principles. Hence, God would need to share the pain to be morally responsible to the World as a whole.

I'm saying the tsunami is a divinely necessary evil that is a consequence of deterministically necessary evil, and if doesn't happen here and now, it will happen somewhere else in the world (or World) as a much worse tragedy (which God would not allow since God seeks to minimize pain and suffering for the World as a whole). If God stops the deterministically necessary evil from exemplifying itself altogether in the World, then that brings a paradoxial result--forbidden by God to allow... As I said, there are many candidates for principles of existence that would require God to allow deterministically necessary evils. One of my favorites is an extension of the least action principle. For every action in the world, the action that nature follows is the one with least action. If God is deterministically required to keep the least action (let's say that the least action is a basis of causality and God must maintain causality), then in that case, least action would be a principle of existence.... As a principle of existence, God would have to judge whether preventing the tsunami was the least amount of action that divine will can take. If it were not (e.g., allowing the tsunami was least), then God would need to allow the tsunami, or violate a key principle of existence. God can still be all-good and all-powerful just as long as following the principle of least action allows God to "figh(t) and overcom(e) evil with as much good as possible, or brin(g) about an all-good Universe despite evil."

There is the issue of how mathematics is an exemplification of God's existence--brute fact. This brute fact brings about worlds (i.e., worlds are instantiated because they reflect God's glory). The worlds that exist as a result of God's existence also must be in conformance with the brute fact of mathematical law. Those laws allow evil because that's brute fact what they do. However, God's existence dictates those laws by setting boundary conditions on what they can allow, and God's presence also transcends those laws by bringing about good in the world. So, it's not all that simple to change the settings of the physical laws, they are brute fact required (or necessiated) as a reflection of God's glory. It just so happens that this brute fact reality (that reflects God's glory) also brings about a lot of pain and suffering, but not to fear, God's glory is stronger than the evil that exhibits itself in the world and good overcomes evil. God is busy with bringing about good, but does so only in conformance with the brute fact laws (i.e., which are approximations of God's glory and existence). In other words, not only are the brute fact laws ultimately about God's glory, but so are the higher laws which more accurately reflect God's transcendence and immanence in the world. These higher laws are spiritual laws that work their way through creation and ultimately succeed about bringing about good in the world.

I wish I could say that I don't have to repeat the above yet more times, but I'm afraid that looks impossible. It seems no matter how often I say it, you just don't get it. ](*,)

Imagine saying that the Hitler argument is no good because it equivocates between "alpha killing" in premise (1) and "beta killing" in premise (2), but being totally unable to explain what these two kinds of killing are, or why I meant alpha killing in one case and beta killing in the other. Would that, do you think, defeat the argument about Hitler being bad? Wouldn't it look a tiny bit suspicious as a response?

If someone made that claim, it is certainly worth looking into. However, let's make this Hitler analogy a little closer to your argument so that we are comparing apples with apples:

• If good exists, then goodness would not allow there to be people who want to do in all Jews.
• Hitler wanted to do in all Jews.
• Therefore, there is no goodness in the world.

Notice, this is an ontological argument involving Hitler. In premise 1, the term "want to do in" (btw, I don't like using some words in internet posts which is why I edited it...) depends entirely on what we mean by goodness, and therefore it must be clarified and agreed upon by those who have their views of goodness. If you want everyone to agree that goodness doesn't exist, then you want everyone to agree that "want to do in" means the same as in the second premise. Since that is whatever someone has in mind in terms of what goodness allows, therefore the argument is only as good as someone who accepts they have the same meaning. If someone doesn't think they have the same meaning, then the argument is not valid. However, if this argument is not valid, then another argument might become valid (e.g., goodness can exist even if it might tolerate those that want to do in all Jews). So, another argument must be constructed for those whose view of goodness allows someone to want to do in others.

In our case, you should forget your reductio and move to an argument that shows that all-powerful, all-good God is inconsistent with deterministic evil (good luck).

And again, arguments are not the kind of thing that can be "false". This is simply a category mistake, like asking what color 17 is. Only individual propositions (statements, claims, whatever you want to call them) can be true or false.

You make way too many cavils. In any case, the term "false argument" is a common term, and although you are technically right that arguments are neither "true" or "false," the term does not warrant wasting our time on this cavil.

So whether the conclusion of the Hitler argument could be true with false premises is totally beside the point. I'm asking you: would the mere possibility that Hitler was being bribed by space aliens on its own defeat this argument?

Well, first of all, possibility is based on reasonable possibility, and possibilities of how to interpret a premise almost always have a way of casting doubt on a reductio ad absurdum argument (i.e., an argument constructed using premises that lead to an absurd result so that one of the premises are rejected). So, no, it is not a reasonable possibility that space aliens bribed Hitler. However, if it were found out that Himler and not Hitler wanted to kill all Jews (itself not a reasonable possibility), then that would defeat that argument as well. However, it is not a reasonable possibility given what we know of Hitler.

In case of God, anything is a reasonable possibility since we simply do not know much of anything with regard to what constraints God is working under. For some reason, I just can't seem to communicate this to you and other atheists. It reminds me of the kid that is sure that the products at the back of comic books are going to do everything as advertised, only you just can't talk any sense into them not to buy it. You so much want to not believe in God, that you allow your reasoning abilities to become obsessed on some small detail (e.g., knowing that God would not be constrained by something that you cannot know about) that you completely lose yourself in a losing argument.

Okay, Spetey. Try to give me reasons why I should accept your reductio since I've clarified what I mean by the terms you have equivocated on. Do you have any reasons that an all-good, all-powerful God cannot exist that do not involve equivocating on those terms?

[The Happy Humanist]

Lying awake in bed last night, I came to two very disturbing realizations:

1. Harvey1 might have a point, at least in terms of pure logic.
2. I'm lying awake nights, wondering if Harvey might have a point.


Now, please bear with me, all I know of formal logic is what I've learned on these here Internet message-board thingys over the years. I have never taken any courses in it, or in philosophy. So this may not be correct, I am just trying to get on the same page with everyone else here.

Spetey's conclusion is that "An (a)all-good, (b)all-powerful God cannot exist." In order to refute, Harvey1 does not need to show that such a God does exist, he only needs to show that such a God might exist. He must do so by challenging one or more premises.

The conclusion is dependent on the premise, "Evil exists." The premise, in turn, requires that we agree on a definition of evil of a kind that God is capable of preventing. If God prevents all evil that he is capable of preventing, he can be said to be all-good, satisfying characteristic (a) for God. Now, since we mere mortals cannot distinguish the difference between evil that God can prevent and that which he can't, we are forced to concede that all evil we see might be unpreventable, and thus an all-good God can exist. Harvey1 is halfway to his goal.

The sticky wicket is characteristic (b), omnipotence. Our first instinct is high-five each other and do a victory lap, since by admitting that there might be evil which even God cannot prevent, we have done away with (b). But wait. Have we not given God an out by defining "omnipotence" as the ability to do all possible things? And have we not agreed that it is not possible to actualize a deterministic paradox, even one so simple as the rock so heavy he can't lift it? Let me stop here, because I'm not certain if we've all agreed on giving God a pass on such things. At the very least, it requires some more thought on my part.

(And don't worry, spetey, I have not taken leave of my senses. Yet. I do have a solution, I just want to see if you're with me so far.)

[harvey1]

Lying awake in bed last night, I came to two very disturbing realizations: 1. Harvey1 might have a point, at least in terms of pure logic. 2. I'm lying awake nights, wondering if Harvey might have a point.

(And don't worry, spetey, I have not taken leave of my senses. Yet. I do have a solution, I just want to see if you're with me so far.)

I hope your "solution" is just not another attempt to show that you can buy great products at the back of comic books...

[The Happy Humanist]

Lying awake in bed last night, I came to two very disturbing realizations: 1. Harvey1 might have a point, at least in terms of pure logic. 2. I'm lying awake nights, wondering if Harvey might have a point.

(And don't worry, spetey, I have not taken leave of my senses. Yet. I do have a solution, I just want to see if you're with me so far.)

I hope your "solution" is just not another attempt to show that you can buy great products at the back of comic books...

No, of course not. But if you call in the next five minutes, we will throw in a second Salad Shooter absolutely free...just pay shipping...