Before I begin the actual argument, a few terms/concepts must be addressed. One of those concepts involves possible world semantics. What is a possible world (PW)?
A PW is a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be true, or could be falseor a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be necessarily true, or necessarily false.
Example: Barack Obama is the President of the United States.
If this statement is true, then there is a possible world at which Barack Obama is President of the United States. However, since Barack Obama could very well NOT be the President of the U.S., then it follows that there is a possible world at which Barack Obama isnt President of the U.S.
So, in essence, there is a possible world (set of circumstances) at which Barack Obama is the President of the U.S. (and vice versa). In other words, its possible.
That being said; lets turn our attention to the difference between contingent truths, and necessary truths. Contingent truths are circumstances or propositions that could be true, but could also be equally false (such as the example above).
Necessary truths are truths that are either true or false REGARDLESS of the circumstances. So in essence, necessary truths are true in ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS. Good examples of necessary truths are mathematical truths, such as 2+2=4 <--- this is true in all possible circumstances and can never be false under any circumstance.
Next, Id like to turn the attention to the definition of God. God, at least as defined by Christian theism, is a maximally great being (MGB). By maximally great, we mean that God is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnipresent (present everywhere at any given time), and omnibenevolent (the ultimate source of goodness)an ultimately, such a being is necessary in its existence (such a being cannot fail/cease to exist).
The four "omni's"that you see above, those are what we'd called "great making properties." A person is considered "great" based on accomplishments, power, influence, character, etc.
Being a maximally great being, all of those great-making properties are maxed out to the degree at which there isn't anything left to add. It is virtually impossible to think of a "greater being" than one that is all-knowing, all powerful, present everywhere, and the ultimate source of goodness.
Now, the Modal Ontological Argument makes a case that it is possible for such a being to actually exist. In other words; there is a possible world at which a MGB exists.
On to the argument..
1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).
5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.
Of course, most of you will agree that it is possible for a MGB to exist. The problem is, once you admit that it is possible for a MGB to exist, you are essentially saying It is possible for a necessary being to exist.
Well, if it is possible for a necessary being to exist, then it follows that such a being must ACTUALLY exist. Why? Because a proposition cannot be possibly necessarily true, but actually false (because if the proposition is actually false, then it was never possibly necessarily true).
Again, most of you admit that it is possible for God to exist. Well, if it is possible for God to exist, then God must actually exist, because Gods existence would be one of necessity, and no necessary truth can be possibly true, but actually false.
And under the same token, if it is possible for God to NOT exist, then it is impossible for God to exist. So, Gods existence is either necessarily true, or necessarily false. And again for the third time, at some point in each and every one of your lives, youve admitted that it is possible for God to exist.
Therefore, God must exist. And as I close this argument, just for the record, it will take more than you people putting your hand over your ears and shouting The argument is not valid or whatever you like to say when a theist bring forth an argument.
You actually have to address the argument (1-5), and explain why any of the premises are false. But I dont think that you can, can you?
The Modal Ontological Argument
Moderator: Moderators
-
For_The_Kingdom
- Guru
- Posts: 1915
- Joined: Thu May 05, 2016 3:29 pm
- rikuoamero
- Under Probation
- Posts: 6707
- Joined: Tue Jul 28, 2015 2:06 pm
- Been thanked: 4 times
Post #251
Since Kingdom likes to throw in 2+2=4 i.e. mathematics, I'd like to counter with a bit of mathematics as well.
Ever hear of Goldbach's Theorem? It states that "every even integer greater than 2 can be expressed as the sum of 2 primes".
Now here's the kicker. We don't know if that's true or not. Kingdom has expressed himself as saying (in a nutshell) that mathematical truths are necessary truths (by challenging us several times to showing a world where 2+2=/= 4).
Well if we plug in Goldbach's Theorem in the MOA, one can make it a necessary truth...even though we haven't proven it.
------
Something else. How powerful is all-powerful? What are the limits of all powerful? Whatever we can imagine? What if it actually IS 100% impossible to raise the dead? In that world, a maximally powerful being would be a being that is maximally powerful, but cannot raise the dead, since such an action is impossible to do.
This is another thing I don't like about the MOA. It gives various properties to its MGB, but does not give us ANY evidence whatsoever as to the limits, if any, of those properties.
Ever hear of Goldbach's Theorem? It states that "every even integer greater than 2 can be expressed as the sum of 2 primes".
Now here's the kicker. We don't know if that's true or not. Kingdom has expressed himself as saying (in a nutshell) that mathematical truths are necessary truths (by challenging us several times to showing a world where 2+2=/= 4).
Well if we plug in Goldbach's Theorem in the MOA, one can make it a necessary truth...even though we haven't proven it.
------
Something else. How powerful is all-powerful? What are the limits of all powerful? Whatever we can imagine? What if it actually IS 100% impossible to raise the dead? In that world, a maximally powerful being would be a being that is maximally powerful, but cannot raise the dead, since such an action is impossible to do.
This is another thing I don't like about the MOA. It gives various properties to its MGB, but does not give us ANY evidence whatsoever as to the limits, if any, of those properties.

Your life is your own. Rise up and live it - Richard Rahl, Sword of Truth Book 6 "Faith of the Fallen"
I condemn all gods who dare demand my fealty, who won't look me in the face so's I know who it is I gotta fealty to. -- JoeyKnotHead
Some force seems to restrict me from buying into the apparent nonsense that others find so easy to buy into. Having no religious or supernatural beliefs of my own, I just call that force reason. -- Tired of the Nonsense
- Furrowed Brow
- Site Supporter
- Posts: 3720
- Joined: Mon Nov 20, 2006 9:29 am
- Location: Here
- Been thanked: 1 time
- Contact:
Re: The Modal Ontological Argument
Post #252Yes. That would be a world which the first world cannot access. That is how Kripke semantics works. Necessity is not naively defined as being true in every world.You are taking one definition of necessity and assuming that is the only definition. But as Bertrand Russell originally pointed out at the beginning of the 20th century the concept of necessity is so difficult to define and has so many meanings it should not be regarded as a logical property. Kripke semantics however gave us a means to define the alternative semantic for many different meanings, and Russells complaint was laregly ignored as a result.For_The_Kingdom wrote:Ok, so you shouldn't have any problem giving me a possible world at which a proposition is possibly necessarily true in one world, but possibly/actually false in other words.Furrowed Brow wrote:
I'm sorry it is well known Plantinga's MOA is only valid in modal system S5. There are hundred of different modal logics. One of the most important alongside S5 is S4. S4 has a different definition of necessity and a smaller set of theorems.
The implication on which you rely and which you are asserting can't be rebutted is not true in S4, along with many buy other alternative modal logics.
So in light of that background and to repeat the point: the MOA relies on just one specific definition of necessity BUT it is not the only one. Here is an alternative example of how possible worlds are related or not related.
- In world w it may be necessary that the speed of light is a constant. That means in every world accessible from w the speed of light is a constant and if we start with w we never find a falsifying world in which the speed of light is not a constant.
Now imagine another world v in which the speed of light is variable. What makes the speed of light necessarily constant in world w is not that the speed must be constant in world v - that would be the naive assumption. for C to be necessarily constant in w then world v cannot be accessible form w.Which is to say from the point of view of w the alternative world v is not possible. Meaning it is not possible to access that world. But v is still classed as a possible world. We can do that because we do not make any metaphysical commitments that there has to be one actual world, or universes of worlds, or if we make a commitment and we are realists about worlds then we admit w and v are parallel worlds that never interact, or if there is some god-like being able to flip between worlds they are still bound by the rules of the world they are in. In other words a local law in one world can be necessarily the case i.e. never open for revision, but that law not apply elsewhere.
Here is one more example:
- If Abraham Lincoln is dead in world w then any other world v in which Lincoln is alive is not accessible. We may say Lincoln is necessarily dead because he is an historical figure and it impossible for a human being to live over 200 hundred years. but then there is the world of 1855 when Lincoln is alive. Is that world possible? If it is possible then what is necessarily true in 2016 i.e. Lincoln must be dead, is false in the world of 1809.
- Furrowed Brow
- Site Supporter
- Posts: 3720
- Joined: Mon Nov 20, 2006 9:29 am
- Location: Here
- Been thanked: 1 time
- Contact:
Post #253
Here is the same mistake again. You take an example that supports your definition and ask the critic to disprove it. But you fail to consider alternative definitions.For_The_Kingdom wrote: Necessary truths are true in ALL POSSIBLE worlds...unless you can tell me how 2+2=4 on earth, but on Mars 2+2=17.....or unless you can tell me how is it possible that 7 can be divided evenly into 294848884848383838383 on earth, but on Jupiter, it can't.
I anxiously await your response.
If something is true in every conceivable world then it is surely necessary. But there are other definitions of necessary your definition does not include.
So take the example I used previously. Imagine there are worlds in which is is impossible to travel faster than the speed of light. In these worlds the speed of light is a constant and the speed limit is never open to change. Now imagine a parallel universe in which the speed of light is variable and faster than light travel is achievable. Imagine yourself with the power to switch between worlds. In the world where there is a speed limit you are limited to the speed limit because it is impossible to break that limit. In the parallel universe you are allowed more freedom and can go faster.
So when you say if an MGB is possible maybe such a thing cannot break the local laws and limits that are necessary in the world they apply.
But however you take this you are still ignoring the bulk of modal logic. How can you do that with a straight face?
- Willum
- Savant
- Posts: 9017
- Joined: Sat Aug 02, 2014 2:14 pm
- Location: Yahweh's Burial Place
- Has thanked: 35 times
- Been thanked: 82 times
Post #254
Hi Kingdom,
What if I can prove 2 + 2 = 11, will that satisfy you enough to try to understand others' posts?
What if I can prove 2 + 2 = 11, will that satisfy you enough to try to understand others' posts?
I will never understand how someone who claims to know the ultimate truth, of God, believes they deserve respect, when they cannot distinguish it from a fairy-tale.
You know, science and logic are hard: Religion and fairy tales might be more your speed.
To continue to argue for the Hebrew invention of God is actually an insult to the very concept of a God. - Divine Insight
You know, science and logic are hard: Religion and fairy tales might be more your speed.
To continue to argue for the Hebrew invention of God is actually an insult to the very concept of a God. - Divine Insight
-
WinePusher
- Scholar
- Posts: 457
- Joined: Mon May 04, 2015 2:57 am
Post #255
That's probably a really bad idea given the huge blunder you made in this post.rikuoamero wrote:Since Kingdom likes to throw in 2+2=4 i.e. mathematics, I'd like to counter with a bit of mathematics as well.
Nope, never heard of such a thing. Oh, did you mean Goldbach's CONJECTURE? Well then yea, I've heard of Goldbach's conjecture in my study of prime numbers and number theory in general. If you think that a conjecture is the same thing as a theorem in mathematics, then it would probably be a great idea to avoid discussing mathematics.rikuamero wrote:Ever hear of Goldbach's Theorem?
Yes, apparently that's the definition posted up on the wikipedia article on Goldbach's conjecture.rikuamero wrote:It states that "every even integer greater than 2 can be expressed as the sum of 2 primes".
A far better, more intuitive understanding of the Goldbach conjecture is that there exists infinitely many pairs of twin primes, which is why the Goldbach conjecture is also commonly linked with the twin prime conjecture.
Speak for yourself. Anybody who is actually familiar with the research and literature would know that we do essentially "know" that the Goldbach conjecture is true. This is common knowledge that is presented in all basic number theory textbooks. The only problem is that no one has been able to provide a formal proof of the conjecture.rikuamero wrote:Now here's the kicker. We don't know if that's true or not.
Burton, D. (2010). Elementary Number Theory, New York, NY: McGraw Hill. 7th Edition, Page 52.The numerical data suggesting the truth of Goldbach's conjecture are OVERWHELMING.
Ever heard of Fermat's Last Theorem? It's essentially the same scenario we have here, prior the Andrew Wiles producing the formal mathematical proof for Fermat's Last Theorem, it was treated as a conjecture that everyone knew to be correct, the only trouble was working out the mathematical details.
Because it is FACT that mathematics consists of necessary truths. You see, this is the problem with forums like this. People think they can just make stuff up and argue with established facts, like how mathematical truths are, by definition necessary truths. On actual university campuses and other actual learned institutions, everyone already recognizes these facts regardless of their personal religious beliefs.rikuamero wrote:Kingdom has expressed himself as saying (in a nutshell) that mathematical truths are necessary truths (by challenging us several times to showing a world where 2+2=/= 4).
Nope, wrong and completely incoherent. Plantinga's argument is simply a more formal reiteration of Anselm's assertion that God exists by definition of being a maximally great being. Again, on university campuses and in philosophy seminars you won't find people debating whether or not mathematical theorems are necessary truths because everyone who is educated on mathematics and philosophy already agrees on this.rikuamero wrote:Well if we plug in Goldbach's Theorem in the MOA, one can make it a necessary truth...even though we haven't proven it.
The actual debate over any form of the ontological argument concerns whether or not maximal greatness and perfection ENTAILS and REQUIRES existence. If one can show that an entity can maintain maximal greatness and perfection while being non-existent, then the ontological argument will have been refuted.
To put it short, your argument concerning mathematics and Goldbach's conjecture is simply misinformed, as are the arguments made by many nonbelievers here.
Post #256
I don't follow... how can a non-existent being be present everywhere, which is one of the great making properties, if the being doesn't exist?WinePusher wrote:The actual debate over any form of the ontological argument concerns whether or not maximal greatness and perfection ENTAILS and REQUIRES existence. If one can show that an entity can maintain maximal greatness and perfection while being non-existent, then the ontological argument will have been refuted.
By the way, the onthological argument was demolished by reason and logic a long time ago by Kant, himself a theist!
-
Bust Nak
- Savant
- Posts: 9874
- Joined: Mon Feb 27, 2012 6:03 am
- Location: Planet Earth
- Has thanked: 189 times
- Been thanked: 267 times
Re: The Modal Ontological Argument
Post #257That's not true, look at the reasons we gave in the older thread, look at this very thread.For_The_Kingdom wrote: Sure, you can systematically deny whatever you choose...but when it comes to questions like "what reasons do you have to conclude that God cannot possibly exist"..when it comes to questions like that, the atheists' bag is empty.
But that's besides the point - You were supposed to provide support for the premise which, in your own words: "isn't sufficient." You never felt the need to give support to any of the premises, because you assumed that most of us would just go along with it.
Evidence says otherwise. I provided a link to an old thread on the same topic, you might have missed that, but I don't know how you could miss me mentioning the problem of evil, long have skeptics argued against the possibility of God as you defined it. Regardless of how valid you think the problem of evil is, you cannot say we haven't been claiming that God is not merely non-existent, but impossible.The arguments for atheism is lacking, I am afraid...that being said, I don't think you have any good reasons for such a contention, other than the fact that you just don't like the idea of a "God", and will go through every lengths to deny him at all costs.
As much as I can dig any other question begging arguments. When the most important bit of the argument (re:God's definition) is sitting in the preamble and not as part of the syllogism, I think I am justified in calling it a sleight of hand. Is a magic trick any less a magic trick if the performer reveals how he is doing it? But like I said, credit where it is due, you did spell it out clearly in said preamble.Bruh, this isn't some magic trick LOL. This is just a good, ole fashioned syllogism. Can you dig it?
This should have been completely obvious, that you say you don't see the significance is telling. The definition of God as a necessary being is relevant to the argument because:I just don't see how that is relevant to the argument.provide justification for defining God as a necessary being...
a) the truth of P1 depends on what kind of god you are talking about; and b) Step 3 may or may not be valid depending on what kind of god you are talking about.
Both the soundness and the validity of the argument hang in the balance depending on the definition of God and you didn't see how it is relevant? That's why I kept telling you, you can't define God into existence. You need to justify treating God as a necessary being.
And if the KCA argument is sound, then KCA alone is enough to prove the existence of God without the need to jump through hoops with modal logic. That literally was the first thing I told you all the way back on page 3. The MOA is redundant even if it is somehow sound.But nevertheless, I can answer that question, just not with this argument. Wait for the KCA thread.
Save the trash talk for another thread. You've already conceded far too much to legitimately claim the argument works.I hate to break the news to you, Nak, but God definitely exists. The reason why the argument works is because it reflects truth. It has truth value. The truth cannot be rebutted. If you stop fighting it and simply embrace the truth, you will be a lot better off, trust me.
It is easier to point out exactly where the fault is when it is numbered as part of the syllogism, it's harder to spot when it is part of the preface. You think cool-ness is a function of transparency?No doubt. The definition of "God/MGB" should act as a preface to the argument. I've seen some versions of the MOA where the definition of God is actually the first premise, which I thought was....uncool lol
Aye, that you did, but that has nothing to do with what I said. You were suggesting that we didn't understand enough about the argument to deny P1 was until you came along and explained it to us. That is simply false.Well, I explained it in the argument to remove all doubt.
Sometimes. The Judeo-Christian God isn't typically defined as a logical necessity you know.Oh, then the Judeo-Christian God wasn't included in those discussions, huh?
You say that, but have a look at the old thread, we are saying the same things now as we did back then. And I have to point out again, I counted only 4 out of 13 ever granted you P1.It was as obvious as the nose on Pinocchio's face after he lied to the grand jury.
Well there you go, the argument is question begging. So much for reflecting truth.No, that isn't sufficient.
Whatever gave you that impression? I am pointing out that you haven't given sufficient support for defining God as necessary, something that you readily admitted to yourself, even in this very post. How exactly does that imply I haven't been following?You haven't been following the thread, have you?
Sure, they should have been more careful, but that's the point. It's about catching people off guard, when they aren't paying full attention, and you know they aren't paying attention because they say God might or might not exist in response.Then they should of said "I don't accept your definition in the first place".
Easy enough, I've already mentioned the problem of evil for dealing with the Omni-X style gods, here is one that specifically deal with necessary gods, for all X:Which is easy to say, but difficult to prove or give reasons why. And if you think otherwise, prove me wrong.
1) If there is a possible world where a being X does not exist then X does not have necessary existence.
2) A world that has no sentient beings is one such possible world where the being X does not exist.
3) Therefore X does not have necessary existence.
Another good, ole fashioned syllogism. Can you dig it?
-
Kenisaw
- Guru
- Posts: 2117
- Joined: Fri Oct 16, 2015 2:41 pm
- Location: St Louis, MO, USA
- Has thanked: 18 times
- Been thanked: 61 times
Post #258
A logically sound objection, no matter the size, is still a valid objection, correct? I thought so. Your MGB, as defined by you, can't be what you claim it is, therefore it can't possibly exist. Your premise is rejected.For_The_Kingdom wrote:Do you think that such a miniscule objection negates the MOA? Dude, can a MGB change the future? If the answer is no, then it must not be POSSIBLE for the future to be changed, because if it were possible, then a MGB would be able to do it!!!Kenisaw wrote: A maximally great being (MGB) would be a being that is all knowing, all powerful, etc. If they weren't, they wouldn't be maximally great. So this all knowing being knows everything that has happened, is currently happening, and will happen. It has to, otherwise it could not be all-knowing. This means that it even knows everything it will ever do. But if it knows everything it will ever do, than it cannot change the future. If it was going to change the future it should already know it was going to to that, because it knows everything. So if it can't change the future it can't possibly be all powerful then. If it can't be all knowing and all powerful at the same time it can't be a MGB.
So an MGB must not exist. Your premise is rejected.
Is free will absurd? Because your MGB doesn't have that either. If it can't change the future it also can't change the present. If it knows all then it can't change its mind when the future becomes the present. An MGB cannot ever make a decision based on its own free will because it can't possibly have one. Fascinating.So, apparently, the changing of the future is thereby impossible...and no one is claiming that even with an attribute such a omnipotence, that a MGB can do something that is logically absurd.
Too bad it can't actually make that choice, seeing as how it doesn't have any free will. Bummer for the MGB. Not that it matters anyway, because your MGB is shooting hoops with an imperfect creation. How goes a MGB create something that isn't maximally great? If it exists everywhere then part of its existence isn't maximally great now...Nonsense. So, if me and the MGB are in a free throw shooting contest, the MGB has the power to make every single free throw, correct? Because after all, he is maximally great?Kenisaw wrote: We can also attack it from a different angle. If an MGB exists, then that means that everything is maximally great, because a MGB cannot have existence that is not a maximally great existence. But it is claimed that the MGB created the universe, the Earth, and us. But this means that the MGB changed the parameters of its existence. You can't improve on maximally great, so any change must therefore reduce the greatness to something below maximally great. So an MGB cannot currently exist.
So an MGB must not exist. Your premise is rejected.
But if the MGB chooses to miss one, despite having the POWER to NOT miss ANY, does that make the being any less maximally great? No, it doesn't.
As long as the miss was a choice, not a short-coming or mishap in his ability.
Your premise is rejected.
While you are trying to figure out how an MGB can't have free will, maybe you can also figure out how an MGB can be everywhere at the same time and be "omni benevolent" while there is evil in the world. It exists everywhere and impart of its existence is evil...another fascinating dilemma.But it is as clear as the sun in the sky that Google is you all's best friend. Keep looking, keep searching for a way out...because we all know, "anything but the "G" word" right?
Maybe you should title this the Modal Ontoillogical Argument....
-
Kenisaw
- Guru
- Posts: 2117
- Joined: Fri Oct 16, 2015 2:41 pm
- Location: St Louis, MO, USA
- Has thanked: 18 times
- Been thanked: 61 times
Re: P
Post #259PhysicsFor_The_Kingdom wrote:KCAKenisaw wrote: No, because $0.00 broken up still equals $0.00. Send them $5 and a -$5. You will have sent them $0. It's not that hard a concept. In our universe everything offsets. The net spin is zero. The net charge is zero. The net momentum is zero. Add up all the positive energy (light, mass, kinetic, heat, etc) and subtract out the negative (gravity) and you zero. The universe is nothing, broken up into a lot of pieces. Don't take my word for it, look it up...
-
For_The_Kingdom
- Guru
- Posts: 1915
- Joined: Thu May 05, 2016 3:29 pm
Post #260
The truth value of P1 is holds regardless of the question of "Why".Inigo Montoya wrote: It is relevant. You have defined the being as necessary without justification or support.
On what grounds do you justify or support this being as being defined "necessary?"
Not relevant? It's your entire linchpin and remains unsupported..

