If God wants to destroy evil...

[Zarathustra]

God created everything that has been, is, and is going to be in existence. He created the Earth and the Heavens. He created the Lake of Fire in which he casts sinners. He created Good, and He created evil. Does not the old adage says "I have created you, and so can I destroy you"?

If God wanted to, couldn't He, in theory, destroy evil with no need for the battle of the apocalypse?

[harvey1]

Now. I have already provided arguments against this position (and indeed against all those versions I gave previous to it). Perhaps you can help make me feel a little understood by giving me what you think my key response to your response is?

Your main argument has been that one of these statements is false:

1. If an all-good, all-powerful entity exists, the amount of evil (throughout our spacetime) is as minimal as possible.
2. The amount of evil (throughout our spacetime) is not as minimal as possible.
3. There is an all-good, all-powerful entity.

You've insisted that (c) is the most likely to be false. You argued based on my position that God could have in principle stopped the tsunami, but didn't do so even though it was possible for God without violating the lower self to do so. Since God didn't stop the tsunami, you've argued that it was good that God didn't stop the tsunami (otherwise God would not be an all-good being by not stopping something that was clearly bad for the victims). You asked whether the tsunami was good that it happened. But, you pushed a little further with this in order to know why it was good that the tsunami happened when it seems that it was not good, but actually downright horrible that such a thing happened. I've claimed that it could be paradoxial for God to stop the tsunami, however you countered by asking how could it be possible for God in principle to stop the tsunami and still be paradoxial (impossible) for God to stop the tsunami (i.e., you can't have something possible and impossible in the same situation, it is either possible or impossible--not both). You think I should have said it was not good for God to stop the tsunami, but it was still possible (which I did not accept your reasoning on that). You asked why I think the situation would be a worse situation had God stopped the tsunami since the tsunami itself seemed like a pretty bad event, what could be worse?

This, overall, is how I understand your argument against this summary. As you know, I disagree that your argument shows that my summary is untenable. Where I think your argument fails is that it does not consider the entire summary as a conjunctive argument. Your argument treates the summary in a disjointed fashion and therefore misses the power of the argument as one whole descriptive of God's omni-nature.

[spetey]

Hullo!

Perhaps you can help make me feel a little understood by giving me what you think my key response to your response is?

Your main argument has been that one of these statements is false:

1. If an all-good, all-powerful entity exists, the amount of evil (throughout our spacetime) is as minimal as possible.
2. The amount of evil (throughout our spacetime) is not as minimal as possible.
3. There is an all-good, all-powerful entity.

You've insisted that (c) is the most likely to be false.

Good, that's a great summary of my position, to which you responded with that paragraph we so carefully reworked. And indeed, I feel a bit more understood! But now I'd like to hear how you think I specifically respond to your response, the one we worked up together.

I've claimed that it could be paradoxial for God to stop the tsunami, however you countered by asking how could it be possible for God in principle to stop the tsunami and still be paradoxial (impossible) for God to stop the tsunami (i.e., you can't have something possible and impossible in the same situation, it is either possible or impossible--not both).

This may be a good incidental place to stop and ask: do you agree that it was either possible or not possible for God to stop the tsunami? IF so, do you have a position on which it was? For example: suppose stopping the tsunami would have violated God's "lower self", the laws of physics. Here you say it would have been strictly impossible for God to stop the tsunami?

Where I think your argument fails is that it does not consider the entire summary as a conjunctive argument. Your argument treates the summary in a disjointed fashion and therefore misses the power of the argument as one whole descriptive of God's omni-nature.

I'm not sure what you mean by this--at the moment it sounds like "where I think your argument fails is by not propertly refuting my argument", which is too vague for me to answer. Perhaps we'd better hold off on this, and just work step by step. We both have agreed on what my original argument is (excellent dialectic progress) and we both have agreed on what your response is (also excellent dialectic progress). Let's see if we can understand together what my response to your response is, please.


spetey

[harvey1]

Hey Spetey,

This may be a good incidental place to stop and ask: do you agree that it was either possible or not possible for God to stop the tsunami? IF so, do you have a position on which it was? For example: suppose stopping the tsunami would have violated God's "lower self", the laws of physics. Here you say it would have been strictly impossible for God to stop the tsunami?

It was possible for God in the sense that God can "do whatever is logically possible" and "God often acts in these worlds to bring about the Omega state." It was not possible in the sense that "prevent[ing] such events would have resulted in other effects that would provide a bad net tradeoff in progress toward the Omega state--making God paradoxically imperfect." If the laws themselves were unsurmountable by God, then "[s]topping the tsunami... would have violated God's lower self... making God paradoxically imperfect."

My position is the former reason. That is, "prevent[ing] such events would have resulted in other effects that would provide a bad net tradeoff in progress toward the Omega state--making God paradoxically imperfect."

[trencacloscas]

He can, but He can not, y'know...

[spetey]

Hullo again!

It was possible for God in the sense that God can "do whatever is logically possible" and "God often acts in these worlds to bring about the Omega state." It was not possible in the sense that "prevent[ing] such events would have resulted in other effects that would provide a bad net tradeoff in progress toward the Omega state--making God paradoxically imperfect."

I think I understand your view, but I don't understand why you resist my rewording of it--that it's possible in the metaphysical sense, but impossible in the ethical sense--"impossible" because not net-good, and God is net-good.

So we have my position well-understood by both of us. And you have said that I understand your response to my position adequately. So next let's please try to ensure we both understand my response to your response. What do you understand it to be?


spetey

[harvey1]

I think I understand your view, but I don't understand why you resist my rewording of it--that it's possible in the metaphysical sense, but impossible in the ethical sense--

I would state my position as: "It's possible in the logical sense, it's not possible in the physical sense." For example, logically it is possible for you to swim across Lake Michigan, but physically it may not be possible. You might be under other physical constraints that logic doesn't forbid, but physical circumstances do forbid. I group ethics under a physical constraint since God could have in principle affected the tsunami to miss land masses or not happen at all (i.e., logically speaking), however physically this would have implied doing it every time when such an outcome was about to happen in principle. Physically it is not possible to prevent a major tsunami everytime and everywhere without logical violations, hence it is the physical constraint of having to face the fact that tsunamis must occur (given these laws of physics) that forces God to act as ethically as possible. Hence, ethics falls under the physical constraint. You might argue that my view would endorse the view that God is logically constrained to act ethically, and I would agree, but the actual constraint that actually forces God to make tough decisions of when and where to interfere is a physical constraint.

That is, physically there must eventually be tsunamis taking lives of the magnitude we saw in December, 2004. Therefore, I think God is physically constrained to allow tsunamis. This has an ethical dimension, along with other dimensions that we may or may not be able to guess. (E.g., God obeying a minimum principle of intervention and still being able to reach an Omega state while using the least amount of energy, statistical laws of intervention require God to intervene within a certain threshhold, truth may require a sense of complete abandonment as a necessary step to divine union, Yin and Yang, etc..) These types of unknown physical constraints can be described as meta-laws that physically God must obey in order to prevent the violation of logical constraints. The meta-laws (including ethical meta-laws) that form the collection of physical constraints shouldn't be confused with the "lower self" of God which form a collection of logical constraints.

The meta-laws are physical boundary conditions of what God is allowed to do over a period of time-events. This is what gives God freedom to act in the universe. So, in effect, God can step temporarily outside the physical boundary conditions as long as God does not step outside the logical boundary conditions (which God cannot do without a paradox). If God steps outside the physical boundary conditions longer than the logical laws allow (i.e., all of God being inconsistent with all of God), then this would be in effect stepping outside the logical boundary conditions--hence, bringing about a logical paradox. The tsunami happened because God was constrained to step back inside the physical boundary in order to prevent a logical error.

"impossible" because not net-good, and God is net-good.

"Impossible" because the bad net tradeoff results in being caught off of first base long enough to be thrown out at first. God can lead-off (i.e., step outside the boundary of the physical constraints), but not further than the logical constraints of being thrown out by the pitcher allow. If God takes appropriate lead-offs, then God can steal a base by moving to the next base when the pitcher is not looking. If God is ever caught stealing a base, then paradox results and there is no game to win.

So we have my position well-understood by both of us. And you have said that I understand your response to my position adequately. So next let's please try to ensure we both understand my response to your response. What do you understand it to be?

I think from what I read you fail to understand my position of the physical constraints as I described above. I think you've taken a bivalent approach where God is either on base (i.e., it is not possible for God to stop the tsunami), or in the process of stealing a base (i.e., it is possible for God to stop a tsunami but then this leaves the question as to why God did not stop the tsunami). The correct answer, in my response, is that the pitcher in that instance threw the ball to the first base man, so in that instance God was constrained to returning to first base and therefore allowing a tsunami even though in principle God can steal the base under much of the circumstances that we see in the universe. Of course, we only see the times when God had to return back to the base to avoid being caught off base, hence the atheist forms the opinion that either God cannot steal a base (i.e., isn't all-powerful), or chooses not to try to steal a base (i.e., isn't all-good).

I hope the baseball metaphor helps...

[spetey]

Hullo Harvey et al!

I would state my position as: "It's possible in the logical sense, it's not possible in the physical sense." For example, logically it is possible for you to swim across Lake Michigan, but physically it may not be possible.

That's an interesting case--and I think you're right that there's different notions of possibility in play. In one sense it's "possible" for me to swim across Michigan and in another it's not.

But let me be clear: you want to say it was physically impossible for God to stop the tsunami, just like it's physically impossible for me to swim across Lake Michigan? In the case of my ill-advised swim, I could try to do it, but being as I am I would inevitably fail, and that's what makes it impossible. So your position is that even if God tried to stop the tsunami, God couldn't have done so? If so, in what sense is God omnipotent?

We agreed that to be omnipotent means you can do anything possible. But surely that doesn't mean "physically possible" in this case. For example: I can do anything "physically possible", in your sense--basically by definition. (If I can't swim across Lake Michigan, then--therefore--it's "physically impossible". The contrapositive of such claims is that if it's physically possible, I can do it. So I can do all that's "physically possible".) But obviously the fact that I can do anything "physically possible" doesn't make me omnipotent!

Physically it is not possible to prevent a major tsunami everytime and everywhere without logical violations...

Why not? A planet completely without tsunamis is perfectly logically consistent. Consider Mars. Actuality is proof of possibility, and Mars is an actual planet with no tsunamis. So it is an obvious logical possibility.

Presumably you'll want to say that it is impossible to support life and not have tsunamis. But first: why think that? Why couldn't the planet be without a molten core, or have only small manageable rivers, or why not make your lifeforms in some way other than carbon-based? And second: even if we had reason to think that tsunamis are necessary for life (?!), this is again an ethical constraint, not a physical one. Again what you would end up saying is that it would be possible for God to make a planet without tsunamis (since according to you God did do so when God made Mars), but not (net) good for God to make all planets without tsunamis because it's better to have some life. It's not impossible to make all planets without tsunamis--God could have made only desert planets, had God so chosen. It's just not good to do, and God does only what's good (you seem to need to say).

(And no, the baseball metaphor doesn't help at all, sorry.)

Anyway this is an interesting discussion of possibility, but kind of a distraction. I still would like to hear what you think my response to your response is. Hint: it has nothing to do with possibility. It's much more obvious than that.


spetey

[harvey1]

Hi Spetey,

you want to say it was physically impossible for God to stop the tsunami, just like it's physically impossible for me to swim across Lake Michigan?

No. I want to say that physical constraints impose a different level of restriction than do logical constraints. Physical constraints generally supervene on logical constraints. Physical constraints in terms of swimming across Lake Michigan might include constraints such as endurance constraints, knowing how to swim constraints, sleeping constraints, etc.. Likewise, God can do whatever is logically possible, but certain physical constraints emerge within this discussion which God must also respect. That doesn't mean that a physical constraint limits God in the same fashion as a logical constraint, I don't believe they do. Rather, physical constraints act as approximations to the logical laws they supervene upon, and therefore God must interpret the meaning of these emergent laws (or meta-laws). The interpretation gives God some leeway in intervening in the universe if God has good reason to act, however it must be within a valid range of interpretation of those base logical laws. When God sees that preventing a particular tsunami would not be a valid interpretation of the base laws, then God must respect the interpretation (or physical constraint) and allow the tsunami (as tragic as it was) to proceed.

In the case of my ill-advised swim, I could try to do it, but being as I am I would inevitably fail, and that's what makes it impossible. So your position is that even if God tried to stop the tsunami, God couldn't have done so? If so, in what sense is God omnipotent?

God is respecting the correct interpretation of those base laws (i.e., God's lower self). If God can produce a valid interpretation (i.e., show that a physical constraint is more liberal than a conventional approach would demonstrate as the case), then in that case this new and valid interpretation would allow for the tsunami to be prevented. Similarly, if you read the rules of a swimming contest for crossing Lake Michigan, and noticed that the rules said nothing about using a surf board as you swam, you would certainly take advantage of that loophole and perhaps undertake the challenge if you were still young and foolish.

We agreed that to be omnipotent means you can do anything possible. But surely that doesn't mean "physically possible" in this case. For example: I can do anything "physically possible", in your sense--basically by definition. (If I can't swim across Lake Michigan, then--therefore--it's "physically impossible". The contrapositive of such claims is that if it's physically possible, I can do it. So I can do all that's "physically possible".) But obviously the fact that I can do anything "physically possible" doesn't make me omnipotent!

It's not that simple and straightforward. Every logical law can be extrapolated to a situational exercise where wisdom of the law must be applied. That is, the laws must be interpreted. The interpretation forms a new constraint, which I termed a physical constraint. This physical constraint if violated in spirit (not necessarily in the letter) becomes a logical violation. God is not lacking in omnipotence because it is not just a violation of a physical constraint we are talking about, it has become a violation of a logical constraint. God interprets the base laws (i.e., purely logical based) and God is able to justly decide if it is the letter of the new physical constraint that must be kept or if God has some leeway in not keeping the letter and instead should focus purely on the spirit of the law. However, if God violates the letter of the physical constraint repeatedly, then it becomes a violation of the spirit of that law. Hence, God must abide approximately to the physical constraint.

As an example, the universe may be the result of God using a loophole in the laws of physics to make something from nothing. If the total energy of the universe is zero (i.e., it approximately cancels out), then God is not in violation of any logical law. God is in violation of the letter of a physical constraint which says that matter-energy must be conserved, but the interpretation of the logical laws might be permissive in allowing God to use the uncertainty principle to bring about a universe from nothing. God cannot continue to violate the physical principle that something must not come from nothing (since that's a logical violation), however the interpretation of the laws may have been permissive enough to allow God to squeeze out a universe. Sometimes (or actually in many, many cases) the laws are not so kind, and this is when God must accept that tsunamis must occur.

Presumably you'll want to say that it is impossible to support life and not have tsunamis. But first: why think that? Why couldn't the planet be without a molten core, or have only small manageable rivers, or why not make your lifeforms in some way other than carbon-based?

You're reasoning based on what we know not. We don't know the constraints that a different kind of laws of physics would present which would allow God to achieve the Omega state without there being events less severe than tsunamis. In addition, because our laws of physics can be used to bestow universes reaching an Omega state, we cannot say whether there must exist other criteria to avoid pain & suffering on the path toward the Omega state. It's very well possible that there's an infinite number of universes that reach an Omega state with no pain & suffering at all, however there might be a logical constraint that all Omega state possibilities be given a shot, not just the ones without p&s along their path.

And second: even if we had reason to think that tsunamis are necessary for life (?!), this is again an ethical constraint, not a physical one. Again what you would end up saying is that it would be possible for God to make a planet without tsunamis (since according to you God did do so when God made Mars), but not (net) good for God to make all planets without tsunamis because it's better to have some life.

I think ethical constraints can be either logical or physical constraints depending on which ethic we are talking about. So, for example, if God cheated in making a logical deductions, this is a primitive type of ethical violation. It is a logical violation, however it is also a type of lying. As one progresses up the ladder to higher levels of interpretation, then the ethical laws translate into what is consistent behavior for God in reaching the Omega state and not violating any logical laws in the process. Keeping to the spirit of these interpretations is what I mean by physical constraints. Let me be clear. By physical constraints I don't mean that God is a physical being or that God has another completely different set of constraints that have nothing to do with logical constraints. The physical constraints, as I said, supervene on the logical constraints. There are perhaps some kind of bridge laws that only God knows which connect those interpretations to the base laws, and those bridge laws form the good reason as to why God sees justification in intervening in some circumstances and not in others.

It's not impossible to make all planets without tsunamis--God could have made only desert planets, had God so chosen. It's just not good to do, and God does only what's good (you seem to need to say).

God could have made only desert planets if there were no logical laws that forbid it (and why should there be?), and if the interpretations of those laws (i.e., as they relate in terms of reaching the Omega state) was also not violated in spirit. Does this mean that God could make only desert planets? I have no idea. Maybe it means that God must have made planets with water, planets having tsunamis. Or, maybe it means that God saw that an infinite number of both desert planets and planets with water all reach the Omega state, hence God thought the spirit of the law was to make all infinite sets of each.

Anyway this is an interesting discussion of possibility, but kind of a distraction. I still would like to hear what you think my response to your response is. Hint: it has nothing to do with possibility. It's much more obvious than that.

Spetey, c'mon. I don't have time for games. If there is a response that you feel I missed, then please state it. So far, I see no reason to think that you have pointed out a counterargument which is not answerable in principle. If you feel that you have, then state it again, this time by showing how your summary of my position does not account for that counterargument.

[spetey]

Hullo!

Physical constraints generally supervene on logical constraints. ... God can do whatever is logically possible, but certain physical constraints emerge within this discussion which God must also respect.

Remember, be careful with words like "supervene". You mean what's physically possible is fully determined by what's logically possible? That it's a logical impossibility for the speed of light to be any different? In other words, a different speed of light entails a straightforward logical contradiction? First, this is enormously implausible. Second, if correct, then there is no distinction between the logically possible and the physically possible--a distinction you initially proposed until it got you into trouble. Do you think there is such a distinction or not? If so, then (since you say, finally, that God can do anything logically possible) is it logically impossible to stop the tsunami? If so, please derive the contradiction using pure logic from the premise "God prevented a tsunami"--or at least indicate how it would go. On the face of it it seems preposterous. But then this means that it was possible (in the only relevant sense) for God to do.

The interpretation gives God some leeway in intervening in the universe if God has good reason to act, however it must be within a valid range of interpretation of those base logical laws.

Just as I say--your claim is that God didn't stop the tsunami because it wouldn't have been net good to do, not because God was just unable to do it.

Anyway this is an interesting discussion of possibility, but kind of a distraction. I still would like to hear what you think my response to your response is. Hint: it has nothing to do with possibility. It's much more obvious than that.

Spetey, c'mon. I don't have time for games. If there is a response that you feel I missed, then please state it.

Sorry, I didn't mean for this to degrade to a game. I had genuinely good intentions for why we should practice stating each others' positions, I really did. But I must admit I started getting frustrated again when you didn't seem interested in reconstructing what my response was.

Basically, my response to your response is that it begs the question. We have no reason to believe in this Omega State of yours, or that the tsunami contributed to it. I summarize our positions this way: First, I ask, "why think there is an all-good, all-powerful God given disasters like the tsunami?" You answer, in effect: because there is an all-good all-powerful God, and sure the tsunami looks bad, but actually it's for the best (it was necessary to get to the "Omega State"). But this response fails to answer my original question, which is why think God is good and powerful given such bad events?

Remember our discussion of Hitler? That was all about this response to your response. For compare this exchange:

Hitler Freak: Hitler was good!
Me: Why think Hitler was good, when he caused such mass evil?
Hitler Freak: Because Hitler iwas good, and he only did what's for the best! So though that war and genocide sure looked evil, it wasn't really (net) evil. Maybe he had to start that war to save us all from space aliens or something! Hitler must have had good intentions, and we just don't know them!
Me: Sure, maybe Hitler saved us from space aliens or something. But why on earth think that? Why isn't it more reasonable to conclude that Hitler was not good?

Now let me be clear: I'm not saying that God exists and is evil like Hitler; I'm saying that there is no all-powerful all-good entity like God. And I'm not comparing you (or anyone on this forum) to the Hitler Freak in terms of political views, or anything like that. All I want to compare is the argument structure. You agree the Hitler Freak is being unreasonable, correct? You agree that the HF is begging the question? If so, then how is your response (that the tsunami was necessary to get to this Omega State) any different from HF's response?

That, in summary, is my response to your response.


spetey

[harvey1]

Remember, be careful with words like "supervene". You mean what's physically possible is fully determined by what's logically possible? That it's a logical impossibility for the speed of light to be any different? In other words, a different speed of light entails a straightforward logical contradiction?

You forget, I'm a Davidsonian! I don't view the supervenience relation in a Kimian (?) fashion at all. Davidson's definition has to do with predicates and not so much in terms of properties. Also, for Davidson the supervenient relation which stems from his anomalous monism does not mean that A is explicitly stateable by some strict set of bridge laws from B:

It follows that the same pair of events may be related causally, and yet, under certain descriptions (though not under all), there be no strict law under which those events fall. In particular, it is possible that a mental event — an event given under some mental description — will be causally related to some physical event — an event given under a physical description — and yet there will be no strict law covering those events under just those descriptions. My wanting to read Tolstoy, for instance, leads me to take War and Peace from the shelf, and so my wanting causes a change in the physical arrangement of a certain region of space-time, but there is no strict law that relates my wanting to the physical change. Similarly, while any mental event will be identical with some physical event — it will indeed be one and the same event under two descriptions — it is possible that there will be no strict law relating the event as described in mentalistic terms with the event as physically described. In fact, Davidson is explicit in claiming that there can be no strict laws that relate the mental and the physical in this way — there is no strict law that relates, for instance, wanting to read with a particular kind of brain activity. Davidson's denial of the existence of any strict ‘psycho-physical’ laws follows from his view of the mental as constrained by quite general principles of rationality that do not apply, at least not in the same way, to physical descriptions: normative considerations of overall consistency and coherence, for instance, constrain our own thinking about events as physically described, but they have no purchase on physical events as such. This does not mean, of course, that there are no correlations whatsoever to be discerned between the mental and the physical, but it does mean that the correlations that can be discerned cannot be rendered in the precise, explicit and exceptionless form — in the form, that is, of strict laws — that would be required in order to achieve any reduction of mental to physical descriptions. The lack of strict laws covering events under mental descriptions is thus an insuperable barrier to any attempt to bring the mental within the framework of unified physical science. However, while the mental is not reducible to the physical, every mental event can be paired with some physical event — that is, every mental description of an event can be paired with a physical description of the very same event. This leads Davidson to speak of the mental as ‘supervening’ on the physical in a way that implies a certain dependence of mental predicates on physical predicates: predicate p supervenes on a set of predicates S ‘if and only if p does not distinguish any entities that cannot be distinguished by S’ (see ‘Thinking Causes’ [1993]).

Of course, this is in regard to psychophysicalism issues, but remember I see the laws of God as linguistic causes to the world. Hence, I also see the physical constraints in a linguistic framework. I think Davidson is right on the mark by his interpretationalism:

Davidson explicitly rules out this possibility when he says in his description of supervenience that it "does not entail reducibility through law or definition. . . ." (4) What other form of dependence might there be?
The answer to this question can be found in Davidson’s interpretationalism. According to Davidson, to have beliefs and desires is to have them ascribed by an interpreter, for there are no independent facts of the matter about mental content: "If we cannot find a way to interpret the utterances and other behaviour of a creature as revealing a set of beliefs largely consistent and true by our own standards, we have no reason to count that creature as rational, as having beliefs, or as saying anything." (5) What mental predicates are ascribed to an agent depend on the procedures we follow in the task of interpretation.

On this Davidson account, my argument is that physical constraints are interpretations of God based on the logical laws (i.e., the physical constraints supervene in Davidsonian fashion on logical constraints). God, as the interpreter in this case, has freedom to interpret the physical constraints in the spirit of the law, however only in so much as logical laws do not expressly forbid.

there is no distinction between the logically possible and the physically possible--a distinction you initially proposed until it got you into trouble.

I don't recall making that claim...

Do you think there is such a distinction or not?

Yes, there is a distinction. That distinction is an issue of interpretation which only God can and does provide.

If so, then (since you say, finally, that God can do anything logically possible) is it logically impossible to stop the tsunami?

In terms of strict logical laws, I believe the answer is no. There were probably no strict logical law statements that said that particular tsunami was unstoppable. But, as I've tried to communicate to you often, there are logical laws that ultimately prevent all catastrophic tsunamis from being stopped. The physical constraints supervening to this ultimate law allow God to choose which tsunami to prevent. However, since it is impossible for God to stop all tsunamis (i.e., and still have this kind of (meta)universe reaching the Omega state--a kind of (meta)universe that God seeks to reach an Omega state), therefore God allows some tsunamis like the one in 2004 in order to reach an Omega state.

Just as I say--your claim is that God didn't stop the tsunami because it wouldn't have been net good to do, not because God was just unable to do it.

Like I said, it was not stopped because it was a kind of physical constraint ultimately based on some logical law that God had to eventually allow some tsunami of this type, and based on God's interpretation of this physical constraint, God chose that particular tsunami as one in which to allow.

Basically, my response to your response is that it begs the question. We have no reason to believe in this Omega State of yours, or that the tsunami contributed to it. I summarize our positions this way: First, I ask, "why think there is an all-good, all-powerful God given disasters like the tsunami?" You answer, in effect: because there is an all-good all-powerful God, and sure the tsunami looks bad, but actually it's for the best (it was necessary to get to the "Omega State"). But this response fails to answer my original question, which is why think God is good and powerful given such bad events?

It's not begging the question since the question you pose is how could there be an all-powerful, all-good God given X. My response could be entirely hypothetical. I could be an atheist and answer, "well, Spetey, I hate to defend theists here, but an all-good, all-powerful God could exist even if there is X because of (harvey's reason, plantinga's reason, craig's reason, etc...). So, I don't think you should try to use that argument against theists because this is an answerable hypothetical question. If the question can be answered based on what we know today, then surely there's no reason not to think there's a million other justifiable answers which we don't know." Of course, I'm a theist, I merely point out that I don't have to be a theist to see that your claims are not strong enough to force one to say that it is logically impossible for an all-good, all-powerful God to exist.

Remember our discussion of Hitler? That was all about this response to your response. For compare this exchange:

Hitler Freak: Hitler was good!
Me: Why think Hitler was good, when he caused such mass evil?
Hitler Freak: Because Hitler iwas good, and he only did what's for the best! So though that war and genocide sure looked evil, it wasn't really (net) evil. Maybe he had to start that war to save us all from space aliens or something! Hitler must have had good intentions, and we just don't know them!
Me: Sure, maybe Hitler saved us from space aliens or something. But why on earth think that? Why isn't it more reasonable to conclude that Hitler was not good?

I would just request that you review my answers to your Hitler argument. I thought I gave a satisfactory answer to this argument.