If God wants to destroy evil...

[Zarathustra]

God created everything that has been, is, and is going to be in existence. He created the Earth and the Heavens. He created the Lake of Fire in which he casts sinners. He created Good, and He created evil. Does not the old adage says "I have created you, and so can I destroy you"?

If God wanted to, couldn't He, in theory, destroy evil with no need for the battle of the apocalypse?

[spetey]

I'm back already!

Remember, be careful with words like "supervene". You mean what's physically possible is fully determined by what's logically possible? That it's a logical impossibility for the speed of light to be any different? In other words, a different speed of light entails a straightforward logical contradiction?

You forget, I'm a Davidsonian! I don't view the supervenience relation in a Kimian (?) fashion at all ...

... This leads Davidson to speak of the mental as ‘supervening’ on the physical in a way that implies a certain dependence of mental predicates on physical predicates: predicate p supervenes on a set of predicates S ‘if and only if p does not distinguish any entities that cannot be distinguished by S’ (see ‘Thinking Causes’ [1993]).

This seems to me an equivalent formulation. How do you see this definition as differing from the one I gave? Please provide a case where the Kim version holds and the Davidsonian version above doesn't, or vice-versa. Do you claim that physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility or not? Put in your apparently preferred terms: do you claim that there is no thing to which "physically impossible" applies that can't be distinguished in terms of what is "logically possible"?

• A sidenote:

  According to Davidson, to have beliefs and desires is to have them ascribed by an interpreter, for there are no independent facts of the matter about mental content...

  You endorse this view, Harvey? In other words, you think mental content is not objective? You think it is, in fact, a subjective matter? Very curious considering our recent discussion on this thread, where you mysteriously accuse me of this view.

there is no distinction between the logically possible and the physically possible--a distinction you initially proposed until it got you into trouble.

I don't recall making that claim...

It follows from your supervenience claim.

Proof that if physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility, then the two notions are co-extensive. Suppose that "[physical possibility] does not distinguish any entities that cannot be distinguished by [logical possibility]", ie suppose the former supervenes on the latter (in the "Davidsonian" sense, if you insist). In possible world semantics, what's physically possible (in this world) is determined by an accessibility relation from this world to the set of all possible worlds (pw's). So the claim is that the physically-possible accessibility relation can be put in terms of the logically-possible accessibility relation. But the latter is simply the universal accessibility relation; that is, all possible worlds are "logically possible" (ie Harvey's favored phrase is redundant, since logically inconsistent worlds are not possible) and all worlds are accessible from this one on the logical accessibility relation. So, since according to the supervenience assumption the physical accessibility relation can be put in terms of the logical accessibility relation, we are left with two options: either all worlds are also physically possible (and the two terms are coextensive), or else no worlds are physically possible (to say it's physically possible is to say it's not logically possible). The latter is an absurdity and the former is what was to be proved.

Or is there something wrong with the proof? If so, please provide the modal semantics for "physically possible" and "logically possible" (provide the accessibility relation for "physically possible") where the predicates differ but the former supervenes on the latter.

Just as I say--your claim is that God didn't stop the tsunami because it wouldn't have been net good to do, not because God was just unable to do it.

Like I said, it was not stopped because it was a kind of physical constraint ultimately based on some logical law that God had to eventually allow some tsunami of this type, and based on God's interpretation of this physical constraint, God chose that particular tsunami as one in which to allow.

<sigh> Right, again, that's just as I say. God had a choice according to you. God could have done either, and God chose not to prevent the tsunami. If it was impossible to do then God had no choice, right? Now, why did God choose that way? Presumably, you want to say, because it was (net) good to allow the tsunami. Just as I said in that quotation you deny, what you claim here is that God didn't stop the tsunami because it wouldn't have been net good to do, and not because God was unable to do it.

God could have chosen to make no tsunamis, right? All planets could have been like Mars, right? God didn't do this not because it was impossible for God to do this, on your story. God didn't do it because it wasn't (net) good.

Look, whatever your weird views on how logical and physical and ethical possibility relate, your point seems to be the same: it was "logically possible" for God to stop the tsunami, but not "ethically possible". Now you might have some weird view about how what's physically possible determines what's "ethically possible" or something, I don't know--I wouldn't put it past you.

Basically, my response to your response is that it begs the question. We have no reason to believe in this Omega State of yours, or that the tsunami contributed to it. I summarize our positions this way: First, I ask, "why think there is an all-good, all-powerful God given disasters like the tsunami?" You answer, in effect: because there is an all-good all-powerful God, and sure the tsunami looks bad, but actually it's for the best (it was necessary to get to the "Omega State"). But this response fails to answer my original question, which is why think God is good and powerful given such bad events?

It's not begging the question since the question you pose is how could there be an all-powerful, all-good God given X.

No, look again at my quotation immediately above yours (and reproduced here). My question is a why question, just as it was written (twice).

My response could be entirely hypothetical. I could be an atheist and answer, "well, Spetey, I hate to defend theists here, but an all-good, all-powerful God could exist even if there is X because of (harvey's reason, plantinga's reason, craig's reason, etc...). So, I don't think you should try to use that argument against theists because this is an answerable hypothetical question..."

Okay, if it's an answerable hypothetical, give me the answer. It's not enough to say "people have attempted answers to this question". I don't think any of them work. Try to convince me otherwise. Notice people have also attempted responses to these answers you cite. Does that prove I'm right? Of course not. Why do you think there is an all-powerful, all-good entity, despite such atrocities? If you can't give an answer to this question, do you think it's reasonable to persist in your belief anyway? (Of course your answer could just be Plantinga's, or whatever. But then I'd like to hear it.)

Of course, I'm a theist, I merely point out that I don't have to be a theist to see that your claims are not strong enough to force one to say that it is logically impossible for an all-good, all-powerful God to exist.

That's not my claim, as you know, and as you made clear in your restatement of my original argument. I grant (for this argument) that it's logically possible that there's an all-good all-powerful entity and that there are tsunami's. It's also logically possible that Hitler was really a good guy who saved us from space aliens. It's logically possible that there are invisible unicorns. (Maybe it's not logically possible that they're pink and invisible!) But just because it's logically possible doesn't mean it's reasonable to believe, right? I'm asking why you think it's reasonable to believe in an all-good, all-powerful entity, given tsunamis and such.

I would just request that you review my answers to your Hitler argument. I thought I gave a satisfactory answer to this argument.

I'm sorry, here I'm at a total loss. I honestly do not know what you consider to be an answer to that argument; it seems to me you sought to avoid it, or simply restated your position that God is good in the face of it. I apologize for repitition on your part--but please state what is different, structurally, between your argument and the Hitler Freak's argument.


spetey

[harvey2]

Well, I guess I'm now Harvey2 since I couldn't log in as Harvey1. I assure you it's still me...

Look, whatever your weird views on... Now you might have some weird view about... I don't know--I wouldn't put it past you.

Do you think calling other views as weird is the best way to have a constructive and enjoyable discussion? We're here to have fun in sharing our thoughts on the universe Spetey, so please...

This seems to me an equivalent formulation. How do you see this definition as differing from the one I gave? Please provide a case where the Kim version holds and the Davidsonian version above doesn't, or vice-versa. Do you claim that physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility or not?

Let me include, though, the last sentence of that paragraph from the Stanford article:

... This leads Davidson to speak of the mental as ‘supervening’ on the physical in a way that implies a certain dependence of mental predicates on physical predicates: predicate p supervenes on a set of predicates S ‘if and only if p does not distinguish any entities that cannot be distinguished by S’ (see ‘Thinking Causes’ [1993]). Put more simply, events that cannot be distinguished under some physical description cannot be distinguished under a mental description either.

When you said "fully determined" that could have two senses to that phrase. It could have a Davidson interpretation which holds a weaker position that " every [p] description of an event can be paired with a [S] description of the very same event." Or, it can have a much stronger interpretation such as what you said in the last post, " if correct, then there is no distinction between the logically possible and the physically possible."

I don't think that Davidson would have said that supervenience entails that there is no distinction between S and p. Rather, it appears he committed himself to "events that cannot be distinguished under some [S] description cannot be distinguished under a [p] description either." Do you see the difference between your much more global statement of supervenience from Davidson's position on supervenience? It seems you were saying that physical possibility predicates [i.e., p predicates] would be necessary and sufficient to replace logical possibility predicates [i.e., S predicates]. I think that is way off the mark as to what Davidson is in fact postulating. In fact, I would say that he goes way out of his way to distinguish himself from this position with regard to supervenience. He merely wants to say that p is dependent on S, but not by law or definition but through interpretation (see Campbel again):

The sort of dependence I have in mind is not the familiar variety of showing that certain predicates from different areas of discourse are definitionally equivalent, and hence can be reduced one to the other in the way some have thought that moral predicates are analytically definable in terms of naturalistic ones. Davidson explicitly rules out this possibility when he says in his description of supervenience that it "does not entail reducibility through law or definition. . . ." (4) What other form of dependence might there be? The answer to this question can be found in Davidson’s interpretationalism.

I think a much more correct interpretation of Davidson is that there can exist some mental interpretation that has no exact lawful characteristic which can correlate p predicates with S predicates. Hence, applying this kind of approach to physical possibility and logical possibility, there would need to exist objective interpretations that correlate what is logical allowable and what is physically allowable. But, what kind of objective interpretations could possibly exist that could fill this role? My answer is that God's thoughts could only fill this role if we applied this kind of approach to supervenience to possibility.

If God's interpretation is what fills this void between the logical and the physical, this does not mean that God is free to offer interpretation on some whim. Rather, it just means that there are parameters of interpretation that exist, but these are not hard and fast rules (i.e., laws or definitions). This is the opening that I discussed which gives God freedom to act in the world without God's will being dictated solely by some logical law. That is, God chooses the best interpretation that God thinks will best meet the Omega state conditions that God intends to bring about.

Put in your apparently preferred terms: do you claim that there is no thing to which "physically impossible" applies that can't be distinguished in terms of what is "logically possible"?

It can be distinguished, but in many cases only by interpretation. That is how I think interpretationalism enters Davidson's approach. Or, as Campbel mentioned in his paper, the dependence is based on interpretation.

A sidenote:

According to Davidson, to have beliefs and desires is to have them ascribed by an interpreter, for there are no independent facts of the matter about mental content...

You endorse this view, Harvey? In other words, you think mental content is not objective? You think it is, in fact, a subjective matter? Very curious considering our recent discussion on this thread, where you mysteriously accuse me of this view.

I couldn't find this quote in this Stanford article that we've been discussing on Davidson. I'd like to read the full context so I can tell you if I agree or disagree. Please link me to the correct article, thanks!

I don't recall making that claim...

It follows from your supervenience claim.

Proof that if physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility, then the two notions are co-extensive. Suppose that "[physical possibility] does not distinguish any entities that cannot be distinguished by [logical possibility]", ie suppose the former supervenes on the latter (in the "Davidsonian" sense, if you insist). In possible world semantics, what's physically possible (in this world) is determined by an accessibility relation from this world to the set of all possible worlds (pw's). So the claim is that the physically-possible accessibility relation can be put in terms of the logically-possible accessibility relation. But the latter is simply the universal accessibility relation; that is, all possible worlds are "logically possible" (ie Harvey's favored phrase is redundant, since logically inconsistent worlds are not possible) and all worlds are accessible from this one on the logical accessibility relation. So, since according to the supervenience assumption the physical accessibility relation can be put in terms of the logical accessibility relation, we are left with two options: either all worlds are also physically possible (and the two terms are coextensive), or else no worlds are physically possible (to say it's physically possible is to say it's not logically possible). The latter is an absurdity and the former is what was to be proved.

Or is there something wrong with the proof? If so, please provide the modal semantics for "physically possible" and "logically possible" (provide the accessibility relation for "physically possible") where the predicates differ but the former supervenes on the latter.

Well, you are doing what Davidson's model specifically disapproves of. You are trying to state p in terms of S by law or definition. Again, p is dependent on S by interpretation. It seems that you are thinking in terms of Kim's properties where he uses a metaphysical treatment of possible worlds to clarify this treatment. In the case of Davidson:

As I see it, the difference between Kim’s approach and Davidson’s lies in the items supervenience is thought to connect. Kim’s formulations of supervenience connect properties, which he takes to be the ontological building blocks of events. In general then, Kim treats supervenience as a metaphysical thesis about the distribution of properties in possible worlds. Davidson has little tolerance for the idea that events should be analyzed in terms of property exemplifications. Given Davidson’s reluctance to endorse properties, he prefers to think of supervenience as a relation between predicates. If we construe Davidson’s thesis in this way, it is quite different from Kim’s. Far from a metaphysical thesis, Davidson’s is a thesis about our use of language, about the logical relations between the application of certain words. This is corroborated by the following passage where Davidson tries to clarify what his supervenience thesis should be taken to express:

The notion of supervenience, as I have used it, is best thought of as a relation between a predicate and a set of predicates in a language: a predicate p is supervenient on a set of predicates S if for every pair of objects such that p is true of one and not of the other there is a predicate of S that is true of one and not of the other. (2)

Davidson's treatment, as Cambpel mentions, is about logical relations between the application of certain worlds, not all possible worlds as your Kimian treatment is trying to accomplish.

God had a choice according to you. God could have done either, and God chose not to prevent the tsunami. If it was impossible to do then God had no choice, right?

That's right. The physical constraint (as it was interpreted by God) reached a critical point to where God could no longer hold off the pent up effects of the laws of physics. Something had to give, and it was the tsumani that exemplified this.

Now, why did God choose that way?

God didn't choose it that way, the laws of physics require that tsunamis happen given worlds like our's having oceans, etc..

Presumably, you want to say, because it was (net) good to allow the tsunami.

Why do you keep wanting me to say that? It was interpreted by God that this event must happen. God could no longer hold off the consequences of these physical constraints as they are interpreted by God to be in effect in our world.

Just as I said in that quotation you deny, what you claim here is that God didn't stop the tsunami because it wouldn't have been net good to do, and not because God was unable to do it.

God was able to stop a tsunami. However, there are many tsunamis, all of them God cannot stop. So, at least one of them has to occur (actually many more than this one), so based on God's decision on which tsunami would still allow God to reach the Omega state (and other physical constraint criteria which I suggested as potential criteria already and which you correctly summarized into a nifty two paragraphs), God choose to allow the 2004 tsunami. God's higher self did not bring about the tsunami, God was in a position that God could not stop all the tsunamis and this is the one that God happened to allow because it was the best decision of all the other possibilities that God evaluated.

God could have chosen to make no tsunamis, right? All planets could have been like Mars, right? God didn't do this not because it was impossible for God to do this, on your story. God didn't do it because it wasn't (net) good.

No, it wasn't just "net good" situation. Once the physical constraints (which God interprets as being in place based on the logical laws that apply) reach the point to where God has no more valid interpretations which allow the natural effect of the laws of physics to no longer be avoided, God has no more options in standing in the way of the laws of physics. That is, God has no more tricks up the divine sleeve.

it was "logically possible" for God to stop the tsunami, but not "ethically possible".

As I said, ethical possibility can be an interpretation of logical laws. All interpretations is what I've grouped under physical constraints. I've done that because I've defined a physical constraint as an interpretation of the logical laws. Since this includes ethical issues (i.e., God's own consistent behavior of what is good), therefore ethically spans both physically and logically possible. (Logically possibility does not have ethical violations per se since it is impossible to violate a logical possibility, but it is conceivable to think of logical violations (e.g., I can mentally conceive of logical contradictions that exist in the world), so similarly we can conceive of a God that breaks logical rules which would be unethical. This kind of conceivable-only "ethical violation" would best be thought of as grouped under logical possibility and not physical possibility as I've defined this term.)

Now you might have some weird view about how what's physically possible determines what's "ethically possible" or something, I don't know--I wouldn't put it past you.

I don't think physically possible determines what is ethically possible, rather physical possibility is composed of interpretations of logical possibility. Some of those interpretations involve ethics. Others might involve a minimum principle, or yin-yang principle, or a principle of the road less travelled, etc., etc.. Take your pick, we don't have full vision as to what physical constraints that God has interpreted as important as based on the logical constraints that exist for God.

No, look again at my quotation immediately above yours (and reproduced here). My question is a why question, just as it was written (twice)... Okay, if it's an answerable hypothetical, give me the answer. It's not enough to say "people have attempted answers to this question". I don't think any of them work.

But, this is your opinion. An opinion that many theists disagree with. If you feel you have good reason to doubt those opinions, then please show the contradiction.

Now, I should mention that no philosophical theory is probably ever going to satisfy you since there are very few philosophers who agree on every philosophical theory. In fact, philosophy turns off many physicists and chemists because there are much fewer "facts" than you have in the hard sciences. I could rattle off the philosophical issues which are major and important issues that agreement is not even close by the major philosophers in the field. Why is that? Well, I don't think it is because everyone is just way wrong. Their issues are just very complex and you have to accept the fact that most likely philosophy will never reach a set of agreed philosophical views on those most controversial issues. So, it is just wrong of you to pick out the problem of evil as a failure when philosophers trying to account for causation and explanation have far worse problems at their doorstep than theist philosophers.

This is not to admit that I think satisfactory solutions haven't been provided. I think they have. The issue though is when people such as yourself come along with a beam in one's philosophical eye. What we should try to constructively do is find suitable answers which make them reasonable solutions. To say that just because you find the answers as unsatisfactory is not good enough. You have to show that the answers are absurd to the point of being a contradiction. If you can't show this, then you are not providing a good enough reason to doubt personal theism.

Why do you think there is an all-powerful, all-good entity, despite such atrocities? If you can't give an answer to this question, do you think it's reasonable to persist in your belief anyway? (Of course your answer could just be Plantinga's, or whatever. But then I'd like to hear it.)

Wow, we go over the same questions so many times I just don't see the point. Just to remind you, the argument for God's existence is not because there is a problem of evil. The problem of evil is a problem that comes up if we postulate that God exists. We must take that step do to the much more major problems brought up if we postulate atheism, problems which I think you terribly ignore (e.g., the beginning and cause of the universe, the nature of the universe to be ordered, the seemingly improbable nature of sophisticated structure emerging from a brute fact world, etc., etc.). We've even discussed a whole thread specifically geared to these discussions, and you've decided those discussions were not profitable at this time. Okay, but why continue to bring up these issues if you don't want to talk about it at that thread??

I grant (for this argument) that it's logically possible that there's an all-good all-powerful entity and that there are tsunami's. It's also logically possible that Hitler was really a good guy who saved us from space aliens. It's logically possible that there are invisible unicorns. (Maybe it's not logically possible that they're pink and invisible!) But just because it's logically possible doesn't mean it's reasonable to believe, right?

Right.

I'm asking why you think it's reasonable to believe in an all-good, all-powerful entity, given tsunamis and such.

Are you prepared to pick up our discussion on the other thread? Perhaps that's the most important discussion to you and we should leave this thread since it seems that we just aren't getting through to each other. I see no contradiction and your main beef here seems to be that we don't have enough reason to suspect that God exists so why assume that the problem of evil must have an explanation which requires that God exists. If so, then the issue of God existing is much more important since you might be prepared to accept an answer to the problem of evil if God can be shown to you to likely exist. I think that means this thread has run out of steam for now. If you want to continue here, I'm fine in doing so, though. I really don't mind either way.

[spetey]

Well, I guess I'm now Harvey2 since I couldn't log in as Harvey1. I assure you it's still me...

Sorry to hear you're having trouble logging in!

Look, whatever your weird views on... Now you might have some weird view about... I don't know--I wouldn't put it past you.

Do you think calling other views as weird is the best way to have a constructive and enjoyable discussion? We're here to have fun in sharing our thoughts on the universe Spetey, so please...

I apologize. Obviously I'm aware that at least in one sense you think my views are "weird", too. (Someone thinks there is no God? Weird! Someone thinks physical possibility might not supervene on logical possibility? Weird!) I do appreciate that you usually have the patience to refrain from saying as much--in so many words, anyway.

I don't think that Davidson would have said that supervenience entails that there is no distinction between S and p.

Indeed he wouldn't, and neither would I. I don't claim that in general if A supervenes on B then there is no distinction between them. You can see my proof appeals to specifics of the relata. I claim that in the case of logical possibility and physical possibility, if the latter supervenes on the former than there is no distinction between them. Though I think I have a pretty good understanding of modal semantics and supervenience claims, my proof may not be correct, of course; you could show me wrong by providing a counterexample.

It's like back in this post when you claimed that the laws of physics supervene on nothingness. I responded this would simply mean that the laws of physics are necessary. It's not generally the case that when A supervenes on B, then A is necessary. It's the case when you claim A supervenes on a downright--pardon me--weird supervenience base like "nothingness". In that case it is merely a roundabout and obscure way to claim A is necessary.

It is eminently plausible that mental states supervene on physical ones, as Davidson claims, and as just about any philosopher of mind seems to agree. That is very different from saying physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility. Because A supervenes on B does not mean that therefore C supervenes on D.

If God's interpretation is what fills this void between the logical and the physical, this does not mean that God is free to offer interpretation on some whim. Rather, it just means that there are parameters of interpretation that exist, but these are not hard and fast rules (i.e., laws or definitions).

I hope you can see why this talk of "interpretation" does not make sense to me in this context. For one thing, you speak of it filling a "gap" that I have proved not to exist if your supervenience claim is correct. For another, it is highly metaphorical--an "interpretation" that "fills the gap" between the logical and the physical. It sounds like more magic from you--more hope that simply waving about words from theories, like 'interpretationalism' from theories of meaning and 'supervenience' from metaphysics, will somehow save your view. But these words actually mean something in those contexts. You need to show how they do work for you. How on earth does interpretational semantics (a view that meaning is subjective etc) have anything to do with the metaphysical notions of logical and physical possibility?

A sidenote:

According to Davidson, to have beliefs and desires is to have them ascribed by an interpreter, for there are no independent facts of the matter about mental content...

You endorse this view, Harvey? In other words, you think mental content is not objective? You think it is, in fact, a subjective matter? Very curious considering our recent discussion on this thread, where you mysteriously accuse me of this view.

I couldn't find this quote in this Stanford article that we've been discussing on Davidson. I'd like to read the full context so I can tell you if I agree or disagree. Please link me to the correct article, thanks!

Well, it's in the quote you gave me--see it here? Sorry, you're right that it's not from the SEP. You cite this paper for it, and I have just skimmed that paper. I see now the source of your insistence on tying supervenience and interpretation. But this is a very particular case--Campbell claims essentially that there are no real mental properties, and so the dependence of the mental on the physical is essentially one of our linguistic dispositions (not obviously, it seems to me, the same as a logical matter--though he seems to think so). That is, roughly, we are inclined to say there are beliefs in a way that correlates with what we say about brain states (even though there aren't really beliefs and such!). Again, this does not have anything to do with the relation between physical and logical possibility, and how "interpretationalism" can "fill the gap" between them. And the view does commit one, as above, to non-factualism about meaning.

Well, you are doing what Davidson's model specifically disapproves of. You are trying to state p in terms of S by law or definition. Again, p is dependent on S by interpretation.

Is your claim that the physical depends on the logical because we think that it does--because we interpret it that way? If so, this is patently false, since you're likely to be the only person alive who thinks that physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility, so "we" (English speakers) don't think it. If you claim that physical-possibility-for-you supervenes (interpretationally) on logical-possibility-for-you because you idiosyncratically use these words this way, then that may be so but it has no force for me or the wider community of thinkers.

Davidson's treatment, as Cambpel mentions, is about logical relations between the application of certain worlds, not all possible worlds as your Kimian treatment is trying to accomplish.

What on earth does that mean, "logical relations between the application of certain worlds"? Davidson's treatment, according to this Campbell guy, is about our inferential practices. And it relies on strange positions like that there are no facts about meaning. Is it your position? And how does it rescue your claim about what's possible for God?

Now, why did God choose that way?

God didn't choose it that way, the laws of physics require that tsunamis happen given worlds like our's having oceans, etc..

Here it is especially clear that you want to have it both ways, for compare this quotation to one from your immediately previous post:

God chose that particular tsunami as one in which to allow. [My emphasis in bold.]

Once and for all: did God choose to let that tsunami happen, or not? It seems an awful lot like you want to say God chose it when discussing whether God has all powers, and that you want to say God didn't choose it when discussing whether it was a good thing to allow. But this of course is exactly the problem--not even God can have it both ways. It's not logically possible that p and not-p.

Presumably, you want to say, because it was (net) good to allow the tsunami.

Why do you keep wanting me to say that?

You don't have to. You can say that it was impossible for God to stop the tsunami. But then you have to explain how God could be all-powerful. If it was possible for God to stop the tsunami, then God must have chosen not to. It's that simple.

It was interpreted by God that this event must happen.

In this context, 'interpreted' is an undefined word that you hope will perform magic for you. Do you mean God decided the event must happen (presumably because it would be net bad to stop), or do you mean God realized it must happen (because it was impossible to stop)? If you mean neither of these things, what exactly do you mean? Don't just point me to Davidson. I've read Davidson and I don't believe you are using "interpret" as he does. I want to know what you think this word means in this context, and how it means neither that God chose to let the tsunami happen nor that God didn't so choose.

God was able to stop a tsunami. However, there are many tsunamis, all of them God cannot stop.

Why not? What reason do you have to believe this, other than that the alternative (to give up on an all-good all-powerful entity) is unpalatable to you? Do you say it was impossible for God to make all planets like Mars, totally bereft of water and thus totally bereft of tsunamis? God did not have the power to do so? If not, then in what sense is God all-powerful?

It's not enough to say "people have attempted answers to this question". I don't think any of them work.

But, this is your opinion. An opinion that many theists disagree with. If you feel you have good reason to doubt those opinions, then please show the contradiction.

I have in this thread given one (of many) reasons to think there is no all-powerful, all-good entity such as God is purported to be. Your response is now: "some people disagree!" Sure enough. I have not heard all the responses such people give; I don't know all their reasons. Maybe there is a good response I haven't heard. But meanwhile given all the arguments I've heard, I still have good reason to think there is no God--such as the reason I have provided here. Obviously you're not asking me to refute every response that anyone might give, right? I am reasonable for holding this view because I have good reasons for it and have not heard as good reasons against. Now you have heard a good reason against. I'm asking you: why do you think my reason is no good? What's wrong with it? In other words, what's your reason to believe, despite my argument? If you (yourself) have no such reason, do you think it's responsible to continue believing? (Or do you consider "other smart people believe" a reason for you to believe, too? After all, even smart people like Plantinga can be self-deceiving and wrong!)

Now, I should mention that no philosophical theory is probably ever going to satisfy you since there are very few philosophers who agree on every philosophical theory. ...

The existence of disagreement does not mean it's okay to believe anything you want. Look, philosophers agree on lots too: like that gratuitous suffering is bad, and so on. (We just don't argue about the stuff on which we agree!) Similarly, scientists disagree about lots of things. When they disagree, they try to figure out which view is right, and philosophers do the same. When some people believe p and others believe ~p, then some people are just wrong! It might be hard to figure out which. But I have given good reason to think that it's false that there is an all-powerful, all-good entity. What is your response to this reason?

But just because it's logically possible doesn't mean it's reasonable to believe, right?

Right.

I'm so relieved to hear you say this! So now, please tell me: why is it reasonable to believe in an all-powerful all-good being, despite tsunamis--but not reasonable to think that Hitler was a good guy, despite the Holocaust (as in Hitler Freak's "argument")? What is different structurally about the responses?

I'm asking why you think it's reasonable to believe in an all-good, all-powerful entity, given tsunamis and such.

Are you prepared to pick up our discussion on the other thread? Perhaps that's the most important discussion to you and we should leave this thread since it seems that we just aren't getting through to each other. I see no contradiction and your main beef here seems to be that we don't have enough reason to suspect that God exists so why assume that the problem of evil must have an explanation which requires that God exists.

I think you're missing out on the dialectic here. I'm not saying "assume God exists--but there's evil too, how could that be?!" That's how religious people "approach" the Problem of Evil--with the unmovable, antecedent assumption that there is in fact a God. (Then the "answer" is inevitably a variation on "oh it's not really evil after all--it's for the best in this best of all possible worlds!") I'm saying that the tsunami is just another reason to be an atheist (in addition to my unanswered reasons from that other thread). It's a very specific reason, and the argument is just as you restated it. For you to be reasonable (and not merely dogmatic) in holding that there is an all-good, all-powerful entity, you need a response to this argument. Whether you wish to try to provide one here or not, I urge you to think honestly about this matter with yourself. Are you sure you have good reason to believe?


spetey

[otseng]

Well, I guess I'm now Harvey2 since I couldn't log in as Harvey1. I assure you it's still me...

I checked the harvey1 account and I see nothing wrong with it. It's still active and all settings seem right to me. What happened when you tried to log in as harvey1?

[harvey1]

Well, I guess I'm now Harvey2 since I couldn't log in as Harvey1. I assure you it's still me...

I checked the harvey1 account and I see nothing wrong with it. It's still active and all settings seem right to me. What happened when you tried to log in as harvey1?

It seems to be working okay today. When I tried logging in, the login screen would just reappear with blank fields.

[harvey1]

Hey Spetey,

Just a quick note...

Wow! According to the time of your post it looks like you made it at 4 am in the morning! I hope this is not keeping you up late. I thought I was makng the last post in North America evening...

Look, philosophers agree on lots too: like that gratuitous suffering is bad, and so on. (We just don't argue about the stuff on which we agree!)

Wow!, you're a philosopher? Just out of curiosity, why are you debating here with us? I thought professional philosophers had their own on-line forums that connects them to philosophers all over the world. I'm just curious as to why you would spend your time here instead at a professional level (not that I mind, I enjoy helping you switch over to theism if that is what you really want in your life).

Anyway, I'll respond to the contents of your 4 am post later...

[spetey]

Wow! According to the time of your post it looks like you made it at 4 am in the morning! I hope this is not keeping you up late. I thought I was makng the last post in North America evening...

Yeah, I've been on a bad sleep schedule thanks to a play I just closed. I sleep like 4a-noon. Also, I'm anxious about work and so eager to procrastinate again, so here I am back posting frequently.

Wow!, you're a philosopher? Just out of curiosity, why are you debating here with us? I thought professional philosophers had their own on-line forums that connects them to philosophers all over the world. I'm just curious as to why you would spend your time here instead at a professional level (not that I mind, I enjoy helping you switch over to theism if that is what you really want in your life).

Actually, what I said doesn't imply I'm a professional philosopher. But yes, (as I think you already knew!) I am a budding young pro. (Unfortunately it doesn't seem to gain me any credence with you about how philosophical terms are typically used and such!)

I don't know of any super-secret members-only professional forum for philosophers. But then I'm often impressed by your ability to scour the web for info, Harvey, so maybe you know of some. I only know of a few philosophy online blogs, I guess. The "members-only professional forums" are basically still the printed journals, unfortunately. Publishing cartels are just another unnecessary evil, in my view. (There are some reputable free online philosophy journals like Philosophers Imprint that are now trying to break that cartel.)

As for why I'm here: as I've hinted before, it's mostly political. I've come to think that the best thing a philosopher can do for the future of this country is to challenge the "moral values" vote that got Bush in office. And I think the best way to do that is to challenge the connection that so many Americans unthinkingly make between religion and ethics. I am also, as I've hinted, professionally opposed to the dangerous kind of dogmatism that "faith" encourages. That got me involved in debating religion generally. (But please, everyone, let's not degrade to a political discussion about the merits and demerits of Bush. That's not appropriate to this forum. In this case I was just answering a personal question with a personal opinion that doesn't demand a response or defense.)

Philosophy of Religion is not my professional interest or area of expertise, and I'm not here to try to learn it or get a paper written or something. And though I don't learn much philosophy as a result of these forums, there's a great deal I've learned about trying to have sustained dialogs with people of radically different views, and I think that is a skill more Americans (in particular) should exercise. For that learning experience you are largely to thank, Harvey!


spetey

[harvey1]

Hello Spetey,

I don't claim that in general if A supervenes on B then there is no distinction between them. You can see my proof appeals to specifics of the relata. I claim that in the case of logical possibility and physical possibility, if the latter supervenes on the former than there is no distinction between them. Though I think I have a pretty good understanding of modal semantics and supervenience claims, my proof may not be correct, of course; you could show me wrong by providing a counterexample.

Proof that if physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility, then the two notions are co-extensive. Suppose that "[physical possibility] does not distinguish any entities that cannot be distinguished by [logical possibility]", ie suppose the former supervenes on the latter (in the "Davidsonian" sense, if you insist). In possible world semantics, what's physically possible (in this world) is determined by an accessibility relation from this world to the set of all possible worlds (pw's). So the claim is that the physically-possible accessibility relation can be put in terms of the logically-possible accessibility relation. But the latter is simply the universal accessibility relation; that is, all possible worlds are "logically possible" (ie Harvey's favored phrase is redundant, since logically inconsistent worlds are not possible) and all worlds are accessible from this one on the logical accessibility relation. So, since according to the supervenience assumption the physical accessibility relation can be put in terms of the logical accessibility relation, we are left with two options: either all worlds are also physically possible (and the two terms are coextensive), or else no worlds are physically possible (to say it's physically possible is to say it's not logically possible). The latter is an absurdity and the former is what was to be proved.

Okay, then, let's take it line by line:

Suppose that "[physical possibility] does not distinguish any entities that cannot be distinguished by [logical possibility]", ie suppose the former supervenes on the latter (in the "Davidsonian" sense, if you insist). In possible world semantics, what's physically possible (in this world) is determined by an accessibility relation from this world to the set of all possible worlds (pw's).

But these words actually mean something in those contexts. You need to show how they do work for you. How on earth does interpretational semantics (a view that meaning is subjective etc) have anything to do with the metaphysical notions of logical and physical possibility?

You're neglecting Davidson's holism. That's the centerpiece of his interpretationalism. Here's a brief review of Davidson's holism:

Since it is indeed a single, combined theory that is the aim here, so the adequacy of any such theory must be measured in terms of the extent to which the theory does indeed provide a unified view of the totality of behavioural evidence available to us (taken in conjunction with our own beliefs about the world) rather than by reference to any single item of behaviour. This can be viewed as a more general version of the same requirement, made in relation to a formal theory of meaning, that a theory of meaning for a language address the totality of utterances for that language, although, in the context of radical interpretation, this requirement must be understood as also closely tied to the the need to attend to normative considerations of overall rationality. A direct consequence of this holistic approach is that there will always be more than one theory of interpretation that will be adequate to any particular body of evidence since theories may differ in particular attributions of belief or assignments of meaning while nevertheless providing an equally satisfactory account of the speaker's overall behaviour. It is this failure of uniqueness that Davidson terms the ‘indeterminacy’ of interpretation.... [which] is not to be viewed merely as reflecting some epistemological limitation on interpretation, but rather reflects the holistic character of meaning and of belief... Indeed, holism of this sort applies, not only to meanings and beliefs, but also to the so-called ‘propositional attitudes’ in general.... Davidsonian holism is thus a holism that applies to meanings, to attitudes, and also, thereby, to the content of attitudes. Indeed, we can speak of the Davidsonian account of interpretation as providing a quite general account of how mental content is determined (such content being understood as the content of propositional mental states such as belief): through the causal relation between speakers and objects in the world and through the rational integration of speakers' behaviour. Thus, as Davidson's approach to the theory of meaning turns out to imply a more general theory of interpretation, so his holistic view of meaning implies a holistic view of the mental, and of mental content, in general.

Hence, reconstructing Davidson, holism is key to understanding how physical predicates are interpreted beyond the logical laws that they supervene upon. In other words, physical predicates are "made in relation to a formal theory of meaning, that a theory of meaning for a language address the totality of utterances for that language." This "accessibility relation from this world to the set of all possible worlds" is a deduction of logical laws and a holistic relation of those laws as a whole. Therefore, physical constraints is an interpretation based on deduction and "more than one theory of interpretation that will be adequate to any particular body of [logical deduction] since theories may differ in particular attributions of... or assignments of meaning while nevertheless providing an equally satisfactory account of the [logical laws]."

So the claim is that the physically-possible accessibility relation can be put in terms of the logically-possible accessibility relation. But the latter is simply the universal accessibility relation; that is, all possible worlds are "logically possible"

The physically-possible cannot be put in strict lawful terms of logically-possible. This is what I'm trying to get across to you. I think you're pushing this extreme reductionism when all that is required is that "events that cannot be distinguished under some [logical] description cannot be distinguished under a [physical] description either." That is, "every [physically described] event can be paired with some [logical description]." This is how I interpret that phrase. If you can't pair a physical described event to a logical law in principle, then the physical event is not a real event.

Causally this means that there is always a logical cause for every event, but due to a "direct consequence of [a] holistic approach [...] there will always be more than one theory of interpretation that will be adequate to any particular body of [logic] since theories may differ in particular attributions [...] assignments of meaning... It is this failure of uniqueness that Davidson terms the ‘indeterminacy’ of interpretation...."

This is how indeterminancy arises within physical constraints. With pure logical law there is no indeterminancy because there is only one interpretation that dictates (or necessitates) the law. However, with physical constraints that are based on holistic interpretation of the complete set of logical laws and intent of God (i.e., toward the Omega state), there is a period of time-events where God's actions can hold off a tsunami or two. However, this indeterminancy is a finite period of time-events, and eventually the logical law dictates what must happen. The holistic interpretation that God provides cannot override the lawful effects forever, and sooner or later God must allow a tsunami. Yet, the holistic interpretations must be valid if God sees that those interpretations are valid, and so logical law must be in overall conformance. Hence, even though the 2004 tsunami was required because God could no longer keep those particular laws at bay, the tsunami that was chosen to be allowed happened to be one that also kept the holistic will of God intact. That is, God's omnipotence (i.e., God's holistic will of the higher self) is and was not nullified as a result of the lower logical laws. The lower logical laws were in conformance as they must be in conformance.

So, since according to the supervenience assumption the physical accessibility relation can be put in terms of the logical accessibility relation, we are left with two options: either all worlds are also physically possible (and the two terms are coextensive), or else no worlds are physically possible (to say it's physically possible is to say it's not logically possible). The latter is an absurdity and the former is what was to be proved.

This conclusion of your's is based on discarding a Davidsonian holistic approach to the interpretation of how A supervenes on B.

It is eminently plausible that mental states supervene on physical ones, as Davidson claims, and as just about any philosopher of mind seems to agree. That is very different from saying physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility. Because A supervenes on B does not mean that therefore C supervenes on D.

It's not that Davidson didn't mention the omniscient interpreter in his writings:

The way in which the Davidsonian rejection of scepticism does indeed derive quite directly from Davidson's adoption of a holistic, externalist approach to knowledge, and to attitudinal content in general, has sometimes been obscured by Davidson's presentation of his argument against scepticism through the employment (for the first time in ‘Thought and Talk’[1975]) of the rather problematic notion of an ‘omniscient interpreter’. Such an interpreter would attribute beliefs to others and assign meanings to their utterances, but would nevertheless do so on the basis of his own, true, beliefs. The omniscient interpreter would therefore have to find a large amount of agreement between his own beliefs and the beliefs of those he interprets — and what was agreed would also, by hypothesis, be true. Like the Swampman example, however, the omniscient interpreter example has given rise to a number of complications and misunderstandings (so much so that Davidson has expressed regret at ever having deployed those examples in the first place) — and although the omniscient interpreter appears at a number of places in Davidson's writings, the idea does not appear in his later discussions, but is instead replaced by the notion of triangulation.

I don't bring this up to say that Davidson endorses the view that there is an omniscient interpreter, but it does show that I'm not the first to bat the concept around. Davidson had done so.

I hope you can see why this talk of "interpretation" does not make sense to me in this context.... it is highly metaphorical--an "interpretation" that "fills the gap" between the logical and the physical. It sounds like more magic from you--more hope that simply waving about words from theories, like 'interpretationalism' from theories of meaning and 'supervenience' from metaphysics, will somehow save your view. But these words actually mean something in those contexts. You need to show how they do work for you. How on earth does interpretational semantics (a view that meaning is subjective etc) have anything to do with the metaphysical notions of logical and physical possibility?

Interpretational semantics holds the world fixed and determines which sentences stay true if interpretations of sentences were changed. In the case of metaphysical notions of logical and physical possibility, it would mean that "an interpreter would attribute beliefs to others and assign meanings to their utterances, but would nevertheless do so on the basis of his own, true, beliefs. The omniscient interpreter would therefore have to find a large amount of agreement between his own beliefs and the beliefs of those he interprets — and what was agreed would also, by hypothesis, be true."

[spetey]

Hullo!

You're neglecting Davidson's holism. That's the centerpiece of his interpretationalism. Here's a brief review of Davidson's holism...

Oy oy oy. I have suggested that you use technical terms like magic wands--you wave them about and hope they will magically fix your theory. When I ask you specifics about how these wands work, you try to rescue them by pulling out a new one and waving it around, hoping that you'll magically show how the others work. I think I know what Davidsonians mean by terms like "interpretationalism" and "holism". What do you mean by these terms? (It doesn't seem to be the same.) And how exactly do these terms show that physical possibility "supervenes" on logical possibility? And how exactly does that show that it's both possible and not-possible for God to have stopped the tsunami?

This "accessibility relation from this world to the set of all possible worlds" is a deduction of logical laws and a holistic relation of those laws as a whole.

I isolate this quotation as particularly indicative of how these words are being used in no way like their standard technical meanings. What do you mean when you say that the "accessibility relation" (normally an aspect of formal modal semantics) is "a deduction" (normally a valid argument) of "logical laws" (normally the things justifying a deduction) and a "holistic relation to those laws" (while normally 'holistic' is a unary predicate)?!

The passage I've quoted is in no way unique in this regard. Almost every sentence in your last post got a similar reaction from me.

Most importantly, it's all largely besides the point--a mere distraction. My main question still stands: in what way does your response to my formulation of the Problem of Evil differ structurally from Hitler Freak's response?


spetey

[harvey1]

Oy oy oy. I have suggested that you use technical terms like magic wands--you wave them about and hope they will magically fix your theory. When I ask you specifics about how these wands work, you try to rescue them by pulling out a new one and waving it around, hoping that you'll magically show how the others work. I think I know what Davidsonians mean by terms like "interpretationalism" and "holism".

Again, if you wish to argue with my use of a term, then please show me the contradiction with the consistency of how I use that term, or the consistency of how others have used it (and I have a chance at rebuttal to show that others have used that term in a similar fashion).

And how exactly does that show that it's both possible and not-possible for God to have stopped the tsunami?

1. There's a large collection of true logical statements
2. Theorems form based on those various sets of those laws
3. There's a large collection of theorems
4. Combining multiple theorems you have an interpretation
5. For the same set of multiple theorems, there may be more than one interpretation for the same set, perhaps an innumerable set of interpretations for the theorems
6. A collection of interpretations for the same set of theorems forms a physical constraint
7. The physical constraint has a range of indeterminancy due to the different interpretations that exist for that constraint
8. Outside the range of indeterminancy, the interpretations of the theorems all agree, hence situations that apply outside the indeterminate range, the logical implications of the interpretations are necessary
9. God decides on the range of indeterminancy based on holistic considerations (as an omniscient interpreter)
10. If God judges a situation such that the situation is outside the range of indeterminancy, then God cannot stop the necessary effects of ( 8 )
11. If God judges a situation such that the situation is inside the range of indeterminancy, then God can stop the necessary effects of ( 8 ) since there is no necessary law that requires ( 8 ) to be in effect in this indeterminate range
12. The 2004 tsunami was a consequence of (10)
13. The 50 other tsunamis that did not happen in 2004 was a consequence of (11) (i.e., it was possible for God to stop the tsunami so those 50 tsunamis did not happen)

This "accessibility relation from this world to the set of all possible worlds" is a deduction of logical laws and a holistic relation of those laws as a whole.

I isolate this quotation as particularly indicative of how these words are being used in no way like their standard technical meanings. What do you mean when you say that the "accessibility relation" (normally an aspect of formal modal semantics) is "a deduction" (normally a valid argument) of "logical laws" (normally the things justifying a deduction) and a "holistic relation to those laws" (while normally 'holistic' is a unary predicate)?!

I put the phrase in quotes because those are your words. I'm assuming that what you meant by an accessibility relation is a relation that correlates a statement dealing with pure logical possibility directly with a statement dealing with pure physical possibility. If that's not what you meant, then please explain it to me (I'm sorry I should have stated this assumption, but I'm rushing in some of these responses and you've been more active than usual lately). As far as what I meant by a deduction of logical laws, I mean that a physical possibility statement is a necessary consequence (deduction) of a logical possibility statement (logical law). By holistic relation I meant it as:

Since it is indeed a single, combined theory that is the aim here, so the adequacy of any such [interpretation of logical laws] must be measured in terms of the extent to which the [interpretation of logical laws] does indeed provide a unified view of the totality of behavioural evidence [of the universe] available to [God] (taken in conjunction with God's own beliefs about the world) rather than by reference to any single item of behaviour.

The passage I've quoted is in no way unique in this regard. Almost every sentence in your last post got a similar reaction from me.

Well, then to be frank, don't respond to it then.

Most importantly, it's all largely besides the point--a mere distraction. My main question still stands: in what way does your response to my formulation of the Problem of Evil differ structurally from Hitler Freak's response?

As I said, we have good reasons to believe there is a God, and very good reasons to think that atheism is fanciful thinking. Therefore, we need to look at the problem of evil to see how serious it is. I say it is not serious at all since for every argument given by an atheist, the argument has a good counterreply by theists. In fact, the problem of evil is in much better situation than many other philosophical problems which are much more in dire (e.g., causation, explanation, realism, skepticism, etc.). Most of these problems are no way close to being resolved, but you don't see people saying that explanations are fictitious or that we really might live in the Matrix. Overall, atheism doesn't even get out of the gate, and theism suffers the attacks of people who probably would be atheists no matter what (e.g., a consequence of religious abuse, or intellectual snobbery, wanting more moral freedom, rebelling against society, etc.).