Is Theism Justified?

[LiamOS]

In the thread 'Can evidence lead to belief in god(s)?' EduChris wrote:

[...] theism is at least as justified (and probably more justified) than non-theism.

For Debate:
-Is Theism justified?
-If so, is it more justified than Non-Theism?

[hatsoff]

Perhaps a deity exists who only rewards you if you choose option #2.

This is an extremely important point. EduChris seems to be posing a kind of Pascal's wager here. Sure, he admits, we don't have the traditional kind of evidence for the existence of God, but we can still be justified in assuming God exists due to the pragmatic benefits. Well of course a pragmatic justification is not the same as an epistemic justification. But even from a purely pragmatic standpoint, until we have a good reason to prefer a God who rewards belief (or punishes unbelief) to a God who rewards unbelief (or punishes belief), then the wager has unknown odds. We might as well choose non-theism.

[EduChris]

...First of all, the theist still has no special epistemic position here...we have no reason to suppose God exists, nor what kind of God he would be if he did. (And this epistemic position is the same regardless of whether or not God exists.)

The original thought experiment grants each side a moment of epiphany, where the truth of theism is alternately certain or false. During these respective epiphanies, the agent is allowed to choose options #1 or #2; then the certainty and the memory of the epiphany fades, leaving behind everything ceteris paribus except for the chosen option. In other words, the thought experiment grants each side a temporary position of epistemic certainty, from which they can choose the most rational option.

...The existence of God in itself has no significance. For that we would need an expectation that God is a certain type of God...

We do not need to know what "type" of theism is true in the case of the theism-affirming epiphany. The mere fact that there is the potential for significant truth is enough to warrant the theist's choice of #1. No equivalent potential is available for the non-theistic epiphany, and so the rational non-theist must choose option #2.

[EduChris]

...EduChris seems to be posing a kind of Pascal's wager here...

The only thing to be gained for the theist is truth, but this is a potentially relevant truth (in contrast to the completely irrelevant truth given the non-theistic epiphany).

...the wager has unknown odds...

Given the theistic epiphany, the odds that the truth will be relevant is unknown. Given the non-theistic epiphany, the odds that the truth will be relevant is "certainly zero." Unknown odds trump "certainly zero" odds.

[hatsoff]

The only thing to be gained for the theist is truth, but this is a potentially relevant truth (in contrast to the completely irrelevant truth given the non-theistic epiphany).

We do not need to know what "type" of theism is true in the case of the theism-affirming epiphany. The mere fact that there is the potential for significant truth is enough to warrant the theist's choice of #1. No equivalent potential is available for the non-theistic epiphany, and so the rational non-theist must choose option #2.

It's not nearly enough. Why should we pass up the opportunity to safeguard against worldly suffering on the mere possibility that our safeguarding has unintended consequences in another world? There is just as real of a possibility that failing to safeguard will have the same unintended consequences. It could be, for instance, that God rewards those who value the well-being of conscious creatures over truth, and/or punishes those who do not. Or it could be that there is an afterlife without God which we can only attain by withholding belief in God.

If we discover that God does or does not exist, then we still haven't learned anything helpful about our future or lack thereof beyond this world.

Given the theistic epiphany, the odds that the truth will be relevant is unknown. Given the non-theistic epiphany, the odds that the truth will be relevant is "certainly zero." Unknown odds trump "certainly zero" odds.

If you mean the truth of whether or not God exists, then that's irrelevant regardless of which happens to be the case, so long as we have no additional information about our hypothetical afterlife. But in any case we aren't interested in the odds of relevancy; rather we want the odds of benefaction. And those are unknown whether we discover that God exists or that he does not. However we do have it in our power to safeguard against some very real, non-hypothetical suffering here on earth. You're asking us to give up that safeguard, and in the mean time---whether or not God exists---the truth may as easily be damning as salvific, or anything in between. Once we recognize this, our choice is obvious.

[EduChris]

...It could be, for instance, that God rewards those who value the well-being of conscious creatures over truth, and/or punishes those who do not. Or it could be that there is an afterlife without God which we can only attain by withholding belief in God...

Your ad hoc surmisings do not change the basic facts: a) non-theistic reality ensures no possible recompense for choosing option #1; and b) theistic reality allows the possibility that the risk of option #1 may be worthwhile (especially given the odds that the overwhelming majority of theists today would find your ad hoc rationalizations comical at best).

[Meow Mix]

Given non-theism, there is no such thing as genuinely objective purpose or reason or anything. But the penultimately "objective" purpose of the process that presumably wrought us is larger than us--it doesn't care about us, it will proceed as it must long after we have become extinct. The only "purpose" of evolution is that organisms compete to survive so that they can later become extinct.

Biological drives aren't conscious purposes. This isn't fair: you pose a question about what would be the rational choice given non-theism, but then you choose an answer that isn't even a conscious choice. If it isn't a conscious choice then calling it "the only rational choice" is fairly dubious.

To diminish human flourishing would be to abandon the evolutionary mandate. True, as (apparently?) conscious beings we can choose to do whatever we wish, but given non-theism, there is no objective basis for choosing anything other than this-worldly human flourishing.

I see, so you support your bald assertion by repeating the same bald assertion a second time...?

Within the confines of ontological non-theism, if the only result of knowing the truth (i.e., no god) results in diminished this-wordly human flourishing, then you have traded an objective good--human flourishing-- for an irrelevant truth that cannot, even in principle, achieve greater human flourishing.

I've already explained how truth-seeking (rather than feel-good-believing) has objectively positive benefits. You seem to be conveniently hand-waving that away here.

If the "truth" (given non-theism) cannot help us, but may in fact hurt us, then it is irrational to insist on an irrelevant truth which only causes diminished flourishing.

No, it is irrational to believe something without justification. It might not be practical to believe something that causes more harm than believing a lie, but it is rational to believe the truth. Again, you are seriously equivocating the word "rational" with the word "practical." I hope no one is getting as confused about these two clear terms as you are here.

Let's suppose that there is a particular lump of clay on the other side of Mars, and let's suppose (just for sake of argument) that we know about this lump of clay. Let's also suppose that we somehow know that propagating this truth will cause WW3 to ensue. There is absolutely nothing special about this lump of clay, either in its composition or characteristics or position or consequences; but yet somehow knowledge of it causes pandemonium and slaughter on earth. In such a case (admittedly contrived) the pursuit of an irrelevant truth in the face of possible human extinction would be utterly absurd.

I'm normally pretty forgiving with the use of analogies but this one is so far fetched that it raised my eyebrows a little. Even so, it would still be rational to acknowledge the existence of the lump of clay. It would be practical to deny it (under those ludicrous constraints). You are equivocating terms, and the actual situation given non-theism is nothing like the scenarios you are providing considering a healthy percentage of the world already lives non-theistic lives without negative consequence.

Now in my original thought experiment the choice is not quite so pronounced, but yet the principle is exactly the same. If the truth (within the non-theistic paradigm) doesn't hurt, then the truth will be had as a consequence of choosing option 2; but if the truth does hurt, then choosing option 1 becomes the same as choosing to propagate the truth about the irrelevant lump of clay even at the expense of causing WW3.

No, your "thought experiment" is pretty void of any force whatsoever. It's overly contrived, it engages in blatant equivocation, and it doesn't reflect anything on the real consequences in the real world regarding theism/atheism.

[hatsoff]

Your ad hoc surmisings do not change the basic facts: a) non-theistic reality ensures no possible recompense for choosing option #1; and b) theistic reality allows the possibility that the risk of option #1 may be worthwhile (especially given the odds that the overwhelming majority of theists today would find your ad hoc rationalizations comical at best).

It sounds like you think that my "ad hoc surmisings" are somehow less likely than the traditional view of God or the popular view of naturalism, but I would suggest that you have no reason to expect God to have any particular character, nor for the Godless universe to place any particular restrictions on our experiences (or lack thereof) beyond this life. The "basic facts" you cite appear to be assumptions on your part, perhaps gotten from your intuition or upbringing. And they may even appear obvious to you, but I think if you took a moment to try to justify them you'd find that they're not so obvious after all. I certainly can find no reason to think they're true.

[Zzyzx]

.

This is an extremely important point. EduChris seems to be posing a kind of Pascal's wager here. Sure, he admits, we don't have the traditional kind of evidence for the existence of God, but we can still be justified in assuming God exists due to the pragmatic benefits. Well of course a pragmatic justification is not the same as an epistemic justification. But even from a purely pragmatic standpoint, until we have a good reason to prefer a God who rewards belief (or punishes unbelief) to a God who rewards unbelief (or punishes belief), then the wager has unknown odds. We might as well choose non-theism.

Well said. Additionally if one accepts Pascal's wager in any form and to any degree, they have two major hurdles:

1) Chose the right "god" to worship from the thousands available and/or promoted -- with a chance of being right being 0.0005 (1 in 2000). Many "gods" are said to be mutually exclusive.

2) Even if one were to beat the odds and pick the right "god", one must KNOW exactly what the "god" requires to obtain personal benefits in an "afterlife". It could be that the "real god" (if such thing existed) would reward independent thought and punish conformity (regardless what is claimed by writers of religion promotional literature).

[Woland]

...It could be, for instance, that God rewards those who value the well-being of conscious creatures over truth, and/or punishes those who do not. Or it could be that there is an afterlife without God which we can only attain by withholding belief in God...

Your ad hoc surmisings do not change the basic facts: a) non-theistic reality ensures no possible recompense for choosing option #1;

Perhaps you should take a closer look at the criticism of your arguments that's been offered in this thread and others.

and b) theistic reality allows the possibility that the risk of option #1 may be worthwhile (especially given the odds that the overwhelming majority of theists today would find your ad hoc rationalizations comical at best).

Sure, because they have certainly demonstrated that they know what they're talking about.

There are certain rationalizations that some of us also find comical at best, but these are not coming from non-theists. Rationalizations attempting to excuse fatal flaws in irrelevant and fallacious thought experiments (from which grand conclusions are pulled as out of a magic hat) are among these.

-Woland

[Hobbes]

...if one accepts Pascal's wager in any form and to any degree, they have [a] major [hurdle]:

1) Chose the right "god" to worship from the thousands available and/or promoted -- with a chance of being right being 0.0005 (1 in 2000). Many "gods" are said to be mutually exclusive.

Interesting.

Thousands of gods are available/promoted in today's world?

Sticking with a present day world model, I'd be hard pressed to name just 5 gods that warrant any serious discussion.

Once just Yahweh and Allah are eliminated, modern day gods are already reduced to the elephant-headed gods and flying snakes of Hinduism, Korean dictators as gods, some pagan gods from Greek mythology, and silly ideas like Earth or other planets as gods/goddess. There are certainly not thousands of them and almost none of the gods/goddesses once you get past the few major religions, are taken seriously by any but a few fringe groups.

Ya think maybe the quoted statement above is exaggerated just a wee bit?