If God wants to destroy evil...

[Zarathustra]

God created everything that has been, is, and is going to be in existence. He created the Earth and the Heavens. He created the Lake of Fire in which he casts sinners. He created Good, and He created evil. Does not the old adage says "I have created you, and so can I destroy you"?

If God wanted to, couldn't He, in theory, destroy evil with no need for the battle of the apocalypse?

[spetey]

Hello again... my I've been an active little poster lately!

Again, if you wish to argue with my use of a term, then please show me the contradiction with the consistency of how I use that term, or the consistency of how others have used it (and I have a chance at rebuttal to show that others have used that term in a similar fashion).

That's exactly what I was doing with the passage I isolated and examined. Let's review it:

This "accessibility relation from this world to the set of all possible worlds" is a deduction of logical laws and a holistic relation of those laws as a whole.

I isolate this quotation as particularly indicative of how these words are being used in no way like their standard technical meanings. What do you mean when you say that the "accessibility relation" (normally an aspect of formal modal semantics) is "a deduction" (normally a valid argument) of "logical laws" (normally the things justifying a deduction) and a "holistic relation to those laws" (while normally 'holistic' is a unary predicate)?!

Again, this is just an indicative passage; I could have asked similar questions about most of that post. And I can ask similar questions about your most recent post and (for example) your idiosyncratic use of "interpretation" as a collections of theorems, etc.

Meanwhile your response to my pressing you on that passage is this:

I put the phrase in quotes because those are your words. I'm assuming that what you meant by an accessibility relation is a relation that correlates a statement dealing with pure logical possibility directly with a statement dealing with pure physical possibility. If that's not what you meant, then please explain it to me ...

No, it's not what I meant at all. I meant the accessibility relation as standardly defined in modal semantics. Since you were relying on terms like "logical possibility", "physical possibility", "supervenience" and so on (to do what you hoped was magic), you were the one who brought up formal modal notions and their relations. It wasn't something I injected into the conversation! I merely spelled out the consequences of your claims. If you don't know what the accessibility relation is then you shouldn't be talking about formal relations between modal notions (like saying that "physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility", something that sounds nonsensical to modal logicians' ears). That was, in effect, my point.

As far as what I meant by a deduction of logical laws, I mean that a physical possibility statement is a necessary consequence (deduction) of a logical possibility statement (logical law).

Then first: why did you say a deduction of logical laws, instead of a deduction of physical possibility statements? The two are quite different, you realize? In order to get your points across, you need to focus on saying what you mean, and not saying something totally different. And second: how do you deduce these empirical claims about what's physically possible from pure logic? Logical laws seem necessary, and so indifferent to empirical matters such as what physical events are possible in a world with contingent physics. If the logical laws can deduce the physical laws then they too are strictly necessary, and in effect just more logical laws--that was the lesson of my "proof".

By holistic relation I meant it as [Davidson quotation] ...

No Harvey, from what I can tell, you don't mean it as Davidson did. Again, when you introduce new technical terms, please say how you mean them--since time and time again you use words in completely nonstandard ways, hoping that pointing to a paragraph from someone will save you.

Most importantly, it's all largely besides the point--a mere distraction. My main question still stands: in what way does your response to my formulation of the Problem of Evil differ structurally from Hitler Freak's response?

As I said, we have good reasons to believe there is a God, and very good reasons to think that atheism is fanciful thinking...

And how does that differ from HF merely repeating: "as I've said, I have good reasons to think Hitler good?" How is that not begging exactly the question at hand? Tsunamis are good reasons to think there is no all-powerful, all-good entity. What is your response to this reason? If you don't have one, is it responsible to continue believing nonetheless? What exactly is "fanciful" about my argument?

Therefore, we need to look at the problem of evil to see how serious it is. I say it is not serious at all since for every argument given by an atheist, the argument has a good counterreply by theists.

Good! Let's please hear your counterreply to my argument. I want to know, again, how your response is different from HF's.

In fact, the problem of evil is in much better situation than many other philosophical problems which are much more in dire (e.g., causation, explanation, realism, skepticism, etc.).

I don't know what you mean in this context by "better situation". There are certainly lots of philosophical controversies. Do you think it's responsible to take a strong stance on any of them when you've heard reasons against that stance and have no response to those reasons?

Overall, atheism doesn't even get out of the gate, and theism suffers the attacks of people who probably would be atheists no matter what (e.g., a consequence of religious abuse, or intellectual snobbery, wanting more moral freedom, rebelling against society, etc.).

Here you resort to ad hominem attacks: something must be wrong with my argument (and other atheist arguments) because we were abused or because we're just intellecutal smartypants or something. But you know, in your more patient moments Harvey, that these don't constitute a response. (You also know that I suffered no religious abuse; I've told you before. I just thought about the issue and became atheist. As for intellectual snobbery: maybe that's a fault of mine, but it's no fault of the views I espouse.)

For such a long time I was working so hard at being validating of your points on this thread, Harvey, but sometimes you make that so difficult! I just can't find ways to validate things like "physical possibility supervenes on logical necessity". I regret that I've gotten snippy again. I really think it's all the wand-waving you try to do that brings this out in me. Please just use simple English to explain your points, and when you need technical terms, define them in your own words, so that we can be sure what you mean by them. I think that would go a long way toward making our interactions more fruitful.


spetey

[harvey1]

Hey Spetey,

Well, finally you've given me an easy post to reply to.

No, it's not what I meant at all. I meant the accessibility relation as standardly defined in modal semantics.

I'm not familiar with the intricracies of modal logic, so I apologize I didn't recognize that technical term. I just responded to what the phrase seemed as though it should mean. My fault.

you were the one who brought up formal modal notions and their relations. It wasn't something I injected into the conversation!

I've injected talk about modal notions and their relations not because I want to talk about modal logic but because I wish to talk about modal concepts. Most people don't know modal logic such as yourself, so the rest of us mere mortals must be content to talk in non-technical terms about those issues which have well-defined terms in modal logic. I'm sorry, though, because I don't know of other terms to use other than the ones that I know that refer to those concepts. It would do no good for me to talk about rocks and sticks when I wish to talk about logical and physical possibility. Perhaps you don't wish to continue this thread because of that reason, and I respect that and understand fully. Perhaps I should engage in this discussion with others who are more comfortable talking about possible worlds without having had 9 courses in logic.

If you don't know what the accessibility relation is then you shouldn't be talking about formal relations between modal notions (like saying that "physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility", something that sounds nonsensical to modal logicians' ears). That was, in effect, my point.

I don't agree with that. Should you ever mention anything that you haven't written a Ph.D. thesis on specifically that topic? Generally speaking, it takes at least that level of knowledge to speak with any authority on any subject, any less is to be a little short-handed in your attempt to understand the world.

This is why professional philosophers don't show up at sites like this because they don't think there is much to learn, and unlike you they aren't always concerned about changing the world, etc. However, I think every professional in their field should be inspired by Richard Feynman who took time to write extensively to everyone who wrote him, including cranks and those who thought he was nuts. Rarely, though, did he correspond with others in his own field. (I mention this story in particular because I just read a good portion of his daughter's book on the letters of Richard Feynman.) He was truely a marvelous person for his ability to learn while talking to laypeople about the intricacies of physics. Unfortunately laypeople would drop out of his lectures, but there were faculty members willing to replace them the moment one dropped out.

Having said that, I think the onus is on anyone who has a specialized knowledge to defend what they believe, even if someone does not have that specialized knowledge (e.g., modal logic). You would think that having that specialized knowledge would give a tremendous advantage at finding contradictions in the language of the person they are descending the Ivory tower to speak from, but that is not always the case.

Then first: why did you say a deduction of logical laws, instead of a deduction of physical possibility statements?

Deduction is from the top down. You start reasoning from a logical theorem (or set of axioms) and you construct more theorems in the process. So, one can deduce from logical laws to arrive at physical possibility since what is physically possible supervenes on what is logically possible.

The two are quite different, you realize? In order to get your points across, you need to focus on saying what you mean,

I don't do anything other than that.

And second: how do you deduce these empirical claims about what's physically possible from pure logic? Logical laws seem necessary, and so indifferent to empirical matters such as what physical events are possible in a world with contingent physics. If the logical laws can deduce the physical laws then they too are strictly necessary, and in effect just more logical laws--that was the lesson of my "proof".

That paragraph seems to have ignored my last post of 13 points entirely.

No Harvey, from what I can tell, you don't mean it as Davidson did. Again, when you introduce new technical terms, please say how you mean them--since time and time again you use words in completely nonstandard ways, hoping that pointing to a paragraph from someone will save you.

I used the words of the Stanford article because that's the words that are very meaningful and well-stated. I'm sorry if that isn't good for you. I really can't (or won't) change that because I prefer to communicate with ideas that I think were written better than I myself could write them.

And how does that differ from HF merely repeating: "as I've said, I have good reasons to think Hitler good?" How is that not begging exactly the question at hand? Tsunamis are good reasons to think there is no all-powerful, all-good entity. What is your response to this reason? If you don't have one, is it responsible to continue believing nonetheless? What exactly is "fanciful" about my argument?

If you have overwhelming reasons to discount atheism, and if you have overwhelming reasons to believe theism, and the arguments from theists on the problem of evil seem to be no worse than answers on issues of causation, explanation, realism, skepticism, etc., then one has good reasons to be a theist and should reject atheism despite the the harsh realities that the problem of evil means for humanity. As for your HF consideration, it fails in that there are no good reasons to believe that Hitler was a good person. We know that the defending Hitler in a "problem of evil" argument is ridiculous since there is overwhelming physical evidence to suggest that he wasn't an all-good person. In the case of God, we don't have physical evidence of God bringing evil to the world or failing to bring good in the world. All we have is evidence of evil, but we don't any evidence or proof that it is God's fault. Some have construed philosophical arguments to show that God is at fault (i.e., in reality: doesn't exist), but those arguments are no stronger than the ones that say there is no causes, or that we can't have knowledge, or that there is no such thing as an explanation, etc.. If we were to take the philosophical argument with that much weight to convince us that their philosophical argument was correct, then we should also by the same token (oops, that's a technical term...) assume that we have no knowledge and can't explain anything to anyone either. That would be absurd, hence we must give the philosophical argument against an all-good, all-powerful God little or no weight in establishing God's existence or non-existence. However, we should dismiss the atheist position with regards to philosophical argument since it is absurd in its defense of an uncaused multiverse. If theories about causation or explanation (etc) relied on such absurd level of support, then I would be convinced that there are no causes, no explanations, no knowledge, no truths, and that we really do live in the Matrix.

I don't know what you mean in this context by "better situation". There are certainly lots of philosophical controversies. Do you think it's responsible to take a strong stance on any of them when you've heard reasons against that stance and have no response to those reasons?

Theists have responses. And, it is a good stance to take a strong stance on most of them since it is ridiculous to say that humans don't possess knowledge, just like it is ridiculous to say that science does not offer explanations, etc.. I don't live in absurdity. If a position appears well-founded, then I don't lose any sleep about philosophers who pick at the most intuitive of concepts. If suddenly one of them can produce an outstanding discovery (e.g., relativity theory, or quantum theory), then at that point our intuitive concepts come under deeper question. Philosophical challenges are a reality of our world and we cannot take most of them all that serious until they show absurd responses. This is the state of atheism in my opinion, and that's why atheism must be rejected even in light of the problem of evil which is a minor tit-tat argument that has no end in sight. I might add that atheists have no answer for the problem of evil either. They would have to attribute some kind of cause to evil (just like theists), and the moment they do that they would be supporting causality which, as I said, is problematical to its core. In fact, causation and the problem of evil may be related issues.

Here you resort to ad hominem attacks: something must be wrong with my argument (and other atheist arguments) because we were abused or because we're just intellecutal smartypants or something. But you know, in your more patient moments Harvey, that these don't constitute a response. (You also know that I suffered no religious abuse; I've told you before. I just thought about the issue and became atheist. As for intellectual snobbery: maybe that's a fault of mine, but it's no fault of the views I espouse.)

You might consider it an ad hominem attack, but I believe it to be true. Afterall, can't it be true that someone holds a particular belief because of abuse, getting even with God, etc.? Of course, if it were true someone would just reply that they were under an ad hominem attack.

For such a long time I was working so hard at being validating of your points on this thread, Harvey, but sometimes you make that so difficult! I just can't find ways to validate things like "physical possibility supervenes on logical necessity". I regret that I've gotten snippy again.

Well, maybe we've come to the end of our road together Spet. If so, I really appreciate your thoughts and although I had no false ambitions that you might find Christ somehow in all of this, I still always had a deep concern for you that in the judgement you will argue against God forever. Hopefully it's not with me.

Please just use simple English to explain your points, and when you need technical terms, define them in your own words, so that we can be sure what you mean by them. I think that would go a long way toward making our interactions more fruitful.

I'm sorry Spet, I just don't think you own language. It's very inconvenient to re-word posts just for you, and I would just have to pass at this point. But, that doesn't mean I haven't enjoyed talking to you if this is our point of departure...

Take care...

[spetey]

Harvey... look. I'm sorry if I come off sounding high-faluting or snobby. I didn't mean to embarrass you for not knowing what an accessibility relation is.

But again, it's not like I started a technical, professional-level discussion and then derided anyone who couldn't keep up. My argument--just as you restate it--is perfectly accessible to the "layman". My response to your response is pefectly accessible to the "layman". It was you who wanted to discuss these technical notions like supervenience claims. You introduced the technical stuff, as you often do, in the hope that it would magically make a point for you. When you do that, I often feel compelled to point out that you don't actually know what the hell you're talking about, and are merely making stuff up in order to sound impressive. You don't believe that physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility, because you clearly don't know just what that phrase means. You just hope that it sounds good enough to shut opponents up. I don't suggest you are deliberately deceitful--but I do think you become enamored of technical work that you don't understand so well but assume must also somehow be part of a giant argument for God, and must (coincidentally) support exactly your antecedent theories.

Look. You seem to know a lot of physics. From where I stand I can't tell if you make it up and abuse it like you do the philosophy. I'm inclined to think, though, that in physics you actually know what you're talking about. (Not when you draw metaphysical conclusions from the physics, mind you--just when you stick to physics.) Now, wouldn't it be frustrating for you if I took my limited knowledge of physics and pulled out some big words and insisted that, for example, because eigenstates are Hamiltonian determinate conjugate momenta (and other such nonsensical abuse of QT terms), therefore there is no God? Do you see how your abuse of formal philosophical terms might be similarly frustrating to me?

Perhaps I should engage in this discussion with others who are more comfortable talking about possible worlds without having had 9 courses in logic.

It's one thing to talk about what's possible, and even possible worlds--that's "layman" talk. It's another when you bring up "supervenience" and "interpretationalism" and such. When you use these words, it should (ideally) be because you understand them well, and that might take some philosophy courses--just as for me to use "Hamiltonian" well might take some physics courses. As it stands now, even with a few low-level courses on quantum theory under my belt, I don't really have a good grip on what a Hamiltonian is. As a result, I don't rely on the notion of a Hamiltonian to do any work for me in my reasoning or debating. Humility can be a virtue!

You made a good simple point about possibility by pointing out that there are senses where I can swim across Lake Michigan and senses where I can't. That made perfect sense, in everyday English, and was a good point relevant to our discussion. That is good philosophy. Good philosophy is not just about using technical terms. Philosophy is perhaps unique in that most of the best stuff can be presented in simple terms.

Should you ever mention anything that you haven't written a Ph.D. thesis on specifically that topic?

No, of course that's not the principle; don't make a straw man of me. Here's the principle I propose: you shouldn't use technical words or theories that you don't understand well in order to make a point. Again, I am not the one insisting on technical philosophical discourse--for some reason, you are the one who insists on it.

Then first: why did you say a deduction of logical laws, instead of a deduction of physical possibility statements?

Deduction is from the top down. You start reasoning from a logical theorem (or set of axioms) and you construct more theorems in the process.

When you start with axiom or theorem A and deduce B, you have given a deduction of B, not of A. You deduce (as you say above) from A to B.

So, one can deduce from logical laws to arrive at physical possibility since what is physically possible supervenes on what is logically possible.

Wait a minute--are you still claiming that physical possibility "supervenes" on logical possibility, despite obviously not being able to defend the view in the face of proofs against it, or even explain what the view could mean? Is there no tiny, minor point on which you might admit you've made a mistake? (You must recognize that your reluctance to admit a mistake, too, is part of what induces me to be somewhat more frank and harsh in my criticism.)

And second: how do you deduce these empirical claims about what's physically possible from pure logic? ...

That paragraph seems to have ignored my last post of 13 points entirely.

Again I was ignoring those 13 points out of charity to you. I thought it was more "brainstorming" credo on your part, not meant to be taken seriously. Are they really an argument you'll stand by? You understand all the words involved, and you feel that they make for a coherent non-question-begging argument? You are prepared to defend the view that an "interpretation" is a collection of theorems, for example? If so, I will give my response.

I used the words of the Stanford article because that's the words that are very meaningful and well-stated. I'm sorry if that isn't good for you. I really can't (or won't) change that because I prefer to communicate with ideas that I think were written better than I myself could write them.

It's one thing to quote another when you understand the passage well, could put the point in your own words, and know what point it makes. Then you simply might prefer the original wording for its clarity, and so that you can give credit for the idea. It's another thing when you don't understand the passage well, couldn't put it in your own words, and hope (or assume) that this person is making a point that supports you.

If you have overwhelming reasons to discount atheism, and if you have overwhelming reasons to believe theism, and the arguments from theists on the problem of evil seem to be no worse than answers on issues of causation, explanation, realism, skepticism, etc., then one has good reasons to be a theist and should reject atheism despite the the harsh realities that the problem of evil means for humanity.

Again: I want to know why you believe there is an all-powerful, all-good entity. I have given you reason not to believe. Is there something wrong with my reason? It sounds like you are assuming that there must be a good answer out there, and you're assuming it because you assume antecedently that your position is correct. But imagine a racist acting like that. You give a racist a cogent argument against racism, and the racist responds "well, gee, I don't have an answer, but other people probably do, and I have overwhelming reasons to believe my racism (though I can't give them to you), so it's okay to keep being racist." Of course, I'm not calling you a racist. But I am calling you a dogmatist--and you renounced dogmatism of any form long ago, on our old thread.

As for your HF consideration, it fails in that there are no good reasons to believe that Hitler was a good person. We know that the defending Hitler in a "problem of evil" argument is ridiculous since there is overwhelming physical evidence to suggest that he wasn't an all-good person. In the case of God, we don't have physical evidence of God bringing evil to the world or failing to bring good in the world.

We don't? Guess what I consider to be evidence of God bringing evil to the world (or, better put, to be evidence that an all-good, all-powerful God doesn't exist). That's right, tsunamis and such! Why don't the countless atrocities throughout history count as any evidence against the idea of an all-good, all-powerful being?

All we have is evidence of evil, but we don't any evidence or proof that it is God's fault.

It's evidence of God's fault if we assume that God is all-powerful. Then God could have made the world less evil and didn't. If you're saying God is not responsible for this evil--that God would prefer the evil not happen, but it was out of God's control--then in what sense is God omnipotent?

Some have construed philosophical arguments to show that God is at fault (i.e., in reality: doesn't exist), but those arguments are no stronger than the ones that say there is no causes, or that we can't have knowledge, or that there is no such thing as an explanation, etc..

Are arguments against racism better than those philosophical arguments? Or, because arguments against racism have been controversial (slaveowers used to argue for it!), do you think it's just as responsible to believe either way? Are there some arguments that are stronger than the opposing arguments? If so, why are you sure that the atheist arguments aren't such? Are there times when it's okay to believe without reason, or not?

If we were to take the philosophical argument with that much weight to convince us that their philosophical argument was correct, then we should also by the same token (oops, that's a technical term...) assume that we have no knowledge and can't explain anything to anyone either.

No. We shouldn't assume anything. We should only believe controversial positions, especially important ones that shape public policy, to the extent we have reasons for them.

Philosophical challenges are a reality of our world and we cannot take most of them all that serious until they show absurd responses.

And how do you know the atheist conclusion is absurd? What reason do you have? Arguments for God are also part of philosophy. Does that mean I can reasonably dismiss them as absurd, without having to answer them? "Ah, you say there must be a God for a universe to exist. But this line of reasoning would conclude that there is indeed a God. This is an absurd conclusion, and it's from a merely philosophical argument. I thus dismiss it out of hand." When you hear it from the other side, doesn't it seem like a textbook case of dogmatism? Don't you feel I owe you a response to the cosmological argument? The whole point is that we disagree on what's absurd. So we have to sort it out with reasons.

This is the state of atheism in my opinion, and that's why atheism must be rejected even in light of the problem of evil which is a minor tit-tat argument that has no end in sight.

Minor?! It is an argument that there is no God of the type in which you believe--an argument you seem unable to answer. Are you sure that's a minor issue?

I might add that atheists have no answer for the problem of evil either. They would have to attribute some kind of cause to evil (just like theists), and the moment they do that they would be supporting causality which, as I said, is problematical to its core. In fact, causation and the problem of evil may be related issues.

What? This is more offhand speculation from you. The atheist solution to the problem of evil is trivial: there is no all-powerful all-good creature to prevent bad things, and so sometimes they naturally happen. Where in that did I give up the notion of causation?!

Here you resort to ad hominem attacks: something must be wrong with my argument (and other atheist arguments) because we were abused or because we're just intellecutal smartypants or something. But you know, in your more patient moments Harvey, that these don't constitute a response. (You also know that I suffered no religious abuse; I've told you before. I just thought about the issue and became atheist. As for intellectual snobbery: maybe that's a fault of mine, but it's no fault of the views I espouse.)

You might consider it an ad hominem attack, but I believe it to be true. Afterall, can't it be true that someone holds a particular belief because of abuse, getting even with God, etc.? Of course, if it were true someone would just reply that they were under an ad hominem attack.

It's not just that I consider these ad hominem attacks. They are such fallacious attacks, independently of how I consider them. And of course it could be true that some atheist came to their views as a result of abuse. But first, if such an atheist were to present an atheist argument, that's no response to the argument. It might be worth reading this entry on the fallacy, which makes that point. Argument strength does not vary depending on the person endorsing it. Consider this argument:

• All people are mortal.
  Socrates is a person.
  Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

Now, suppose some crazy abused atheist made that argument. Would that make the argument bad? This argument would be good even if Hitler said it!

Put it this way. A lot of people believe religions because they were abused or otherwise indoctrinated, correct? Does that prove that any arguments theists make must be incorrect? Suppose, when cornered philosophically, I responded by a) assuming that your arguments are the result of atheistic abuse as a child, and b) therefore dismissed the arguments as not requiring an answer. Do you see how fallacious (not to mention insulting) that would be?

Please just use simple English to explain your points, and when you need technical terms, define them in your own words, so that we can be sure what you mean by them. I think that would go a long way toward making our interactions more fruitful.

I'm sorry Spet, I just don't think you own language. It's very inconvenient to re-word posts just for you, and I would just have to pass at this point.

I don't claim to own language. I claim that you don't own language, and cannot bend terms to your will. Despite what Humpty Dumpty says and what you seem to believe, you can't just use words to mean whatever you want them to mean, hoping that they'll make your point for you.

And thanks for the well-wishes, but I don't consider this discussion over--I'd still like to hear what your reasons are for believing in an all-good, all-powerful being in the face of evil. (Or hear you defend controversial beliefs not grounded in reason.) Of course you're free to terminate (your end of) the discussion! But if you no longer wish to discuss it with me, I urge you to ask yourself honestly: do you have good reason to believe in an all-good, all-powerful entity?


spetey

[harvey1]

Hello Spetey,

Harvey... look. I'm sorry if I come off sounding high-faluting or snobby. I didn't mean to embarrass you for not knowing what an accessibility relation is.

I'm not embarrassed, why should I be embarrassed? I didn't bring up modal logic, you did. I brought up modal concepts. If I were to bring modal logic up, and didn't really know that logic, then I should be embarrassed. But, I did nothing of the sort. If anything, you should be embarrassed for bringing modal logic without asking me if I knew those concepts. If I had known you were using a technical term, I would have told you honestly that I didn't know it.

But again, it's not like I started a technical, professional-level discussion and then derided anyone who couldn't keep up. My argument--just as you restate it--is perfectly accessible to the "layman". My response to your response is pefectly accessible to the "layman". It was you who wanted to discuss these technical notions like supervenience claims.

Of course, because I feel that I have a pretty approximate grasp of what Davidson talked about, and you might be surprised that he wrote his books in English, not modal logic. So, I see no reason why I should revert to symbolic language if Davidson didn't present his ideas to the public like that in his books. Now, perhaps you have read a book entirely in modal logic by Davidson, and if so, congratulations. But, since I haven't, I use the ideas spoken by Davidson as I understand them.

To be honest, it seems to me that you might be afraid to deal with the concepts of Davidson, and rather than be a sport and actually address those issues, you look for whatever you think can embarrass your opponent with cheap shots. If that is your intension, then that would be shame on you Spetey. The purpose of debating is to discuss subjects in words that each of us can understand and share. If we can't do so, then we don't have to debate. I see that as the issue here. I wish to employ what I learned from philosophers such as Davidson, this makes you think that I don't understand Davidson (especially if I can't speak in terms of modal logic), and therefore you wish me to try some other argument that has nothing to do with any philosopher. Of course, that becomes a game since whatever argument I employ in a philosophical discussion, it will always come down to you "knowing" the philosophical issues and me as the layman not. Well, I'm sorry, I beg to differ. That is a game and I won't have anything to do with it. I feel perfectly fine to discuss modal concepts in layman terms. If you feel that is offensive to modal thought and can't possibly be done, then let's agree to disagree and say our farewells.

You introduced the technical stuff, as you often do, in the hope that it would magically make a point for you.

No, I introduce "technical stuff" because that technical stuff is written in English and it makes sense to how I think. If you find that absolutely ridiculous that lay people can understand philosophers then I feel sorry for you. I think it odd though that you would ask that people believe what you say, then. Afterall, you're just another philosopher writing in English who would also be one that is not to be understood unless you have 9 courses in logic. Perhaps when you say you're an atheist you actually mean you are a theist but we lay people need 9 courses in logic before we would understand your theist beliefs. I would like to think that is the case, but somehow or another I think you really want us to understand and believe a philosopher when he's an atheist and then not understand a philosopher when speaking about other matters of philosophy. Of course, this is all just horse feathers.

When you do that, I often feel compelled to point out that you don't actually know what the hell you're talking about, and are merely making stuff up in order to sound impressive. You don't believe that physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility

Maybe I don't know what the hell I'm talking about, but I feel that I do. So, you'll have to show a contradiction in my own words. Of course, rather than do that you just want to push the discussion into logic where you have some expertise.

You just hope that it sounds good enough to shut opponents up.

I don't think that I do. On the other hand, I think it is quite possible that you brought up modal logic to shut me up. I think that's a terrible way to try and win an argument. Why not show me that my way out construal of Davidson will lean to heavy contradiction? Why do you think it necessary to use formal logic when Davidson himself wrote many of his ideas down using words. Even if I do terribly misunderstand Davidson, then what does it matter? You might misunderstand him too. The point is that I am using words that I think benefit my cause and you can make your point simply by showing how my use of those words leads to ridiculous outcomes. For example, instead of bringing up a technical term, why not show the problem in layman language? Incidentally, even if I did understand modal logic (which I never gave the impression that I do), would it even be beneficial to most people here who might have interest in our discussion to become so overly technical? I think not. In fact, this is a perfect opportunity for you to show how confused my ideas are from your perspective. Instead of taking this high road, you took the cheap shot road.

Look. You seem to know a lot of physics. From where I stand I can't tell if you make it up and abuse it like you do the philosophy. I'm inclined to think, though, that in physics you actually know what you're talking about.

I'm not a physicist and I don't pretend to be a physicist. If you or others think that I'm abusing those terms too, then please feel free to ignore what I have to say. I've had this same discussion before with an atheist physicist. It's always the same, people who want to win arguments the cheap way (i.e., the non-valid way) look to discredit the person rather than discredit the ideas. I'm fine with that. I know better, and for those who don't know better, they probably will come to the wrong conclusions of many things anyway, so their opinion doesn't count.

That's not to say that it isn't impossible to be ignorant and misrepresent ideas because one doesn't properly understand those notions. This happens all the time by many due to the multi-disciplinary nature of how the universe works. For those who think that only experts in fields should be discussing issues, then I suggest that they read forums like this only for people's feelings about certain issues. For example, they shouldn't discuss philosophy if they are not a philosopher, shouldn't discuss physics if not a physicist, shouldn't discuss politics unless a political theorist, etc.. In other words, for those people who have such overriding concerns, they probably shouldn't even try to know those subjects since they themselves will have confusion about the meaning of those topics. They will probably not understand what the expert is saying no matter what. Perhaps they should just turn on the TV and watch re-runs of "Friends."

Well, I don't think like that. I am what I am, and I say what I say. If that disgusts people such as yourself, then let's do each other a favor and not have these discussions. I do feel your pain, you don't have a forum that you can discuss your ideas and your beliefs at a level that you feel comfortable. I might even suggest that you only engage in debate with others that you feel do not make the mistakes that you feel that I make.

Now, wouldn't it be frustrating for you if I took my limited knowledge of physics and pulled out some big words and insisted that, for example, because eigenstates are Hamiltonian determinate conjugate momenta (and other such nonsensical abuse of QT terms), therefore there is no God? Do you see how your abuse of formal philosophical terms might be similarly frustrating to me?

No, because I would just ask you what you are trying to say. I would ask you questions about your ontology to see how you would respond. Eventually I would be able to point out areas that perhaps you didn't think of, or areas where you had the wrong assumptions. I would then show why those assumptions are wrong. If necessary, I would force you into contradictions, at which point I would hope that you would give up some of your ideas if you are blatantly contradicting yourself.

It's one thing to talk about what's possible, and even possible worlds--that's "layman" talk. It's another when you bring up "supervenience" and "interpretationalism" and such.

It might be another thing, but that's all that it is, another thing that I bring up.

When you use these words, it should (ideally) be because you understand them well, and that might take some philosophy courses--just as for me to use "Hamiltonian" well might take some physics courses. As it stands now, even with a few low-level courses on quantum theory under my belt, I don't really have a good grip on what a Hamiltonian is. As a result, I don't rely on the notion of a Hamiltonian to do any work for me in my reasoning or debating. Humility can be a virtue!

That's your preference Spetey. I understand your objection to those who do discuss notions that you think they don't understand. It is a fact that people are doing it on internet forums, and I am perhaps one of those people. I don't look at the world like you do. I am willing to take a chance in misunderstanding a concept and it's not my intention to make university professors rich by taking a college course for every concept I have an interest. If that's what you like to do, and it is what you insist on doing, then all the power to you.

You made a good simple point about possibility by pointing out that there are senses where I can swim across Lake Michigan and senses where I can't. That made perfect sense, in everyday English, and was a good point relevant to our discussion. That is good philosophy. Good philosophy is not just about using technical terms. Philosophy is perhaps unique in that most of the best stuff can be presented in simple terms.

Again, I'm who I am. I am fine with who I am, and I'm not going to change because of you. If we all must ask our credentials and number of courses (grades), how much we published to write about a subject, etc., before we can use a term that we think is meaningful to what we want to say, then I think that forums such as this would completely disappear.

Here's the principle I propose: you shouldn't use technical words or theories that you don't understand well in order to make a point. Again, I am not the one insisting on technical philosophical discourse--for some reason, you are the one who insists on it.

I disagree. The criteria for using concepts by experts (e.g., Davidson) is if one feels they understand the material. The challenge for those who respond to those people who are deluded by their feeling is to show contradiction or absurdities that result in them using such material. Of course, we should all try hard to stay consistent with the use of certain terms in the way they were intended. We shouldn't purposely or continue on naively in using terms outside of their intended usage. So, if someone can show that the word is being abused in that way, then a person should respect that unless they can show good indication that they are using the word in a consistent way that the term is being used or interpreted.

This "accessibility relation from this world to the set of all possible worlds" is a deduction of logical laws and a holistic relation of those laws as a whole.

When you start with axiom or theorem A and deduce B, you have given a deduction of B, not of A. You deduce (as you say above) from A to B.

Yes, I should have said "from" and not "of."

Wait a minute--are you still claiming that physical possibility "supervenes" on logical possibility, despite obviously not being able to defend the view in the face of proofs against it, or even explain what the view could mean? Is there no tiny, minor point on which you might admit you've made a mistake? (You must recognize that your reluctance to admit a mistake, too, is part of what induces me to be somewhat more frank and harsh in my criticism.)

I have been able to defend this view. You changed the subject by introducing modal logic and going into a huff about how I don't know modal logic. Well, that's not good enough. You have to show why my argument is faulty without resorting to a language that I cannot understand. If all you wish to say is that I don't understand the language for how these concepts are understood, then you have to show why we need this language to understand the concepts within the primitive arena that we are discussing. Of course, you don't have to do any of those things. You can just say that I am not humble enough for your tastes and we'll leave it at that.

And, I did admit a tiny mistake. I should have said "from" instead of "of."

Again I was ignoring those 13 points out of charity to you. I thought it was more "brainstorming" credo on your part, not meant to be taken seriously. Are they really an argument you'll stand by? You understand all the words involved, and you feel that they make for a coherent non-question-begging argument? You are prepared to defend the view that an "interpretation" is a collection of theorems, for example? If so, I will give my response.

Well, I'm not typing this stuff just to make the post look pretty. If you want a dialogue from me on why it is that I hold to my position, then you have to discuss those 13 points, unless you wish a rewording. And, of course, I expect you to tear into them. I'm comfortable if you do.

It's one thing to quote another when you understand the passage well, could put the point in your own words, and know what point it makes. Then you simply might prefer the original wording for its clarity, and so that you can give credit for the idea. It's another thing when you don't understand the passage well, couldn't put it in your own words, and hope (or assume) that this person is making a point that supports you.

Well, that in itself is question begging. How do you know that you understand the words correctly? How do you know the words you put them in are the same intent as Davidson? You don't and you can't know. You simply get people coming back at you saying you don't understand it. This happens all the time when someone says they misunderstood Quine, or they misconstrued Dummett, etc.. That's what discourse is all about.

Again: I want to know why you believe there is an all-powerful, all-good entity. I have given you reason not to believe. Is there something wrong with my reason?

Yes, and we discussed that in the other thread. You left and haven't returned, so what am I supposed to do write your responses for you?

You give a racist a cogent argument against racism, and the racist responds "well, gee, I don't have an answer, but other people probably do, and I have overwhelming reasons to believe my racism (though I can't give them to you), so it's okay to keep being racist." Of course, I'm not calling you a racist. But I am calling you a dogmatist--and you renounced dogmatism of any form long ago, on our old thread.

What the heck? I gave you my reasons and you left the thread. What else am I supposed to do??

We don't? Guess what I consider to be evidence of God bringing evil to the world (or, better put, to be evidence that an all-good, all-powerful God doesn't exist). That's right, tsunamis and such! Why don't the countless atrocities throughout history count as any evidence against the idea of an all-good, all-powerful being?

See, your answer that comes back is not that God caused the evil, the answer is that God doesn't exist to cause the evil. Well, this is not the situation with Hitler. We have physical evidence that Hitler was responsible for the evil.

It's evidence of God's fault if we assume that God is all-powerful. Then God could have made the world less evil and didn't. If you're saying God is not responsible for this evil--that God would prefer the evil not happen, but it was out of God's control--then in what sense is God omnipotent?

A better analogy is FDR. Some conspiracy nuts say that Roosevelt knew of the concentration camps exterminating Jews prior to WWII and said nothing. I hear it sometimes argued that the US could have even bombed the train tracks and stopped a majority of the carnage. Well, is it FDR's fault that the Holocaust happened? I don't know really (but I think it is absurd). What really is the evidence against FDR? (Do we even care to look into the issue, probably not.) If there is no evidence, just the possibility that FDR could have prevented the Holocaust but didn't, then we can't blame FDR. For all we know, he was surprised as anyone at the time about the devastation that took place. So, when you don't know, you can't pretend to know.

Are arguments against racism better than those philosophical arguments? Or, because arguments against racism have been controversial (slaveowers used to argue for it!), do you think it's just as responsible to believe either way? Are there some arguments that are stronger than the opposing arguments?

Racism is not usually a metaphysical issue about what exists or doesn't exist. It is a moral issue that is justified based on the beliefs of the people (I think early on we discussed this issue). The founding fathers of the U.S., for example, said that all men are created equal. So, if you believe all men are created by God, then racism is wrong based on those beliefs. Since the U.S. is founded on these documents, it is absurd to argue that racism is justified in the law of the U.S.. So, yes, the arguments against racism are much better than those philosophical arguments. Of course, if one doesn't believe that all men are created (i.e., atheism), then the documents are wrong and we might have a problem. Just another reason why atheism should be discarded...

If so, why are you sure that the atheist arguments aren't such? Are there times when it's okay to believe without reason, or not?

Well, it's never okay to believe without any reason. That's not to say that one needs an immediate reason to believe something. The reason might be rather abstract such as trusting that a teacher is teaching correctly and not just having fun with students by purposely deceiving them.

No. We shouldn't assume anything. We should only believe controversial positions, especially important ones that shape public policy, to the extent we have reasons for them.

But, our reasons for believing a position need not be a philosophical argument. It is more than likely to be something of a much more intuitive nature.

And how do you know the atheist conclusion is absurd? What reason do you have?

You skipped out on those discussions, unfortunately.

Arguments for God are also part of philosophy. Does that mean I can reasonably dismiss them as absurd, without having to answer them? "Ah, you say there must be a God for a universe to exist. But this line of reasoning would conclude that there is indeed a God. This is an absurd conclusion, and it's from a merely philosophical argument. I thus dismiss it out of hand." When you hear it from the other side, doesn't it seem like a textbook case of dogmatism? Don't you feel I owe you a response to the cosmological argument? The whole point is that we disagree on what's absurd. So we have to sort it out with reasons.

Well, this just shows the importance of preferring the other discussion to this one. But, you prefer to discuss this one, so we are here.

Minor?! It is an argument that there is no God of the type in which you believe--an argument you seem unable to answer. Are you sure that's a minor issue?

No, I have provided answers Spetey, but you played the authority card to end that discussion. I don't buy into the authority card (e.g., must know modal logic), but you do, so you just assume that I haven't answered the issue. Of course, I do think I have a reasonable grasp on what Davidson is saying, and I think his views are able to shed light on this subject. But, not only that, I have never seen many theist philosopher throw in the towel and say, "show's over folks, the atheist is right, God is evil or powerless to help us." If and when I see that, I might raise an eyebrow, but I have good reason to suppose that this debate is a lot like the philosophical disputes taking place with most of the rest of philosophy.

What? This is more offhand speculation from you. The atheist solution to the problem of evil is trivial: there is no all-powerful all-good creature to prevent bad things, and so sometimes they naturally happen. Where in that did I give up the notion of causation?!

You can't answer the issues confronting those who offer causality as an answer to any event (e.g., evil). I know that because right beside me is a book on causality written by a number of authors all disagreeing fundamentally with the other author in the book. The reasons to doubt each position are strong, and there are no valid answers that have been proposed to the problem of causality. Therefore, the atheist cannot answer what causes evil anymore than the theist. It is just that the atheist is usually concerned about religion and not the more obscure debate happening in causality. Now, I'm sure you're familiar with that debate, but you must be looking at that debate with the beam in your own eye.

And thanks for the well-wishes, but I don't consider this discussion over--I'd still like to hear what your reasons are for believing in an all-good, all-powerful being in the face of evil. (Or hear you defend controversial beliefs not grounded in reason.) Of course you're free to terminate (your end of) the discussion! But if you no longer wish to discuss it with me, I urge you to ask yourself honestly: do you have good reason to believe in an all-good, all-powerful entity?

Well, that's good to know, but I'm not as optimistic as you. We have a deep disagreement about how to use terms and how to support one's views on a subject. In my view, a layman can walk over to the philosophy section of a bookstore or a physics section, and buy the book that they have interest in because it contains subject matter that will help them understand concepts that they believe are useful to understanding perplexing questions. They don't have to be an expert to connect with the writings of the philosopher (physicist/chemist/biologist/etc), and as far as I'm concerned, as soon as they feel comfortable with the text they can walk over to their computer and state new arguments, even ones slightly different than the ones they just read. They are free to cite the basis of their position which they construed from the philosopher of whom they read. That's how things go in my book. You have a fundamental issue with that, so I don't see how we can progress further. I'm not trying to change you, but you are trying to change me. And that isn't going to happen. So, I'm somewhat pessimistic at this stage. I'd like to continue if possible, but I don't like the insinuations that I don't feel comfortable with the material that I'm reading and writing about either. That's getting a little annoying as well.

[spetey]

<deep breath in hopes of inspiring patience>

First, let me bypass these suggestions that it's really my fault when you misuse terms like 'supervenience' and so on. That alone takes a big chunk of patience.

If you find that absolutely ridiculous that lay people can understand philosophers then I feel sorry for you.

Another straw man. Of course lay people can (at least eventually) understand philosophy. After all, everyone was a lay person at one time. But it doesn't follow that everyone understands all philosophy they read. I am often impressed by the philosophy you know and understand Harvey, but it gets overshadowed by the abuses--especially when you simply will not step down from your own misunderstandings.

Maybe I don't know what the hell I'm talking about, but I feel that I do. So, you'll have to show a contradiction in my own words.

What more can I do toward this end than provide a proof that there can be no distinction in these notions of logical possibility if one supervenes on the other? Yes, I relied on technical notions there to spell out the technical terms you introduced like 'supervenience'. You did not respond with "hmn, maybe I did make a mistake; what's this accessibility relation of which you speak?" Instead you assumed that you magically understood everything about my proof, and answered it with nonsense. Then when I called you on it, you got upset. Throughout I asked you to explain what on earth you meant by these terms. I'm not sure how much more patiently I could have handled that exchange. Given that you were mistaken to make this claim--you do grant that now, don't you?--how should I ideally have handled things?

In fact, this is a perfect opportunity for you to show how confused my ideas are from your perspective. Instead of taking this high road, you took the cheap shot road.

I can't show you how confused your technical claims are without explaining the proper use of the technical claims and their proper meaning. Imagine I'd claimed that there is no God because quantum eigenstates are conjugate Hamiltonian momenta. To show why I'm wrong, after I insist on this phrase without being able to explain it, you'd have to explain what Hamiltonians actually are. Right? And that would require some technical detail. Right?

Now, wouldn't it be frustrating for you if I took my limited knowledge of physics and pulled out some big words and insisted that, for example, because eigenstates are Hamiltonian determinate conjugate momenta (and other such nonsensical abuse of QT terms), therefore there is no God? Do you see how your abuse of formal philosophical terms might be similarly frustrating to me?

No, because I would just ask you what you are trying to say. I would ask you questions about your ontology to see how you would respond.

I did that, here, before this whole debacle on your supervenience claim. That initial, layperson response to your claim--where I asked for clarification and pointed out the surface implausibility of your claim--did not seem to move you. You did not respond except to drag in poor Davidson and more irrelevant technical terms like "interpretationalism".

Meanwhile you claim you would ask me what I mean, but I don't remember you ever asking me what I mean by something. You obviously didn't understand "accessibility relation", as you later confessed, but that didn't hinder you from immediately assuming I was wrong and using this phrase you didn't understand at all to try to argue as much. I would of course be grateful if you asked me what I meant when I used terms and phrases in ways you don't expect, or understand, or think are right. A good philosopher looks forward to a chance to clarify their obscure terms, instead of counting on them to do work for them.

I am willing to take a chance in misunderstanding a concept ...

That's fine, of course. But I suggest when the chance you take misfires, then you should back down graciously, instead defending with more nonsense, or taking offense when someone suggests (with ever-increasing force over a series of posts) that you might actually be misunderstanding.

Wait a minute--are you still claiming that physical possibility "supervenes" on logical possibility, despite obviously not being able to defend the view in the face of proofs against it, or even explain what the view could mean? Is there no tiny, minor point on which you might admit you've made a mistake? (You must recognize that your reluctance to admit a mistake, too, is part of what induces me to be somewhat more frank and harsh in my criticism.)

I have been able to defend this view. You changed the subject by introducing modal logic and going into a huff about how I don't know modal logic.

What?! Oh my dear non-existent-lord-in-heaven. I can't believe you won't even back down from this claim after this much. "Supervenience" and "physical possibility" and "logical possibility" are all modal notions that you introduced. I merely spelled out what your claim literally meant, to show that it's probably not what you intended (that is, I showed that if physical possibility supervened on logical possibility, then the notions would be co-extensive). And you say I was changing the subject? Imagine if I claimed eigenstates are Hamiltonian momenta conjugates, and then when you responded with how this made no sense, I complained that you had "changed the subject" to quantum physics!

<sigh> Okay, Harvey. Please. Tell me exactly what you mean when you say "physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility". Do not quote Davidson or some other third party with other big philosophy words. Tell me in your words exactly what your response is to my proof. Please, how exactly do you defend this claim about notions which you confess you don't understand?

Well, that's not good enough. You have to show why my argument is faulty without resorting to a language that I cannot understand.

You resorted to the language you don't understand when you invoked words like 'supervenience'--I just responded in the same language. It is not unfair for me to do so, obviously.

And, I did admit a tiny mistake. I should have said "from" instead of "of."

Fair enough. It's big progress and I appreciate it. Now, can you also muster the energy / patience / whatever to confess that indeed it wasn't just one word, but that this whole sentence was pretty confused?

This "accessibility relation from this world to the set of all possible worlds" is a deduction of logical laws and a holistic relation of those laws as a whole.

(Once you get to the point when you can admit maybe whole sentences of yours might be confused, then we'll work our way up to paragraphs, then arguments, and maybe eventually even whole theories. Like aversion therapy!)

Again I was ignoring those 13 points out of charity to you. I thought it was more "brainstorming" credo on your part, not meant to be taken seriously. Are they really an argument you'll stand by? You understand all the words involved, and you feel that they make for a coherent non-question-begging argument? You are prepared to defend the view that an "interpretation" is a collection of theorems, for example? If so, I will give my response.

Well, I'm not typing this stuff just to make the post look pretty. If you want a dialogue from me on why it is that I hold to my position, then you have to discuss those 13 points, unless you wish a rewording. And, of course, I expect you to tear into them. I'm comfortable if you do.

I'm sure you are. I'm sure you're confident that you can respond to whatever my response is with more big technical terms that make no sense in context. Should I call you on those, you can always play the hysterical victim.

Okay. <another deep breath> That wasn't civil. Sorry. Let's look at those 13 points. I'll try to be tempered in my comments. I'll put my comments in green.

1. There's a large collection of true logical statements Is this a premise, or what? I'm guessing, a premise.
2. Theorems form based on those various sets of those laws I guess by "theorems form ..." you mean that theorems can be derived given logical laws... is that right? It's pretty obscure, but if that's what you mean, then I agree; given axioms and logical laws, we can indeed derive theorems.
3. There's a large collection of theorems Are you pointing this out, like by looking at math journals? Are you stipulating we pick some arbitrary set of theorems? Why do you make this claim, and how does it form part of an argument?
4. Combining multiple theorems you have an interpretation This is a completely nonstandard use of the word 'interpretation'. What do you mean by "combine" here? You mean any set of theorems is an interpretation? Is {Fermat's Last Theorem, The Four-Color Theorem} an "interpretation" on this idiosyncratic account?
5. For the same set of multiple theorems, there may be more than one interpretation for the same set, ... note that this contradicts the most charitable reading of your immediately previous claim that a collection of theorems determines the interpretation; if that's not what you meant, then you have completely failed to specify what you mean by "interpretation"... perhaps an innumerable set of interpretations for the theorems
6. A collection of interpretations for the same set of theorems forms a physical constraint So interpretations are collections of theorems, and collections of interpretations--collections of collections of theorems--are a "physical constraint"? So for example the set of sets {{Godel's incompleteness theorem, Fermat's Last Theorem}, {The Four-Color Theorem, The independence of the AoC theorem}} is a "physical constraint"?
7. The physical constraint has a range of indeterminancy due to the different interpretations that exist for that constraint Again you contradict the most charitable reading of your immediately previous claim. If the physical constraint just is a collection of interpretations then you can't vary the interpretations without varying the constraint (and thus there are no "different interpretations" for that constraint).
8. Outside the range of indeterminancy, the interpretations of the theorems all agree, ... in other words, outside the range of possible interpretations that make up the physical constraint, the (presumably impossible) interpretations agree? What does "agree" here, and what interpretations could be outside the range of possible interpretations? ... hence situations that apply outside the indeterminate range, the logical implications of the interpretations are necessary ... so "hence" the impossible interpretations are necessary? (That is, the interpretations true in no possible world are true in every possible world?)
9. God decides on the range of indeterminancy based on holistic considerations (as an omniscient interpreter) Putting aside the highly obscure notions of "indeterminacy", which make this sentence highly mysterious ("God decides on the range of sets of theorems which determine the 'physical constraint' that is one collection of interpretations"??) this sounds a lot like you're saying God decides what can happen and what can't, and is thus responsible for all that happens after. It also, of course, sounds like a simple assertion about God's powers, rather than any kind of argument.
10. If God judges a situation such that the situation is outside the range of indeterminancy, then God cannot stop the necessary effects of ( 8 ) If there are necessary effects, then to say God judges a situation is "outside the range of indeterminacy" (in this case, and contra your earlier "definitions") seems to say that God judges something is impossible. (And why not just say that?!)
11. If God judges a situation such that the situation is inside the range of indeterminancy, then God can stop the necessary effects of ( 8 ) since there is no necessary law that requires ( 8 ) to be in effect in this indeterminate range Here you say that God can stop what's necessary; that is, it is possible to stop what is impossible to stop. This is a logical contradiction--is it something you stand by? Or is it your claim that it's only necessary in certain possibilities? If so, then you again merely claim that God judges something possible--and why not just say that?
12. The 2004 tsunami was a consequence of (10)In other words, God judged it was impossible to stop.
13. The 50 other tsunamis that did not happen in 2004 was a consequence of (11) (i.e., it was possible for God to stop the tsunami so those 50 tsunamis did not happen) In other words, other times God judged it was possible to stop.

Most importantly: notice that this isn't an argument. In effect you merely assert, after many confused preambles with obscure terms, that it was impossible for God to stop the 2004 tsunami, but it was possible for God to stop other tsunamis. How does this show that God could both choose and not choose to stop the 2004 tsunami (the claim you attempted to defend)? How does it use or support the claim that physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility?

How do you know that you understand the words correctly? How do you know the words you put them in are the same intent as Davidson? You don't and you can't know.

Right. But if you put it in your own words, then it becomes clear to the other thinkers involved what you mean, and what your take on Davidson is. Do you see how this could have advantages?

Again: I want to know why you believe there is an all-powerful, all-good entity. I have given you reason not to believe. Is there something wrong with my reason?

Yes, and we discussed that in the other thread. You left and haven't returned, so what am I supposed to do write your responses for you?

I don't remember discussing the problem of evil in that other thread. (I also don't remember any response to my arguments about Inference to the Best Explanation on that thread.) Please, remind me, or somehow indicate other than by vague pointing what your response is.

We don't? Guess what I consider to be evidence of God bringing evil to the world (or, better put, to be evidence that an all-good, all-powerful God doesn't exist). That's right, tsunamis and such! Why don't the countless atrocities throughout history count as any evidence against the idea of an all-good, all-powerful being?

See, your answer that comes back is not that God caused the evil, the answer is that God doesn't exist to cause the evil. Well, this is not the situation with Hitler. We have physical evidence that Hitler was responsible for the evil.

That's not the structural analogy. The structural analogy is in begging the question by in both cases claiming that the purported actor is good despite lots of evil actions under the person's control. Now your response seems to be that God didn't cause the tsunami--God was not responsible. Is that because (as your roundabout 13 points seems to try to say) it was impossible for God to stop the 2004? If so, in what sense is God omnipotent?

Again, please commit: was it possible for God to have stopped the 2004 tsunami (and, if you like, all other tsunamis)? In other words, had God decided to stop the tsunami (and all of them if you like), could God have done so? If yes, why did God permit them? If no, in what sense is God omnipotent?

If there is no evidence, just the possibility that FDR could have prevented the Holocaust but didn't, then we can't blame FDR. For all we know, he was surprised as anyone at the time about the devastation that took place. So, when you don't know, you can't pretend to know.

This analogy is obscure. Are you claiming God didn't know the tsunami would kill hundreds of thousands of innocents? If God doesn't have these powers of knowledge (which we mere mortals possess), then in what sense is God omninpotent?

Of course, if one doesn't believe that all men are created (i.e., atheism), then the documents are wrong and we might have a problem. Just another reason why atheism should be discarded...

Oy vey. It's not what the "founding fathers" wrote that makes racism wrong--as though tearing up the document would make racism okay again! It's that racism violates the ethical principle that races are equal with respect to moral evaluation. This does not rely on claims about how the races were created, though the founding fathers (who themselves were mere deists and, as I understand it, thus did not believe God actively made humans) chose to word things that way.

No. We shouldn't assume anything. We should only believe controversial positions, especially important ones that shape public policy, to the extent we have reasons for them.

But, our reasons for believing a position need not be a philosophical argument. It is more than likely to be something of a much more intuitive nature.

Oh no, back to "intuition" as your favorite sneaky word for "faith". Again: is this intuition shareable with those who disagree about these important and controversial topics? If not, is it responsible to rely on that mere intuition that others don't have?

But, not only that, I have never seen many theist philosopher throw in the towel and say, "show's over folks, the atheist is right, God is evil or powerless to help us."

I'm one. Most other atheists are. We once believed in God, and then heard (or realized) good arguments against the position, and threw in the towel and joined the winning team. You have seen many people change their minds in the face of arguments. You just refuse to take it as evidence that they may be right. Instead you merely dismiss them, assuming that their views must be formed irrationally as a result of abuse or something.

Of course, we don't say God is evil or powerless--we take the more reasonable position that there is no such God in the first place. It's indicative that to you "giving up" on theism means believing in a God, but an evil God instead. It seems very hard for you to imagine someone actually not believing there's any God at all. You keep forgetting it's even a genuine option for belief.

... right beside me is a book on causality written by a number of authors all disagreeing fundamentally with the other author in the book. The reasons to doubt each position are strong, and there are no valid answers that have been proposed to the problem of causality. Therefore, the atheist cannot answer what causes evil anymore than the theist.

Whoa. Your claim is that there is controversy about causality and "therefore" the atheist has no good argument with respect to the problem of evil? Does that work for racists too? Can a racist say "I've got a book here that shows the notion of causality is controversial. Therefore there's no good answer about whether racism is correct or not, and so therefore it's okay for me to continute blithely believing in racism!"

I'd like to continue if possible, but I don't like the insinuations that I don't feel comfortable with the material that I'm reading and writing about either. That's getting a little annoying as well.

What you seem to mean is that it's getting annoying when I suggest you might be wrong in your understandings of what you've read. I know it's hard to be wrong--believe me, I know--but do you admit it's possible, right? That indeed, part of the point of these forums is to see whether we in fact have good reasons for our views? Harvey, I assure you, you are just wrong when you say that physical possibility "supervenes" on logical possibility, and they are distinct notions. This is contradictory. You are also just plain wrong whenever you suggest that it was both possible and impossible (in the same sense of possibility) for God to stop the tsunami. That, too, is a straightforward contradiction. You might, might, might even be wrong about whether God exists. Right? Do you admit the possibility that you're wrong about God? I certainly recognize the possibility that I'm wrong. (I just don't have good reason to believe I'm wrong, so far.)


spetey

[harvey1]

Hi Spetey,

What you seem to mean is that it's getting annoying when I suggest you might be wrong in your understandings of what you've read.

No. It's annoying that instead of arguing back in the same language of words that I use to describe a view, you've rejected it without so much of an analysis of those words. Instead you drifted into modal logic, and that's not the context that I posted those articles to describe what I was trying to say. By using that approach, you've completely assumed that your response was a "proof" when all you did was answer in German when you should have answered back in English. Again, I did not know you were using a technical term. Accessibility relation sounds like an ordinary term that accesses relata between each other, and as I discussed prior, Davidson agrees that there is a relata between physical and mental. So, I didn't catch on that you started speaking German because the words in German appeared to be written and understandable in English. You should have made it more clear that you were switching over to talking into German and also ask if I knew German.

I know it's hard to be wrong--believe me, I know--but do you admit it's possible, right?

Anything like being wrong is possible Spetey.

That indeed, part of the point of these forums is to see whether we in fact have good reasons for our views? Harvey, I assure you, you are just wrong when you say that physical possibility "supervenes" on logical possibility, and they are distinct notions.

Well, we need to discuss this issue further. I disagree at this point (i.e., after reading your response to my 13 points, I see no reason to think I am wrong).

This is contradictory. You are also just plain wrong whenever you suggest that it was both possible and impossible (in the same sense of possibility) for God to stop the tsunami.

Not so. I described this in the 13 points, and you completely missed the point there too.

That, too, is a straightforward contradiction. You might, might, might even be wrong about whether God exists. Right?

I'm a human being, so yes I am fallible in my knowledge. We might even live inside the Matrix for all I know, or you might be a theist just having fun.

Do you admit the possibility that you're wrong about God? I certainly recognize the possibility that I'm wrong. (I just don't have good reason to believe I'm wrong, so far.)

Sure. However, being wrong should always be decided on reasons, not on whim (e.g., I might be wrong therefore I am wrong...).

What I would like to know is whether your obvious lack of patience at this point has just made it impossible for you to continue further with me. I don't think our tone recently is suitable for an enjoyable debate, and even though I really like to continue to debating you, I get the feeling I will send you into a hospital if I continue to quote Davidson, which I intend to do once I get back to my library. If so, then let's stop before the heart murmers start.

If you are settled down and ready to resume where we left off before you got all out of whack because I'm intent on using Davidson terms, then let me respond to your response of the 13 points. If you are just completely wigged out by these references, then I better save you the heart pain. Afterall, you do realize that my response to the 13 points will be quotes from Davidson, right?

[spetey]

It's annoying that instead of arguing back in the same language of words that I use to describe a view, you've rejected it without so much of an analysis of those words. Instead you drifted into modal logic, and that's not the context that I posted those articles to describe what I was trying to say.

Okay. I ask for something like the fifth time now: what exactly were you trying to say when you said that "physical possibillity supervenes on logical possibility"? Explain what you mean by each of the operant phrases ("physical possibility", "X supervenes on Y", and "logical possibility") and show how they are related. I have explained what I (and, as I understand it, the wider community of English speakers) mean by those terms, and shown how by those meanings what you say is essentially nonsensical. But all along, since the very beginning, I've asked you to explain exactly what you mean. Do not quote Davidson. Remember, my proof used exactly your favored formulation for supervenience from Davidson, and it was using that notion that I showed what you claim makes no sense. So it does not look like Davidson will avail you, right?

By using that approach, you've completely assumed that your response was a "proof" when all you did was answer in German when you should have answered back in English. Again, I did not know you were using a technical term.

And again--you started the German with words like "supervenience". Harvey, I'm sorry, but you just don't understand what supervenience is. It is obvious in the way you use the word to anyone who does know what it means. It's as though someone kept talking about "the prime numbers that weigh more than two ounces". If people talk about numbers that way, as though they had weights, it becomes obvious they have no idea what a number is. You started speaking a language you don't understand, and I responded--because I happen to speak the language well and was trying to extend you charity that perhaps you understood it too. But it turns out you don't speak it, and now you are embarrassed and defensive. If you can make your point without German--without words like "supervenience"--please make it. If you insist on speaking German, then I assure you I will respond in German. I am not the one having trouble with the language.

Accessibility relation sounds like an ordinary term that accesses relata between each other, and as I discussed prior, Davidson agrees that there is a relata between physical and mental.

Because "accessibility relation" uses the word 'relation', you assume that any old relation (like that between the physical and the mental) will do? Why not pick "A is taller than B" or "A looks like B" or "A eats B"? Look: the mental plausibly supervenes on the physical, as most philosophers today would say. That has nothing to do with whether physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility.

That indeed, part of the point of these forums is to see whether we in fact have good reasons for our views? Harvey, I assure you, you are just wrong when you say that physical possibility "supervenes" on logical possibility, and they are distinct notions.

Well, we need to discuss this issue further. I disagree at this point (i.e., after reading your response to my 13 points, I see no reason to think I am wrong).

That is exactly what is so frustrating. You admit you don't speak German, and yet somehow you are sure that what I say in German must be wrong. Don't you find that the least bit suspicious?

Remember, your 13 points had nothing to do with physical possibility, logical possibility, and supervenience. None of these phrases were ever mentioned. (You mention a physical "constraint", which you implausibly define as a set of sets of logical theorems, but you don't say anything about how that relates to physical possibility, supervenience, or logical possibility.) Your 13 points were (purported to be) in defense of the idea that God both chose and and didn't choose to let the tsunami happen, and so did not even purport to be a defense of your supervenience claim. Your 13 points first state some irrelevant truisms like "there are lots of theorems in the world", then defined some terms that make no sense, and then simply stated (in obscure language) that God finds some things possible and some things impossible. It wasn't an argument at all. Compare this "argument":

1. Chickens are birds.
2. Birds are collections of feathers. [So pillows count as birds!]
3. Feathers are collections of hairs. [So wigs count as feathers, and collections of wigs count as birds!]
4. Sometimes chickens can fly, because of how the hairs are.
5. But sometimes they can't, because of how the hairs are.

An argument starts with plausible premises that all parties to the discussion are likely to share, and then shows how those premises lend support to a controversial conclusion. How does "there are theorems" and "interpretations are collections of theorems" show that God could not have prevented a tsunami but is still magically omnipotent? And what does it have to do with your supervenience claim?

This is contradictory. You are also just plain wrong whenever you suggest that it was both possible and impossible (in the same sense of possibility) for God to stop the tsunami.

Not so. I described this in the 13 points, and you completely missed the point there too.

Okay. Give me the point. If you can't give the point in your own words, why are you confident that you have a point, or understand Davidson's point? Why do you insist on using another's words? Is it because you are dimly aware that you can't put it in your own words? If so, why do you not take this as a sign that you don't actually understand the points being made?

I assure you there is no passage in all of Davidson that says "Harvey's 13 points are correct". Without having read all of Davidson, I can also assure you there isn't a passage in Davidson that says "interpretations are combinations of theorems". So you can't defend your 13 points by appealing to Davidson. (Some of your 13 points--like that "there are theorems"--are trivial and don't need defending.) You can only bring up irrelevant quotations that you implicitly trust must support you, for some reason.

"German" is hard, Harvey. It takes a long time to learn. It's not shameful that you might not speak it fluently. And luckily, we don't have to speak German. My original argument is not in German, as you recognize. Your response is not in German, as you recognize I recognize. My response to your response is not in German. We can continue in non-German. I would like that, for your sake. Why do you insist on defending your poor use of German, when you admit you don't speak it?! "Physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility" is in German, and it's horrible, ungrammatical German. Why do you insist that somehow it's magically perfect? Isn't this one of those times you might admit that maybe, just possibly, you said something that is just plain wrong?


spetey

[harvey1]

Hello Spetey,

Remember, my proof used exactly your favored formulation for supervenience from Davidson, and it was using that notion that I showed what you claim makes no sense. So it does not look like Davidson will avail you, right?

I provided Davidson's use of the term supervenience without reverting to modal logic, so that's how I expect you to answer--without reverting to modal logic. I don't know modal logic, and I find your proof meaningless now that I know you are using terms from modal logic. If you want to show me that my understanding of Davidson is wrong, then use Davidson's words to show that I am wrong.

]And again--you started the German with words like "supervenience". Harvey, I'm sorry, but you just don't understand what supervenience is. It is obvious in the way you use the word to anyone who does know what it means.

I defined supervenience based on the words given by good sources in their interpretation of Davidson. I think very few of those words were actually mine. It seems you don't have a problem with my use of the term, you have a problem with the way those sources defined the term. Reverting to modal logic is not the proper way to show that those sources misconstrued Davidson.

If you insist on speaking German, then I assure you I will respond in German. I am not the one having trouble with the language.

I just got off a plane and on my way back I sat next to a German on his way back to Munich, I thought that was a little funny. However, I didn't bring up modal logic, you did. I brought up modal concepts. There's a distinction in that.

That is exactly what is so frustrating. You admit you don't speak German, and yet somehow you are sure that what I say in German must be wrong. Don't you find that the least bit suspicious?

I don't think you must be wrong, I think that there's no way for me to know if you are right if you insist on speaking German. I'm just talking about Germany as a country, that doesn't require that we speak German.

Remember, your 13 points had nothing to do with physical possibility, logical possibility, and supervenience. None of these phrases were ever mentioned.

Well, I probably tried to accommodate you too much already. I really should have mentioned all of those concepts, but I am concerned about your sleep as of late.

It wasn't an argument at all. Compare this "argument":

I wasn't posting a formal argument. I was trying to answer your question on how exactly a tsunami can be both possible and impossible for God to stop depending on the range of indeterminancy it falls within. I think you must have taken it as a formal argument, which it was not meant to be. (I barely had time to write those points, much less devise a formal argument for you.)

Okay. Give me the point. If you can't give the point in your own words, why are you confident that you have a point, or understand Davidson's point?

I can give it in my own words, but giving it in Davidson's words has a function. It allows me to continue to expand upon his work and what I think underlies the nature of reality. I know you have no interest in me making those kind of parallels, but I think others might benefit from that. In any case, I always like quoting respected philosophers because, whereas I am more sloppy with words, they are much more precise.

If so, why do you not take this as a sign that you don't actually understand the points being made?

Spetey, show some respect. If you don't want to do so, then why continue our discussion? The reason for using Davidson's words versus my own words is that Davidson is very precise and it is easier to refer back to those statements later if and when necessary.

So you can't defend your 13 points by appealing to Davidson. (Some of your 13 points--like that "there are theorems"--are trivial and don't need defending.) You can only bring up irrelevant quotations that you implicitly trust must support you, for some reason.

What is it to you? I will arrange the quotes for the responses that I think apply to your questions. I tell you what, you can write a disclaimer at the bottom of every post that states that you think that Harvey1 has hijacked Davidson in an unsatisfactory way, but you only put up with the charade because you wish to show this forum that there are no consistent arguments for theism, even the ones that Harvey1 makes. If you want such kind of disclaimer, I'm happy to allow it. Maybe I'll put my own disclaimer in my responses to your posts if you see such ridiculousness as necessary.

Why do you insist on defending your poor use of German, when you admit you don't speak it?!

I'm referring to the country of Germany because it happens to be the place where some of the answers are found to your questions. If you won't let me talk about Germany, then I don't see the point in having a discussion where I can't tell you what I believe to be the case. It just so happens that Davidson has wrote many fine things about Germany, so let's see what he has to say (go ahead and post your disclaimer...).

Isn't this one of those times you might admit that maybe, just possibly, you said something that is just plain wrong?

No. I think what I said is absolutely right. The question is, do you want to continue under the condition that I will use quotations of others (e.g., Davidson) as I interpret them. I expect your answers back in the same language as used by those authors. If you can't do that, then I suppose we can go no further on this subject. Disclaimers are fine by me if you have integrity issues to defend for yourself.

[Curious]

I really hate to interfere in this lovers tiff but could we get back to the point?

[spetey]

I really hate to interfere in this lovers tiff but could we get back to the point?

Quite right, Curious, quite right ... thank you.

Harvey, here is the point as I see it:

• Is it a logical truth that tsunamis exist? Can you derive "at least 50 tsunamis throughout history must bring pain and suffering to millions of people" from purely logical laws?
• If yes, if it's a logical truth that there must be tsunamis that cause vast pain and suffering, then that would go some way toward showing that even an omnipotent being couldn't prevent such suffering (since we've agreed that omnipotent beings can do all and only what's logically possible). But of course if yes, you owe us this derivation from logical laws, or else owe us a good reason to think such a derivation exist. Can you derive other apparently contingent propositions, like "spetey had Indian food for lunch", from pure logic too?
• If no, then it was possible God could have made a world without so much pain and suffering, and then I'd like to know why you think God didn't make such a world, given that God is good. Is it because it would be (net) bad to prevent all the tsunamis, even though possible?
• If so--if you think God permitted the 2004 tsunami for the (net) good--then (again) why do you think this, given that it seems to have resulted in great net evil? How is it different from the Hitler Freak defense we discussed?

That's enough to start for now.

(If you insist on talking about "supervenience" to answer these questions, then alas, we will have to talk more about supervenience, I guess. I notice that upon my fifth request you still don't choose to clarify what you mean by "physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility". I have no problem with Davidson's construal of supervenience. I have a problem with your use of the word in this demonstrably false claim that you keep defending. Indeed, I remind you again that I used exactly Davidson's construal to show that your specific claim makes no sense. But I am hoping that if you are constitutionally unable to admit your supervenience claim was just wrong, then you're at least capable of dropping it.)

And yes, I ask that you use your own words rather than quote someone else. I am willing to sacrifice the "precision" that you prefer in the original text in order to hear what you think those philosophers mean, so that we can discuss your ideas. I have suggested that you do not, in the majority of cases, understand these passages you quote. So your best response to my challenge is to prove me wrong and show me that you do understand them. To do that, you need to put them in your own words. If you continue merely quoting people, and then essentially tacking on "see, that's just like my claim p!" when p has nothing at all apparent to do with the quotation, then I will continue believing that you just don't understand the quotation. Doesn't that sound fair?

After all, as David Lewis says:

Given our definitions, we can eliminate T-terms in favor of the definite descriptions whereby we have defined them. Replacing each T-term by its definiens throughout the postulate of T, we obtain an O-sentence which we may call the (definitionally) expanded postulate of T. ["How to Define Theoretical Terms", in Philosophical Papers vol I, p88]

There, see! Just like I said! That proves there's no God and the problem of evil is definitive! Yeah! Definite descriptions and expanded postulates and stuff, obviously! I would explain in my own words how that shows God doesn't exist--but you know, Lewis just says it so much more precisely!


spetey