Ephesians 2:10

[JoeyKnothead]

From Post 9 here:

Ephesians 2:10 (For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them.)

I think you have a poor conclusion here. I don't see your point connected to the verse. Let me go a bit further in this verse for you to comprehend. It said " For we are his workmanship" Human is created by a creator.
...

My emboldenizationin'.

For debate:

Is the notion that we are created by a god the most reasonable and rational conclusion to be had?

[Mithrae]

I could be misunderstanding him too, but I think what he's getting at is that the word 'physical' - which we associate with tables, houses, planets and so on - can often imply limitations which the available evidence does not support.

To use a different term, what I'm aware of regarding our current knowledge or strong theories about 'stuff' is that:
- there are several different types of 'quarks,' several different types of 'leptons,' and several different types of 'bosons' which, as far as we currently know, make up all the stuff
- there are four fundamental ways in which bits of stuff interact with other bits of stuff (called gravitation, weak interaction, strong interaction and electro-magnetism)
- there are four inter-related 'dimensions,' which don't serve as a mere substrate or place to be for stuff, but are themselves actually affected by it
- there's a great deal more 'dark stuff' in the known universe than there is 'regular stuff,' but we don't know anything much at all about it
- the tables, houses, planets and so on which we see and touch are mostly not stuff at all; there's really very little stuff on earth, let alone in the universe as a whole
- far as we can tell, stuff doesn't have a single discernable nature, instead behaving both as we'd conceive a particle might and as a wave might

Which, as we see, is nothing more than stuff acting according to its properties. In this fashion then, I contend that proposing some volitional agent as the most rational means of determining a god created humans is not the most rational way to go about things.

So, we can say that I, JoeyKnothead, am composed in part of a heaping pile of empty space (among other less comforting terms), but that there's some physicality to me. My brain, or a computer, doesn't exist entirely of empty space, so we can conclude there's some physical properties involved in being me.

Now supposing it's true that volition does have to come from stuff, what have we reliably learned? Or what possibilities can we reliably exclude?

Such seems more a problem for the claimant, where I present rational explanations that don't require some non-physical, ethereal entity to have produced humans, but that I propose humans are the product of a universe full of complex electro-chemical reactions.

Trouble is that we don't (or certainly I don't) know that it's just stuff acting according to its properties. What I was trying to get at is that the nature of stuff and what it does and why is still all a big mystery to me, but at each stage what little I've learned has always just seemed to get weirder and more complicated. Even physicists are having to invent 7 extra dimensions to try to understand stuff and its behaviour, which doesn't strike me as being intuitively more reasonable than a volitional agent. Or we could of course presume until further notice that all of it just is and is indeed simply behaving according to its properties - but again, I don't think that presumption could really claim any rational superiority over a theistic alternative.

Whether or not the term 'physical' should be applied to gravity or time or space or dark energy or strings or this god is not, in my opinion, a useful point for discussion. That's nothing more than the question "Is this god made of the type of stuff we can currently detect with instruments, or a type of stuff which we can't currently detect with instruments?" I agree that most theists would tend towards the latter, but unless you're suggesting that there's no stuff we can't detect - or, alternatively, that measurable detection is the only valid basis for knowledge - as far as I can tell the distinction is irrelevant to EduChris' argument.

Mithrae, you taking your name from the god, or mithradates, one of four persion/greek kings?

The god. I found it quite ironic that the ancient Indo-Iranian covenant god Mitra would flourish, persist and evolve through stages, including if memory serves being the son and mediator for the one God Ahura-Mazda, to be a major 2nd/3rd century rival to the sect of a Son of God proclaiming a new covenant.

If it is possible for a volitional non-contingent entity to exist, then WE could be it. No God necessary.

The only way you can avoid this simple reality is by special pleading

I don't think it's special pleading to suppose that my existence depends on prior factors. It seems pretty obvious, unless you're advocating some form of solipsism?

[JoeyKnothead]

From Post 31:

Trouble is that we don't (or certainly I don't) know that it's just stuff acting according to its properties. What I was trying to get at is that the nature of stuff and what it does and why is still all a big mystery to me, but at each stage what little I've learned has always just seemed to get weirder and more complicated. Even physicists are having to invent 7 extra dimensions to try to understand stuff and its behaviour, which doesn't strike me as being intuitively more reasonable than a volitional agent. Or we could of course presume until further notice that all of it just is and is indeed simply behaving according to its properties - but again, I don't think that presumption could really claim any rational superiority over a theistic alternative.

Nor should we claim the theistic alternative is superior, given the arguments I've presented in this regard. At best we have a tie, while I contend the notion that volition is observed in physical agents, and not in non-physical agents, adds just enough added rationality to break the tie.

Whether or not the term 'physical' should be applied to gravity or time or space or dark energy or strings or this god is not, in my opinion, a useful point for discussion. That's nothing more than the question "Is this god made of the type of stuff we can currently detect with instruments, or a type of stuff which we can't currently detect with instruments?" I agree that most theists would tend towards the latter, but unless you're suggesting that there's no stuff we can't detect - or, alternatively, that measurable detection is the only valid basis for knowledge - as far as I can tell the distinction is irrelevant to EduChris' argument.

We have a rational reason to conclude the universe is made of physical stuff. We then have folks positing an entity that is not physical to have, through volition, created this physical universe. I contend such an argument is not rationally superior to the notion, and to the evidence we have that volition is the product of a physical entity. In this regard then, one might say this volitional agent is physical, but that merely begs the question of what made that physical entity.

As well, this volitional entity would ostensibly have to exist for an eternity in order to create time itself, otherwise, there's a time this volitional entity didn't exist, and all the problems that creates. I contend that if such is the argument for this entity, the most rational thing to conclude is that it's the universe itself that is this volitional entity, where there's physicality, and where there's evidence that there it sits. But that's not what we get, we get an argument that this volitional entity - devoid itself of being created - created the universe. Thus, an irrational argument that discludes this entity from being bound to the very rules it seeks to place on the universe. (Granting, thanks to bernee51, that time is merely a series of nows.)

Notice the typical argument against the universe having existed for an eternity into the past is along the lines of there'd be an eternity before humans are created. I contend such a problem exists for anyone who proposes a volitional agent to have existed eternally into the past, where there'd be an eternity before it decided to create humans. So, with two off-setting arguments, I contend the rational thing to conclude, given that we observe the universe, is that the universe should not be bound to any argument this volitional agent is not bound to as well. If the universe could not have existed eternally into the past, neither could this volitional agent. So then, what caused this volitional agent?

There's also the issue of why disclude the universe having existed in a form prior to what we observe, and how such relates to a volitional agent. Is the universe the very volitional agent expressing itself in physical form? I contend this results in a circular argument, where the evidence we have indicates that volition doesn't occur without physical form to begin with.

Where this volitional agent may be proposed to be expressed as the universe itself, there is it's physicality. But, we have no reason to conclude that volition occurs prior to a physical state. So, where a volitional entity is discluded from the rules and limits placed on the universe, and then to propose this entity created humans is, I contend, less than rational than the explanations I've put forth. Namely, there the universe sits, and here we are, so humans were ostensibly created by the universe, with the mechanisms of chemicals combining to produce life, and evolution then 'acting' to form the human species.

But what created the universe? I propose we may never know, but that the rational argument is that it is the product of its own composition, as relates to the interactions of the various known, and even unknown properties of the universe itself, and whatever may have been in existence prior to the universe itself that would have acted on the 'pre-universe'. Circular? Perhaps. More rational than proposing a volitional agent? I contend so.

[Xian Pugilist]

Xian Pugilist wrote:
Mithrae, you taking your name from the god, or mithradates, one of four persion/greek kings?

Mithra:>>The god. I found it quite ironic that the ancient Indo-Iranian covenant god Mitra would flourish, persist and evolve through stages, including if memory serves being the son and mediator for the one God Ahura-Mazda, to be a major 2nd/3rd century rival to the sect of a Son of God proclaiming a new covenant. <<<

Interestingly enough, originally, centuries before the time of Christ, he was born of a rock in a cave. After Christ was born from a virgin in a cave. And people say Xianity copied him. So many rumors, so little time.

There was an emperor or four named Mithradates, after the God. You should read about them, very interesting.

[ThatGirlAgain]

Xian Pugilist wrote:
Mithrae, you taking your name from the god, or mithradates, one of four persion/greek kings?

Mithra:>>The god. I found it quite ironic that the ancient Indo-Iranian covenant god Mitra would flourish, persist and evolve through stages, including if memory serves being the son and mediator for the one God Ahura-Mazda, to be a major 2nd/3rd century rival to the sect of a Son of God proclaiming a new covenant. <<<

Interestingly enough, originally, centuries before the time of Christ, he was born of a rock in a cave. After Christ was born from a virgin in a cave. And people say Xianity copied him. So many rumors, so little time.

There was an emperor or four named Mithradates, after the God. You should read about them, very interesting.

Mithras was said to be born (fully grown) from a rock under a tree near a river, not in a cave. (Ref). Neither Matthew nor Luke mention where Jesus was born other than the town. Luke has Jesus laid in a manger, which is ambiguous. Jesus being born in a cave comes from the non-canonical Protevangelium of James. (Ref)

[Xian Pugilist]

Xian Pugilist wrote:
Mithrae, you taking your name from the god, or mithradates, one of four persion/greek kings?

Mithra:>>The god. I found it quite ironic that the ancient Indo-Iranian covenant god Mitra would flourish, persist and evolve through stages, including if memory serves being the son and mediator for the one God Ahura-Mazda, to be a major 2nd/3rd century rival to the sect of a Son of God proclaiming a new covenant. <<<

Interestingly enough, originally, centuries before the time of Christ, he was born of a rock in a cave. After Christ was born from a virgin in a cave. And people say Xianity copied him. So many rumors, so little time.

There was an emperor or four named Mithradates, after the God. You should read about them, very interesting.

Mithras was said to be born (fully grown) from a rock under a tree near a river, not in a cave. (Ref). Neither Matthew nor Luke mention where Jesus was born other than the town. Luke has Jesus laid in a manger, which is ambiguous. Jesus being born in a cave comes from the non-canonical Protevangelium of James. (Ref)

the tree by the river rings a bell. What a pathetic god, to have to live in a tree down by the river.

(insert laugh track here)

I knew the more modern version, like 250 years post Christ had the cave and got confuzled I guess.

And, not being catty, but I don't care where Jesus was born, that's one of those little details that people make issue of that don't really matter in regards to the purpose. It's up there with dunk or sprinkle, wine or grape juice, same cup, little multi cups, etc..

[EduChris]

...I'm not so sure if I accept a charge of specificity. Such language seems too subjective...

Firstly, your "acceptance" is beside the point--unless, of course, you're trying to claim that all roads to reason must pass through you. What matters is whether you have any reasonable counterargument.

Secondly, many people--including experts in the relevant fields of science and philosophy--do "accept" that our universe demonstrates a high degree of specificity. Scientists routinely speak of "apparent design," and if our universe were not so amazingly neat and tidy and mathematically elegant, no one would be advocating the multiverse hypothesis as a means of explaining away the design that is apparent in our universe.

...I note also that where I propose a volitional agent would require physicality, you present the physical universe as evidence it doesn't...

My mistake. My standard phrase is, "our universe and our selves."

...Uninteresting is a purely subjective value...

So is "interesting." Still, scientists routinely express their amazement with our universe.

...By who's determination must we consider the universe "organized"?...

Scientists. If our universe were not well organized, science would not be able to study it to any pragmatic advantage.

...where there's something, there's information to be had. Upon considering such, a charge of "information laden" is only dependent on one's ability to investigate...

In a way you are correct. Quantum phyiscs suggests that the "information" available in our universe depends to a large extent upon the questions that we ask, and the observations we make.

...all evidence indicates that consciousness-inhabited would be a product of the brain, a physical form, as expressed through the mind...

I doubt you can demonstrate that our subjective mental experience is a "physical" thing at all. Quantum particles and fields do not possess the qualities that we experience subjectively, including sensations of colors and tastes and sounds and wetness.

...where you declare "didn't have to exist", you are positing a position based on chance, but saying such a position is not warranted...

"Didn't have to exist" implies contingency, and contingencies can be explained either by chance (a lack of explanation) or by volition.

...necessity is the ultimate rule that things act according to their properties. In this fashion then, the universe could be considered "necessary" because of its own (pre-) composition...

And that is your hypothesis, but neither you nor anyone else have any empirical evidence for such.

...Volition. This is the theistic option. In order to rule out this option, we have two options: 1) we could present a very strong argument that our human volition is an illusion, a chimera, an impotent mirage which does not actually cause anything to happen in our universe, wherein absolutely everything derives from chance and/or necessity; or 2) we could present a very strong argument that volition cannot exist in the absence of some highly specific physical substructure (such as our brain)...

...EduChris seemingly accepts that volition can't exist without some physical structure (with apologies if that ain't what he's getting at here)...

I was merely laying out possible options. It should be clear that I do not consider the two options as successful.

...The problem with the "volition-requires-physicality" option is that we don't know this. We can't know this...

I contend this is an argumentum ad ignorantiam, where you propose we can't know it ain't, so therefore it is...

I am simply stating the fact that we are ignorant; and given this ignorance, it seems futile to insist (as many non-theists on this forum do insist) that we have only one rational option which everyone must accept.

...When it comes right down to it, we don't even know what "physicality" is. We sometimes assume that we know, but yet appearances can be deceiving. We are not solid masses, but rather mostly empty space...

...this reeks of a "god of the gaps" argument...

Are you saying that you or anyone knows precisely what "physicality" is? From what I can tell, quantum physics suggests that physical reality may be nothing more than possibility superimpositions waiting to be actualized by the observations and attentiveness of rational agency.

...where we don't know something, some'll insert a god into that gap...

The point is, where we don't know something, we have three options: 1) chance, 2) necessity, or 3) volition. To arbitrarily exclude volition from the mix is to beg the question.

...So any way we look at it, we apparently have some sort of "possibility reservoir" from which our very specific universe became actualized...

I fear the use of "specific" in this sense may be borne of an entity observing such from within. It is a subjective term, even if one may produce objective criteria for determining just how "specific" this universe may be...

I am simply following the lead of science and philosophy here.

...necessity would be understood as stuff acting according to its properties...

We are free to cut our investigation short at any point, starting with the solipcism of our own subjective experience. However, my argument simply goes straight to Non-Contingent Reality, whatever it is, and asks whether we can reasonably exclude volition from NCR. Simply asserting that volition must be excluded is not an argument--though of course your argument is that volition requires "physicality," though you do not precisely define "physicality."

...so the majority of all other universes are amorphous blobs. Here we sit in one that aint. How might such a condition show us the rational take is that a god created humans?...

Given the three possibilities: 1) chance, 2) necessity, and 3) volition, we have to do some analysis. Chance is a lack of explanation, so it should be our last resort. Necessity entails that our subjective mental experience is an illusion; it fails to adequately support a workable worldview; and it ensures that every answer to every question is equally meaningless, since no matter how we might answer a question, neither the question nor the answer nor our subjective assessment of the answer could have been different than they were, whether right or wrong.

...But we have no empirical evidence for these other universes, nor can we have ever have any empirical evidence for them, even in principle, since we don't have the luxury of getting outside our own universe to observe these putative universes...

So then, we discount as irrational a belief in other universes, and sit here wondering my we should consider a god as creating this'n, so by extension, humans...

Again, volition seems the best option, given that "chance" is a lack of explanation, and "necessity" renders meaningless all answers to all questions, while at the same time failing to support an adequate worldview.

...By what rationale should we include volition if we...contend that such is borne [only] of a physical brain (or analogous component)?...

From the standpoint of epistemology, we want to assume no more than we need to. Your assumption that volition is "impossible" entails a greater assumption than that volition is "possible," on the grounds that "possible" is more privative than "impossible."

...volition...is...a component of a physical brain...

You believe (or assume) that subjective mental experience can only arise from a physical brain, and therefore that volition sans physical brain is impossible. My assumption--that volition might constitute part of the warp and woof of necessary reality--is more privative, and hence epistemically preferred.

...Providing for a possibility is not providing for a most rational basis...

From the standpoint of epistemology, "possible" is more privative, and hence preferred, over "impossible."

...This option alone provides the necessary metaphysical framework for the sort of wordview most of us employ in our daily lives. For all of these reasons and more, most people have been, are, and will continue to be, theists...

Argumentum ad populum.

An argument ad populum would go as follows: most people believe X; therefore, X is rational.

My argument has been quite different: there are good reasons to believe X; therefore, this explains why most people believe X.

[EduChris]

...on what basis do you conclude that theism is the default position from volition as opposed to deism...

The most privative assumptions for non-contingent reality are as follows:

1) Not arbitrarily limited in any spatio-temporal dimensions

2) Not arbitrarily limited in causal efficacy

3) Not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle and process information

These assumptions are most privative because they explicitly rule out the sort of arbitrary limitations which would demand some further explanation.

Since there are no arbitrary limitations in causal efficacy, volition must be part of the mix--which in turn entails a being which is not less than personal.

Given that this being is not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle and process information, it seems that this being would know precisely what is best for the contingent sentient beings it had caused to exist. Moreover, since this being is not subject to the arbitrary limitations which (in our experience) underlie all gratuitous harmful behaviors, it follows that this being would not seek to unduly harm us--either by action or inaction.

However, we do see evil in this world which would seem gratuitous if this world were all there is to life. Therefore, we must conclude that this being is either 1) arbitrarily limited in such a way as to allow or compel it to cause gratuitous harm, or 2) using these apparently gratuitous evils to bring about ultimate good, which is experienced in some life beyond this present existence.

In other words, we either have to introduce arbitrary limitations into our conception of non-contingent reality, or else we have to posit an afterlife. All things considered, the afterlife seems less ad hoc than the alternative of positing arbitrary limitations without any means of explaining what those limitations might be. And it is this afterlife which points to theism rather than deism.

[EduChris]

The second problem with the "volition-as-illusion" option is that we have a diffiicult time explaining how evolution could have produced conscious thoughts which have no bearing whatsoever on behavior. Conscious thoughts which do not affect behavior in any way cannot have been built and honed according to adaptive advantage, for the very reason that these conscious thoughts produced no behaviors at all. Thus the "evolutionary accident" explanation for SME seems too ad hoc to be taken seriously, especially since we apparently do use our inner conscious subjective thought life to weigh and evaluate arguments, resulting in specific behaviors every single day.

I suspect this would be a valid argument only against some views. I'm not wholly up to speed on the nuances between epiphenomenalism, emergentism and so on, but I understand that many people consider mental states (SME) to be the same as brain states, but seen from inside. We know that feeling angry is very different from seeing someone yelling and screaming; that being in love is very different from hearing that someone offed themselves because their girlfriend of two weeks was dead. It seems only reasonable to conclude that what we see in neurobiology won't look the same as what the person thinks and feels - but that doesn't mean that they're not ultimately the same thing.

The behaviours which we subjectively associate with conscious thought would therefore be associated with the brain-states which are conscious thought, and therefore be as subject to evolutionary selection as anything else.

I'm thinking of Shallow Hal here. His subjective mental experience tells him his girlfriend is the epitome of physical beauty, whereas the supposed "objective reality" is something quite different. Now beauty is a cultural thing which changes according to time and place, but whatever the cultural standard may be, one's subjective mental experience need not have anything to do with reality. As long as the correct (i.e., adaptive) behaviors follow, subjective mental experience matters not one bit.

That said, we apparently do have some control over our subjective mental experiences, and our subjective mental experiences do seem to make a difference in the world. This tells me that the causal arrow goes in both directions--from the physical to the mental, and vice-verse. And this means that epiphenomenalism is not a complete description of reality, which in turn means that strict materialism is false.

[ThatGirlAgain]

The second problem with the "volition-as-illusion" option is that we have a diffiicult time explaining how evolution could have produced conscious thoughts which have no bearing whatsoever on behavior. Conscious thoughts which do not affect behavior in any way cannot have been built and honed according to adaptive advantage, for the very reason that these conscious thoughts produced no behaviors at all. Thus the "evolutionary accident" explanation for SME seems too ad hoc to be taken seriously, especially since we apparently do use our inner conscious subjective thought life to weigh and evaluate arguments, resulting in specific behaviors every single day.

I suspect this would be a valid argument only against some views. I'm not wholly up to speed on the nuances between epiphenomenalism, emergentism and so on, but I understand that many people consider mental states (SME) to be the same as brain states, but seen from inside. We know that feeling angry is very different from seeing someone yelling and screaming; that being in love is very different from hearing that someone offed themselves because their girlfriend of two weeks was dead. It seems only reasonable to conclude that what we see in neurobiology won't look the same as what the person thinks and feels - but that doesn't mean that they're not ultimately the same thing.

The behaviours which we subjectively associate with conscious thought would therefore be associated with the brain-states which are conscious thought, and therefore be as subject to evolutionary selection as anything else.

I'm thinking of Shallow Hal here. His subjective mental experience tells him his girlfriend is the epitome of physical beauty, whereas the supposed "objective reality" is something quite different. Now beauty is a cultural thing which changes according to time and place, but whatever the cultural standard may be, one's subjective mental experience need not have anything to do with reality. As long as the correct (i.e., adaptive) behaviors follow, subjective mental experience matters not one bit.

That said, we apparently do have some control over our subjective mental experiences, and our subjective mental experiences do seem to make a difference in the world. This tells me that the causal arrow goes in both directions--from the physical to the mental, and vice-verse. And this means that epiphenomenalism is not a complete description of reality, which in turn means that strict materialism is false.

In Shallow Hal Hal’s perceptions about his girlfriend were illusory. His subjective image of her did not cause any change in the physical world. Her panties were still size 6XL. She could still drain an ice cream soda in 3 seconds flat. These were unexpected and thereby slipped by the psychological filters that modified his interpretation of sensory inputs. So his subjective mental experience had no effect on the physical world. This is still compatible with epiphenomenalism.

It is the case that our actions derive primarily from our subjective mental state (without getting into what is conscious or unconscious). And our actions do influence the physical world. But to say that this demonstrates that strict materialism is false assumes that mental states are not strictly material. You may have arguments to legitimately support that contention, but this is not one of them.

[JoeyKnothead]

From Post 36:

Firstly, your "acceptance" is beside the point--unless, of course, you're trying to claim that all roads to reason must pass through you. What matters is whether you have any reasonable counterargument.

Of course I'm not suggesting such must pass through me, except so far as one tries to do it. Are you confident the observer will accept your charge of "specificity" simply because you assert such?

Let's do this...

Please define specificity, and offer examples for analysis.

Secondly, many people--including experts in the relevant fields of science and philosophy--do "accept" that our universe demonstrates a high degree of specificity.

Please present some of these scientists, and / or their arguments in this regard for analysis.

Scientists routinely speak of "apparent design,"...

Unless you present where they do for analysis, I must conclude they use it as a useful term.

and if our universe were not so amazingly neat and tidy and mathematically elegant, no one would be advocating the multiverse hypothesis as a means of explaining away the design that is apparent in our universe.

I don't present such, so fail to see why this has bearing on the OP.

...I note also that where I propose a volitional agent would require physicality, you present the physical universe as evidence it doesn't...

My mistake. My standard phrase is, "our universe and our selves."

I note that even with the change, you still propose that which is physical as some form of evidence for a volitional entity that doesn't (if I understand you) possess physicality itself. As I've said, we have evidence to support the conclusion that volition is a product of a physical entity. Such a conclusion should then lead us to wonder why one proposes some volitional agent as creating the physical universe, and all it contains, while exluding that volitional agent from having been created.

...Uninteresting is a purely subjective value...

So is "interesting." Still, scientists routinely express their amazement with our universe.

Argument from incredulity, aka argumentum ad ignorantiam.

...By who's determination must we consider the universe "organized"?...

Scientists.

Please present these scientists, and / or their arguments for analysis.

If our universe were not well organized, science would not be able to study it to any pragmatic advantage.

My desk is a mish-mash of papers, cds, an ashtray and a couple beer cans on their way to being emptied. I just plop stuff wherever it goes. By looking at my my desk, one could propose "organization" merely on the basis of of picture thereof. Until we can objectively determine what constitutes "organized", I propose we are merely examining a snapshot.

...where there's something, there's information to be had. Upon considering such, a charge of "information laden" is only dependent on one's ability to investigate...

In a way you are correct. Quantum phyiscs suggests that the "information" available in our universe depends to a large extent upon the questions that we ask, and the observations we make.

So we see that the examination of information is dependent on the observer more than any inherent informational value contained in a something. In this regard, I propose the use of information as you propose is merely an act of observation moreso than any inherent information contained within a thing.

...all evidence indicates that consciousness-inhabited would be a product of the brain, a physical form, as expressed through the mind...

I doubt you can demonstrate that our subjective mental experience is a "physical" thing at all.

Stick a screwdriver into the base of someone's skull, jiggle it around there a good bit, and observe the loss of consciousness.

Quantum particles and fields do not possess the qualities that we experience subjectively, including sensations of colors and tastes and sounds and wetness.

I fail to see how quantum particles are relative in discussing the mind / brain connection.

...where you declare "didn't have to exist", you are positing a position based on chance, but saying such a position is not warranted...

"Didn't have to exist" implies contingency, and contingencies can be explained either by chance (a lack of explanation) or by volition.

And volition, as I contend, leads us to the rational conclusion that such mind must be the product of a physical brain, and all the problems that creates for an "uncreated" "volitional agent".

...necessity is the ultimate rule that things act according to their properties. In this fashion then, the universe could be considered "necessary" because of its own (pre-) composition...

And that is your hypothesis, but neither you nor anyone else have any empirical evidence for such.

Then show us empirical evidence for your "volitional agent". Otherwise, I contend, as you've alluded to elsewhere in this site, that our most rational answers should rule the day.

...Volition. This is the theistic option. In order to rule out this option, we have two options: 1) we could present a very strong argument that our human volition is an illusion, a chimera, an impotent mirage which does not actually cause anything to happen in our universe, wherein absolutely everything derives from chance and/or necessity; or 2) we could present a very strong argument that volition cannot exist in the absence of some highly specific physical substructure (such as our brain)...

I was merely laying out possible options. It should be clear that I do not consider the two options as successful.

While I contend that the "most possible" (read most plausible or rational) answer is that a volitional agent must contain physical properties. Such would then throw into question any mention of a volitional agent that doesn't possess physical properties.

I am simply stating the fact that we are ignorant; and given this ignorance, it seems futile to insist (as many non-theists on this forum do insist) that we have only one rational option which everyone must accept.

As you declare the atheist position "absurd".

...When it comes right down to it, we don't even know what "physicality" is. We sometimes assume that we know, but yet appearances can be deceiving. We are not solid masses, but rather mostly empty space...

...this reeks of a "god of the gaps" argument...

Are you saying that you or anyone knows precisely what "physicality" is? From what I can tell, quantum physics suggests that physical reality may be nothing more than possibility superimpositions waiting to be actualized by the observations and attentiveness of rational agency.

I'm saying we can rationally consider physicality because when we hold someone's brain in our hands, we feel it's weight, it's mushiness, it's warmth (if freshly plucked). In this fashion then I propose it is more rational to conclude the physical exists, as opposed to relegating such into the realm of "may be nothing". I contend yours is still an argument from ignorance, where you present "may be", then prefer to posit a volitional agent that can only be deduced, not directly observed, and where volition is shown to be the product of a mind / brain.

...where we don't know something, some'll insert a god into that gap...

The point is, where we don't know something, we have three options: 1) chance, 2) necessity, or 3) volition. To arbitrarily exclude volition from the mix is to beg the question.

While I contend your use above of "may be" is effectively more question begging. We observe that all instances of volition are the product of a mind / brain, and that such is the result of the physical brain. I contend we beg questions when we propose a volitional agent that is neither physical, nor observable.

I fear the use of "specific" in this sense may be borne of an entity observing such from within. It is a subjective term, even if one may produce objective criteria for determining just how "specific" this universe may be...

I am simply following the lead of science and philosophy here.

Science indicates volition is the product of a mind / brain. Yet you hop off the rails and propose a volitional agent that doesn't, comport with the science as we know it. As above, I request you present these arguments as laid out by scientists.

...necessity would be understood as stuff acting according to its properties...

We are free to cut our investigation short at any point, starting with the solipcism of our own subjective experience. However, my argument simply goes straight to Non-Contingent Reality, whatever it is, and asks whether we can reasonably exclude volition from NCR. Simply asserting that volition must be excluded is not an argument--though of course your argument is that volition requires "physicality," though you do not precisely define "physicality."

While I ask why we should reasonably include it, as you define it being a product devoid of physical form and where you propose the physical universe and physical humans are bound to being created by this non-physical volitional agent.

Physicality would be the result of having form, shape, mass, such that no two of anything can occupy the same space at the same time.

...so the majority of all other universes are amorphous blobs. Here we sit in one that aint. How might such a condition show us the rational take is that a god created humans?...

Given the three possibilities: 1) chance, 2) necessity, and 3) volition, we have to do some analysis. Chance is a lack of explanation, so it should be our last resort.

While noting the lack of confirmable mathematical argumentation here, I accept as reasonable that we would disclude chance, if only because here we are.

Necessity entails that our subjective mental experience is an illusion; it fails to adequately support a workable worldview; and it ensures that every answer to every question is equally meaningless, since no matter how we might answer a question, neither the question nor the answer nor our subjective assessment of the answer could have been different than they were, whether right or wrong.

Yet you seem to imply that by necessity, this volitional agent exists.

So then, we discount as irrational a belief in other universes, and sit here wondering my we should consider a god as creating this'n, so by extension, humans...

Again, volition seems the best option, given that "chance" is a lack of explanation, and "necessity" renders meaningless all answers to all questions, while at the same time failing to support an adequate worldview.

While I contend that by proposing a volitional agent that is not bound by what we know of volition - that it is the product of the mind / brain - that you offer just as meaningless an explanation.

From the standpoint of epistemology, we want to assume no more than we need to. Your assumption that volition is "impossible" entails a greater assumption than that volition is "possible," on the grounds that "possible" is more privative than "impossible."

While I contend that your positing volition that doesn't require what we observe to be necessary for it to occur, is to include the assumption that volition exists sans any cause, and that such a proposal is contrary to observation.

I contend that just because something is possible is not a more powerful notion than something is impossible, insofar as neither position tells us if such is actually the case. It's "impossible" for me hop up to the moon, except when I include the "possibility" that I could turn into a giant cricket upon making a wish.

...Providing for a possibility is not providing for a most rational basis...

From the standpoint of epistemology, "possible" is more privative, and hence preferred, over "impossible."

There's where epistemology fails then. Where it assumes that just because something is possible it should be considered more likely, it makes more assumptions than what is warranted. Granted, concluding that because something is impossible, it therefore can't or never has happened is an assumption fraught with problems.

So then, I contend that in this matter, we look at what is observed, which would then be probable, namely, volition is the product of a mind / brain, and that at least in the form of a brain, there must be some physicality in order for volition to exists / occur.

...This option alone provides the necessary metaphysical framework for the sort of wordview most of us employ in our daily lives. For all of these reasons and more, most people have been, are, and will continue to be, theists...

Argumentum ad populum.

An argument ad populum would go as follows: most people believe X; therefore, X is rational.

Which is the implication I took from "most people...will continue to be...". I'll retract my charge if I misunderstood your intent, while noting I don't think I'd be the only one confused about it.

My argument has been quite different: there are good reasons to believe X; therefore, this explains why most people believe X.

I'm still seeing it the other way there, as much as I try not to.

I will still contend that the most rational conclusion to be had here is that this volitional agent, sans creator or physicality that you propose, is not the rational conclusion to be had, based on what we observe regarding volition being a product of the mind / brain.