Arguments for theism without logical fallacies?

[Justin108]

Can ANY argument be made in support of theism that does not rely on a logical fallacy?


A few popular logical fallacies used to support theism include ad populum, appeal to ignorance, appeal to authority, appeal to emotion, begging the question, false dilemma, false dichotomy, non-sequitur, special pleading, tautology, tu quoque, ad baculum, circular reasoning, confirmation bias, excluded middle, proving non-existence, etc.

[Mithrae]

If there's a distinction between deism and theism, it's whether or not the deity in question has an ongoing interest and intervention in the world. The two possible examples of that which I can think of are physical intervention (miracles) and personal intervention (revelation or spiritual experiences). There are many reported occurrances of each of these, both in Christian tradition and in other religions.

Those might be viewed with a little more scepticism than reports of kings and battles, but if it were probable that our universe were designed with a view to producing life, we obviously wouldn't have any reason to view those reports with extreme scepticism..

The fact that there are so many contradictory claims would give reason to doubt. One faith says god did one thing while another faith says different. It's like gossip magazines. If one magazine claims Brad Pitt is a vegan, another claims he loves meat, another claims he's gay, another claims he is a registered sex offender... eventually I would start wondering if a single one of these magazines are telling the truth and without one providing proof, there is no reason I should believe it in favor of another magazine.

Why do they make those different claims? Are they simply making up lies entirely at random? Or is there some discernable pattern which we might to some extent account for in our assessment of their claims? Even secular history (and yes, modern mass media) suffers from the bias and perspective of those on whose reports we must of necessity rely. And sometimes those sources are indeed entirely untrustworthy. But a lot of the time we can account for probable biases and glean some useful information regardless.

Aside from those reports most obviously associated with a particular motivation (eg. God told me to raise taxes and invade this country), I'm not sure that the first-hand reports of divine interaction are all that contradictory or dissimilar in any case. The moral systems of most religions are largely similar for example - don't steal, don't kill, respect your parents, largely summed up in the golden rule and general or specific social/communal order. It is not enough to say that since there are conflicting accounts of, for example, Napoleon's life and actions, all of those accounts are unreliable. Rather we ought to assess those accounts and try to decide which ones are mostly likely to give us the best picture of the reality which they all purport to describe.

And let's suppose for argument sake there is a deistic deity... the world would look the same way it does now: with rules and norms (physics for example) and with these scientific norms, if there is a claim that someone somehow managed to break these rules of physics, that claim would be met with skepticism. Even in a world where God exists, if you claim you have met him or you found a book that was written by him (or per his instructions) then these would still be radical claims that need justification.

Certainly - a claim of greater impact on the normal course of events or a claim which hopes to have a greater impact on the future course of events should both be treated with greater caution. And a claim that I saw a vision of Jesus should be treated with more caution than a claim that I saw a fire truck - visions of Jesus are considerably less common and less readily explained, after all.

But is the vision of Jesus or any other well-known representative of divinity, which involves little impact on the past or future course of events, a particularly radical claim? We might accept that the person had the vision and it was an hallucination, or we might accept that the person had the vision and it was a genuine experience from god. But unless the person is known to be a habitual liar, or is gaining somehow from the claim, or was doing drugs or going through some intense emotional crisis at the time, surely our reservations about the truth of the claim should be quite slim?

The point I'm making is that while it's very unlikely that all such claims are genuine encounters with a deity, it's similarly unlikely that all such claims are delusions or hallucinations. Even regarding visions of Jesus specifically off the top of my head I can think of two such reports which have stuck with me, one from my step-mother (who became a Christian after the experience) and one from Danmark on this forum (who did not). In order for deism (or atheism for that matter) to be the position we adopt, we would need to assume that not only those two but all such accounts are either deliberate falsehoods (as many of them may be) or some kind of delusion or hallucination (as some of them surely are).

But we simply have no evidence that all such accounts fall into those categories, and the mathematics of probability suggests that it becomes increasingly unlikely with each such account we consider.

--

The probability that five reports are a product of delusion or deliberate falsification is obviously lower than the probability that a single report is a product of delusion or deliberate falsification. Therefore the probability that all reported accounts of miracles or revelatory/spiritual experience are false is quite low indeed. Without arbitrarily assigning excessive scepticism to those reports, it must be acknowledged that it's more likely that some of them involved genuine encounters/intervention - in other words that theism is significantly more probable than deism..

The difference is deism is a conclusion reached by logic only (even if it isn't always sound).
Theism is a conclusion based on claims.

I can for example argue that aliens exist due to the vastness of the universe. But to then claim aliens visited me is a claim not reached using logic.


"Therefore the probability that all reported accounts of miracles or revelatory/spiritual experience are false is quite low indeed"
- Why? There are also tons of claims about superstition. One claims a black cat is bad luck while another claims spilling salt is. No matter how many superstitious claims are made, not one is more likely to be true than another.

We all base our beliefs and knowledge on experience, and a very large part of it comes from other people's experience. If those superstitious examples you offered were based on experience - for example someone saw a black cat four times in their life, each time followed within a day by the worst events of their life - we should treat it on its merits accordingly, including reference to any other reported black cat sightings and possible theorized luck association mechanisms

I'm not suggesting that because more people believe something, it becomes more plausible. I'm suggesting that if more people personally experience something, it becomes more probable that at least some of those experiences were genuine. And for that matter, more probable that at least some of those experiences were delusional or otherwise spurious.

Unfortunately a common approach seems to be to put those alleged experiences in an entirely different category - a pre-emptive distinction of 'natural' experiences from the 'supernatural' - and furthermore to point out the accepted delusiona/spurious cases as if they were evidence for the falsehood of all the others also! It really is quite a poor process of reasoning, such as it is

[Justin108]

Why do they make those different claims? Are they simply making up lies entirely at random? Or is there some discernable pattern which we might to some extent account for in our assessment of their claims? Even secular history (and yes, modern mass media) suffers from the bias and perspective of those on whose reports we must of necessity rely. And sometimes those sources are indeed entirely untrustworthy. But a lot of the time we can account for probable biases and glean some useful information regardless.

But if all claims are radically improbable, such as defying the laws of nature, then my skepticism is to be expected. If alternate explanations that do not defy physics can be pondered then Occam's razer dictates them to be more plausible.

Simply put, if someone claims he has observed something that defies the laws of physics then Occam's razor dictates that a more natural explanation, if one can be found, is more likely. In the case of religion I can think of any number of alternate explanations such as misunderstanding of events, delusions, exaggerations, etc. Wouldn't you take the same approach in modern cases? If a man told you that the voices in his head tells him he is God, would you believe him or would you instead consider more plausible explanations?

or maybe they deliberately made false claims in order to control the masses. Surely you can see the benifit of religion in crowd control?

Aside from those reports most obviously associated with a particular motivation (eg. God told me to raise taxes and invade this country), I'm not sure that the first-hand reports of divine interaction are all that contradictory or dissimilar in any case. The moral systems of most religions are largely similar for example - don't steal, don't kill, respect your parents, largely summed up in the golden rule and general or specific social/communal order. It is not enough to say that since there are conflicting accounts of, for example, Napoleon's life and actions, all of those accounts are unreliable. Rather we ought to assess those accounts and try to decide which ones are mostly likely to give us the best picture of the reality which they all purport to describe.

Why do morals have to have a divine origin? I'd say the reason these moral codes coincide is not because they share some divine inspiration but because morality comes from man and not God. Surely you can see that the moral codes that are shared are also reached when using reason.

Secondly, why do we need to assess the accounts to try to decide which ones are most likely true? How do you know ANY of them are true? The way I see it, all these accounts are equally unsupported yet conflicting. I would therefor conclude that none of them is probably true.

But is the vision of Jesus or any other well-known representative of divinity, which involves little impact on the past or future course of events, a particularly radical claim? We might accept that the person had the vision and it was an hallucination, or we might accept that the person had the vision and it was a genuine experience from god. But unless the person is known to be a habitual liar, or is gaining somehow from the claim, or was doing drugs or going through some intense emotional crisis at the time, surely our reservations about the truth of the claim should be quite slim?

A non-habitual liar randomly lying one day is more likely the case than a supernatural occurrence. A person with no history of mental health issues suddenly experiencing an hallucination is more likely than a supernatural occurrence. Statistically, what are the odds of someone who is without a mental health issue experiencing an hallucination? Let's assume it's 1 in a million chance for that. Well winning the lottery has a one in 15 million chance yet when someone wins we do not attribute it to supernaturalism.

All this aside, I go back to the question of what if a perfectly healthy man who is not known as a liar claims to have been abducted by aliens? Would you believe his claim?

In order for deism (or atheism for that matter) to be the position we adopt, we would need to assume that not only those two but all such accounts are either deliberate falsehoods (as many of them may be) or some kind of delusion or hallucination (as some of them surely are).

That would still be more likely than the laws of nature being broken. The mind is a delicate thing.

But let's assume that some of these claims "must be true" - how would you distinguish which are and which aren't? What if all the Jesus visions were false but the Allah visions were real? What if those too were false but the African tribesman who saw his ancestor in a vision is true?

But we simply have no evidence that all such accounts fall into those categories, and the mathematics of probability suggest that it becomes increasingly unlikely with each such account we consider

You're talking as though this happens to every 3rd person on earth. These claims are relatively scarce.

And of those who make the claims, many are from people who simply misunderstand the nature of dreams. TheTruth101 has this idea that every single dream is somehow divine and that when we dream we are temporarily in heaven (or something..) I personally know someone who also has this misconception of dreams. I would not be surprised if a large sum of the people who do claim these visions simply misunderstand or overestimate the importance of their dreams. There are people who see signs in everything. If you were to subtract the people who simply misunderstand the nature of dreams from the larger total of divine claims made by intellectuals then the number becomes less and less.

I'm not suggesting that because more people believe something, it becomes more plausible. I'm suggesting that if more people personally experience something, it becomes more probable that at least some of those experiences were genuine. And for that matter, more probable that at least some of those experiences were delusional or otherwise spurious.

And it is that very experience that tells me the world works one way and not the other.

Experience also tells me that people lie, people see things that aren't there, people often attribute supernaturalism to natural cases, people jump to conclusions, people do not always think rationally, etc.

All these paired with my understanding of how the world works make their claims highly highly unlikely. I am yet to see or hear of a supernatural claim that does not have an explanation that more easily fits into what my experience says reality is like.

Ergo, my experience tells me supernatural claims are most probably false.

[Artie]

So your atheism, in order to reject a creator in the universe, must embrace the statistical impossibility.

There is a proof of a God. Not a single fallacy in it.

So what you are actually saying is that a god had to produce a universe with a diameter of about 29 gigaparsecs (93 Gly or 8.8×1026 m) containing up to a septillion stars and an unknown number of planets to produce one single planet with life on it? I hope they flunked him for wasting resources in life making school. I bet the other students, being gods, just made one planet and put some life on it without having to wait 13.7 billion years for it. The sheer incompetence of it is mind-boggling.

[Mithrae]

But is the vision of Jesus or any other well-known representative of divinity, which involves little impact on the past or future course of events, a particularly radical claim? We might accept that the person had the vision and it was an hallucination, or we might accept that the person had the vision and it was a genuine experience from god. But unless the person is known to be a habitual liar, or is gaining somehow from the claim, or was doing drugs or going through some intense emotional crisis at the time, surely our reservations about the truth of the claim should be quite slim?

A non-habitual liar randomly lying one day is more likely the case than a supernatural occurrence. A person with no history of mental health issues suddenly experiencing an hallucination is more likely than a supernatural occurrence. Statistically, what are the odds of someone who is without a mental health issue experiencing an hallucination? Let's assume it's 1 in a million chance for that. Well winning the lottery has a one in 15 million chance yet when someone wins we do not attribute it to supernaturalism.

All this aside, I go back to the question of what if a perfectly healthy man who is not known as a liar claims to have been abducted by aliens? Would you believe his claim?

I'd consider it a very intriguing piece of evidence - and if ten or twenty people of sound mental, physical and moral health reported similar experiences, with no plausible alternative explanation (eg. sleep paralysis), I'd have to consider it quite strong evidence indeed, though of course questions such as the alleged aliens' motivation would remain pertinent.

You've made numerous references in your post to "the laws of nature being broken" or "a supernatural occurrence" and so on. You seem to have a view about the nature of the universe which I don't currently share. So before we proceed any further, could you explain more clearly what those views about the nature of the universe are and how you reached that conclusion? Specifically, do these 'laws of nature' and the designation of some things as 'supernatural' change with passing centuries? Are you simply talking about the current limits of common (scientific) observation?

[Mithrae]

Since my discussion with Fuzzy Dunlop is more along the lines of arguing in favour of theism (and it certainly doesn't involve arguments for non-theism), I think it's polite to EduChris to move my comments over here from this thread.

Isn't this the genetic fallacy?

No.

You seem to be saying that Santa and God cannot be compared because of the different ways the concepts originated. How is that not the genetic fallacy?

Not quite. Santa actually began based on St. Nicholas. I'm saying that since Santa developed and is currently viewed purely as a concept, we should consider it to be purely a concept. Since theism developed and is currently viewed as an explanatory theory, we should consider it on its merits as an explanatory theory. How is that the genetic fallacy?

You can't prove that God doesn't exist. Unfalsifiable theories by definition cannot be rendered obsolete. The burden of proof is on the theist - to ask for arguments in favour of the default position is the fallacy of shifting the burden of proof.

You can't prove anything with certainty, but I actually mentioned in that very post that LiamOS had posted a potential falsification criterion for theistic theories. I think the burden of proof is on you to show why you think theism cannot be falsified by reasonable criteria.

Why can't God create a universe where consciousness is entirely the product of matter-energy interactions?

Proposing a conscious God > nonconscious matter-energy > conscious humans sequence seems unnecessarily complex, as I commented with regards to traditional Christian god/universe duality. But the reason I think that LiamOS' suggestion is a falsification criterion for theism is because it would undercut the thought/choice phenomena which provide the basis for theistic theories; by otherwise explaining them, it would provide a point beyond which extrapolation from our experience would have been falsified. Why do you think that theism is non-falsifiable in the normal sense of the term, or is that no longer your view?

Theism requires additional assumptions, making it is a less preferable position according to Occam's razor.

I spend a disturbing amount of time thinking about this, so in the spirit of generousity I won't ask you to back up your bare assertion here

Theism which proposes a god/universe duality (as in the case of traditional Christianity for example) does indeed require additional assumptions. But as far as I can imagine the simplest form which any metaphysical theories could take would have to involve both substance and behaviour (and arguably a substrate, or place to be and happen, such as the dimensions of time and space). I explained my thoughts more fully in one of those thousand-word threads you don't much like, so I'd better not give you a link So we might say that the basic substance of reality are the elementary particles - the quarks, leptons and bosons - and the basic behaviour is described by the fundamental interactions - strong and weak nuclear forces, electromagnetism and gravity. Or we might say that the basic substance of reality is one-dimensional strings and/or two-dimensional branes, and the basic behaviour is (I really don't know what M-theory proposes), and the substrate consists of 11 dimensions (or perhaps 26 depending on how you look at it).

But both of those theories propose types of behaviour in addition to the choice which we all know and experience throughout each day, whereas theism does not. Moreover idealism/panentheism - hardly a new type of theory, hailing back to ancient Hindu and Greek philosophy - proposes that the basic substance of reality is thought, and there is an obvious and intimate association between thought and choice: Without choice thought is meaningless, and without thought choice cannot exist.

So we have:
> An option/s which proposes an additional type of behaviour (or, as some would argue, requires negating the type of behaviour which we all experience every day), and a type of substance (physical) which is not obviously or necessarily associated with any particular behaviour at all
> Or an option which extrapolates from our known and experienced type of behaviour, and a type of substance (mental) intimately associated with it (and the most certain thing we can know of our own being; cogito ergo sum)

Which one does Ockham's razor favour, would you say? Or did you have some other theory in mind against which theism requires additional assumptions?

Agnostic atheism. An option which does not assume anything about what the "basic substance of reality" is and does not assume that the experience of "choice" to be some distinct thing or fundamental causal factor.

That's not a theory. According to many folk who identify themselves as such, it's not even a position. Theism is not "a less preferable position according to Occam's razor" than a barebones agnostic atheism which suggests nothing about substance or causation; theism is a position, and agnostic atheism is nothing.

[Justin108]

I'd consider it a very intriguing piece of evidence - and if ten or twenty people of sound mental, physical and moral health reported similar experiences, with no plausible alternative explanation

That's just it. I have never come across a supernatural claim that did not have a plausible alternative explanation

You seem to have a view about the nature of the universe which I don't currently share. So before we proceed any further, could you explain more clearly what those views about the nature of the universe are and how you reached that conclusion? Specifically, do these 'laws of nature' and the designation of some things as 'supernatural' change with passing centuries? Are you simply talking about the current limits of common (scientific) observation?

I am forced to talk about the current limits of scientific observation and while I do not see it as absolute and indisputable, I do see them as most probable as only these findings can be reproduced. Unless that which is not considered a scientific possibility can be shown to be possible, my reason would dictate that either it is something that can happen but for some reason only happened in the Bible (such as water being turned into wine), or I am forced to consider the more likely explanation that the claim was false.

In other words, if something does not conform to our understanding of science then it is either impossible or highly improbable. Either case, a more probable explanation of false claims is more likely.

[Fuzzy Dunlop]

You seem to be saying that Santa and God cannot be compared because of the different ways the concepts originated. How is that not the genetic fallacy?

Not quite. Santa actually began based on St. Nicholas. I'm saying that since Santa developed and is currently viewed purely as a concept, we should consider it to be purely a concept. Since theism developed and is currently viewed as an explanatory theory, we should consider it on its merits as an explanatory theory. How is that the genetic fallacy?

You're suggesting two concepts are incomparable because of the different ways in which the concepts originated. The "currently viewed" caveat doesn't take away from this ("we should consider theism as an explanatory theory because it is currently viewed as an explanatory theory"). The comparison stated that both Santa and God are not falsifiable, and this commonality is not invalidating by contrasting the historical circumstances in which the concepts first came to be believed.

Why can't God create a universe where consciousness is entirely the product of matter-energy interactions?

Proposing a conscious God > nonconscious matter-energy > conscious humans sequence seems unnecessarily complex, as I commented with regards to traditional Christian god/universe duality. But the reason I think that LiamOS' suggestion is a falsification criterion for theism is because it would undercut the thought/choice phenomena which provide the basis for theistic theories; by otherwise explaining them, it would provide a point beyond which extrapolation from our experience would have been falsified. Why do you think that theism is non-falsifiable in the normal sense of the term, or is that no longer your view?

Showing something to be unnecessarily complex doesn't falsify it. We are still left with a gap to put God in even if consciousness is shown to be a purely physical phenomenon, are we not?

Agnostic atheism. An option which does not assume anything about what the "basic substance of reality" is and does not assume that the experience of "choice" to be some distinct thing or fundamental causal factor.

That's not a theory. According to many folk who identify themselves as such, it's not even a position. Theism is not "a less preferable position according to Occam's razor" than a barebones agnostic atheism which suggests nothing about substance or causation; theism is a position, and agnostic atheism is nothing.

Of course it's a position, it's the default position with regard to the existence of gods. It says we do not know and makes no assumptions on the matter either way. Leaving options on the table when evidence is too scant to make strong conclusions one way or the other is more parsimonious than making a series of unproven assumptions or arguments about the existence or nonexistence of God.

[Divine Insight]

One thing I find quite impressive is that the Inflation Theory, originally proposed by Alan Guth, solves the cosmological constant problem precisely, yet that wasn't his reason for proposing the theory originally.

If memory serves The Grand Design (2010) mentions the inflation theory (and probably Guth himself, though I'd need to double-check that) but neither it (nor Wikipedia from what I've glanced over) acknowledge that a solution to the cosmological constant problem has been found. When did this discovery occur if you don't mind me asking, and is it widely acknowledged?

I'm not sure of the exact date that Guth made his realization. Especially in terms of the effects that Inflation would have on the cosmological constant. However I believe he did the bulk of his work in the late 70's early 80's.

His initial concern was to solve a problem called "The Monopole Problem". This has to do with the question of why there are no magnetic monopoles in the observable universe. Due to various ideas he got from attending lectures he came up with this idea of inflation which he could justify as a phase transition of the universe as a whole. The concept of the universe going through various phase transition was already widely accepted in cosmology. But none of them suggested a period of rapid expansion or inflation of the universe.

Guth showed how a phase could exist under the current laws of physics that would produce this type of inflation. And this solved "The Monopole Problem".

However, shorty after that Guth realized that this also solves "The Flatness Problem" as well as "The Horizon Problem".

The Horizon Problem being concerned with why the universe is so homogeneous in every direction we look. (I won't go into that since it's unimportant to the cosmological constant)

The Flatness Problem does, however, have much to do with the cosmological constant. The Flatness Problem is to simply explain why the universe appears to be "flat" in terms of geometry. (In mathematical terms this is the same as asking why the universe is Euclidean in geometry on large scales).

What is needed is a ratio between the mass/energy content of the universe to the cosmological constant to be ONE.

Why should that ration just accidentally be perfectly ONE?

Well, Inflation explains precisely why that would happen. A universe that expands to a very huge size will appear to be "Flat" (which is the same as this ratio being One).

It's similar to why the surface of the earth appears to us to be flat to us as individual humans standing on it (imagine there are no mountains around). The surface appears to be flat out as far as we can visually see.

The reason is simply because it is so big compared to us. And this is basically the same effect that Inflation has with the universe.

So in this sense, this explains why the cosmological constant is what it is.

One reason why some people may claim that the cosmological constant has not yet been explained is because Inflation theory itself has not been confirmed to be a fact. It's still just a theory.

So until Inflation can be shown to be a fact it cannot be said that this problem has actually been "solved".

Inflation theory "solves" the problem, but Inflation theory has not been confirmed to have actually happened. So in that sense it hasn't "solved" anything.

I might add that there are other theories that also solve the cosmological constant problem. M-Theory being one of them. But again, no one can prove that M-theory is any other than a guess.

So while we have some potential plausible explanations for these things, we can't really say that they have been "solved" yet.

Moreover, the cosmological constant is not really constant at all. In fact, current observations suggest that Dark Energy will ultimately rip the universe apart.

This is another thing to consider as well. Not only are we living in a universe that appears to be "fine-tuned" for life, but it also appears that we are living within a very narrow region of time within this universe where life will be possible.

In other words, our universe was not always hospitable to life, nor will it continue to be hospitable to life for very much longer (in terms of cosmological timescales).

That's a good point. I'd appreciate any corrections to my limited knowledge, but I gather that the more complex molecules could only come about after the demise of 1st generation stars (and could only develop into life in orbit around 2nd generation stars). If the universe began some 14 billion years ago and if Earth, which formed some 4-5 billion years ago, was not especially early amongst such possible life-forming planets, we'd have perhaps 6-8 billion years of life-possible circumstances in the universe to date as a rough estimate? I don't know much about predicted futures for the universe as a whole, but our sun is estimated to last another 5 billion years or so (though whether the last billion or two will be life-permitting is dubious). I'd appreciate more information about how narrow this life-possible time-frame really is, but it's a valid point to make.

Well, the actual lifespan of the universe as a whole would be hard to predict since we can't even be sure what it's fate will be. One theory suggest that the universe won't truly be "over" until all black holes completely evaporate. If you take that view, then compared with the lifespan of the entire universe any life that might have existed within the universe would have been a mere blink of an eye compared to the lifespan of the entire universe.

On the other hand, there are theories that suggest that Dark Energy may actually rip the universe to shreds much earlier. Potentially even whilst living things may still exist within it.

So those kinds of predictions are hard to guess at.

But like you pointed out, the universe didn't spring from the Big Bang prepared to create life. It required quite a bit of stellar evolution to occur first. So in that sense, the original Big Bang was clearly not designed to produce life, at least not directly.

Of course for thousands of years Christians have already claimed that this world would pass away and we'd exist in another instead

This is true. But then again, the Eastern Mystics have already proposed the existence of infinitely many universes. In fact, many westerners think of reincarnation as a very simplistic thing where you only become reincarnated back on Earth again. But actually Eastern mystics believe that you can be reincarnated anywhere. Perhaps onto another planet or galaxy within this universe, or into another universe altogether. In fact, time is not even a barrier. So you could be reincarnated into what we think of as the past as you could be reincarnated into the future.

In mysticism time and space are totally irrelevant. For them life is but a dream in the infinite mind of God. There are no limitations concerning what part of the dream you can become next.

Physics is a moot point in mysticism.

Also, I personally don't buy into these "fine-tuning" observations. The reason being is because in a very real sense they are artificial.

What's being imagined is changing a single parameter without necessarily changing other parameters. In other words, they claim that if the strong force were slightly different atomic reactions could not exist as they currently do in our universe (i.e. keeping all the other forces and laws of physics the same).

But is that even a reasonable thing to suggest?

Perhaps the only way that the strength of the strong force could be changed is by changing the very laws of physics themselves. But if that is done perhaps nuclear reactions would unfold and behave in ways totally different from what we observe in our universe.

Another good point, which I'd considered regarding some of the more extreme lists of conditions in the sites Stubbornone has linked to. But again I wonder whether the likes of Stephen Hawking would be likely to fall into such a basic error?

It may be possible that a change in such-and-such parameter of the universe would necessitate a corresponding change in other parameters which would then still permit life-possible conditions. But that doesn't make the list of fine-tuned paramaters artificial, it just leaves open the faint possibility that they are not quite so remarkable as they initially appear.

So there may be three possible alternatives to the fine-tuning argument, one of which we haven't covered yet (though perhaps hinted at in Hawking/Mlodinow's phrase "life as we know it"):
> That a quasi-infinite multiverse renders the improbability of any one universe irrelevant
> That many/most/all possible sets of parameters for a universe could be life-permitting, since changes in one could necessitate changes in others
> That there may be other possible types of 'life,' not requiring complex molecules and planetary orbits, so the improbability of conditions for a certain type of life needn't be important

I agree with all those as having equal potential as possible truths.

I especially like the last one you mention too. There may actually be other lifeforms right here in our own universe that we wouldn't even recognize as being alive.

However I wonder if any of those potential alternatives are open to observation, testability or falsification?

That's what makes science so exciting. You never know what might be discovered next.

One thing I've learned about science (and unfortunately I've learned this way too late in my career) is to not let the idea that you can't prove something stop you from investigating it.

What we often find is that things that seem impossible to test at one point in time may indeed become testable if someone puts enough effort and thought into how they might go about testing it.

Of course even as purely speculative alternatives they do detract at least a little from the weight of any fine-tuning argument.

Well that's the other thing I've learned the hard way.

If an idea is even remotely plausible based on our current understanding of science, then by all means DON'T rule it out!

Being quick to rule things out just because they first appear to be potentially untestable is a really bad habit to fall into.

If it can't be tested, then it can't be ruled out.

[stubbornone]

Complexity with purpose does indicate design. Again, a series of breaches could, though its statistically impossible, indicate a totally random natural occurrence, but it is much more probable that the breaches occurred as the result of a plan. The claim is not simply 'complexity ... blah' its the evidence of purpose in complexity ... complexity achieving results rather than nothing ... and with each link in the complexity needed to achieve a result ... the more improbable that complexity is in random chance rather than design.

If everything in the universe is designed then there is no example of what something non-designed would look like and so it becomes a circular argument.

That is irrelevant to the statistical probability of THIS universe being created. And yes, there are examples of what a none designed universe looks like. Statistically speaking, like most explosions, the Big Bang should have just radiated out into disparate energy. Instead, it somehow coalesces into ... matter. Its one of those events that makes the whole thing so improbable.

Its like a bomb hitting a bridge. If you drop a bomb in the middle of the woods, who cares? But when it hits a bridge ... well, to have such a specific result is highly indicative of planning and targeting. That energy produces matter is a very specific result, and just one step in which probability begins to make you go ... hmmm.

In short, you are not debating, you are coming up with random non-scientific excuses that you clearly haven't even thought through ... all to deny.

And what is the point of asking fro evidence if you aren't even going consider it? Why should anyone treat such rabid denial as 'rational' rather than emotional?

"Everything that exists is designed because if it exists it must have been designed"

No one is saying that except you. I believe I asked you to stop using deliberate strawmen.

Also I would need to know what non-complex would look like. You would have to provide an example thereof for me to be able to contrast complex from non-complex otherwise it is a further fallacious argument.

You could try using the scientific method, as has been done to produce the statistical analysis from the source you clearly have not read. Here are the assumptions you just skipped ...well, a portion anyway, because the entire list is way too long:

Requirements Related to the Universe and Our Galaxy
Correct local abundance and distribution of dark matter
Correct relative abundances of different exotic mass particles
Correct decay rates of different exotic mass particles
Correct density of quasars
Correct density of giant galaxies in the early universe
Correct galaxy cluster size
Correct galaxy cluster density
Correct galaxy cluster location
Correct galaxy size
Correct galaxy type
Correct galaxy mass distribution

You keep asking for things, but you aren't even talking statistics. You have so far ditched both math and the Big Bang in order to do what? Maintain your atheism?

You asked for this, remember?

"Everything is complex because it is more complex than that which is not complex" while "that which is not complex" does not exist since "everything is complex".

Once again, this is your strawman. Your deliberate reduction of an argument into a deliberate oversimplification.

Once again, the bridge example. To blow up the bridge from the air, you need a bomb, a plane, a pilot, an airfield, mechanics, fuel, spare parts, coordinates, etc. That is a complex operation. So when we see a blown bridge, we can either assume like atheists do, that it was just a natural occurrence, or we can look at all the things necessary to blow a bridge randomly rather than by a plan, is astronomically higher ... all of those complex steps needed to drop a bomb make the random chance ridiculously high ... impossibly high.

Its far more likely something was behind the bridge drop, in this case ... the Air Force.

The same principle applies to the universe.

Your strawman, I can only assume was pulled from a random atheist web site rather than by actually addressing the points I am making.

The watchmaker fallacy has been refuted by David Hume as follows:

Design accounts for only a tiny part of our experience with order and "purpose". Furthermore, the design argument is based on an incomplete analogy: because of our experience with objects, we can recognize human-designed ones, comparing for example a pile of stones and a brick wall. But to point to a designed Universe, we would need to have an experience of a range of different universes. As we only experience one, the analogy cannot be applied.

So you did pull it off a random atheist website. Good to know.

And Mr. Hume is wrong. If I see ONE dropped bridge, I can figure out the statistical probability, which Mr. Hume is not even addressing BTW, of whether the drop was natural or induced. I don't need to see 17 dropped bridges to know what happened.

Take the I-90 bridge collapse (which did not result from explosion) in Minneapolis a few years back. Did we need to see a dozen other collapsed bridges to determine that it was mechanical failure that caused it?

When we come across a crime scene, so we need to see other crimes in order to determine the likely cause?

Its simply looking for an excuse to deny, and doesn't even deal with the MATH, it deal with design.

If you read the entire paragraph, you would note that I needn't disagree with the Big Bang to support my point.

If you are claiming that the universe is infinite, you are disagreeing with the Big Bang. The universe might be infinitely large (which is incorrect, its still expanding which means it must be expanding somewhere) has no bearing on the math whatsoever.

Its another excuse to deny.

Deism is very much relevant since if you recall me specifying in my OP aswell as later on in my discussion, I specifically asked for arguments for THEISM in contrast to DEISM. That's what the OP is about: arguing for THEISM

.

Once again, for a guy who complains about his points not being read, you seem oddly content to ignore massive portions of argumentation. Whether a god stops caring after creation (deism), is irrelevant to the probability of design. It really is that simple.

I am sure you think its a good excuse, but simply screaming 'deism' has no bearing on MATH.

Again I stress it is a scientific theory and theories can be questioned. There is a difference between theory and fact. But if you persist in believing a theory is as good as a fact then the Big Bang paired with abiogenesis and evolution would make theism obsolete.

Once again, you are simply using an argument from absurdity. You are picking and choosing scietific theories in a clear case of confirmation bais, rather than looking at the whole.

Abiogenesis only adds to the probability issue, for all the step to occur ... from an explosion, only adds to the probability problem making it even more unlikely that it was just random chance.

You clearly have not thought this through, and given your religious bias and its clear effect on the scientific material, I don't think you intend to.

You're the one who pulled off the statistical argument off some apologist website. Hypocritical much? But anyway; the only thing I got from Google thus far is David Hume's refutation of the watchmaker fallacy but there is nothing wrong with having sources for your arguments. You had all the right to get your statistics online. I refuted it anyway.

Not only id Mr. Hume rebutted, but we have the emotionalism of "It's from a Christian Website!" Indeed, 'I' am Christian, therefore you can ignore me at will? Why indeed did you bother coming to a Christian Website if your biases are so strong and compelling you cannot even acknowledge the countering points?

You have refuted nothing. One of us is talking statistics, the other is not. It really is that simple.

Once again, atheists claim they are driven by evidence, two points:

#1 - your entire argumentation is about attempting to poke holes in a SINGLE piece of analysis that points toward God ... and we haven't even gotten to a comprehensive look have we? You are literally doing cheetah flips over ONE ANALYSIS.

#2 - You offer no evidence in support of your own contention that the universe is the result of random processes.

In short, your atheism is about denying at any cost, not science, not analysis, not reason. It is, as it always is when prideful atheists demand evidence, all about finding a reason to deny .. not matter how superfluous the reasoning might be.

Its why I left atheism.

[stubbornone]

That's just it. I have never come across a supernatural claim that did not have a plausible alternative explanation.

"1)Lisa Larios: Cell Sarcoma of the right Pevic bone.

Larios didn't know she had cancer. She had developed a great deal of pain in her pevis and was confined to a wheel chair, but the doctors had not found the evidence of the tumor at the time her mother took her to hear Kulhman. Yet, when Miss Kulhman said "someone over here is being healed of cancer, please stand up" she stood up without knowing why. She had already started feeling a strange heat in that area and had ceased to feel pain. She went up onto the stage and walked around without pain. She was than "slain in the spirit" which is that odd thing when the healer places his/her hand on the forehead and the person falls over in a faint. It took some time to receive the next set of x-rays becasue she only learned after the meeting some days latter that she had cancer. Than the next set of x-rays showed vast and dramatic improvement. It would still be some time,almost a year, before her pelvis was completely resorted. But she did return to full health. The Catholics wouldn't except this miracle because it could be confussed with a normal remission. The power of suggestion can be ruled out because the heat started before she was called to the stage, and because she didn't even know she had cancer, but responded to a call for healing of cancer. The first dramatic improvement which was immediate within a few days, and walking on the stage is not characteristic of remission. Casdroph has the medical evidence from several hospitals to which she had been taken."

http://christiancadre.blogspot.com/2009 ... acles.html

There are several more in that source alone.

"The ceremony, which awes the souls of Christians, takes place in the Church of the Resurrection in Jerusalem. The date for Pascha is determined anew for every year. It must be a first Sunday after the spring equinox and Jewish Passover. Therefore, most of the time it differs from the date of Catholic and Protestant Easter, which is determined using different criteria. The Holy Fire is the most renowned miracle in the world of Eastern Orthodoxy. IIt has taken place at the same time, in the same manner, in the same place every single year for centuries. No other miracle is known to occur so regularly and so steadily over time. No other miracle is known to occur so regularly and so steadily over time. It happens in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, the holiest place on earth[2], where Christ was crucified, entombed, and where He finally rose from the dead."

http://www.holyfire.org/eng/

I think we can simply write off the quoted statement as confirmation bias, or an expression of faith ... that everything MUST have an explanation, and so we ignore that which doesn't confirm our faith choice.