If God wants to destroy evil...

[Zarathustra]

God created everything that has been, is, and is going to be in existence. He created the Earth and the Heavens. He created the Lake of Fire in which he casts sinners. He created Good, and He created evil. Does not the old adage says "I have created you, and so can I destroy you"?

If God wanted to, couldn't He, in theory, destroy evil with no need for the battle of the apocalypse?

[spetey]

Okay, then, at this point I'd like to shift to discussing this issue with QED who debates much more pleasantly and not so vehemently. QED, do you mind pursuing this discussion that physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility as it relates to the PoE? I would like to explore this topic with someone who would approach the topic without being so vehement.

If not, then maybe someone else (e.g., ST88, NGR, Curious, etc.). I think the topic is well worth exploring.

How very suspicious that you don't think it's "worth exploring" with someone who has given you knock-down reasons against the position, and who is no longer happy to just let this kind of bluffing slide. Harvey, you have made some outrageous claims--that "physical possibility supervenes on logical possibiliy" and (even worse) that "the physical supervenes on the logical". If you could just give some reasons for this claim (reasons that if actually good would stand thousands of years of philosophy on its head), I would stop hounding you.

And if you can't give reasons to support these claims to me, why would you magically be able to give such reasons to QED or anyone else? If QED isn't as confident with the word 'supervenience' as I am, and thus doesn't himself see how obviously false your claims are, does that mean your view is right? Whether or not you like the source of the reasons, I have given good strong reasons to think these claims are just false. I have pointed out the absurdities they would imply. I have even given a fairly rigorous proof from the underlying logic of supervenience--a proof that you confess you don't understand but nonetheless, suspiciously, blithely assume must be wrong. I honestly don't know what else I can do to convince you that what you're saying is just nonsense, and not "an idea worth exploring".

I am vehement because it is maddening that you make such an outrageous claim, one that--I'm sorry--you obviously just don't understand, and then when confronted with the idea that the claim is wrong (gently at first, but with ever-increasing "vehemence"), you stick by it without being able to give any reason for it or any response to the arguments against it. You know such unreasoned dogmatism drives me nuts.

Part of my vehemence comes from the fact that this is a tiresome pattern with you, Harvey. I have politely let you get away with this kind of behavior for months now. You latch on to these arcane theories that have nothing to do with the subject at hand, and that you clearly don't understand well, but you are sure prove you're right. First there was evolution, and your "evolution of ideas" somehow proving God exists. Then there was your brief stint with (what you thought was) "Tarskian semantics". There was the "physicalism" debacle, oh and the "naturalism" debacle before that. Recently there was your horrid abuse of information theory. There was your misunderstanding of the term "a priori" that went on for weeks. There was your insistence that quantum entanglement demonstrated "intent". There's the current stuff over "supervenience" and "interpretationalism" and "holism". I'm probably forgetting twenty others. In each case I would patiently explain how the terms you use clearly don't mean what you think they mean, and instead of admitting that maybe you didn't quite know what was going on and asking for further explanation, or instead of explaining to me how actually I was wrong and giving reasons for the view I'd challenged, you would drop that theory like a hot potato. After all, it wasn't doing the magic you hoped it would, and you were actually asked to justify the position. Then of course you would move on to the next shiny toy, as though that one surely must be the magic theory to prove God exists--and with never a hint that maybe you had taken a misstep in one of your views. In each case I just let it slide, without pointing out that suddenly and without a word you've dropped a claim you clinged to so surely in the past.

It's a long-standing pattern, as I say, and I'm sorry, I've finally gotten fed up with it. I'd like to hear you say, just once, that actually, your claim was mistaken, that you don't actually have complete command of the concept of supervenience, and that there is no reasonable way to support the claim that "the physical supervenes on the logical". (Or that physical possibility can "supervene on" logical possibility and yet be two separate notions.)

QED, and any others--of course you are welcome to humor Harvey's claim if you like. But I urge you to learn the word 'supervenience' for yourself, study it and make sure you're confident with it on your own, before you take anything Harvey says about it on face value. Try the free Stanford Encyclopedia article. It's a hard article, and a difficult concept. I don't know what else I can do to show Harvey that he doesn't understand it (given how he uses it). And given Harvey's stubborn dogmatism, I can't be optimistic you could do it either. After all, what more than an unanswered, unchallenged proof from definitions can one do?


spetey

[harvey1]

Spetey,

Well, I have an entirely different take on the subject. A take that sees you giving up on a number of your arguments and leaving threads where your arguments were failing.

But, let's not leave on poor terms. Obviously your vehemence is going to stop you from providing an enjoyable experience for both of us, so let's leave it at that. Good luck Spetey. If you decide to change your approach then I'm happy to pick up our discussions again at any time. I've enjoyed your arguments and I appreciate the time you took to explain your ideas.

Best Wishes, Harvey

[QED]

No. I want to tell the ten year old that God is Davidson's omniscient interpreter

This is the very problem that I'm talking about. I don't think that Davidson Tarski and Quine make suitable reading for ten year-olds. Human language is suited to human expression but it can quickly run into trouble when attempting to capture the subtleties of the external world. Davidson himself expressed regret at coming up with the example of the omniscient interpreter which he dropped in his later discussions preferring to talk about the notion of triangulation instead.

With all due respect to the learned company here, I regret to say that the intense web of philosophy strikes me as being a potential 'Tarot deck' for those who wish to give their own particular reading. This is why I look for an account wich is accessible on face value. A ten year-old is quite capable of grasping the concepts of special and general relativity, such is it's connection (albeit beyond our daily experience) to the real world. Given that the PoE is not resolvable at this sort of level, it suggests to me that we are being presented with an awkward rationalization.

[harvey1]

This is the very problem that I'm talking about. I don't think that Davidson Tarski and Quine make suitable reading for ten year-olds...I regret to say that the intense web of philosophy strikes me as being a potential 'Tarot deck' for those who wish to give their own particular reading. This is why I look for an account wich is accessible on face value... Given that the PoE is not resolvable at this sort of level, it suggests to me that we are being presented with an awkward rationalization.

I'm sure there are ways to present the material in ways that don't require the "intense web of philosophy," however there is great explanatory power to looking at a theory of interpretation as it relates to the beginning of the world. In any case, I think I can demonstrate that an atheist position on the PoE is answerable given the various interpretations that would exist "out there." Of course, if someone doesn't even want to consider it, but just conclude they are right from the beginning because it doesn't match up with how they prefer to see the world, nothing can be done.

But, please understand, most theists see this as reason to reject the atheist perspective especially when atheists just won't consider the theist perspective.

[spetey]

Hullo again!

Well, I have an entirely different take on the subject. A take that sees you giving up on a number of your arguments and leaving threads where your arguments were failing.

I'm sure that is your "take". When you have the luxury of forming your beliefs without needing to justify them or give reason for them, your "take" on anything can be whatever tickles your fancy. So not only can your "take" on Davidson be that "the physical supervenes on the logical" with no reason whatsoever, you can also "take" it that "spetey's arguments are failing" with no reason. (Of course you are careful not to mention which of my arguments you consider to have been failing. Naturally I suspect you daren't mention one for fear that I'll actually give my argument, and make you justify the opposing position again.)

If you decide to change your approach then I'm happy to pick up our discussions again at any time.

No, sorry; my approach will continue to be to ask for reasons for controversial claims. I know it makes you uncomfortable, but I just don't see how debate makes sense without this approach, and I don't see myself giving this approach up. As long as you want to maintain a claim like "the physical supervenes on the logical", I'll be asking you to give reasons for it, and I'll continue giving my reasons against it. I'm sorry if my insistence on reasons means you just don't see yourself debating with me further. But again, I urge you: If you can't give reasons to me, think carefully and honestly with yourself. Are you sure you have reasons, if you can't provide them? If you're not sure you have reasons for your controversial claims, are you sure it's a good idea to continue believing them anyway?

I've enjoyed your arguments and I appreciate the time you took to explain your ideas.

Thanks, that's gracious of you to say. When you have explained your ideas, I have appreciated that too.

With all due respect to the learned company here, I regret to say that the intense web of philosophy strikes me as being a potential 'Tarot deck' for those who wish to give their own particular reading.

It doesn't have to be that way, QED. Good philosophy is a precise dialog where people insist as a groundrule for reasons to defend their controversial takes and "interpretations", and where people use technical terms only because they understand them well, not because they sound impressive.

That said, I agree that technical philosophy is not likely to be appropriate here. Remember, my initial argument (and my response to Harvey's response to this argument, for example) used no technical terms. When Curious asked for a summary of "the point" so far, I gave it, and used no technical terms. The Problem of Evil as I have presented it is completely accessible to a 10-year-old; indeed, at about 10 years old the PoE is a big reason why I started to become an atheist. It is Harvey who insists on using words like "supervene" and "interpretationalism" and "omniscient interpreter". That would be bad enough if he actually did know these terms well, or gave them up when pointed out that perhaps he doesn't have a complete grasp of them after all. But his unreasoned, undefended insistence on them is what gives you the unfortunate impression that philosophy is just a bunch of big words used any way anyone pleases. But QED, please don't judge the field of philosophy by its use at Harvey's hands!


spetey

[harvey1]

Hello again,

No, sorry; my approach will continue to be to ask for reasons for controversial claims. I know it makes you uncomfortable, but I just don't see how debate makes sense without this approach, and I don't see myself giving this approach up. As long as you want to maintain a claim like "the physical supervenes on the logical", I'll be asking you to give reasons for it, and I'll continue giving my reasons against it. I'm sorry if my insistence on reasons means you just don't see yourself debating with me further. But again, I urge you: If you can't give reasons to me, think carefully and honestly with yourself. Are you sure you have reasons, if you can't provide them? If you're not sure you have reasons for your controversial claims, are you sure it's a good idea to continue believing them anyway?

Spetey, I would never ask you to believe my arguments without good reason to believe them. What I want to eliminate is your vehemence which you have admitted that you now have toward me. That's not a good situation to be engaged in a debate since it takes all the fun out of it in having these kinds of discussions. Besides, I think you're not enjoying yourself either. Why else would you possibly be here debating with me unless you were having fun doing so? Let's have fun here and treat it as fun (not at the expense of others having fun). Okay? That's all that I ask. This means keeping your challenges non-provocative. I shouldn't have to respond to your points as you are responding to my points. (E.g., "that's weird," "oh my," "I'm fed up," "Please don't quote others to express your points," etc.). We should abide by the forum rules not only in the letter but in the spirit as well.

Honestly, I really like you, and I hope that you can somehow like me. There's no reason that having two vastly different conceptual schemes should separate us to the point of expressing hostility to each other. Of course, we all have our frustrations and that can sometimes leak through in our comments. We are all human.

[spetey]

Harvey, there are many things I admire about you, but your insistence on using technical theories as "magic wands" is definitely not one of them. I do not mean to express hostility toward you, but I do stand vehemently opposed to any style of debate that refuses to engage in reason.

Spetey, I would never ask you to believe my arguments without good reason to believe them.

Harvey, you have been asking me (and others) to believe your claims (no arguments, yet, as you admit!) without providing any defense of them for something like 15 posts now. All along I have asked for these reasons, and you have not given them; I don't know how many more chances I can give you. Please, for at least the fourth time now: either admit you are mistaken to claim that "physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility", or give your reasons for this claim and respond to my reasons against it. And for at least the eighth time now: either admit you are mistaken to claim that "physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility but the notions are distinct", or give your reasons for this claim and your responses to my reason against it (including the proof, which stands as a reason whether or not you happen to understand the technical language you insisted on speaking).


spetey

[harvey1]

Harvey, you have been asking me (and others) to believe your claims (no arguments, yet, as you admit!) without providing any defense of them for something like 15 posts now. All along I have asked for these reasons, and you have not given them; I don't know how many more chances I can give you. Please, for at least the fourth time now: either admit you are mistaken to claim that "physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility", or give your reasons for this claim and respond to my reasons against it. And for at least the eighth time now: either admit you are mistaken to claim that "physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility but the notions are distinct", or give your reasons for this claim and your responses to my reason against it (including the proof, which stands as a reason whether or not you happen to understand the technical language you insisted on speaking).

My last 15 or so posts have been directed toward changing the tone of this debate so that I don't start responding to you as you have been responding to me. For example:

Okay. <another deep breath> That wasn't civil.

This has to stop! Otherwise you are entirely at fault for the way this thread has deteriorated. Okay? You can't blame me for not giving reasons when I get this incessant reaction from you. Please understand.

This is no good for either of us. However, in the hope that this turbulence is behind us, I will respond to your post.

1) Spetey's Proof: Please rephrase your proof without referring to modal logic. You can talk about possible universes, and you can introduce an accessibility relation if you define in it non-modal logical terms so that I can understand why you think your argument is a proof.

2) Spetey's response (in green):

2. There's a large collection of true logical statements Is this a premise, or what? I'm guessing, a premise.
3. Theorems form based on those various sets of those laws I guess by "theorems form ..." you mean that theorems can be derived given logical laws... is that right? It's pretty obscure, but if that's what you mean, then I agree; given axioms and logical laws, we can indeed derive theorems.
4. There's a large collection of theorems Are you pointing this out, like by looking at math journals? Are you stipulating we pick some arbitrary set of theorems? Why do you make this claim, and how does it form part of an argument?
5. Combining multiple theorems you have an interpretation This is a completely nonstandard use of the word 'interpretation'. What do you mean by "combine" here? You mean any set of theorems is an interpretation? Is {Fermat's Last Theorem, The Four-Color Theorem} an "interpretation" on this idiosyncratic account?
6. For the same set of multiple theorems, there may be more than one interpretation for the same set, ... note that this contradicts the most charitable reading of your immediately previous claim that a collection of theorems determines the interpretation; if that's not what you meant, then you have completely failed to specify what you mean by "interpretation"... perhaps an innumerable set of interpretations for the theorems
7. A collection of interpretations for the same set of theorems forms a physical constraint So interpretations are collections of theorems, and collections of interpretations--collections of collections of theorems--are a "physical constraint"? So for example the set of sets {{Godel's incompleteness theorem, Fermat's Last Theorem}, {The Four-Color Theorem, The independence of the AoC theorem}} is a "physical constraint"?
8. The physical constraint has a range of indeterminancy due to the different interpretations that exist for that constraint Again you contradict the most charitable reading of your immediately previous claim. If the physical constraint just is a collection of interpretations then you can't vary the interpretations without varying the constraint (and thus there are no "different interpretations" for that constraint).
9. Outside the range of indeterminancy, the interpretations of the theorems all agree, ... in other words, outside the range of possible interpretations that make up the physical constraint, the (presumably impossible) interpretations agree? What does "agree" here, and what interpretations could be outside the range of possible interpretations? ... hence situations that apply outside the indeterminate range, the logical implications of the interpretations are necessary ... so "hence" the impossible interpretations are necessary? (That is, the interpretations true in no possible world are true in every possible world?)
10. God decides on the range of indeterminancy based on holistic considerations (as an omniscient interpreter) Putting aside the highly obscure notions of "indeterminacy", which make this sentence highly mysterious ("God decides on the range of sets of theorems which determine the 'physical constraint' that is one collection of interpretations"??) this sounds a lot like you're saying God decides what can happen and what can't, and is thus responsible for all that happens after. It also, of course, sounds like a simple assertion about God's powers, rather than any kind of argument.
11. If God judges a situation such that the situation is outside the range of indeterminancy, then God cannot stop the necessary effects of ( 8 ) If there are necessary effects, then to say God judges a situation is "outside the range of indeterminacy" (in this case, and contra your earlier "definitions") seems to say that God judges something is impossible. (And why not just say that?!)
12. If God judges a situation such that the situation is inside the range of indeterminancy, then God can stop the necessary effects of ( 8 ) since there is no necessary law that requires ( 8 ) to be in effect in this indeterminate range Here you say that God can stop what's necessary; that is, it is possible to stop what is impossible to stop. This is a logical contradiction--is it something you stand by? Or is it your claim that it's only necessary in certain possibilities? If so, then you again merely claim that God judges something possible--and why not just say that?
13. The 2004 tsunami was a consequence of (10)In other words, God judged it was impossible to stop.
14. The 50 other tsunamis that did not happen in 2004 was a consequence of (11) (i.e., it was possible for God to stop the tsunami so those 50 tsunamis did not happen) In other words, other times God judged it was possible to stop.

Most importantly: notice that this isn't an argument. In effect you merely assert, after many confused preambles with obscure terms, that it was impossible for God to stop the 2004 tsunami, but it was possible for God to stop other tsunamis. How does this show that God could both choose and not choose to stop the 2004 tsunami (the claim you attempted to defend)? How does it use or support the claim that physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility?

Is this a premise, or what? I'm guessing, a premise.

Yes. This is a premise.

I guess by "theorems form ..." you mean that theorems can be derived given logical laws... is that right? It's pretty obscure, but if that's what you mean, then I agree; given axioms and logical laws, we can indeed derive theorems.

Yes, I mean theorems are derived.

Are you pointing this out, like by looking at math journals? Are you stipulating we pick some arbitrary set of theorems? Why do you make this claim, and how does it form part of an argument?

It's not a formal argument, but it is a cryptic means by which to understand the underlying structure of the world.

Harvey: Combining multiple theorems you have an interpretation This is a completely nonstandard use of the word 'interpretation'. What do you mean by "combine" here? You mean any set of theorems is an interpretation? Is {Fermat's Last Theorem, The Four-Color Theorem} an "interpretation" on this idiosyncratic account?

No. Okay, sorry to drive you bonkers, but now I want to start re-constructing Davidson quotes (don't pay attention to the fact these are Davidson words):

Tarski's work on truth definitions for formalized languages serves as inspiration for the kind of theory of truth that is wanted for [the language of physical laws:: replacing the term "natural languages"]... An important feature of Tarski's approach is that a characterization of a truth predicate 'x is true in L' is acceped only if it entails, for each sentence of the language L, a theorem of the form 'x is true in L if and only if ...' with 'x' replaced by a description of the sentence and the dots replaced by a translation of the sentence into the language of the theory. It is evident that these theorems, which we may call T-sentences, require a predicate that holds of just the true sentences of L.... These remarks are only roughly correct. A theory of truth for a [language of physical laws:: replacing the term "natural language"] must relativize the truth of a sentence to the circumstances of utterances [or effects of the laws in nature], and when this is done the truth conditions given by a T-sentence will no longer translate the described sentence... What a theory of truth does for [the language of physical laws:: replacing the term "natural language] is reveal structure... When we study terms and sentences directly, not in light of a comprehensive theory, we must bring metaphysics to language; we assign roles to words and sentences in accord with the categories we independently posit on epistemological or metaphysical grounds.(D. Davidson, "The Method of Truth in Metaphysics," 1977

So, I'd like to call these theorems as T-sentences, and these T-sentences provide the structure for the natural laws. This is a platonic rendering of the laws of physics. It's why there is a strong relationship between mathematics (T-sentences) and the language of physics. The laws share the structure of these T-sentences. However, since there is a translation problem going from T-sentences to the language of physics, there arises an interpretation issue. Hence, the theorems of reality must be interpreted for application in the real world.

Okay, I guess that's enough for now. No sense in going further if you find this totally absurd.

[spetey]

It's not a formal argument, but it is a cryptic means by which to understand the underlying structure of the world.

Well, in case I haven't made it abundantly clear by now, what I'd like is an argument. I'd like some reasons that support your controversial claim. Your "cryptic means" to "understand the underlying structure of the world" have no argumentative force. You cannot settle a controversial matter by appealing to non-shareable "cryptic means" for your claim. It is just another form of dogmatism. Otherwise, for example, racists could support their controversial claims by their own "cryptic means" to "understand" the world.

No. Okay, sorry to drive you bonkers, but now I want to start re-constructing Davidson quotes (don't pay attention to the fact these are Davidson words):

Okay. You have quoted Davidson (though you know perfectly well it will drive me bonkers to pull out yet another wand you claim will do magic). Again, based on your reading of this passage (for example, the apparently nonsensical claim that "these T-sentences provide the structure for the natural laws"), I challenge your understanding of this passage. And I think we have agreed that we should only quote passages that we understand, right? (You do agree with this principle, right?) So show me you understand this passage by giving it to me in your own words, or else drop the (controversial) claim that you understand this passage and how it supports your other claims.

Meanwhile:

Please, for at least the fifth time now: either admit you are mistaken to claim that "physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility", or give your reasons for this claim and respond to my reasons against it. And for at least the ninth time now: either admit you are mistaken to claim that "physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility but the notions are distinct", or give your reasons for this claim and your responses to my reason against it (including the proof, which stands as a reason whether or not you happen to understand the technical language you insisted on speaking).

Yes, this above passage will repeat (with increment in the counters) until you have complied with the requests for exactly your claims quoted above (and not for "T-sentences provide the structure for the natural laws" or whatever new shiny toy you have found and abused).

And incidentally, to ask for a proof regarding formal modal notions like 'supervenience' (notions you insist on using) that doesn't use the meaning of the term 'supervenience' in formal modal notions is exactly like asking to prove Fermat's last theorem without math. Again, see the SEP article. Notice how it uses lots of modal logic to specify the meanings of its claims? That's because it's the only precise way to specify what is meant. To the extent you don't understand these formal notions, you thereby don't understand 'supervenience'. Similarly, to the extent you don't understand partial derivatives and such, you just don't understand something like Hamiltonian operators in quantum mechanics.

Of course I have also given informal reasons against your claims too, though, such as the various absurdities they would imply. You can start there if you like. Indicate how physical claims can follow necessarily from purely logical postulates, for example.


spetey

[harvey1]

Your "cryptic means" to "understand the underlying structure of the world" have no argumentative force.

At this stage, let's just get through the underlying structure. We can discuss the argument later. Since you challenge every little phrase, and every little quote, this will take months to go through this conceptual structure that I'm proposing.

Otherwise, for example, racists could support their controversial claims by their own "cryptic means" to "understand" the world.

Sure, and that's true. The difference though is that I'm setting up what I believe to be acceptable premises.

Okay. You have quoted Davidson (though you know perfectly well it will drive me bonkers to pull out yet another wand you claim will do magic). Again, based on your reading of this passage (for example, the apparently nonsensical claim that "these T-sentences provide the structure for the natural laws"), I challenge your understanding of this passage.

Don't worry about how I interpret that passage. If you have questions about a specific meaning of what I said, then please ask. I won't repeat what I just said. The text should be treated as my words and not someone else's words.

And I think we have agreed that we should only quote passages that we understand, right?

Ideally, yes, but from your perspective all that is required for you to do is remove the quotation marks. They are only in there for ethical and legal reasons.

Please, for at least the fifth time now: either admit you are mistaken to claim that "physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility", or give your reasons for this claim and respond to my reasons against it.

If T-sentences (which provide us with what is logically possible) provide the structure for sentences in L (which provide us with what is physically possible), then sentences of L reside upon (i.e., supervene) on T-sentences in that:

[physical possibility] is not reducible to [logical possibility], every [physical possible event] can be paired with some [logical possibility] — that is, every [physical possible] description of an event can be paired with a [logically possible] description... This leads... [to speaking] of the [physical possible] as ‘supervening’ on the [logical possible] in a way that implies a certain dependence of [physical possible] predicates on [logical possible] predicates: predicate p supervenes on a set of predicates S ‘if and only if p does not distinguish any entities that cannot be distinguished by S’... Put more simply, [phenomena] that cannot be distinguished under some [logical possible] description cannot be distinguished under a [physical possible] description either. (re-constructed from the Stanford encyclopedia article on Davidson, this is not a quotation but a recompilation of a quote by substituting certain terms)

"physical possibility supervenes on logical possibility but the notions are distinct", or give your reasons for this claim and your responses to my reason against it (including the proof, which stands as a reason whether or not you happen to understand the technical language you insisted on speaking).

The articles I provided on what Davidson meant by supervenience is not shown in technical language. So, please provide your proofs in the same language that I provided to you in telling you how the use term can be meant (i.e., as it was provided to you by me).

Yes, this above passage will repeat (with increment in the counters)

Spetey, why are so rude like this?? Don't you believe that we are having a friendly discussion? Don't you know I don't want an unfriendly discussion with anyone? Please, stop with this kind of hostile reaction. I was proceeding on the assumption that you would be friendly in your posts from that point. If you haven't agreed to this request, then let's stop now. Otherwise, I will reply in full in kind and I don't want to be that way with you. Besides, the moderators would quickly start issuing warnings to us.

Stop being rude! Please.