Ephesians 2:10

[JoeyKnothead]

From Post 9 here:

Ephesians 2:10 (For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them.)

I think you have a poor conclusion here. I don't see your point connected to the verse. Let me go a bit further in this verse for you to comprehend. It said " For we are his workmanship" Human is created by a creator.
...

My emboldenizationin'.

For debate:

Is the notion that we are created by a god the most reasonable and rational conclusion to be had?

[EduChris]

From Post 36...Are you confident the observer will accept your charge of "specificity" simply because you assert such?...

Not because I assert such; rather, because scientists and philosophers of all stripes--theist or non-theist--accept that our universe exhibits specificity. This is not a particularly contentious claim, and therefore needs no support here.

...Please present some of these scientists, and / or their arguments in this regard for analysis...

I defer to TGA on this. I could do a quick search on the Internet, or read through Dawkins' books, but there's no point. The claim of specificity is itself hardly contentious; but there are various explanations for this specificity, which are debated.

...you still propose that which is physical as some form of evidence for a volitional entity that doesn't (if I understand you) possess physicality itself. As I've said, we have evidence to support the conclusion that volition is a product of a physical entity...

The evidence is the same for either position; the difference lies in the interpretation we bring to bear on the evidence, based on our initial assumptions.

...Argument from incredulity, aka argumentum ad ignorantiam...

And I could say that your argument depends on argument from unbridled credulity--but name-calling gets us nowhere.

...By who's determination must we consider the universe "organized"?...

...Scientists...

Please present these scientists, and / or their arguments for analysis.

...If our universe were not well organized, science would not be able to study it to any pragmatic advantage...

My desk is a mish-mash of papers, cds, an ashtray and a couple beer cans on their way to being emptied. I just plop stuff wherever it goes. By looking at my my desk, one could propose "organization" merely on the basis of of picture thereof. Until we can objectively determine what constitutes "organized", I propose we are merely examining a snapshot.

...where there's something, there's information to be had. Upon considering such, a charge of "information laden" is only dependent on one's ability to investigate...

In a way you are correct. Quantum phyiscs suggests that the "information" available in our universe depends to a large extent upon the questions that we ask, and the observations we make.

So we see that the examination of information is dependent on the observer more than any inherent informational value contained in a something. In this regard, I propose the use of information as you propose is merely an act of observation moreso than any inherent information contained within a thing.

...all evidence indicates that consciousness-inhabited would be a product of the brain, a physical form, as expressed through the mind...

I doubt you can demonstrate that our subjective mental experience is a "physical" thing at all.

Stick a screwdriver into the base of someone's skull, jiggle it around there a good bit, and observe the loss of consciousness.

Quantum particles and fields do not possess the qualities that we experience subjectively, including sensations of colors and tastes and sounds and wetness.

I fail to see how quantum particles are relative in discussing the mind / brain connection.

...where you declare "didn't have to exist", you are positing a position based on chance, but saying such a position is not warranted...

"Didn't have to exist" implies contingency, and contingencies can be explained either by chance (a lack of explanation) or by volition.

And volition, as I contend, leads us to the rational conclusion that such mind must be the product of a physical brain, and all the problems that creates for an "uncreated" "volitional agent".

...necessity is the ultimate rule that things act according to their properties. In this fashion then, the universe could be considered "necessary" because of its own (pre-) composition...

And that is your hypothesis, but neither you nor anyone else have any empirical evidence for such.

Then show us empirical evidence for your "volitional agent". Otherwise, I contend, as you've alluded to elsewhere in this site, that our most rational answers should rule the day.

...Volition. This is the theistic option. In order to rule out this option, we have two options: 1) we could present a very strong argument that our human volition is an illusion, a chimera, an impotent mirage which does not actually cause anything to happen in our universe, wherein absolutely everything derives from chance and/or necessity; or 2) we could present a very strong argument that volition cannot exist in the absence of some highly specific physical substructure (such as our brain)...

I was merely laying out possible options. It should be clear that I do not consider the two options as successful.

While I contend that the "most possible" (read most plausible or rational) answer is that a volitional agent must contain physical properties. Such would then throw into question any mention of a volitional agent that doesn't possess physical properties.

I am simply stating the fact that we are ignorant; and given this ignorance, it seems futile to insist (as many non-theists on this forum do insist) that we have only one rational option which everyone must accept.

As you declare the atheist position "absurd".

...When it comes right down to it, we don't even know what "physicality" is. We sometimes assume that we know, but yet appearances can be deceiving. We are not solid masses, but rather mostly empty space...

...this reeks of a "god of the gaps" argument...

Are you saying that you or anyone knows precisely what "physicality" is? From what I can tell, quantum physics suggests that physical reality may be nothing more than possibility superimpositions waiting to be actualized by the observations and attentiveness of rational agency.

I'm saying we can rationally consider physicality because when we hold someone's brain in our hands, we feel it's weight, it's mushiness, it's warmth (if freshly plucked). In this fashion then I propose it is more rational to conclude the physical exists, as opposed to relegating such into the realm of "may be nothing". I contend yours is still an argument from ignorance, where you present "may be", then prefer to posit a volitional agent that can only be deduced, not directly observed, and where volition is shown to be the product of a mind / brain.

...where we don't know something, some'll insert a god into that gap...

The point is, where we don't know something, we have three options: 1) chance, 2) necessity, or 3) volition. To arbitrarily exclude volition from the mix is to beg the question.

While I contend your use above of "may be" is effectively more question begging. We observe that all instances of volition are the product of a mind / brain, and that such is the result of the physical brain. I contend we beg questions when we propose a volitional agent that is neither physical, nor observable.

I fear the use of "specific" in this sense may be borne of an entity observing such from within. It is a subjective term, even if one may produce objective criteria for determining just how "specific" this universe may be...

I am simply following the lead of science and philosophy here.

Science indicates volition is the product of a mind / brain. Yet you hop off the rails and propose a volitional agent that doesn't, comport with the science as we know it. As above, I request you present these arguments as laid out by scientists.

...necessity would be understood as stuff acting according to its properties...

We are free to cut our investigation short at any point, starting with the solipcism of our own subjective experience. However, my argument simply goes straight to Non-Contingent Reality, whatever it is, and asks whether we can reasonably exclude volition from NCR. Simply asserting that volition must be excluded is not an argument--though of course your argument is that volition requires "physicality," though you do not precisely define "physicality."

While I ask why we should reasonably include it, as you define it being a product devoid of physical form and where you propose the physical universe and physical humans are bound to being created by this non-physical volitional agent.

Physicality would be the result of having form, shape, mass, such that no two of anything can occupy the same space at the same time.

...so the majority of all other universes are amorphous blobs. Here we sit in one that aint. How might such a condition show us the rational take is that a god created humans?...

Given the three possibilities: 1) chance, 2) necessity, and 3) volition, we have to do some analysis. Chance is a lack of explanation, so it should be our last resort.

While noting the lack of confirmable mathematical argumentation here, I accept as reasonable that we would disclude chance, if only because here we are.

Necessity entails that our subjective mental experience is an illusion; it fails to adequately support a workable worldview; and it ensures that every answer to every question is equally meaningless, since no matter how we might answer a question, neither the question nor the answer nor our subjective assessment of the answer could have been different than they were, whether right or wrong.

Yet you seem to imply that by necessity, this volitional agent exists.

So then, we discount as irrational a belief in other universes, and sit here wondering my we should consider a god as creating this'n, so by extension, humans...

Again, volition seems the best option, given that "chance" is a lack of explanation, and "necessity" renders meaningless all answers to all questions, while at the same time failing to support an adequate worldview.

While I contend that by proposing a volitional agent that is not bound by what we know of volition - that it is the product of the mind / brain - that you offer just as meaningless an explanation.

From the standpoint of epistemology, we want to assume no more than we need to. Your assumption that volition is "impossible" entails a greater assumption than that volition is "possible," on the grounds that "possible" is more privative than "impossible."

While I contend that your positing volition that doesn't require what we observe to be necessary for it to occur, is to include the assumption that volition exists sans any cause, and that such a proposal is contrary to observation.

I contend that just because something is possible is not a more powerful notion than something is impossible, insofar as neither position tells us if such is actually the case. It's "impossible" for me hop up to the moon, except when I include the "possibility" that I could turn into a giant cricket upon making a wish.

...Providing for a possibility is not providing for a most rational basis...

From the standpoint of epistemology, "possible" is more privative, and hence preferred, over "impossible."

There's where epistemology fails then. Where it assumes that just because something is possible it should be considered more likely, it makes more assumptions than what is warranted. Granted, concluding that because something is impossible, it therefore can't or never has happened is an assumption fraught with problems.

So then, I contend that in this matter, we look at what is observed, which would then be probable, namely, volition is the product of a mind / brain, and that at least in the form of a brain, there must be some physicality in order for volition to exists / occur.

...This option alone provides the necessary metaphysical framework for the sort of wordview most of us employ in our daily lives. For all of these reasons and more, most people have been, are, and will continue to be, theists...

Argumentum ad populum.

An argument ad populum would go as follows: most people believe X; therefore, X is rational.

Which is the implication I took from "most people...will continue to be...". I'll retract my charge if I misunderstood your intent, while noting I don't think I'd be the only one confused about it.

My argument has been quite different: there are good reasons to believe X; therefore, this explains why most people believe X.

I'm still seeing it the other way there, as much as I try not to.

I will still contend that the most rational conclusion to be had here is that this volitional agent, sans creator or physicality that you propose, is not the rational conclusion to be had, based on what we observe regarding volition being a product of the mind / brain.[/quote]

[EduChris]

...his subjective mental experience had no effect on the physical world...

Yes, but then epiphenomenalism gives us reason to doubt (from a Darwinian perspective) that our subjective mental experience is accurate.

...to say that this demonstrates that strict materialism is false assumes that mental states are not strictly material...

Colors, tastes, sounds, smells do not exist objectively, outside our subjective mental experience of them. What does exist, so we suppose, are various quantum "particles" and "forces" which themselves have no color or taste or sound or smell. Given than no one can measure or weigh or quantify our subjective mental experience, the supposition that such experiences are "material" requires empirical evidence, which cannot be had even in principle, since there is no such thing as a Vulcan Mind Meld.

[ThatGirlAgain]

...his subjective mental experience had no effect on the physical world...

Yes, but then epiphenomenalism gives us reason to doubt (from a Darwinian perspective) that our subjective mental experience is accurate.

Our subjective mental experience is a cut down version of sensory input that is itself a very limited report of the physical world, all mixed up with cut down versions of past experiences pulled from memory and further mixed up with feedback loops. It is accurate to the degree that is needed to be useful without being overwhelming. But it is not anywhere near an accurate rendition of physical reality in all its complexity.

...to say that this demonstrates that strict materialism is false assumes that mental states are not strictly material...

Colors, tastes, sounds, smells do not exist objectively, outside our subjective mental experience of them. What does exist, so we suppose, are various quantum "particles" and "forces" which themselves have no color or taste or sound or smell. Given than no one can measure or weigh or quantify our subjective mental experience, the supposition that such experiences are "material" requires empirical evidence, which cannot be had even in principle, since there is no such thing as a Vulcan Mind Meld.

The quanta and forces we suppose are not real either. We use sophisticated abstractions to deal with the world in detail. The pictures we paint with science are such abstractions. We are simply not capable of modeling the ‘all at once’ non-linear interplay of mutual influences that is the world. We do not think that way and the models we dream up do not work that way.

Subjectivity is a superb evolutionary ‘invention’. It is a way of binding past, present and future in ways very beneficial to survival. Our highly complex frontal cortex, working in conjunction with the rest of the brain and the body, is a tool for creating “I�. Color, taste, sound, smell – these are examples of what “I� does, making electrochemical representations in ‘chunked forms’ that can be manipulated in various ways by the electrochemical processes of the brain and nervous system. “I� may be only a fiction but it is a highly persistent and very useful one. We are abstraction makers and “I� is our best abstraction ever. But there is no real reason for assigning any reality to it beyond the physical processes that support it and in whose absence there is no evidence of its existence.

[EduChris]

...“I� may be only a fiction but it is a highly persistent and very useful one...

How do we know that it is useful? Perhaps it is a hindrance, or perhaps it does nothing, or perhaps there is no "I" which can actually "know" anything at all! How can we test ourselves to know how well we would do without any "I" to know things?

...We are abstraction makers and “I� is our best abstraction ever. But there is no real reason for assigning any reality to it beyond the physical processes that support it and in whose absence there is no evidence of its existence.

What would count as evidence for "I," other than my own subjective experience of myself?

And if we can't assign any reality to it, then why should we assign any utility to it?

[ThatGirlAgain]

...“I� may be only a fiction but it is a highly persistent and very useful one...

How do we know that it is useful? Perhaps it is a hindrance, or perhaps it does nothing, or perhaps there is no "I" which can actually "know" anything at all! How can we test ourselves to know how well we would do without any "I" to know things?

Humans have much more powerful “I�s than other primates. There are thousands of times as many humans around as other primates. From an evolutionary point of view, the human “I� appears to be beneficial so far. But evolution has no plan and no conscience. We could wipe ourselves out and so demonstrate that brains can indeed be too big.

...We are abstraction makers and “I� is our best abstraction ever. But there is no real reason for assigning any reality to it beyond the physical processes that support it and in whose absence there is no evidence of its existence.

What would count as evidence for "I," other than my own subjective experience of myself?

We all seem to have “I�, unless you want to go the solipsist route. (Solipsists unite!) I am therefore willing to grant that “you� experience your own “I�. But I have never seen evidence of an “I� separate from a physical infrastructure. Many billions of humans that have lived are now dead. Where are their “I�s?

And if we can't assign any reality to it, then why should we assign any utility to it?

We cannot assign genuine reality to any of our abstractions. The map is most definitely not the territory. Yet we assign utility (or non-utility) all over the place. That is what we do.

[EduChris]

...Humans have much more powerful “I�s than other primates. There are thousands of times as many humans around as other primates. From an evolutionary point of view, the human “I� appears to be beneficial so far...

And yet we are outnumbered by ants and amoebas. Are their "I's" more powerful than ours?

But the real question is, how could we ever determine whether we as a species would be even more numerous than we are at present, if we could only abdicate our "I's"?

...I have never seen evidence of an “I� separate from a physical infrastructure. Many billions of humans that have lived are now dead. Where are their “I�s?...

Sounds like an argument from ignorance. Besides, many people claim to have personally experienced an "I" (or a "thou") which, apparently, is separate from a physical infrastructure. Many people claim to have experienced subjectivity even while their brains were clinically dead. Yes, I know that materialists can always invent "just-so" stories to explain this all away, but at some point this seems to beg the question.

...We cannot assign genuine reality to any of our abstractions. The map is most definitely not the territory...

Our "I" is completely unlike any other "abstraction." Other abstractions are objects which we study from the outside. Our "I," by contrast, is what we experience internally, and which we use to study all other objects.

Other objects are photographs. Our "I," by contrast, is the camera.

[ThatGirlAgain]

...Humans have much more powerful “I�s than other primates. There are thousands of times as many humans around as other primates. From an evolutionary point of view, the human “I� appears to be beneficial so far...

And yet we are outnumbered by ants and amoebas. Are their "I's" more powerful than ours?

But the real question is, how could we ever determine whether we as a species would be even more numerous than we are at present, if we could only abdicate our "I's"?

Different species have different survival tool boxes. For ants and amoebas an important survival trait is the ability to reproduce at prodigious rates. For us an important survival trait is the ability to figure things out, especially in the context of past, present and future. This is a function of our I-ness. Having I-ness is not a necessary pre-condition for survival for all species any more than it is necessary for fish to have wings and tail feathers.

To determine the importance of our I-ness, we are best compared to those creatures most similar to ourselves – other primates. Compared to ourselves they fare much poorer in the survival game. (At least for now. Nothing is certain forever in the wide wide world of evolution). This is despite our having less effective natural defenses such as extreme strength, nastier teeth and natural fur coats. One thing we have in much greater abundance than they is extremely elaborate mental capabilities. Virtually all of the things we have and do that facilitate survival and have led to such a proliferation of our species are related to our ability to form much more sophisticated abstractions and to relate them to the real world. Everything that we lump under the broad title of civilization derives from this. Giving up any portion of our I-ness would make us more like other primates, with reduced survival rates. There is no need for context free philosophical flights of fancy here. Nature has performed the experiment.

...I have never seen evidence of an “I� separate from a physical infrastructure. Many billions of humans that have lived are now dead. Where are their “I�s?...

Sounds like an argument from ignorance.

He: Everything in the world has a conscious spirit: trees, rocks, everything.

She: There are billions of rocks around. If rocks are conscious, why have we seen no indication of conscious activity in rocks?

He: Sounds like an argument from ignorance.

Of course it is not an argument from ignorance, which relies “merely on the fact that the veracity of the proposition is not disproven to arrive at a definite conclusion�. In the case of subjectively conscious entities existing independent of brains and/or residing in rocks, no evidence of such a thing has been seen despite what ought to have been ample opportunities to do so. I could say there is an invisible dragon in every garage in the world. Should you believe this? If you do not, is that an argument from ignorance?

An argument from ignorance asserts that statement A is true because it has not been disproven or that Statement B is false because it has not been proven. I made no assertions. I asked for evidence of a non-obvious claim for which there ought to be ample evidence.

Besides, many people claim to have personally experienced an "I" (or a "thou") which, apparently, is separate from a physical infrastructure. Many people claim to have experienced subjectivity even while their brains were clinically dead. Yes, I know that materialists can always invent "just-so" stories to explain this all away, but at some point this seems to beg the question.

Please provide credible evidence of many instances of a person being clinically brain dead, as verified by the total absence for some significant time of any brain activity observed on a competently performed EEG, and who later resumed brain activity and presented credibly verified evidence that they were in fact subjectively aware during the period in which brain activity was observed to be totally absent.

The reason I ask for such elaborate conditions is that this statement has been presented to me in the past by others, on this site and other sites. Yet when I traced the links provided back to an original source, it turned out that they were talking about a case where the heart had stopped beating for a short period but the person may have remained subjectively aware. There is no reason why brain activity should always cease immediately when the heart stops beating. There was no measurement of brain activity made, this being in the middle of surgery and not an EEG recording session. Yet when the link was given to me it was represented as “the brain being clinically dead�.

But as I alluded to in my previous post, really convincing evidence would be multiple well verified instances of the survival of “I�s well after the brain is definitely and permanently dead. With all the people who have ever died, there should be ample opportunity for this, if it is possible at all. Either that or a good sound reason why such observations could not be made, although that is skating on thin ice, credibility wise.

...We cannot assign genuine reality to any of our abstractions. The map is most definitely not the territory...

Our "I" is completely unlike any other "abstraction." Other abstractions are objects which we study from the outside. Our "I," by contrast, is what we experience internally, and which we use to study all other objects.

Other objects are photographs. Our "I," by contrast, is the camera.

Photographs are a poor analogy. Our memories and other objects of mentation are much fuzzier than that. If they were much sharper it would be difficult to perform the associations with similar objects that constitute so much of our mental life. How do you manage to distinguish between a cat and a dog in poor lighting at a fair distance with high reliability yet do it almost instantaneously? If you had to dredge through every memory of cats and dogs and perform some kind of similarity comparison it would take far too long. Just like it would take far too long to decide if there were a leopard hiding in that berry bush up ahead.

What we work with in our heads is ‘cut down to size’ abstractions that emphasize the similarities between dissimilar things. I imagine all animals do it. My dogs were able to immediately figure out if something was a toy even if they never saw this toy before. Even if I were trying to transfer it from bag to drawer without them seeing it. Things of interest will be recognized quickly. That is a survival trait and presumably appears in anything with a non-trivial brain. Our main strength is the ability to do abstractions at a far greater level of sophistication than other creatures. We also have a much more elaborate neo-cortex than other creatures and the neo-cortex is the part of the brain that ‘lights up’ the most when we do really abstract abstractions.

It is not that we do things that other animals do not do. It is that we do certain things so well. In particular, we form complicated feedback loops among abstractions that even other primates simply do not have enough neo-cortex to support. It is this ongoing and constantly changing set of feedback loops that constitute our I-ness. We are our abstractions.

BYTW do dogs have “I�s? Sure seems like it. If I deny this, it is not too far a leap to denying the I-ness of other humans. Do their “I�s survive the physical death of their brains? Why not?

[Mithrae]

From Post 31:

Trouble is that we don't (or certainly I don't) know that it's just stuff acting according to its properties. What I was trying to get at is that the nature of stuff and what it does and why is still all a big mystery to me, but at each stage what little I've learned has always just seemed to get weirder and more complicated. Even physicists are having to invent 7 extra dimensions to try to understand stuff and its behaviour, which doesn't strike me as being intuitively more reasonable than a volitional agent. Or we could of course presume until further notice that all of it just is and is indeed simply behaving according to its properties - but again, I don't think that presumption could really claim any rational superiority over a theistic alternative.

Nor should we claim the theistic alternative is superior, given the arguments I've presented in this regard. At best we have a tie, while I contend the notion that volition is observed in physical agents, and not in non-physical agents, adds just enough added rationality to break the tie.

I'm not sure that we actually directly observe any form of causation at all, outside our own heads. If a lion came near me I'd no doubt move away, and if my foot gets up close and personal with a ball, the ball moves away: Can we conclude that my foot directly and necessarily caused the ball's movement? Can we conclude that the lion directly and necessarily caused my movement? Or might my movement away from the lion indicate my aversion to it, just as the ball has an aversion to my foot?

While it's not a compelling example, hopefully it illustrates the point that we only observe volition in our own minds and that volition is the only causation we actually observe. To say that this particular causal agent is only observed in 'physical' things, in other words, is not particularly meaningful.

Whether or not the term 'physical' should be applied to gravity or time or space or dark energy or strings or this god is not, in my opinion, a useful point for discussion. That's nothing more than the question "Is this god made of the type of stuff we can currently detect with instruments, or a type of stuff which we can't currently detect with instruments?" I agree that most theists would tend towards the latter, but unless you're suggesting that there's no stuff we can't detect - or, alternatively, that measurable detection is the only valid basis for knowledge - as far as I can tell the distinction is irrelevant to EduChris' argument.

We have a rational reason to conclude the universe is made of physical stuff. We then have folks positing an entity that is not physical to have, through volition, created this physical universe. I contend such an argument is not rationally superior to the notion, and to the evidence we have that volition is the product of a physical entity. In this regard then, one might say this volitional agent is physical, but that merely begs the question of what made that physical entity.

Back in the day, folk believed there was a difference between 'mind' and 'matter' or mind and body. It's easy to see why; one is what we experience in our heads, one is what we experience outside our heads. But I gather that sometime after Descartes' day, philosophers began to agree that something of a certain nature (eg 'mind') could not affect something of a fundamentally different nature (eg 'matter'), or vice versa.

That seems fairly reasonable to me. So if we were forced to pick between saying that the real nature of stuff is best described as what our bodies perceived, or that the real nature of stuff is best described as what our minds conceived, which do we choose?

EduChris would be quick to point out that in strictly epistemic terms, the second option is more parsimonious. I'm not sure myself, especially since there may be a third option that the real nature of stuff might at times be perceived by the body and at others conceived by the mind. Point is that I don't think we have a rational reason to conclude that the universe is made of physical stuff - that's just the side of a discarded duality which happened to prevail. I agree, however, that many theists' views are as you described.

As well, this volitional entity would ostensibly have to exist for an eternity in order to create time itself, otherwise, there's a time this volitional entity didn't exist, and all the problems that creates. I contend that if such is the argument for this entity, the most rational thing to conclude is that it's the universe itself that is this volitional entity, where there's physicality, and where there's evidence that there it sits. But that's not what we get, we get an argument that this volitional entity - devoid itself of being created - created the universe. Thus, an irrational argument that discludes this entity from being bound to the very rules it seeks to place on the universe. (Granting, thanks to bernee51, that time is merely a series of nows.)

Time (and to an extent space) are puzzling questions to me. Time as a continuum of 'now's makes sense, as does space as a continuum of 'here's in different directions. In that sense they could be considered (as I suggested in an earlier post) a place to be for things or stuff. . . . What confuses me is the bit where stuff (eg black holes or near-light speed travel) actually affect and distort these dimensions. The notion of a deity being wholly 'outside time' seems nonsensical, but on the other hand it seems absurd to think that our time is a true measure of anything besides it's own relativistic self within our universe.

Another point of curiousity from my view is what the difference is between this supposed volitional entity creating a 'real' universe, and merely imagining a universe? I suspect that what's 'real' is probably just as fluid and relative a notion as time or physicality. If there were nothing but a thinking thing, then its non-self-referential thoughts would be as distinct and 'real' as anything else imaginable, right? In other words, do we need to suppose that said deity is non-physical, or should we instead be marvelling at the supposedly 'physical' stuff which nevertheless largely meets the conception of our minds through bodily senses?

---

3) Not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle and process information

These assumptions are most privative because they explicitly rule out the sort of arbitrary limitations which would demand some further explanation.

Since there are no arbitrary limitations in causal efficacy, volition must be part of the mix--which in turn entails a being which is not less than personal.

Given that this being is not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle and process information, it seems that this being would know precisely what is best for the contingent sentient beings it had caused to exist.

From 'avoiding' an arbitrary limit on knowledge, you have concluded an arbitrarily unlimited capacity for knowledge.

[EduChris]

3) Not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle and process information

These assumptions are most privative because they explicitly rule out the sort of arbitrary limitations which would demand some further explanation.

Since there are no arbitrary limitations in causal efficacy, volition must be part of the mix--which in turn entails a being which is not less than personal.

Given that this being is not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle and process information, it seems that this being would know precisely what is best for the contingent sentient beings it had caused to exist.

From 'avoiding' an arbitrary limit on knowledge, you have concluded an arbitrarily unlimited capacity for knowledge.

What is the alternative? Is an arbitrarily limited capacity for knowledge more privative than what I proposed?

It almost seems to me that "not arbitrarily limited in causal efficacy" entails "not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle and process information."

[Mithrae]

3) Not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle and process information . . . . .

Given that this being is not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle and process information, it seems that this being would know precisely what is best for the contingent sentient beings it had caused to exist.

From 'avoiding' an arbitrary limit on knowledge, you have concluded an arbitrarily unlimited capacity for knowledge.

What is the alternative? Is an arbitrarily limited capacity for knowledge more privative than what I proposed?

It almost seems to me that "not arbitrarily limited in causal efficacy" entails "not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle and process information."

"Not arbitrarily limited" is not the same as [arbitrarily] unlimited. I had hoped this was a simple mistake on your part.

The case might be made that there is not enough justification for presuming an arbitrary limit to what said being might know/process/conceive.

The case cannot be made that said being can therefore "know precisely what is best for the contingent sentient beings it had caused to exist."