The Trinity and Personhood

[theopoesis]

A few weeks back I discussed briefly the doctrine of the Trinity with McCulloch. I lacked the time then to fully provide an acceptable level of attention to the matter, but have taken some time now. Please forgive the length of the OP, but I need to present an idea before I can ask the questions necessary.

I believe that the writings of John Zizioulas, a contemporary Orthodox theologian, might shed some interesting light on the doctrine of the Trinity. Or, perhaps it will be pointless. Regardless, here is discussion of Zizioulas' Being as Communion. I will follow up my discussion of Zizioulas with some brief comments on Constantin Scouteris.

The Language:

Theology has traditionally claimed that the Trinity is the notion of a God of one substance/being (ousia) but three persons (hypostases). This is in the creeds, and Zizioulas takes it as granted. He also notes that the development of the philosophical idea of the "person" originated in the writings of the Cappadocian Fathers in their attempt to understand the three hypostases or persons in the Godhead.

The East/West Dispute:

Zizioulas points to the division between conceptions of the Trinity in the East among the Orthodox, and in the West among Catholics and Protestants. In the East, the Person of the Father is the source of the Son and the Spirit. The Second and Third Persons of the Trinity find their being in and through the First Person, the Father, who is the unifying principle. In the West, the unifying principle is being. The son is from the Father, and the Spirit from the Son and the Father, but all tend to be conceptualized as arising out of a nature or being - God. This seems trivial, but to Zizioulas, it is critical to understand. Zizioulas suggests correct theology is only done by the Orthodox in this area.

Personhood

To Zizioulas, to be a person or hypostasis is to exist in relation to others on one's own terms, separate from the other and yet capable of experiencing the other positively. In a biological sense, Zizioulas suggests that personhood is impossible insofar as the person is a product of biological nature. The ontological ground of "personhood" is the biological nature of the person. This is true in that the biological "person" comes to exist through a biological act of procreation, and in that the "person" ceases to exist when the biological substance of that "person's" body itself ceases to function. The will and identity of the "person," biologically speaking, is constrained by the nature of that "person" genetically, hormonally, mentally, bodily, etc.

Socially, one might also try to construct a conception of the person, but the "person" here exists only artificially. Rather, the "person" is in fact reduced to the social nature. This is true insofar as the social "person" exists in a role (plumber, architect, trend setter, outcast) only as a result of that individual's participation in the nature of society itself. Though in a small degree, an individual might influence society, society as a whole seems the stronger influence on the identity and will of the "person" itself. Thus, the "person" only exists as a manifestation of a particular social current. Here again, personhood collapses into nature/being.

Ecclesially, however, Zizioulas argues that it is possible to be a person through the theological concept of the Trinity as understood by the Eastern Church. In the Trinity, the first person of the Trinity, the Father, acts by will to eternally beget the Son and to send forth the Spirit. The Spirit and Son maintain the full nature or being of the Father, but this being or nature is not the determinative principle. Differentiation of personhood is possible through the Father's sovereign will despite the perfect identity of nature. Whereas a human being is differentiated through biological diversity or through divergent social roles and positions, the Father and Son are differentiated not by differences in nature but by will. And therefore, through the eternal begetting of the Father, within the Godhead itself three persons exist which can relate to one another on their own terms, separate from one another and yet capable of experiencing one another positively through love. The diversity of the Godhead conversely allows for unity and authentic relationship insofar as the nature of the three persons is identical. Were there no similarity of nature, there would be no basis for communication or communion.

Through participation in the divine communion (the Greek term for this is theosis or theopoiesis - from which my name is derived) the Christian, theologically speaking, claims to develop an identity through a "rebirth" in relation to God. The Son, Jesus Christ, through assuming the human nature, offers the opportunity for that nature to come into communion with the nature of the Father, thereby establishing the grounds for relationship despite the infinite divide between the infinite, eternal God and the human being. This relationship is continually unfolding, but offers the eschatological hope of personhood, wherein the human being relates to God as other in an unconstrained way, effected no longer by biological determinism (the body) or by social location (society itself having ceased to exist). Rather, the human exists independently, willingly, and autonomously, and yet is capable of relation to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit through love as a result of the assumption.

Therefore, to Zizioulas, the primary question is not "how can something be three persons in one nature?" Instead, the question becomes, how can the concept of "person" have any meaning if the "person" can be reduced to an epiphenomenon of biology or sociology or some other nature?

I might point out that I have just summarized chapter 1 of Zizioulas's book, just one of many solid books on the Trinity. But this brief introduction is sufficient for now in terms of Zizioulas.

Here I would add a few brief points from another Orthodox thinker, Constantine Scouteris in his book Ecclesial Being. Scouteris notes several points worth considering. Salvation when understood as a restoration to true personhood involves not simply a rational understanding of the work of Christ, but a participation in that work unto restored personhood. Therefore, the Church itself is not the gathering of those who share a set of ideas, but rather is the union of those beings which are saved into a communion of persons. Jesus restores the image of God onto humanity through defeating the sinful nature as represented in the biological and social and even spiritual nature of human beings, but this defeat entails both the offering of a new nature which is shared among all believers and also the creation of humans as persons in communion, no longer constrained to finitude as a result of their impending biological death, nor constrained to social inequality, but subsisting eternally in equality as independent wills and not as social roles, biologically determined bodies, or otherwise as a result of natures.

I hope these thoughts will be helpful. If nothing else, they would seem to open up a host possible of debate topics:

(1) If personhood is not grounded in being, is it illogical to speak of one being subsisting in three persons?
(2) Can personhood exist when grounded in being? How might we define this personhood?
(3) Can a non-Christian affirm or explain personhood apart from the Trinity?

[EduChris]

...I consider the options to be Christian personalism or non-personalism...

Wasn't there are time in history when Eastern Christianity had as much or more contact with Muslims than with Western Christianity? Is there any evidence that Eastern Christianity's understanding of "personhood" had any influence on Islam?

It doesn't seem that Islam has adopted "Christian personalism," and it doesn't seem as though they accept "non-personalism" either. Does that leave them in the same intellectually bankrupt position as secularism on this issue?

[Zzyzx]

.

It doesn't seem that Islam has adopted "Christian personalism," and it doesn't seem as though they accept "non-personalism" either. Does that leave them in the same intellectually bankrupt position as secularism on this issue?

Has it been established that any theological position is "intellectually bankrupt"?

Or is that just a personal judgment set forth as though it was factual?

[EduChris]

...Has it been established that any theological position is "intellectually bankrupt"?...

The opportunity is here to explain why how personhood can be anything other than a vacuous or redundant term if "person" is grounded in "being" (per secularism) as opposed to Divine will (per the Eastern Christian Trinitarian understanding). So far this has not been done. Thus far all we have seen is the claim that personhood is an illusion according to the view of some Eastern non-Christian religions.

[Lux]

Moderator Comment

Does that leave them in the same intellectually bankrupt position as secularism on this issue?

Refereing to a conviction as "intellectually bankrupt" is rude and uncalled for. Please be more respectful of others' opinions, as these sort of comments add nothing to civil debate.

[Grumpy]

EduChris

Funny, you invent a concept("personhood")that requires belief in your version of a god(Trinitarianism), then insult all who don't buy it as "intellectually bankrupt". I find that offensive.

Grumpy

[JoeyKnothead]

From Post 51:

...Does that leave them in the same intellectually bankrupt position as secularism on this issue?

That's rich coming from one who argues that imagining something means that something exists.

[Zzyzx]

.

...Has it been established that any theological position is "intellectually bankrupt"?...

The opportunity is here to explain why how personhood can be anything other than a vacuous or redundant term if "person" is grounded in "being" (per secularism) as opposed to Divine will (per the Eastern Christian Trinitarian understanding). So far this has not been done. Thus far all we have seen is the claim that personhood is an illusion according to the view of some Eastern non-Christian religions.

I repeat the question with bold for emphasis. Has it been established that any theological position is "intellectually bankrupt"?. Or is that just another unsubstantiated claim or "presupposition" on your part?

[theopoesis]

EduChris

Funny, you invent a concept("personhood")that requires belief in your version of a god(Trinitarianism), then insult all who don't buy it as "intellectually bankrupt". I find that offensive.

Grumpy

As the author of the OP I think I should point out the thread began slightly differently. The objection I was responding to is the claim that 3 persons = 1 being is illogical. The attempt was to show that personhood is either (1) without meaning, or (2) necessarily (and historically) defined in such a way as to eliminate any claim of contradiction.

Those who do not accept personhood would not necessarily be "intellectually bankrupt." They would be internally consistent. The correct objection by those who do not accept personhood, then, would be against the very idea of God being Persons, not against the logical consistency of a belief rooted in personhood. The challenge, rather, was to those who maintain belief in personhood to explain how such a belief can be meaningful while simultaneously maintaining the claim that the interpersonal nature of the Trinity is illogical.

I'm mostly just responding to this comment of yours to make sure that I am not guilty of offending you as well. It would seem non-personalism is certainly a viable philosophical alternative.

[EduChris]

...Has it been established that any theological position is intellectually bankrupt"?...

I am simply referring back to what was stated in post #33:

"...Western Secularism is parasitic on Christianity..."

"...the idea of a "person" is vacuous apart from its context in Trinitarian thought..."

"...if the secularist is to maintain the idea of personhood apart from Christian theology, he or she does so parasitically, as a heretic or as an unwitting advocate of Christian personalism..."

"...a result of the completely barren nature of the secular narrative, which still clings feebly to a tradition of Christian theology and philosophy in the area of terms like "person" but which has failed to develop its own discourse and narrative of the world apart from that which it has assumed from my tradition..."

And my question (perhaps better phrased as "intellectual barrenness" rather than "intellectual bankruptcy") referred back to the previous remark (again from post #33):

"...knowledge of history allows me to understand the degree to which personalism is steeped in Christian thought. Perhaps there are alternatives, but apart from blanket dismissals of theology, I have seen nothing here to suggest their existence..."

[horiturk]

it was said that the message of christ is a simple one,yet it takes millions of words by many many men to explain the trinity. the only "evidence" for a trinity are verses by someone other than jesus that are ambigous at best jesus never made a claim that he was God.