From
Post 47:
Mithrae wrote:
I'm not sure that we actually directly observe any form of causation at all, outside our own heads. If a lion came near me I'd no doubt move away, and if my foot gets up close and personal with a ball, the ball moves away: Can we conclude that my foot directly and necessarily caused the ball's movement? Can we conclude that the lion directly and necessarily caused my movement? Or might my movement away from the lion indicate my aversion to it, just as the ball has an aversion to my foot?
I propose the most rational conclusion'd be your foot caused that ball to move. In regards the lion, I contend your aversion to that lion is more at fault for your moving away, but we still oughta tell all the lions to leave us be
If we are to dismiss what we observe as some form of hallucination, I contend then that the OP presents but one more hallucination.
Mithrae wrote:
While it's not a compelling example, hopefully it illustrates the point that we only observe volition in our own minds and that volition is the only causation we actually observe. To say that this particular causal agent is only observed in 'physical' things, in other words, is not particularly meaningful.
And evidence indicates that without a brain, there is no mind, so no volition.
Mithrae wrote:
Back in the day, folk believed there was a difference between 'mind' and 'matter' or mind and body. It's easy to see why; one is what we experience in our heads, one is what we experience outside our heads. But I gather that sometime after Descartes' day, philosophers began to agree that something of a certain nature (eg 'mind') could not affect something of a fundamentally different nature (eg 'matter'), or vice versa.
Where the mind acts, it is the product of the physical.
Mithrae wrote:
That seems fairly reasonable to me. So if we were forced to pick between saying that the real nature of stuff is best described as what our bodies perceived, or that the real nature of stuff is best described as what our minds conceived, which do we choose?
The most rational for a given circumstance. Thus, the OP seeks to determine how rational it is to think an
immaterial (as commonly defined) entity could produce an entire population of humans.
Mithrae wrote:
EduChris would be quick to point out that in strictly epistemic terms, the second option is more parsimonious. I'm not sure myself, especially since there may be a third option that the real nature of stuff might at times be perceived by the body and at others conceived by the mind. Point is that I don't think we have a rational reason to conclude that the universe is made of physical stuff - that's just the side of a discarded duality which happened to prevail. I agree, however, that many theists' views are as you described.
I prefer not to argue what another'n may or may not say.
Mithrae wrote:
Time (and to an extent space) are puzzling questions to me. Time as a continuum of 'now's makes sense, as does space as a continuum of 'here's in different directions. In that sense they could be considered (as I suggested in an earlier post) a place to be for things or stuff. . . . What confuses me is the bit where stuff (eg black holes or near-light speed travel) actually affect and distort these dimensions. The notion of a deity being wholly 'outside time' seems nonsensical, but on the other hand it seems absurd to think that our time is a true measure of anything besides it's own relativistic self within our universe.
Where our perception of time or space is in error, there we go. I propose we shouldn't then try to ameliorate that error with a proposition that raises more questions than it answers, e.g. "there's a god behind all this that is immaterial, but essentially thought all us humans into being".
Mithrae wrote:
Another point of curiousity from my view is what the difference is between this supposed volitional entity creating a 'real' universe, and merely imagining a universe? I suspect that what's 'real' is probably just as fluid and relative a notion as time or physicality. If there were nothing but a thinking thing, then its non-self-referential thoughts would be as distinct and 'real' as anything else imaginable, right? In other words, do we need to suppose that said deity is non-physical, or should we instead be marvelling at the supposedly 'physical' stuff which nevertheless largely meets the conception of our minds through bodily senses?
I can sure see that angle. I propose that where we propose a
thinking or acting entity that is also
immaterial, that entity doing all that thinking or acting can't exist. Thought or action is a product of the physical.
So, the god in question must most rationally be argued as a physical entity, but then that gets us right back to what created that physical entity, if the requirement is that that physical entity had to be there to cause the creation of humans (beyond them being simply the product of their physical properties).
I might be Teddy Roosevelt, but I ain't.
-Punkinhead Martin
