"Are there good reasons to believe that a god exists?"
Doesn't seem like much preamble is needed, but expect this largely to be filled (if at all) with arguments in favour of the existence of a God and counter-arguments. (Because the question is not "Are there good reasons to believe that a god does not exist?"). Though if you do think you have a good argument that shows it is reasonable to believe God does not exist, that is also valid.
This question comes up a lot in other threads where various classical arguments (e.g. ontological, axiological, cosmological) have been given in those threads.
If possible, try not to shotgun debate by raising lots of arguments at once. One sound argument should be sufficient.
Are there good reasons to believe that a god exists?
Moderator: Moderators
Post #651
[Replying to post 649 by instantc]
It's not about one sense, it's about shared experience across senses.
We can't evaluate the performance of a sense if we don't have something close to a standard.
If we trusted morality without checking it against other things, is there "objective" hatred? Is there "objective" sadness? I.e., hatred and sadness devoid of persons entirely - no haters, no hated, no depressed, no depressants.
The best explanation for our senses is not that we have invented the entire Universe and arbitrarily restrained our capability. We test our senses the same way we test scientific instruments. We check if they match expected observations from other data.
It's not that each sense is a bit of data and we put it together to some arbitrary limit, it's that we don't know what to trust until the senses start to work together.
Regardless, treating senses as inherently real or having some accuracy wouldn't work.
It's not about one sense, it's about shared experience across senses.
We can't evaluate the performance of a sense if we don't have something close to a standard.
If we trusted morality without checking it against other things, is there "objective" hatred? Is there "objective" sadness? I.e., hatred and sadness devoid of persons entirely - no haters, no hated, no depressed, no depressants.
The best explanation for our senses is not that we have invented the entire Universe and arbitrarily restrained our capability. We test our senses the same way we test scientific instruments. We check if they match expected observations from other data.
It's not that each sense is a bit of data and we put it together to some arbitrary limit, it's that we don't know what to trust until the senses start to work together.
Regardless, treating senses as inherently real or having some accuracy wouldn't work.
Post #652
Your argument is a complete non-sequitur. As I said, consider a dream state for example, all my senses converge in the dream, and yet none of it is real. You haven't provided any reason to believe that the number of the converging senses has a bearing on the question whether or not the data that they produce is made up in the head. At face value, it is just as likely that your mind makes up five converging streams of sensory data than that it makes up one such sense.Jashwell wrote: [Replying to post 649 by instantc]
It's not about one sense, it's about shared experience across senses.
We can't evaluate the performance of a sense if we don't have something close to a standard.
If we trusted morality without checking it against other things, is there "objective" hatred? Is there "objective" sadness? I.e., hatred and sadness devoid of persons entirely - no haters, no hated, no depressed, no depressants.
The best explanation for our senses is not that we have invented the entire Universe and arbitrarily restrained our capability. We test our senses the same way we test scientific instruments. We check if they match expected observations from other data.
It's not that each sense is a bit of data and we put it together to some arbitrary limit, it's that we don't know what to trust until the senses start to work together.
Regardless, treating senses as inherently real or having some accuracy wouldn't work.
Your argument doesn't hold up at all. You suggest that you can verify sense 1, for example, by testing it against senses 2, 3, 4, and 5. But that presupposes that senses 2, 3, 4 and 5 provide accurate data from reality. How do we know that? We test them against each other, which again presupposes that the other senses provide us with real data. It's a woefully question-begging system.
Post #653
[Replying to post 651 by instantc]
If you are in a dream, and thinking the same as you do when awake (which you aren't), if you had the same capability to think and process information (which you usually don't) then your memories and the inconsistency of your dream would be the only reason not to believe it's real.
If you didn't have memories, and the world was perfectly consistent, you might well be justified in believing it to be real. At the very least, it would be your reality.
No, it does not presuppose other senses.
Where does the strength in a brick wall come from? Each individual brick?
No, you could take the bricks and stack them in a pile and columnize the stacks. That wall would be so weak you could poke it over.
It comes from the interlocking pattern. One brick alone doesn't give you this, two bricks do. But that doesn't presuppose each brick having the strength of the brick wall, that is a division fallacy.
I never said you could guarantee what is reality. Not that an 'ulterior reality' would be of any relevance at all to anyone. It would be unparsimonious and unreasonable - if not at the very least unusable and indifferentiable, having no impact on your subjective experience whatsoever.
If you are in a dream, and thinking the same as you do when awake (which you aren't), if you had the same capability to think and process information (which you usually don't) then your memories and the inconsistency of your dream would be the only reason not to believe it's real.
If you didn't have memories, and the world was perfectly consistent, you might well be justified in believing it to be real. At the very least, it would be your reality.
No, it does not presuppose other senses.
Where does the strength in a brick wall come from? Each individual brick?
No, you could take the bricks and stack them in a pile and columnize the stacks. That wall would be so weak you could poke it over.
It comes from the interlocking pattern. One brick alone doesn't give you this, two bricks do. But that doesn't presuppose each brick having the strength of the brick wall, that is a division fallacy.
I never said you could guarantee what is reality. Not that an 'ulterior reality' would be of any relevance at all to anyone. It would be unparsimonious and unreasonable - if not at the very least unusable and indifferentiable, having no impact on your subjective experience whatsoever.
Post #654
I've no doubt that your arguments are heartfelt, but to me it appears that you are making up ad hoc explanations in order to cover up a clear double standard.Jashwell wrote: [Replying to post 651 by instantc]
If you are in a dream, and thinking the same as you do when awake (which you aren't), if you had the same capability to think and process information (which you usually don't) then your memories and the inconsistency of your dream would be the only reason not to believe it's real.
If you didn't have memories, and the world was perfectly consistent, you might well be justified in believing it to be real. At the very least, it would be your reality.
No, it does not presuppose other senses.
Where does the strength in a brick wall come from? Each individual brick?
No, you could take the bricks and stack them in a pile and columnize the stacks. That wall would be so weak you could poke it over.
It comes from the interlocking pattern. One brick alone doesn't give you this, two bricks do. But that doesn't presuppose each brick having the strength of the brick wall, that is a division fallacy.
I never said you could guarantee what is reality. Not that an 'ulterior reality' would be of any relevance at all to anyone. It would be unparsimonious and unreasonable - if not at the very least unusable and indifferentiable, having no impact on your subjective experience whatsoever.
You say that one sense alone is no justification to believe that reality exists, but five converging senses together comprise such justification. A direct implication of your claim is that persons who are born with only one sense, for example people who cannot hear, taste, touch or smell but who have eye sight, are not justified in believing that there anything they see is real. Is that what you believe?
I don't even need to point out the absurdities of your ad hoc explanation, since you have not given me any reason to believe in the explanation. You would have to show two things in order for your explanation to carry any weight at face value.
(1) You'd need to show that it is prima facie more likely that five converging streams of sensory data are not made up by the mind than that one stream of sensory data is not made up by the mind. As far as I can see, the mind could just as easily make up five converging streams of sensory data or one single sense. Can you show otherwise?
(2) You'd need to explain me how testing five senses against each other justifies you to believe in them. You have simply asserted this. Explain me the system and the rationale. As far as I can see, testing a sense against anything presupposes that that against which you are testing the sense provides real data to begin with, which would make your system question-begging. Apart from being question-begging, this idea seems really odd to me. Are you seriously suggesting that once you bump into a wall, you cannot know that there's anything real there until you have opened your eyes, smelled the wall and tasted it?
Give an adequate response to both of these points and I will accept that your argument is more than an ad hoc explanation covering up a double standard.
Post #655
[Replying to post 653 by instantc]
Aside from the fact we have more than five senses, and that being born with one sense is impossible, multiple senses is what gives us reliability in this kind of meta view where we evaluate the ability to know. An early cell with one kind of input i.e how light/dark it is wouldn't need to know nor care whether "reality is real" (which to me seems like a redundant statement).
I don't need to give you a reason to believe anything. You're the one accepting that one "sense" has some truth prima facie.
Of course by likely we mean more plausible, esp. by occam's razor. Seemingly more likely, or apparently more likely, often in cases where finding out whether it is "actually" more likely is difficult.
The whole point of multiple senses is that reality is a shared experience. Multiple senses means a shared experience. One sense means one experience.
If we had two senses, and both detect something in common, it is more plausible that the common is objective than that both conveniently had the same delusion. (there can be overruling evidence, which is itself another kind of sense - for instance, we know that personal testimony can be very unreliable in many cases, even en mass)
It is less parsimonious to believe that two unique senses have reached the exact same input illusively than to believe that both are truly detecting it, in absence of other evidence regarding the reliability of those senses - which is of the same sort itself.
Aside from the fact we have more than five senses, and that being born with one sense is impossible, multiple senses is what gives us reliability in this kind of meta view where we evaluate the ability to know. An early cell with one kind of input i.e how light/dark it is wouldn't need to know nor care whether "reality is real" (which to me seems like a redundant statement).
I don't need to give you a reason to believe anything. You're the one accepting that one "sense" has some truth prima facie.
Of course by likely we mean more plausible, esp. by occam's razor. Seemingly more likely, or apparently more likely, often in cases where finding out whether it is "actually" more likely is difficult.
The whole point of multiple senses is that reality is a shared experience. Multiple senses means a shared experience. One sense means one experience.
If we had two senses, and both detect something in common, it is more plausible that the common is objective than that both conveniently had the same delusion. (there can be overruling evidence, which is itself another kind of sense - for instance, we know that personal testimony can be very unreliable in many cases, even en mass)
It is less parsimonious to believe that two unique senses have reached the exact same input illusively than to believe that both are truly detecting it, in absence of other evidence regarding the reliability of those senses - which is of the same sort itself.
Post #656
That is not the case at all, here is my argument restated in its simplicity. We are justified in relying in our moral sense to the same extent that we are justified in believing that our sensory data of the physical reality is real. I haven't yet claimed that we are justified to trust in either one, I have simply pointed out your double standard of trusting one but not the other. You are the one who expressly claimed that our moral sense does not justify the belief in moral realism while our other senses justify the belief in the physical reality. The burden of proof is on you here, and you have not yet even properly attempted to carry it.Jashwell wrote: I don't need to give you a reason to believe anything. You're the one accepting that one "sense" has some truth prima facie.
I am in agreement.Jashwell wrote:Of course by likely we mean more plausible, esp. by occam's razor. Seemingly more likely, or apparently more likely, often in cases where finding out whether it is "actually" more likely is difficult.
I don't see why this should be the case. Since both of the senses are grounded in the same mind, they could be unreal just as a single sense could. Again, you'd need to take up my challenge and show me that it is less plausible that a mind would make up a few converging senses than that it would make up one sense.Jashwell wrote:If we had two senses, and both detect something in common, it is more plausible that the common is objective than that both conveniently had the same delusion. (there can be overruling evidence, which is itself another kind of sense - for instance, we know that personal testimony can be very unreliable in many cases, even en mass)
This is not at all the case. Parsimony is one of the well-known arguments for hard solipsism. The hypothesis where only your mind exists is evidently more parsimonious than the hypothesis that your mind exists in addition to an objective reality.Jashwell wrote:It is less parsimonious to believe that two unique senses have reached the exact same input illusively than to believe that both are truly detecting it, in absence of other evidence regarding the reliability of those senses - which is of the same sort itself.
Post #657
[Replying to post 655 by instantc]
Of course the moral sense does not justify belief in objective morality.
Seeing something doesn't justify it as objectively existing. There are more criteria to meet.
It is a logical fact that without other presuppositions, one cannot inherently jump from subjective morality to objective morality. Not to mention the other reasons (i.e. inconsistency, differing morality in other animals)
When I call morality a "sense", it is plainly the wrong word. As I said, it's not a sense like sight or sound, it's a set of reactions and thoughts to actions and behaviour.
Not to mention that a person's morality can change. Therefore, it cannot reflect something unchanging, and there's no convincing reason to believe that it's reflecting anything in reality (i.e. outside of oneself - which is the only place we know morality to exist) as it would be significantly less parsimonious (and also significantly more like moral relativism) to think that it did and that the "moral reality" was merely changing.
As for the mind, we can't avoid using it, personally I don't see how it's possible for their to be "no reality" because reality is just an abstract selection of our sensory input. It is just the best explanation of our shared sensory experience. We naturally have to experience through our subjective POV. I don't know if 'no reality' actually means anything.
Solipsism is certainly not more parsimonious. You are still expecting the same sensory input only this time you are getting unquantifiable amounts of order from complete chaos. It's not about the sheer quantity of "objectively existing" things, under Solipsism you are still getting the same sensory data, only this time you are not wrapping it into objects and rules but treating it as random.
Of course the moral sense does not justify belief in objective morality.
Seeing something doesn't justify it as objectively existing. There are more criteria to meet.
It is a logical fact that without other presuppositions, one cannot inherently jump from subjective morality to objective morality. Not to mention the other reasons (i.e. inconsistency, differing morality in other animals)
When I call morality a "sense", it is plainly the wrong word. As I said, it's not a sense like sight or sound, it's a set of reactions and thoughts to actions and behaviour.
Not to mention that a person's morality can change. Therefore, it cannot reflect something unchanging, and there's no convincing reason to believe that it's reflecting anything in reality (i.e. outside of oneself - which is the only place we know morality to exist) as it would be significantly less parsimonious (and also significantly more like moral relativism) to think that it did and that the "moral reality" was merely changing.
As for the mind, we can't avoid using it, personally I don't see how it's possible for their to be "no reality" because reality is just an abstract selection of our sensory input. It is just the best explanation of our shared sensory experience. We naturally have to experience through our subjective POV. I don't know if 'no reality' actually means anything.
Solipsism is certainly not more parsimonious. You are still expecting the same sensory input only this time you are getting unquantifiable amounts of order from complete chaos. It's not about the sheer quantity of "objectively existing" things, under Solipsism you are still getting the same sensory data, only this time you are not wrapping it into objects and rules but treating it as random.
-
spiritualrevolution
- Student
- Posts: 94
- Joined: Thu May 24, 2012 12:59 am
- Contact:
Re: Are there good reasons to believe that a god exists?
Post #658So i saw you two guys, guy 1 and guy 2 talk about this,
and then guy 2 is saying something like "dude, your statement doesn't make sense"
Which leads me to think: Well you know what guy 2, in this case i bring up imaginary numbers. What is sqrt( -3) but an imaginary number? You can't express it in math but imaginary numbers are still used in engineering and so forth.
And I would counter that with, I answer questions like guy 1 too! For example, many theists like to ask:
So tell me, where did the universe come from if there is no God? I just replace what that guy said with
The universe does not come from nothing and the universe does not come from something. The universe does not come from anything, the universe simply is, always was, uncreated, uncaused, unique in that respect, the only exception to the rule of causation.
The only good reason I can think of for the existence of god is the punishment system whereby evildoers are gonna get punished in the afterlife, to remove people's feelings of revenge, and then actually carrying out revenge, and to scare people into not committing acts deemed "evil". How do we know what's evil? Well too bad, you don't...
So basically in the first quote, guy 1 is saying that God exists, boohoo for you, i don't have to give an explanation that makes sense, haha!You're saying God isn't A- but he also isn't not A.God does not come from nothing and God does not come from something. God does not come from anything, God simply is, always was, uncreated, uncaused, unique in that respect, the only exception to the rule of causation.
In other words, you are denying the law of excluded middle.
Any logical proposition is true xor false. It can't be neither.
and then guy 2 is saying something like "dude, your statement doesn't make sense"
Which leads me to think: Well you know what guy 2, in this case i bring up imaginary numbers. What is sqrt( -3) but an imaginary number? You can't express it in math but imaginary numbers are still used in engineering and so forth.
And I would counter that with, I answer questions like guy 1 too! For example, many theists like to ask:
So tell me, where did the universe come from if there is no God? I just replace what that guy said with
The universe does not come from nothing and the universe does not come from something. The universe does not come from anything, the universe simply is, always was, uncreated, uncaused, unique in that respect, the only exception to the rule of causation.
The only good reason I can think of for the existence of god is the punishment system whereby evildoers are gonna get punished in the afterlife, to remove people's feelings of revenge, and then actually carrying out revenge, and to scare people into not committing acts deemed "evil". How do we know what's evil? Well too bad, you don't...
Jesus is totally a lesbian.
Damn. And I thought I had a shot...
Damn. And I thought I had a shot...
Re: Are there good reasons to believe that a god exists?
Post #659[Replying to post 657 by spiritualrevolution]
Nothing is not something
Not nothing is something
"God doesn't come from something" (God doesn't come from not nothing)
"God doesn't come from nothing"
=
"God does come from nothing"
"God doesn't come from nothing"
sqrt(-3) is called an imaginary number but that does not mean it is any more imaginary than real numbers. Just an unfortunate naming scheme.
If you're saying that "well maybe you can't express God in logic" then both sides of the debate could be right at once, and any number of other impossibilities.
The Universe is caused by nothing because it is not caused by anything.
This is the same as not having a cause.
Nothing is not something
Not nothing is something
"God doesn't come from something" (God doesn't come from not nothing)
"God doesn't come from nothing"
=
"God does come from nothing"
"God doesn't come from nothing"
sqrt(-3) is called an imaginary number but that does not mean it is any more imaginary than real numbers. Just an unfortunate naming scheme.
If you're saying that "well maybe you can't express God in logic" then both sides of the debate could be right at once, and any number of other impossibilities.
The Universe is caused by nothing because it is not caused by anything.
This is the same as not having a cause.
Post #660
But, for example, seeing and touching something does? You keep asserting this but haven't given me any justification.Jashwell wrote: [Replying to post 655 by instantc]
Of course the moral sense does not justify belief in objective morality.
Seeing something doesn't justify it as objectively existing. There are more criteria to meet.
That's not the question though. The question is whether the belief in moral reality can be justified by virtue of moral sense to the same extent than the belief in physical reality can.Jashwell wrote:It is a logical fact that without other presuppositions, one cannot inherently jump from subjective morality to objective morality. Not to mention the other reasons (i.e. inconsistency, differing morality in other animals)
For the sake of the conversation, I'll limit my argument to concern one single moral proposition, namely that torturing children for fun is wrong. I doubt that one's perception regarding the truth about this proposition is going to change any more than their perception of physical reality is.Jashwell wrote:Not to mention that a person's morality can change. Therefore, it cannot reflect something unchanging, and there's no convincing reason to believe that it's reflecting anything in reality
Then moral reality is also the best explanation of our shared moral experience. Again, I am limiting my argument to concern the aforementioned moral proposition that, I take it, nearly everyone agrees with.Jashwell wrote: It is just the best explanation of our shared sensory experience.
'No physical reality' means that physical things do not exist.Jashwell wrote:We naturally have to experience through our subjective POV. I don't know if 'no reality' actually means anything.
I have no idea what you are trying to say here, what do you mean by 'treating it as random'? As far as I can see, only your mind existing is more parsimonious than your mind existing in addition to a physical reality. This is also the opinion of every scholar I have ever heard of. Even wikipedia agrees with me about the minimality advantage of solipsism. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SolipsismJashwell wrote:Solipsism is certainly not more parsimonious. You are still expecting the same sensory input only this time you are getting unquantifiable amounts of order from complete chaos. It's not about the sheer quantity of "objectively existing" things, under Solipsism you are still getting the same sensory data, only this time you are not wrapping it into objects and rules but treating it as random.
So far you haven't provided any justification for your central claim that five converging sense provide a justification to believe in reality but one sense does not. I've expressly challenged it in two aspects, and you haven't taken up either challenge.
