The Permissibility of Faith

[spetey]

Hi folks!

In my experience, when debating with those who believe in God, my interlocutors will inevitably appeal to faith as their justification for belief. (Some don't call it "faith"--some call it "intuition", or "trust" or some such.) I'm very wary of such appeals, because I hear it as "I will continue to believe despite lack of evidence or argument for my position (at least, of the kind that I can share with anyone who disagrees)." I think such behavior is impermissible. Faith to me is just dogmatism, and to me, dogmatism of any kind is very dangerous.

For comparison: imagine, for example, that you met a rabid racist. You give a carefully reasoned argument to the effect that skin color doesn't matter to who a person is or what rights they have, etc. The racist responds: "Although I have no answer to your argument, or arguments that I can share with you for my own position, I just believe; I have faith that my race is superior." You would be at an impasse, right? Should you come to disagree over some important social policy measure, there is no way to reason out your disagreement. Instead you have to see who has more money for PR, or who has more tanks, or what have you. I assume that in these cases we all agree that "faith" is in an important sense impermissible. We think the racist is being dogmatic, and we think that it's destructive not to be open to reasoning.

So why might appeal to faith be permissible when it comes to discussions of religion? Or have I somehow misconstrued what it is to appeal to faith?


spetey

[harvey1]

All beliefs must terminate to some kind of a priori knowledge or some kind of belief that we take for granted (e.g., "there's an infinite set of reasons that support my belief", etc).

This is to assume that the structure of justification is foundationalist, which I do not assume. (Also notice infinitism, which I think is what you intend by your example belief, contradicts foundationalism.)

What do you assume?

There is no guarantee that everyone shares the same terminal beliefs

No, of course there is no guarantee of this. For a dogmatic racist, "my race is superior" is a terminal belief. I think it shouldn't be--I think the racist should be prepared to give reasons for her position.

Fine, but how do you answer (4)?

There is no way we can necessarily provide a reason that will persuade someone of our terminal belief if it is not consistent with someone else's terminal belief.

No, of course not it doesn't necessarily follow. We might have to change someone's mind, or get them to consider the reasons for the belief they are treating as terminal. So?

You're missing my point, though. If you have terminal beliefs how is your mind changed when all your inferential beliefs are based on those beliefs?

My contention is that (4) is what you call "faith"-based

The proposition you state in 4 is not the property of being a faith-based belief. My contention is roughly, in your new terms, that terminating in a non-shared belief when provided reasons against your belief is irresponsible. That is the sense in which I say faith is impermissible. And you agree, right? So let's move on!

Again, you're not getting the whole picture. Alice has terminating beliefs and Bob has terminating beliefs. Alice has reasons against Bob's terminating beliefs (i.e., she uses her terminating beliefs to construct her arguments), whereas Bob has reasons against Alice's terminating beliefs (i.e., he uses his terminating beliefs to construct his arguments).

Your argument amounts to infinitism since your position is that both should have reasons for their terminating beliefs, which means those beliefs are not terminating beliefs (i.e., they are inferential beliefs). So, how do you escape from being an infinitist in your appeal to Alice and Bob to give reasons supporting their terminating beliefs?

Or do we have to start all over again? Are you that hesitant to agree with me about anything? It's okay! This is a good thing to agree on! Look, I say the racist is being epistemically irresponsible when he refuses to consider reasons for or against his racist assumption. And you agree, right?

I have a way out that you haven't admitted to yourself, so as I see it, you are in a jam. You won't accept my argument that pragmatic experiences are what is terminating, therefore you are stuck either with infinitism or admitting that, in fact, you are asking Alice and Bob do what is impossible (i.e., give reasons for their terminating beliefs).

In my view, Alice and Bob give intuitive reasons to each other that is based on their direct experience. If Alice is a racist, she of course will not be effected by Bob's call for racial equality. However, as time goes by she will be effected by negative experiences which come as a result of being racist, and she will be effected by the positive experience of seeing Bob's well-managed life. As a result of these new experiences, she will gradually move away from racism and toward the more efficacious beliefs that Bob possesses.

Are you prepared to come over to my side and allow pragmatic experiences to be the causal tie that brings about terminating beliefs? That's rhetorical, I know you will not abandon your views, but I want to understand (finally) how you see Alice and Bob terminating their beliefs (or not terminating their beliefs in case of infinitism...).

Similarly you agree that an atheist is being irresponsible if she flatly refuses to consider reasons for or against her belief when others provide reason against it, right? Similarly again, you agree that a Christian is being irresponsible if he flatly refuses to consider reasons for or against his belief when others provide reason against it, right?

I think the experiences of Christians and atheists are fundamentally different, hence the terminating beliefs are different.

Honestly, sometimes I think you would claim 2+2=5 if you heard me claim 2+2=4, out of some dread fear that agreeing with me about anything will lead you down the devil's path to scary atheism.

You crack me up sometimes... I don't mind agreeing with you if you're right, but sometimes it seems to me like you want to be a pragmatist when it is convenient to be so, but not be a pragmatist when it interferes with your inability to convince religionists that they need convincing reasons that meet your satisfaction. We might agree on a subject, but I know the reason why I agree with a belief. What I want to hear is how you can agree when you have, what appear to me as, inconsistencies in your argument.

As soon as we show any signs of agreeing about anything, you back off. In the past for example, you proposed simplicity as a theoretical virtue. I simply agreed. Then you started attacking simplicity and suggesting it's not a good criterion to judge theories by, and so on. Don't you find this suspicious behavior, on reflection?

You need to review those posts. You started talking some weird stuff about a simplicity criterion (e.g., MML theory). Nobody uses MML theory - nobody. Okay, maybe the guy who came up with it and is trying to write a book about it is trying to construct examples of using MML theory, but c'mon Spetey.

I'm a big believer in simplicity as an aesthetic criterion. However, I don't eliminate all the other criterions of science and try to state every decision in science as a result of two criterions. That totally removes the necessity of criterions in science. Their purpose is to help decide issues, not make the situation worse by initiating a philosophical debate for every experiment result or hypothesis of science!

[spetey]

You're missing my point, though. If you have terminal beliefs how is your mind changed when all your inferential beliefs are based on those beliefs?

If there are terminal beliefs (as only internal foundationalists think), even they are likely to be terminal relative to a time; when you consider a "terminal" belief, you start to ask about reasons to believe it. You may then find such reasons, and that belief is no longer terminal. This does not require infinitism--at any given time, the foundationalist would say, the beliefs have foundations. But how deep and sturdy those foundations are can change with time.

You won't accept my argument that pragmatic experiences are what is terminating, therefore you are stuck either with infinitism or admitting that, in fact, you are asking Alice and Bob do what is impossible (i.e., give reasons for their terminating beliefs).

I still have no idea what "pragmatic experiences" are (when I press you on them, they seem to just be "reasons to believe" or "evidence"). And I have seen no argument to the effect that pragmatic experiences are "what is terminating" (ie the grounds for justification?). And I see no reason why a belief that was formerly treated as terminal could become, upon reflection, inferential.

In my view, Alice and Bob give intuitive reasons to each other that is based on their direct experience. If Alice is a racist, she of course will not be effected by Bob's call for racial equality. However, as time goes by she will be effected by negative experiences which come as a result of being racist, and she will be effected by the positive experience of seeing Bob's well-managed life. As a result of these new experiences, she will gradually move away from racism and toward the more efficacious beliefs that Bob possesses.

Why are you so sure of this? What if Alice lives in a racist community that only supports her, and would shun her if she was one of those liberal types? Do you claim it's physically impossible for someone to live their life out happily in such a community?

I think the experiences of Christians and atheists are fundamentally different, hence the terminating beliefs are different.

Are you saying here that it's okay for either side to stop giving reasons to someone of opposing views when they disagree? If so, then I guess you have mysteriously changed your mind, and we have to start all over again I guess.

If you're not saying that, then we agree on the fundamental issue here, so let's leave it.

You crack me up sometimes... I don't mind agreeing with you if you're right, but sometimes it seems to me like you want to be a pragmatist when it is convenient to be so, but not be a pragmatist when it interferes with your inability to convince religionists that they need convincing reasons that meet your satisfaction.

Funny, I was thinking very similar things about your "pragmatism"! We seem to disagree. So let's sort it out with reasons in one of those other threads.

You need to review those posts. You started talking some weird stuff about a simplicity criterion (e.g., MML theory). Nobody uses MML theory - nobody. Okay, maybe the guy who came up with it and is trying to write a book about it is trying to construct examples of using MML theory, but c'mon Spetey.

I only brought up MML when you asked me how to decide on simplicity criteria. What is your standard for simplicity, if you like it so much? Look, this is a very hard question, and usually it never comes up in practice, but if you insist on asking, my answer is that my best guess is MML. Are you attacking simplicity as a criterion or not?

I'm a big believer in simplicity as an aesthetic criterion. However, I don't eliminate all the other criterions of science and try to state every decision in science as a result of two criterions. That totally removes the necessity of criterions in science.

Huh? Having few criteria removes the necessity of criteria in science? How many criteria do you need before you no longer remove the necessity of crieteria in science? 10? 15? 300?

Their purpose is to help decide issues, not make the situation worse by initiating a philosophical debate for every experiment result or hypothesis of science!

Of course they help decide issues. But then someone like you asks, "why those criteria?" (And you ask despite your having agreed to them.) And that is what brings us to the realm of "philosophical debate". I have been urging that we stay at the level of our agreed criteria for some time (or, I have asked, attack my criteria, or defend extra criteria that aren't covered by mine).


spetey

[harvey1]

But how deep and sturdy those foundations are can change with time.

Sure, but in that case Bob and Alice have only discovered that a terminal belief is not terminal. It would be nice if you came out and stated your view on this subject. Do you think that there are terminal beliefs?

You won't accept my argument that pragmatic experiences are what is terminating, therefore you are stuck either with infinitism or admitting that, in fact, you are asking Alice and Bob do what is impossible (i.e., give reasons for their terminating beliefs).

I still have no idea what "pragmatic experiences" are (when I press you on them, they seem to just be "reasons to believe" or "evidence"). And I have seen no argument to the effect that pragmatic experiences are "what is terminating" (ie the grounds for justification?).

Pragmatic experiences are just those experiences that a "society" sees as applicable to a particular belief. They are observations, in some particular societies they are very controlled observations (e.g., societies of science), and in other cases the society in question places value on experiences which are less tangible. You will definitely consider some pragmatic experiences as "reasons to believe", but I'm speaking much more generally. I'm talking about experiences that a society sees as relevant versus observations that you may only feel are relevant.

In my view, if a society picks dubious experiences as relevant to a belief, then over time natural selective pressures will gradually replace those societies in favor of ones that have a more efficacious set of standards with regard to pragmatic experiences.

Experiences impress themselves on the societies who value them. There is a causal link that exists between experiences and societies who value them. Like Neurath's ship that is rebuilt while at sea, each plank represents a belief and the experience is whatever water the ship takes in that the crew perceives as a ship in need of repair (or improved speed, stability, etc). This requires the ship to be rebuilt at sea to be seaworthy and so the crew is constantly looking for new "planks" to do the repair. As new planks (beliefs) are discovered, the ship is checked to see if those planks are needed to improve the seaworthiness. No original plank survives the rebuilding process. Old planks are simply tossed overboard.

What is the terminal belief (or original plank) in Neurath's ship? It is irrelevant since all those beliefs have disappeared in our evolutionary past (if you can even properly label such structures as "beliefs" is another question). All that is terminal is the experiences and the crew and the knowledge to rebuild the ship. The crew are just those in the society who encounter the problems that they see are in need of a resolution at the time of their service. The are reacting to the experiences they encounter or have encountered in their memory (e.g., the Perfect Storm, Jaws, etc).

So, it is the experiences which are terminal to beliefs. There is a pre-existing set of beliefs that we find ourselves on the "ship", however it is our responsibility to rebuild the ship one plank at a time by looking at what experiences are relevant. Different portions of the ship need to look at different kinds of experiences, and hence the reason that science should consider different kinds of experiences than religion.

And I see no reason why a belief that was formerly treated as terminal could become, upon reflection, inferential.

I don't see any reason either, however is it your position that there are no terminal beliefs and that every belief should be treated as inferential?

In my view, Alice and Bob give intuitive reasons to each other that is based on their direct experience. If Alice is a racist, she of course will not be effected by Bob's call for racial equality. However, as time goes by she will be effected by negative experiences which come as a result of being racist, and she will be effected by the positive experience of seeing Bob's well-managed life. As a result of these new experiences, she will gradually move away from racism and toward the more efficacious beliefs that Bob possesses.

Why are you so sure of this? What if Alice lives in a racist community that only supports her, and would shun her if she was one of those liberal types? Do you claim it's physically impossible for someone to live their life out happily in such a community?

Communities can survive indefinitely if there is little or no interaction with the larger communities that are equality based. Yet, if there is extensive interaction, as I mentioned, the study of complex systems indicate that such systems tend to move toward homogenous beliefs. I'm assuming a statistical norm with regard to Alice and Bob as two interacting people over time.

I think the experiences of Christians and atheists are fundamentally different, hence the terminating beliefs are different.

Are you saying here that it's okay for either side to stop giving reasons to someone of opposing views when they disagree? If so, then I guess you have mysteriously changed your mind, and we have to start all over again I guess.

No. Christians are required to preach the Gospel to everyone, so this sets up a pathway for people to share beliefs over time by shared experiences as I discussed before.

If you're not saying that, then we agree on the fundamental issue here, so let's leave it.

First I want to understand how you can say that Alice and Bob can give reasons for their terminal beliefs if they are really terminal beliefs and not just inferential beliefs in disguise. If they are terminal beliefs, then how can you say that Alice and Bob ought to resolve their differences?

You crack me up sometimes... I don't mind agreeing with you if you're right, but sometimes it seems to me like you want to be a pragmatist when it is convenient to be so, but not be a pragmatist when it interferes with your inability to convince religionists that they need convincing reasons that meet your satisfaction.

Funny, I was thinking very similar things about your "pragmatism"! We seem to disagree. So let's sort it out with reasons in one of those other threads.

Sure, however before we leave this thread I want to be sure that you are really justified in asking questions if you do not have an appropriate answer to the issue I raised about terminal beliefs...

I only brought up MML when you asked me how to decide on simplicity criteria. What is your standard for simplicity, if you like it so much? Look, this is a very hard question, and usually it never comes up in practice, but if you insist on asking, my answer is that my best guess is MML. Are you attacking simplicity as a criterion or not?

Simplicity is completely subjective if you ask me. It's like asking what is the simplest way to get to New York. It all depends on what you mean by "New York", where are you located, how much money do you have, etc. There is no MML answer on the simplest way to get to "New York". That's why it is an aesthetic criterion. It's a criterion that requires one to use intuitive thought which is not subject to quantification like an MML theory suggests.

Huh? Having few criteria removes the necessity of criteria in science? How many criteria do you need before you no longer remove the necessity of crieteria in science? 10? 15? 300?

There's no specific number and I think it is contextually determined by the theory/experiment. However, generally speaking, there are some general criteria used in science (extracted from Wesley Salmon's "The Foundations of Scientific Inference"):

• (*) Criteria of adequacy
  (*) Criteria of plausibility
  (*) Criterion of admissibility
  (*) Criterion of ascertability
  (*) Criterion of demarcation
  (*) Criterion of linguistic invariance

Of course, that's just Salmon's list...

Their purpose is to help decide issues, not make the situation worse by initiating a philosophical debate for every experiment result or hypothesis of science!

Of course they help decide issues. But then someone like you asks, "why those criteria?" (And you ask despite your having agreed to them.) And that is what brings us to the realm of "philosophical debate". I have been urging that we stay at the level of our agreed criteria for some time (or, I have asked, attack my criteria, or defend extra criteria that aren't covered by mine).

I've never had a problem in having stated criteria (i.e., as a general picture to differentiate reasonable from unreasonable). I think you have that perception of me only because I was talking in terms of the simplicity criterion as a means to show that aesthetic criteria have a place within science. Aesthetic criteria shows that intuitive thought is needed to establish a rational canon. If I remember correctly:

Some don't call it "faith"--some call it "intuition"... I'm very wary of such appeals, because I hear it as "I will continue to believe despite lack of evidence or argument for my position (at least, of the kind that I can share with anyone who disagrees)."

So, this is why I felt that you were making an inappropriate statement since you called intuitive thought as equivalent to some kind of blind faith without reason. I brought up the simplicity criterion to challenge this notion, but then for some reason you wanted to establish MML theory as a basis for all rational thought. I resisted this and saw no need to talk about simplicity beyond the use of it as an example of intuitive reasoning that has a positive use in reasoning - despite that people cannot come to an agreement on simplicity (or beauty, etc).

[spetey]

Hey Harvey et al.

Again cutting a great deal that is confused but largely irrelevant:

If you must know my views on the structure of justification, my best guesses are foundherentism when it comes to internal justification and a foundationalism when it comes to external justification.

There--now can you answer my question about whether or not it is permissible to continue to hold the same degree of belief in a proposition when you can no longer state reasons for it, and when there are good reasons given against it by others?

(I'm also very curious about whether you think there are facts about which theory is simpler or not, or whether it's all subjective--so that there's no fact about whether pixies-plus-M-theory is just as simple as M-theory; but you needn't answer for the sake of this thread.)


spetey

[harvey1]

If you must know my views on the structure of justification, my best guesses are foundherentism when it comes to internal justification and a foundationalism when it comes to external justification.

Please define in your own words foundherentism and foundationalism. Do you think there are any real terminal beliefs? If so, must everyone have the same terminal beliefs?

There--now can you answer my question about whether or not it is permissible to continue to hold the same degree of belief in a proposition when you can no longer state reasons for it, and when there are good reasons given against it by others?

Our pragmatic experiences are a direct causal link to our intuitive reasons, and therefore, you don't have to give reasons to support the causal link. If experience E causally precedes intuitive reason R (i.e., E --> R), then there is no further need to justify R as long as one is highly confident of R with regard to E. However, if E is causally related to a number of conflicting Rs (e.g., R1, R2, R3, etc.), and there is no other pragmatic or analytical reason to favor R1 or the other Rs, then R1 is in doubt.

For example, if Alice misses a meeting (E) because she ran out of gas or because the meeting started earlier than expected, she might initially reason that she missed the meeting because she ran out of gas (R1). On the other hand, if later she learns that the meeting started earlier than she was first told, then she cannot be sure she missed the meeting because she ran out of gas (~R1). Maybe she would have missed the meeting even if she had not run out of gas simply because the meeting started earlier than expected (R2). Alice is in doubt about R1 and R2, although she is quite sure E can be explained by either R1 or R2.

[spetey]

Please define in your own words foundherentism and foundationalism.

<sigh> I think this is just a distraction. But very briefly, here are four views on the structure of epistemic justification, as I would characterize them:

• foundationalism: the view that some things (not necessarily beliefs) provide justification without themselves being justified (or that some things are self-justifying, but that would alter the definitions below slightly).
• infinitism: the denial of foundationalism plus the requirement that the ancestral of the justification relation be irreflexive (ie no circles of justification).
• coherentism: the denial of foundationalism and the permission of reflexivity in the ancestral (ie mental states may support each other mutually, like planks in Neurath's boat rather than like stones in a pyramid).
• foundherentism: coherentism with the proviso that some mental states are more important to maintain than others; equivalently, I think, foundationalism with merely defeasible foundations.

Do you think there are any real terminal beliefs? If so, must everyone have the same terminal beliefs?

No, I don't think there are any "terminal" beliefs, as I understand you mean them. When it comes to external justification, I think only non-mental states are foundational.

There--now can you answer my question about whether or not it is permissible to continue to hold the same degree of belief in a proposition when you can no longer state reasons for it, and when there are good reasons given against it by others?

Our pragmatic experiences are a direct causal link to our intuitive reasons, and therefore, you don't have to give reasons to support the causal link.

I still don't know what "pragmatic experiences" are (as opposed to regular-old experiences), nor do I know what "intuitive reasons" are (as opposed to regular-old reasons). If you mean reasons and experiences that are non-shareable, say so explicitly now and start explicitly defending an appeal to them. Meanwhile given the mystery of the constituents, the claimed connection between them is unenlightening at best.

Look, of course you can have a private experience that justifies your belief and is non-shareable. For example, you could personally experience capture by aliens. You would reasonably come to believe you had been captured by aliens, but it's unlikely you would be able to convince others. Is this the kind of experience you have for saying God exists? Did God or an angel appear to you personally? If so, you are in the unfortunate position of being in a good position to believe reasonably but not in a good position to share that reason with others.

If not, then as far as I can tell it's not ultimately about your private experiences--it's about reasons you can give to others, or else it's about a belief you simply hold despite its lack of reasons. If you have some fourth way here (other than personal revelation, shareable reasons, or faith appealing), I need to hear exactly what it is and why it is permissible.

If experience E causally precedes intuitive reason R (i.e., E --> R), then there is no further need to justify R as long as one is highly confident of R with regard to E.

Huh? What is it to be "highly confident of [an 'intuitive reason'] with regard to [an experience]"? Is this different from believing (for example) that the mug is on the desk as a result of, and for the reason of, the experience of seeing a mug on the desk?

For example, if Alice misses a meeting (E)

Is 'E' for experience here, or event?

because she ran out of gas or because the meeting started earlier than expected, she might initially reason that she missed the meeting because she ran out of gas (R1).

Notice here you are not talking about a reason in the sense of epistemic justification; instead you are talking about a reason in the sense of causal explanation. But I'm well aware that you have "reasons" for your Christian beliefs in a causal-explanatory sense--you parents took you to church or you read C.S. Lewis or blah-blah. The racist also has "reasons" in this sense--she needs to feel superior, she hangs out with a lot of Klansmen who fill her head with nonsense, and so on. I'm not interested in these. I'm interested in epistemic justification--whether in some important sense that belief is a good one, not whether and how it was caused.

On the other hand, if later she learns that the meeting started earlier than she was first told, then she cannot be sure she missed the meeting because she ran out of gas (~R1). Maybe she would have missed the meeting even if she had not run out of gas simply because the meeting started earlier than expected (R2). Alice is in doubt about R1 and R2, although she is quite sure E can be explained by either R1 or R2.

Because I'm not interested in causal-explanatory reasons here, I don't see how causal overdetermination relates to the issue at hand. (And this example confuses me more than ever about what you mean by "intuitive reason" and "pragmatic experience". Running out of gas is an intuitive reason for the pragmatic experience of missing the meeting?)


spetey

[harvey1]

Please define in your own words foundherentism and foundationalism.

<sigh> I think this is just a distraction. But very briefly, here are four views on the structure of epistemic justification, as I would characterize them:

Hehe. And, you think I saw your requests any differently?

• foundationalism: the view that some things (not necessarily beliefs) provide justification without themselves being justified (or that some things are self-justifying, but that would alter the definitions below slightly).
• infinitism: the denial of foundationalism plus the requirement that the ancestral of the justification relation be irreflexive (ie no circles of justification).
• coherentism: the denial of foundationalism and the permission of reflexivity in the ancestral (ie mental states may support each other mutually, like planks in Neurath's boat rather than like stones in a pyramid).
• foundherentism: coherentism with the proviso that some mental states are more important to maintain than others; equivalently, I think, foundationalism with merely defeasible foundations.

If you must know my views on the structure of justification, my best guesses are foundherentism when it comes to internal justification and a foundationalism when it comes to external justification.... No, I don't think there are any "terminal" beliefs, as I understand you mean them. When it comes to external justification, I think only non-mental states are foundational.

So...

• 1) You reject being an infinitist - so your inferential beliefs can't be justified by another inferential belief (so on and on) for every belief that one can hold
  
  2) You reject being an internal foundationalist with regard to beliefs (i.e., mental states) - so your beliefs can't be justified by a terminal belief.
  
  3) You reject treating every belief as equal (i.e., "some mental states are more important to maintain than others"). Let's call those beliefs that are more important to maintain as your "core beliefs"
  
  4) You accept that your "core beliefs" are internally justified by coherentism (i.e., "[beliefs] may support each other mutually, like planks in Neurath's boat planks")
  
  Hence,
  
  5) Your "core beliefs" aren't terminal, they aren't externally justified, and you see them as justified as a result of "support[ing] each other mutually"

I see big problems here. Let's say that Alice is a racist and she agrees with (1)-(5). How can Bob convince Alice that her "core beliefs" are wrong if she believes that her beliefs cohere together?

I still don't know what "pragmatic experiences" are (as opposed to regular-old experiences), nor do I know what "intuitive reasons" are (as opposed to regular-old reasons). If you mean reasons and experiences that are non-shareable, say so explicitly now and start explicitly defending an appeal to them. Meanwhile given the mystery of the constituents, the claimed connection between them is unenlightening at best.

Regular-old experiences can be pragmatic experiences if they are seen as useful by a "society". However, most experiences have little or no use by a "society".

Look, of course you can have a private experience that justifies your belief and is non-shareable. For example, you could personally experience capture by aliens. You would reasonably come to believe you had been captured by aliens, but it's unlikely you would be able to convince others. Is this the kind of experience you have for saying God exists? Did God or an angel appear to you personally? If so, you are in the unfortunate position of being in a good position to believe reasonably but not in a good position to share that reason with others.

I want to talk in terms of "societies" since humans mainly belong to societies and, for the most part, many of the truths that humans produce are done in the context of societies. In order for a society to consider a "capture by aliens" an acceptable pragmatic experience (i.e., useful for the group), they would have to accept this experience as within the bounds of their criteria.

If not, then as far as I can tell it's not ultimately about your private experiences--it's about reasons you can give to others, or else it's about a belief you simply hold despite its lack of reasons. If you have some fourth way here (other than personal revelation, shareable reasons, or faith appealing), I need to hear exactly what it is and why it is permissible.

A society shares its criteria with members, recruits, and even the public at large. If the society is successful in obtaining new recruits, then they can survive to the next generation. As a result of surviving, they buy themselves time to have their beliefs tend toward truth (i.e., as a statistical process) as long as the evolutionary conditions I discussed are ever-present. This happens by more pragmatic experiences occurring along with analytical work taking place which refines their methods, criteria, and beliefs.

If experience E causally precedes intuitive reason R (i.e., E --> R), then there is no further need to justify R as long as one is highly confident of R with regard to E.

Huh? What is it to be "highly confident of [an 'intuitive reason'] with regard to [an experience]"? Is this different from believing (for example) that the mug is on the desk as a result of, and for the reason of, the experience of seeing a mug on the desk?

Well, that's a very explicit situation - of course yes. However, I'm talking more generally about a pragmatic experience and the lessons that a society draws from that experience. Those experiences can eventually be proven false, however if they appear to be true (i.e., they do not contradict anything else that we might know such as scientific knowledge, logical fallacies, etc), then one is justified in holding those beliefs as long as they continue to be useful.

For example, if Alice misses a meeting (E)

Is 'E' for experience here, or event?

Experience

because she ran out of gas or because the meeting started earlier than expected, she might initially reason that she missed the meeting because she ran out of gas (R1).

Notice here you are not talking about a reason in the sense of epistemic justification; instead you are talking about a reason in the sense of causal explanation. But I'm well aware that you have "reasons" for your Christian beliefs in a causal-explanatory sense--you parents took you to church or you read C.S. Lewis or blah-blah. The racist also has "reasons" in this sense--she needs to feel superior, she hangs out with a lot of Klansmen who fill her head with nonsense, and so on. I'm not interested in these. I'm interested in epistemic justification--whether in some important sense that belief is a good one, not whether and how it was caused.

What you're missing is that 'epistemic justification' is also a causal-explanatory result of years of evolutionary development. That's not saying those rational canons aren't true standards. Rather, we only know they are true because they survived long enough, and humans became so familiar with them that over time they appear like it to us that they justify "good" beliefs and disqualify "bad" beliefs. Again, that's not to say they aren't true, but I think what it is an causal-evolutionary result that humans have even adapted to them by evolutionary "wiring" into our brains. The important question is why did evolution favor those standards over another, and I believe, the answer is due to successful implementation of those 'epistemic beliefs.' I would say that the reason they were successful is because they "fit" reality better than its competitors (because they are true!... ? - fallibilistically speaking).

On the other hand, if later she learns that the meeting started earlier than she was first told, then she cannot be sure she missed the meeting because she ran out of gas (~R1). Maybe she would have missed the meeting even if she had not run out of gas simply because the meeting started earlier than expected (R2). Alice is in doubt about R1 and R2, although she is quite sure E can be explained by either R1 or R2.

Because I'm not interested in causal-explanatory reasons here, I don't see how causal overdetermination relates to the issue at hand. (And this example confuses me more than ever about what you mean by "intuitive reason" and "pragmatic experience". Running out of gas is an intuitive reason for the pragmatic experience of missing the meeting?)

This example was to show an episode of how justified doubt can enter a situation where experience has a causal effect on reasons. It's not a pure example for a pragmatic experience where conflicting intuitive reasons occur, however with that thought in mind it's not too difficult to construct such an experience. For example, Alice could be a scientist who must struggle with the conflict between the simplicity criterion and an elegance criterion. John Tsilikis defined the elegance criterion as:

Elegance is the principle that postulates the adequate representation of a physical problem in mathematical formulae which bestows unity, symmetry, and harmony among the elements of the problem. "Simplicity and Elegance in Theoretical Physics"

[spetey]

Back again!

Hence,

5) Your "core beliefs" aren't terminal, they aren't externally justified, and you see them as justified as a result of "support[ing] each other mutually"

Note this doesn't follow--my core beliefs could be externally justified by something foundational. (As you quote me saying, I am a foundationalist on external justification.) But otherwise, that's correct. Like Quine, I think our set of beliefs is like a web, some of which are nearer the center than others, but all of which are subject to revision.

I see big problems here. Let's say that Alice is a racist and she agrees with (1)-(5). How can Bob convince Alice that her "core beliefs" are wrong if she believes that her beliefs cohere together?

1. She may be wrong that her current beliefs cohere together; Bob shows her so by asking her to consider her own reasons for her position, demonstrating inconsistencies with other beliefs of hers, etc. (For example, maybe Alice thinks racism is justified because it is an old belief system that has therefore survived the evolution of ideas. Bob asks if Alice accepts that style of reasoning when it comes to the equal-rights movement and other old ideas she doesn't hold, and she slowly comes to suspect that her beliefs are incoherent on this score. )
2. Bob could introduce new beliefs to Alice, and she finds that the {OldBeliefs + NewBeliefs - RacismBelief} is more coherent than {OldBeliefs} or {OldBeliefs + NewBeliefs} and thus rationally picks the new set of beliefs and rejects racism. For example, perhaps Bob convinces Alice that other races are capable of suffering, that other races are just as intelligent and hard-working, and so on.

And what, incidentally, are the "big problems" you see with my view? Are they related to your question?

Regular-old experiences can be pragmatic experiences if they are seen as useful by a "society". However, most experiences have little or no use by a "society".

Okay then, what are pragmatic-experiences-for-a-society? Can you give some examples? Nevermind--if it's not relevant to the major question in my last paragraph of this thread, then I don't need an answer.

Rather, we only know [beliefs] are true because they survived long enough, and humans became so familiar with them that over time they appear like it to us that they justify "good" beliefs and disqualify "bad" beliefs.

No, no no no! Survival of an idea is not enough for it to be epistemically justified! Otherwise astrology and racism are just as justified as Christianity, if not moreso (they are considerably older and thus have survived longer). Is this a consequence you accept or not?! If not, then you presumably have some criterion other than idea-survival for telling what theories are true and which ones aren't.

If you can share this criterion, or reasons for your view generally, please do so on our other thread. If you cannot give me reasons for your view, but maintain your belief in the view anyway, please defend that epistemic policy here.


spetey

[harvey1]

5) Your "core beliefs" aren't terminal, they aren't externally justified, and you see them as justified as a result of "support[ing] each other mutually"

Note this doesn't follow--my core beliefs could be externally justified by something foundational. (As you quote me saying, I am a foundationalist on external justification.)

So, let me correct (5) as follows:

5) Your "core beliefs" aren't terminal [a], they ultimately are foundationally justified "without themselves being justified... or that some [beliefs] are self-justif[ied]" , however after these "core beliefs" are foundationally justified "you see them as justified as a result of 'support[ing] each other mutually.' [c]"

In other words...

[a] "I don't think there are any 'terminal' beliefs"
"my core beliefs could be externally justified by something foundational. (As you quote me saying, I am a foundationalist on external justification.)"
[c] my best guesses are foundherentism (i.e., "coherentism with the proviso that some mental states are more important to maintain than others") when it comes to internal justification

Would this be a correct re-wording for (5)?

[spetey]

5) Your "core beliefs" aren't terminal [a], they ultimately are foundationally justified "without themselves being justified... or that some [beliefs] are self-justif[ied]" , however after these "core beliefs" are foundationally justified "you see them as justified as a result of 'support[ing] each other mutually.' [c]"

Would this be a correct re-wording for (5)?

Yeah, pretty good, with these notes:

• Like many people, I think it's important to distinguish "internal" and "external" versions of justification, which we haven't discussed (because it's honestly not relevant). But it's missing from your rewording of (5), and it's important because it's not consistent to be both a foundationalist and a non-foundationalist on either, but it is consistent to be a foundationalist on one and an anti-foundationalist on the other. (Your quotation of me emphasizes this.)
• "Core beliefs" is your term--as a foundherentist, though, I do think some beliefs are "more important to the coherence than others", and I guess I could call those "core beliefs".
• I don't think there's any chronology involved. It's not that after the "core beliefs" are externally justified they play a role in internal foundherence. The core beliefs may or may not be externally justified; that's not a matter entirely up to the thinker in question. One hopes, though, that the core beliefs (and others) are externally justified.

Can you give us some hint about how my views on the structure of justification are relevant to the main issue? To remind you, that main issue is:

• When you cannot give others reason for your position, and others can give reason against your position, is it permissible to continue to believe that position to the same degree--even when that belief has an impact on many others' lives?

spetey