Are there any non-fallacious arguments for non-theism?

[EduChris]

Let's assume for sake of argument that if non-theism were the objective reality, we would be able to offer some positive and non-fallacious argument to support the philosophical viewpoint known as non-theism.

In this discussion, we will use the following definitions:

Theism: the philosophical viewpoint that the non-contingent source and fount of all possibility is not less than personal.

Non-theism: the philosophical viewpoint that theism need not be the case.

God: the non-contingent, not-less-than-personal source and fount of all possibility.

Our universe and our selves constitute the evidence, and we must provide arguments as to why, given this evidence, we should adopt the philosophical viewpoint known as non-theism. In this thread we are not allowed to rely on some supposed "default position of non-theism"; rather, we must provide an actual, non-fallacious argument for non-theism.

After all, if non-theism can be asserted (or adopted, or held) without evidence, then non-theism can be dismissed without evidence.

[Fuzzy Dunlop]

No, EduChris is right. Just as there is a santaism http://www.cromwell-intl.com/fun/santaism.html there must be a non-santaism. I think he's trying to philosophically prove the existence of Santa by stating there are no actual, non-fallacious arguments for non-santaism. I just don't understand why you would need any in the first place to understand that Santa doesn't exist.

It's remarkable how common this type of parody is, considering its manifest absurdity. Is the average atheist really so intellectually bankrupt that he can conceive no valid reasons for supposing that Santa does not exist?

The argument that Santa, leprechauns, Harry Potter and so on do not exist is that we know and can trace their development as fictional ideas.

By contrast in the case of theism we can (to some extent) trace its development - from animism to polytheism to monotheism, with various other developments along the way - as an explanatory theory, primarily regarding causation (why does it rain? why do things exist?).

Isn't this the genetic fallacy?

And unless we attempt to turn scientific observations/descriptions into metaphysical principles/prescriptions - proposing that the 'laws of nature' we have recently formulated are actual principles which constrain things' behaviour - theism's role as explanatory theory has not yet been superceded or otherwise rendered obsolete (though like the theory of gravity it has certainly needed a lot of refinement over the millenia!).

Is there any valid alternative theory? Is there any non-fallacious argument for a state of affairs in which theism is not the case?

You can't prove that God doesn't exist. Unfalsifiable theories by definition cannot be rendered obsolete. The burden of proof is on the theist - to ask for arguments in favour of the default position is the fallacy of shifting the burden of proof.

So can we, at best, conclude that the state of affairs in which a god exists is at least as plausible as the state of affairs in which a god does not exist? If not, we surely ought to be seeing considerably better efforts on the part of alternative theories - some decent non-fallacious arguments that theism needn't be the case.

Theism requires additional assumptions, making it is a less preferable position according to Occam's razor.

[Mithrae]

In the case of theism - from its roots in animism and polytheism - the reason for supposing that clouds, animals, rivers and so on were governed by choice is because that is the causal process with which we are most intimately familiar. In fact to my knowledge I don't think that a conclusive case can be made for any other causal process at all! The reason why local spirits merged into pantheons of gods, and pantheons of gods into a single Creator boils down largely to Ockham's razor, I suspect.

The problem is that theism does not stop at explanations for the existence of the universe. Theism goes to add attributes and personality traits to god where nothing suggests these traits. They also add claims such as that god made a list of commands by which we must live by aswell as claiming an afterlife.

Yes, that can be a problem both logically and socially. But it doesn't invalidate my reasoning, and nor is it an argument for non-theism. And on the flip side, some of those attributions and anthropomorphisms might possibly be true even if not reached through philosophy, and perhaps more importantly can provide benefits as much or more than their detriments - offering hope, inspiring good and so on.

Over the millenia, and over the past few centuries especially, we've greatly broadened both the scope and depth of our descriptions of observable phenomena. We have disconfirmed any suggestion that the sun is pulled across the sky in Apollo's chariot, or is pushed by a celestial dung beetle. But to my knowledge we have not disconfirmed the suggestion that the motions of sun, moon and stars operate under divine governance.

My point is the belief in god is an assumption that has a bad reputation of being false in the case of sunsets and seasons. Why does our gap of knowledge have to conclude the existence of god? What is so wrong with saying "we don't know yet"? Even if a 9 year old boy does not know where babies come from does not mean they come from storks. To me the god argument is as good as the stork theory; both are based on nothing other than hastily filling in a gap in our knowledge.

On the one hand you're suggesting that if a theory is consistently found to be wanting in its specifics, it can more generally be considered a bad theory. But on the other hand you're suggesting that if an alternative theory is consistently absent, we cannot more generally suppose that it won't be found.

I don't accept either view, myself. Where a theory is wrong, it's wrong - though as I've suggested, I'm not sure that Hebrew theism for one has actually made any incorrect claims regarding sunrises and seasons (though there's certainly the question of how some of the Genesis myths were intended to be read, which could be considered falsified claims if they were intended factually/literally). And where no alternative theory has been found, an existing theory is not merely "filling in a gap in our knowledge."

Of course we can't be certain of the god theory, any more than we can be certain of other theories about the past which depend on inference from current observations. But as I suggested, the particular content of the god theory is not merely a catch-all causal explanation, but an extrapolation from our own experience of thought and choice. And as LiamOS correctly identified, that makes an alternative explanation of thought and choice a key problem in falsifying the god theory; these are (apparently) remarkable and unique characteristics of living beings, which should not be simply waved away as bound to be explained 'properly' before too long.

---

No, EduChris is right. Just as there is a santaism http://www.cromwell-intl.com/fun/santaism.html there must be a non-santaism. I think he's trying to philosophically prove the existence of Santa by stating there are no actual, non-fallacious arguments for non-santaism. I just don't understand why you would need any in the first place to understand that Santa doesn't exist.

It's remarkable how common this type of parody is, considering its manifest absurdity. Is the average atheist really so intellectually bankrupt that he can conceive no valid reasons for supposing that Santa does not exist?

The argument that Santa, leprechauns, Harry Potter and so on do not exist is that we know and can trace their development as fictional ideas.

By contrast in the case of theism we can (to some extent) trace its development - from animism to polytheism to monotheism, with various other developments along the way - as an explanatory theory, primarily regarding causation (why does it rain? why do things exist?).

Isn't this the genetic fallacy?

No.

And unless we attempt to turn scientific observations/descriptions into metaphysical principles/prescriptions - proposing that the 'laws of nature' we have recently formulated are actual principles which constrain things' behaviour - theism's role as explanatory theory has not yet been superceded or otherwise rendered obsolete (though like the theory of gravity it has certainly needed a lot of refinement over the millenia!).

Is there any valid alternative theory? Is there any non-fallacious argument for a state of affairs in which theism is not the case?

You can't prove that God doesn't exist. Unfalsifiable theories by definition cannot be rendered obsolete. The burden of proof is on the theist - to ask for arguments in favour of the default position is the fallacy of shifting the burden of proof.

You can't prove anything with certainty, but I actually mentioned in that very post that LiamOS had posted a potential falsification criterion for theistic theories. I think the burden of proof is on you to show why you think theism cannot be falsified by reasonable criteria.

So can we, at best, conclude that the state of affairs in which a god exists is at least as plausible as the state of affairs in which a god does not exist? If not, we surely ought to be seeing considerably better efforts on the part of alternative theories - some decent non-fallacious arguments that theism needn't be the case.

Theism requires additional assumptions, making it is a less preferable position according to Occam's razor.

I spend a disturbing amount of time thinking about this, so in the spirit of generousity I won't ask you to back up your bare assertion here

Theism which proposes a god/universe duality (as in the case of traditional Christianity for example) does indeed require additional assumptions. But as far as I can imagine the simplest form which any metaphysical theories could take would have to involve both substance and behaviour (and arguably a substrate, or place to be and happen, such as the dimensions of time and space). I explained my thoughts more fully in one of those thousand-word threads you don't much like, so I'd better not give you a link So we might say that the basic substance of reality are the elementary particles - the quarks, leptons and bosons - and the basic behaviour is described by the fundamental interactions - strong and weak nuclear forces, electromagnetism and gravity. Or we might say that the basic substance of reality is one-dimensional strings and/or two-dimensional branes, and the basic behaviour is (I really don't know what M-theory proposes), and the substrate consists of 11 dimensions (or perhaps 26 depending on how you look at it).

But both of those theories propose types of behaviour in addition to the choice which we all know and experience throughout each day, whereas theism does not. Moreover idealism/panentheism - hardly a new type of theory, hailing back to ancient Hindu and Greek philosophy - proposes that the basic substance of reality is ("God's") thought, and there is an obvious and intimate association between thought and choice: Without choice thought is meaningless, and without thought choice cannot exist.

So we have:
> An option/s which proposes an additional type of behaviour (or, as some would argue, requires negating the type of behaviour which we all experience every day), and a type of substance (physical) which is not obviously or necessarily associated with any particular behaviour at all
> Or an option which extrapolates from our known and experienced type of behaviour, and a type of substance (mental) intimately associated with it (and the most certain thing we can know of our own being; cogito ergo sum)

Which one does Ockham's razor favour, would you say? Or did you have some other theory in mind against which theism requires additional assumptions?


Edit: I just realised that I've got a terrible habit of hijacking EduChris' threads. Did the same to one about volitional non-contingent entities a while back I'll try to stay on topic henceforth:
Are there any non-fallacious arguments for the viewpoint that theism needn't be the case?

[Fuzzy Dunlop]

No, EduChris is right. Just as there is a santaism http://www.cromwell-intl.com/fun/santaism.html there must be a non-santaism. I think he's trying to philosophically prove the existence of Santa by stating there are no actual, non-fallacious arguments for non-santaism. I just don't understand why you would need any in the first place to understand that Santa doesn't exist.

It's remarkable how common this type of parody is, considering its manifest absurdity. Is the average atheist really so intellectually bankrupt that he can conceive no valid reasons for supposing that Santa does not exist?

The argument that Santa, leprechauns, Harry Potter and so on do not exist is that we know and can trace their development as fictional ideas.

By contrast in the case of theism we can (to some extent) trace its development - from animism to polytheism to monotheism, with various other developments along the way - as an explanatory theory, primarily regarding causation (why does it rain? why do things exist?).

Isn't this the genetic fallacy?

No.

You seem to be saying that Santa and God cannot be compared because of the different ways the concepts originated. How is that not the genetic fallacy?

And unless we attempt to turn scientific observations/descriptions into metaphysical principles/prescriptions - proposing that the 'laws of nature' we have recently formulated are actual principles which constrain things' behaviour - theism's role as explanatory theory has not yet been superceded or otherwise rendered obsolete (though like the theory of gravity it has certainly needed a lot of refinement over the millenia!).

Is there any valid alternative theory? Is there any non-fallacious argument for a state of affairs in which theism is not the case?

You can't prove that God doesn't exist. Unfalsifiable theories by definition cannot be rendered obsolete. The burden of proof is on the theist - to ask for arguments in favour of the default position is the fallacy of shifting the burden of proof.

You can't prove anything with certainty, but I actually mentioned in that very post that LiamOS had posted a potential falsification criterion for theistic theories. I think the burden of proof is on you to show why you think theism cannot be falsified by reasonable criteria.

Why can't God create a universe where consciousness is entirely the product of matter-energy interactions?

So can we, at best, conclude that the state of affairs in which a god exists is at least as plausible as the state of affairs in which a god does not exist? If not, we surely ought to be seeing considerably better efforts on the part of alternative theories - some decent non-fallacious arguments that theism needn't be the case.

Theism requires additional assumptions, making it is a less preferable position according to Occam's razor.

I spend a disturbing amount of time thinking about this, so in the spirit of generousity I won't ask you to back up your bare assertion here

Theism which proposes a god/universe duality (as in the case of traditional Christianity for example) does indeed require additional assumptions. But as far as I can imagine the simplest form which any metaphysical theories could take would have to involve both substance and behaviour (and arguably a substrate, or place to be and happen, such as the dimensions of time and space). I explained my thoughts more fully in one of those thousand-word threads you don't much like, so I'd better not give you a link So we might say that the basic substance of reality are the elementary particles - the quarks, leptons and bosons - and the basic behaviour is described by the fundamental interactions - strong and weak nuclear forces, electromagnetism and gravity. Or we might say that the basic substance of reality is one-dimensional strings and/or two-dimensional branes, and the basic behaviour is (I really don't know what M-theory proposes), and the substrate consists of 11 dimensions (or perhaps 26 depending on how you look at it).

But both of those theories propose types of behaviour in addition to the choice which we all know and experience throughout each day, whereas theism does not. Moreover idealism/panentheism - hardly a new type of theory, hailing back to ancient Hindu and Greek philosophy - proposes that the basic substance of reality is thought, and there is an obvious and intimate association between thought and choice: Without choice thought is meaningless, and without thought choice cannot exist.

So we have:
> An option which proposes an additional type of behaviour (or, as some would argue, requires negating the type of behaviour which we all experience every day), and a type of substance which is not obviously or necessarily associated with any particular behaviour
> Or an option which extrapolates from our known and experienced type of behaviour, and a type of substance intimately associated with it (and the most certain thing we can know of our own being; cogito ergo sum)

Which one does Ockham's razor favour, would you say? Or did you have some other theory in mind against which theism requires additional assumptions?

Agnostic atheism. An option which does not assume anything about what the "basic substance of reality" is and does not assume that the experience of "choice" to be some distinct thing or fundamental causal factor.

[Mithrae]

Fuzzy since we aren't discussing arguments for non-theism, I think it'd be polite to EduChris to move our discussion over to the more appropriate 'Arguments for theism' thread. My reply is here.

[Justin108]

Yes, that can be a problem both logically and socially. But it doesn't invalidate my reasoning, and nor is it an argument for non-theism.

It does. The more assumptions a belief makes, the less likely it is true.

Atheism makes one assumption: that a universe can exist without the help of a god.

Deism makes one assumption: that a universe must have a god to exist.

Theism makes many assumptions: that god exists, that god is male, that he spoke to so-and-so, that he commanded x and y, that he made a place called heaven, that he has helpers called "angels", etc.

And though I know not all theistic religions conforms to this set of beliefs, they still make the same kinds of assumptions.

And on the flip side, some of those attributions and anthropomorphisms might possibly be true even if not reached through philosophy, and perhaps more importantly can provide benefits as much or more than their detriments - offering hope, inspiring good and so on.

No matter the benefits derived from believing in X, it does not affect the probability of X.

Just as believing in Santa promotes obedience from children and give them a magical outlook on the world, it does in no way increase the probability of validity.

On the one hand you're suggesting that if a theory is consistently found to be wanting in its specifics, it can more generally be considered a bad theory. But on the other hand you're suggesting that if an alternative theory is consistently absent, we cannot more generally suppose that it won't be found.

No the thing is that the same model is constantly being shifted from one unexplained phenomena to another. It isn't that much one theory as it is recycling an explanation.

It isn't just that one theory persists despite being wanting, it is that one explanation is being shifted around from one concept to the next.

"God did it" is used time and time again to explain that which we do not know. It forms a pattern of of "God did it" followed by "oh actually it's just nature" to "well God did this then" to "no that's nature too" to "then God did this" to "nope... also nature" etc.

Let's make the problem clearer by taking away "God". Let's look at evil spirits. Evil spirits have been used to explain illness for ages. Science however confirms time and again that ailment after ailment is caused by something other than "evil spirits". If there came a new virus out that scientists could not explain, would you jump back to the age-old explanation of "evil spirits"? Or would you have concluded by now that evil spirits is a poor argument that never stands?

And where no alternative theory has been found, an existing theory is not merely "filling in a gap in our knowledge."

Like I mentioned before, Theism does more than merely attempt to explain things. Theism isn't a theory in that it assumes itself to be true and irrefutable. A fair theorist does not make this claim while a theist often does. Not to mention, Theism adds to itself more than is needed to explain reality. God does not need to be a "he" or have had to have spoken to Abraham and made promises to Moses for the basic theory to explain the universe. In that it stops being a theory.

If God is to be used as a theory of origin then I persist in saying the Deistic god makes the most sense as it makes no unnecessary assumptions other than that which is needed for the theory to be internally consistent.

[d.thomas]

Atheism or non theism is not a philosophical viewpoint anyway you slice it.

I've debated with atheists now for some 4 months daily
and 99% says it is philosophy or at least logic and logic
is part of phil?

so what is atheism to you then? As a former atheist and now freethinker
I would find an answer interesting

Atheism is without theism. I don't do religion and I don't bowl either, there just happens to be a name for those that don't do religion, and those that bowl don't get on my case about my non participation, there's not even a thread for that let alone a forum.

[EduChris]

...if we don't know what caused our universe, how can we know whether or not our universe is logically necessary?...

We are compelled by force of logic to say that the "source of all possibility" exists necessarily. To say otherwise is to say that there was some state of affairs in which nothing was, and nothing could ever be. But since we obviously are here, we know that the "source and fount of all possibility" cannot not be, which is to say it is logically necessary (i.e., non-contingent).

But notice that we are not compelled by any force of logic to say that our universe and our selves are logically necessary. It is perfectly reasonable to say, "Our universe might not have been," or "it might have been other than it is." No logical contradiction is entailed by those statements. Of course we might be factually wrong--perhaps for some unknowable reason our universe and our selves are logically necessary. But until such facts can be established, the only rational option is to make a decision according to the normal epistemic principle that we do not assume something is logically necessary when we are not compelled to do so. To assume, without any basis, that something is logically necessary is to commit the worst sort of epistemological error.

...what is the logical contradiction in the statement "our universe might not have been created by God"?

Given the definition of God proposed in the OP, your question is equivalent to the following: "What is the logical contradiction in the statement, 'our universe might have come about through strictly impersonal means'." There is no logical contraction in the statement, but it does involve the epistemic error of assuming necessity without sufficient warrant or need or reason.

[EduChris]

...your definition for non-theism should be the viewpoint that the non-contingent source and fount of all possibility need not be personal....You've stated that necessity is a known possible type of causation alongside personal agency...So you must acknowledge that the non-contingent source and fount of all possibility might be causal necessity...

I think these objections are answered in this post (a reply to Fuzzy). If you still have objections, please let me know.

[olavisjo]

If consciousness in humans can be shown to be entirely the product of matter-energy interactions, no other form of consciousness is known. Given this, one would logically default to the position that anything preceding matter cannot be conscious, which gives us the conclusion that God, in any meaningful sense, is not conscious, and therefore Theism is not the case.

Textbook case of argument from ignorance.

Need I say more?

[EduChris]

...you're setting aside the default position so that we can get on with the proactive task of seeing if there are any non-fallacious arguments for the default position...

I think we can agree that the initial or "default" position to just about anything is, "I don't know." What I am trying to do on this thread is find out what might happen if we were to venture forth, if we were to stop clinging to our comfortable perch of ignorance, in order to discover what we might come to know if we were to exert proactive due diligence.

In other words, I am suggesting that we temporarily, for the sake of argument, use "I'm working on that, and I'll let you know what I find" as our default position on this thread.

It may be that after we have performed due diligence, we will find that "I don't know" is still the best option.

It seems to me that "I don't know because I haven't done due diligence" is less enlightened than "I don't know even though I've performed due diligence." Maybe, just maybe, some worthwhile knowledge might ensue from having performed our due diligence.