Do You Apply Your Epistemology Consistently?

[bluegreenearth]

Whenever I evaluate apologetic arguments, I'm compelled to wonder if these apologists consistently apply their epistemology to other claims. Usually, the apologists I encounter dodge the challenge of applying their epistemology consistently. Instead, I'm offered appeals to special pleading for why they are justified in accepting a positive result of a particular epistemology when it has been applied to a desirable theistic claim but also justified in rejecting an equally positive result from that same epistemology when it has been applied to an unfavorable or competing claim.

For example, some Christians commonly refer to an epistemology which justifies the application of faith in Holy Scriptures and sensory experiences they interpret to be divine revelation from the Holy Spirit as a reliable mechanism for obtaining knowledge of Gods existence and his requirements for humanity. At the same time, the identical or nearly identical epistemology underlies theological claims from other competing religious traditions which are not only incompatible with Christianity but each other as well. This inconsistency is not necessarily a problem for theism in general, but most religious traditions are inherently dogmatic and unwilling to embrace external theological claims.

When confronted with this dilemma, many theists modify or transfer their epistemology grounded on faith to an epistemology grounded on something like emotional appeal or personal experience which may help distinguish their preferred theology from other less desirable theologies, but these epistemological approaches are equally unreliable. For instance, Christians will often say things like, I know Jesus Christ exists as my one true Lord and Savior because I have a personal relationship with him. or I know Christianity is true because Ive experienced positive changes since surrendering my life to the will of God. Meanwhile, nothing prohibits loyal followers of competing religious traditions from using the identical epistemology to distinguish and justify their own theological beliefs.

In more intellectual circles, many theists will modify their epistemology to resemble a scientific or historiographic methodology as a strategy for maintaining confidence in a religious belief. Nevertheless, those intellectually motivated epistemological modifications usually fail at permanently resolving the initial problem of producing positive results that also serve in supporting the interests of unfavorable or competing claims. At the same time none of those strategies successfully mitigate for confirmation bias and may actually depend upon it to achieve the theist's desired goal unlike an epistemology that is actually grounded in a scientific or historiographic methodology.

In all fairness, theists are not prohibited from utilizing a fluid epistemology in that way to justify their beliefs among themselves. If the goal is to reinforce a preferred belief, then adopting the most favorable epistemology or swapping back and forth between multiple epistemologies will serve to achieve that goal regardless of whether or not it corresponds with reality. Furthermore, when changing the epistemic rules at any convenient moment is acceptable or unnoticeable, it becomes relatively easy for apologists to justify theological claims to themselves and other people who already harbor a strong emotional attachment to their shared beliefs. However, it should be noted that every religious tradition retains the same ability to modify their epistemology at will in order to justify and reinforce a preferred theology. More importantly, there is no reason to expect a non-believer to operate under such an unstable and unreliable epistemological model which fails to mitigate for confirmation bias and produces a knowledge base that is inconsistent with or contradictory to the reality they experience.

Questions for consideration and debate:

What is the justification for failing to consistently apply an established epistemology?

How reliable is an epistemology that serves to support multiple competing or contradictory beliefs?

[bluegreenearth]

William: I see you still want to argue this from the platform of non-creation and accompanying bias, rather than accept that it has not been established either way.

Be that as it may, insisting things exist without intelligent sentient process doesn't lend any weight to your argument.
If you could show us any part of the physical universe which definitely exists independently of a Creator, that would make your argument less weak.

That you think given enough time it would 'seem possible' that a simulated reality could happen on the belief that this is what happened with our own universe, one has to remind you that it is not an established fact that our universe came about through that process.

It is only a presumption - and furthermore a presumption instigated through the belief that we are NOT within a Creation.

I'm not arguing from a platform of non-creation. I'm arguing from a platform of agnosticism. I don't recall claiming to believe that we are not living within a creation. In fact, I've indicated that living within a creation is one of many logical possibilities.

William: That may well be the case for you, but it is not the case for others who have and who do experienced alternate realities.
As to an 'empirical reality' (as opposed to your arguing 'metaphysical realities'), I have already pointed out that any reality experienced can be regarded as Simulated Reality Experiences, so trying to differentiate them seems to be erroneous...especially since you have so far avoided replying to those points I made about it.

From my perspective, I thought I had replied to those points in the way they were understood by me. Maybe I am just unclear as to what you were attempting to convey. As for the claim that others are able to experience alternate realities, what would be my justification for accepting that assertion is true? How could I distinguish between people who have experienced an alternate reality and people who mistakenly believe they have experienced an alternate reality?

In regards to any experienced reality being regarded as a simulated reality experience, I've no problem considering that possibility. The issue I have is with the claim that anyone can know the reality they are experiencing is simulated as apposed to merely considering it as one of many logical possibilities. Are you suggesting that the reality simulation claim is an axiomatic assertion of your epistemology?

William:William: While your sense might be restricted, this does not mean that other peoples senses are just as restricted.

Would you argue that a blind person has the right to refuse a description of something from someone who can see, just because the blind person cannot see it with their own eyes?

A blind person would have the right to refuse a description of something from someone who can see if the object being described is not otherwise detectable by another sense perception like touch. For example, if I claim to see a unicorn in front of me but the blind person cannot feel the properties I've described about the unicorn, then the blind person will be justified in remaining skeptical of my claim.

William:Indeed, even that you yourself have not experienced anything other than this particular reality, and may be entitled to create your own Epistemology based only upon what you sense, does not allow for you to then say that all others with a different Epistemology are wrong, or applying their world view incorrectly.

I don't recall claiming that every epistemology other than my own is wrong. No epistemology can be "wrong" in the sense that the term "wrong" is defined by the arbitrary axioms of an epistemology. There is a logical reason why the axioms of any epistemology are arbitrary. The chain of reasoning required to justify an argument is actually infinite because any statement someone makes to justify another statement will also require its own justification thereby creating an infinite regress of justifications. Consequently, every epistemology must arbitrarily select statements which will be exempt from further justification to serve as a foundation for knowledge. Once someone has described their epistemology to me, I can assess whether it is being applied consistently. I can also evaluate if someone's epistemology, when consistently applied, produces competing or contradictory knowledge claims. Furthermore, regardless of the epistemology, I can assess if an argument is logically consistent.

William: I have not argued that it would be unreasonable to conclude this. Indeed, every single Reality Experience should be regarded as a Simulated Creation, involving a Creator.

What is the justification for regarding every reality experience as a simulated creation rather than acknowledging where that claim is one of an infinite number of other logical possibilities? Are you indicating to me that this claim is one of the arbitrary axioms in your epistemology?

I have been saying as much, (my theology includes this) which is why I have been questioning your propensity to bring into the argument "metaphysical" as opposed to this current Reality Experience. You appear to have either skimmed over that, or simply have not understood my examples already given.

It is probable that I'm not understanding your examples. When you refer to this current reality experience, what is the justification for claiming a simulation is the source of this reality experience as opposed to any other logical possibility? Has every other logical possibility been conclusively falsified or are you designating the simulation claim as an arbitrary axiom in your epistemology?

William: This is why I have been asking you why you insist on complicating the idea through this 'either it is or it isn't' argument. Dispensing with the 'metaphysical' and just treating all Reality Experiences as Simulated, deals with those unnecessary additions.

I'm not sure that treating all reality experiences as simulations allows you to escape any and all philosophical problems. It is fine if you are designating that claim as an axiomatic assertion in your epistemology, but then your epistemology won't function to help you consider the other logical possibilities for the source of the reality you are experiencing. Unless I'm missing something, it seems to me that treating all reality experiences as simulations only removes the other logically possible sources of those realities by arbitrarily ignoring them. Personally, I prefer to utilize an epistemology which permits me an intellectually honest ability to consider all logical possibilities for the source of the reality I am experiencing regardless of the additional complications that might bring. Then again, maybe I'm just misunderstanding your point.

William: So I suppose then that until you drop this unnecessary "Metaphysical-reality-as-opposed-to physical-reality" idea from your argument, there is little more we can accomplish in discussion.

In that, I have no option but to conclude that the OP subject is just another non-theist 'pot calling the kettle black' thread...

When there are other logically possible sources for the reality I experience, what would be my justification for declaring them to be unnecessary considerations? If I am to avoid being the "pot calling the kettle black," it is essential that I consistently apply my epistemology. As such, would you agree that I should be applying my epistemology consistently to all logical possibilities for the source of the reality I'm experiencing? Would I be consistently applying my epistemology if I ignored the logical distinction between a metaphysical reality and an empirical reality in favor of treating all realities as simulations?

[William]

[Replying to post 60 by bluegreenearth]

William: As I wrote in my last post, I have no option but to conclude that the OP subject is just another non-theist 'pot calling the kettle black' thread...

To add to that, your defense appears to be that you don't understand me.

I agree that this appears to be the case. However, I am confident that what I write is understandable enough, even more so with clarifying - so when someone complains that I am making no sense to them, after my having clarified, I am unwilling to put any more effort into the process.

In that, I am happy to believe that there are those who have read our interaction and who understand what it is I am saying.

Perhaps they will quietly take that into consideration as they work their ways through the puzzle of this particular Realiyt Simulation.

Go Well.

[bluegreenearth]

[Replying to post 60 by bluegreenearth]

William: As I wrote in my last post, I have no option but to conclude that the OP subject is just another non-theist 'pot calling the kettle black' thread...

To add to that, your defense appears to be that you don't understand me.

I agree that this appears to be the case. However, I am confident that what I write is understandable enough, even more so with clarifying - so when someone complains that I am making no sense to them, after my having clarified, I am unwilling to put any more effort into the process.

In that, I am happy to believe that there are those who have read our interaction and who understand what it is I am saying.

Perhaps they will quietly take that into consideration as they work their ways through the puzzle of this particular Realiyt Simulation.

Go Well.

Would you please at least attempt one more clarification? I do not understand where the accusation of "the pot calling the kettle black" applies to me in this thread. Where am I failing to apply my epistemology consistently? If this is not what you mean by "the pot calling the kettle black," then you'll need to indicate otherwise because that is how I'm interpreting your objection.

[bluegreenearth]

[Replying to post 60 by bluegreenearth]

William: As I wrote in my last post, I have no option but to conclude that the OP subject is just another non-theist 'pot calling the kettle black' thread...

To add to that, your defense appears to be that you don't understand me.

I agree that this appears to be the case. However, I am confident that what I write is understandable enough, even more so with clarifying - so when someone complains that I am making no sense to them, after my having clarified, I am unwilling to put any more effort into the process.

In that, I am happy to believe that there are those who have read our interaction and who understand what it is I am saying.

Perhaps they will quietly take that into consideration as they work their ways through the puzzle of this particular Realiyt Simulation.

Go Well.

Would you please at least attempt one more clarification? I do not understand where the accusation of "the pot calling the kettle black" applies to me in this thread. Where am I failing to apply my epistemology consistently? If this is not what you mean by "the pot calling the kettle black," then you'll need to indicate otherwise because that is how I'm interpreting your objection.

If anyone monitoring my dialogue with William in this thread would like to help me understand his point more clearly, I will appreciate the assistance. Of course, this request presumes there is someone who does properly understand the point William has attempted to convey on me. If anyone else is as equally confused as I am, an expression of sympathetic concurrence with my frustration will also help me know I'm not alone in my lack of understanding. Thanks.

[William]

William: I see you still want to argue this from the platform of non-creation and accompanying bias, rather than accept that it has not been established either way.

What is the justification for regarding every reality experience as a simulated creation rather than acknowledging where that claim is one of an infinite number of other logical possibilities? Are you indicating to me that this claim is one of the arbitrary axioms in your epistemology?

William: Where in "it has not been established either way." do you see me claiming one over the other?

My attempt to explain to you that we can take the agnostic position for either, but we also need to acknowledge that the idea of the physical universe being the only universe to exist and itself NOT being a Creation verses the idea that we exist within one of - possibly - infinite number of Creations.

In that there are only two possibilities, and only one of them appears to me to being more logical than the other...

There is no justification in complicating things further than that.

bluegreenearth: It is probable that I'm not understanding your examples. When you refer to this current reality experience, what is the justification for claiming a simulation is the source of this reality experience as opposed to any other logical possibility? Has every other logical possibility been conclusively falsified or are you designating the simulation claim as an arbitrary axiom in your epistemology?

William: If you can list 10 of these "other logical possibilities" which cannot be said to be Simulations, I will examine these.
The idea of we being within a Creation is simply being given equal footing with the idea we that are not. That is as far as I go with an arbitrary axiom regarding that.

bluegreenearth: A blind person would have the right to refuse a description of something from someone who can see if the object being described is not otherwise detectable by another sense perception like touch. For example, if I claim to see a unicorn in front of me but the blind person cannot feel the properties I've described about the unicorn, then the blind person will be justified in remaining skeptical of my claim.

William: Is this what you think is going on? That I am arguing for that? I am saying to the blind person that there are things I can see which he cannot touch with his hands, because such things exist, even that he is blind and cannot see - or touch - them.

Let me know if you want to see a picture of one such thing, and I will gladly post it here.

[bluegreenearth]

William: Where in "it has not been established either way." do you see me claiming one over the other?

You indicated that all reality experiences should be treated as simulations. I interpreted that position to be one in which the simulation possibility is arbitrarily accepted and the non-simulation possibility is arbitrarily rejected. If that is not the case, then what is the justification for treating all reality experiences as simulations at the expense of the non-simulation possibility?

My attempt to explain to you that we can take the agnostic position for either, but we also need to acknowledge that the idea of the physical universe being the only universe to exist and itself NOT being a Creation verses the idea that we exist within one of - possibly - infinite number of Creations.

In that there are only two possibilities, and only one of them appears to me to being more logical than the other...

There is no justification in complicating things further than that.

I'm sensing a false dichotomy here, but I could be mistaken. Nevertheless, if you grant that we can take the agnostic position for either, then what is your objection?

William: If you can list 10 of these "other logical possibilities" which cannot be said to be Simulations, I will examine these.
The idea of we being within a Creation is simply being given equal footing with the idea we that are not. That is as far as I go with an arbitrary axiom regarding that.

If both possibilities are being given equal footing, then what is the objection?

William: Is this what you think is going on? That I am arguing for that? I am saying to the blind person that there are things I can see which he cannot touch with his hands, because such things exist, even that he is blind and cannot see - or touch - them.

Let me know if you want to see a picture of one such thing, and I will gladly post it here.

From the perspective of the blind man, the reliability of a claim from the person with sight will depend on whether the claim has an implicit empirical bases upon which the blind man could justify being less skeptical of the claim. If the person with sight claims to have seen an apple in a photograph, the blind man's prior experience with touching, smelling, and tasting apples provides him with the implicit empirical bases for which to be less skeptical of the claim that someone photographed an apple. Conversely, the blind man would not be justified in accepting any claim that does not have an implicit empirical bases. So, if you are comparing yourself to the person with sight and comparing me to the blind man, you'll have to provide me with the implicit empirical basis upon which I would have a justification for being less skeptical of your claim.

[William]

William: Where in "it has not been established either way." do you see me claiming one over the other?

You indicated that all reality experiences should be treated as simulations. I interpreted that position to be one in which the simulation possibility is arbitrarily accepted and the non-simulation possibility is arbitrarily rejected. If that is not the case, then what is the justification for treating all reality experiences as simulations at the expense of the non-simulation possibility?

My attempt to explain to you that we can take the agnostic position for either, but we also need to acknowledge that the idea of the physical universe being the only universe to exist and itself NOT being a Creation verses the idea that we exist within one of - possibly - infinite number of Creations.

In that there are only two possibilities, and only one of them appears to me to being more logical than the other...

There is no justification in complicating things further than that.

I'm sensing a false dichotomy here, but I could be mistaken. Nevertheless, if you grant that we can take the agnostic position for either, then what is your objection?

William: If you can list 10 of these "other logical possibilities" which cannot be said to be Simulations, I will examine these.
The idea of we being within a Creation is simply being given equal footing with the idea we that are not. That is as far as I go with an arbitrary axiom regarding that.

If both possibilities are being given equal footing, then what is the objection?

William: Is this what you think is going on? That I am arguing for that? I am saying to the blind person that there are things I can see which he cannot touch with his hands, because such things exist, even that he is blind and cannot see - or touch - them.

Let me know if you want to see a picture of one such thing, and I will gladly post it here.

From the perspective of the blind man, the reliability of a claim from the person with sight will depend on whether the claim has an implicit empirical bases upon which the blind man could justify being less skeptical of the claim. If the person with sight claims to have seen an apple in a photograph, the blind man's prior experience with touching, smelling, and tasting apples provides him with the implicit empirical bases for which to be less skeptical of the claim that someone photographed an apple. Conversely, the blind man would not be justified in accepting any claim that does not have an implicit empirical bases. So, if you are comparing yourself to the person with sight and comparing me to the blind man, you'll have to provide me with the implicit empirical basis upon which I would have a justification for being less skeptical of your claim.

William: You are confused.

The agnostic position sees both ideas as on the table.

Looking at the idea that the universe we are currently experiencing as being all that is, and NOT a creation, leaves us with nothing more to say on the subject.

Looking at the idea that the universe we are currently experiencing as being a simulation, allows for more scope and thus discussion.

As such, it becomes the better thing to focus upon in relation to the two ideas.

You are confusing my indicating that all reality experiences should be treated as simulations, as being the position I hold on the matter. What I have been saying is that when we look at the possibility that the universe we are currently experiencing is a creation, we cannot do anything other than treat it as a simulation, and any other experience we might have, also has to be a created simulation, if it is a case we exist within a simulation.

I have no objection to us agreeing that if this universe is NOT a creation, then we can speak of it as such. However, like I said, the discussion would naturally have to end there.

In which case, we would hardly be holding an agnostic position on the matter.

If both possibilities are being given equal footing, then I have no objection.

Obviously to examine the possibility of this universe being a creation, we have to agree that there is more on that which requires discussion, if we are to truly hold the position of agnostic on both ideas equally.

This is to say (and I think I have already said it in this thread) that holding an agnostic position does not mean one cannot delve into the idea of a simulated universe and examine it for strength or weakness.

Perhaps that is the source of confusion for you?

Meantime, if you can list just [strike]10[/strike] 3 of these "other logical possibilities" you claim exist which cannot be said to be Simulations, I will examine these.

Your comments regarding the blind man are specific to the argument that our universe is all that is and is not created.
My use of the analogy of the blind man was in response to your argument against a simulated universe, because you - personally - have never experienced any other alternate universe. Others have, and thus, you are the blind man in that analogy.

Your argument of the unicorn in your last post was irrelevant because it did not take that into consideration. The one describing the thing you have not experienced with your senses, isn't trying to show you something which when you reach out to it, you should be able to touch.

To add to that analogy, no person, blind or otherwise, can touch a galaxy, but someone can describe the galaxy to the blind person, as best they are able. The blind person can argue that he cannot touch it, so therefore it might not exist.

But it does exist, even that he cannot see or touch it.

That was the point and substance of the blind-person analogy.

[bluegreenearth]

[Replying to post 66 by William]
I think I'm finally beginning to understand your point but will have to wait for you to confirm if that is the case:

So, you seem to prefer the "created reality simulation" possibility because you have become convinced that it offers more substance for which to engage in speculation than the "non-created reality" possibility. I can appreciate that sentiment, but what does your preference for substantive speculation have to do with whether the claim is true or not? I understand that you accept agnosticism as the logically justifiable position here. However, if it is the case that the application of your epistemology to the "created reality simulation" claim produces agnosticism as the logically justifiable position, then how does it also produce theism as the logically justifiable position?

I've entertained your line of reasoning on the expectation that it would somehow lead back to the purpose of this thread. However, if my latest understanding of your argument is correct, it doesn't seem to serve in demonstrating anything about the reliability of your epistemology or if you are applying it consistently. It will help me if you could demonstrate how you apply your epistemology to another claim. If I'm mistaken in identifying this apparent discrepancy, please offer a clarification. Thanks.

[William]

[Replying to post 66 by William]
I think I'm finally beginning to understand your point but will have to wait for you to confirm if that is the case:

So, you seem to prefer the "created reality simulation" possibility because you have become convinced that it offers more substance for which to engage in speculation than the "non-created reality" possibility. I can appreciate that sentiment, but what does your preference for substantive speculation have to do with whether the claim is true or not? I understand that you accept agnosticism as the logically justifiable position here. However, if it is the case that the application of your epistemology to the "created reality simulation" claim produces agnosticism as the logically justifiable position, then how does it also produce theism as the logically justifiable position?

I've entertained your line of reasoning on the expectation that it would somehow lead back to the purpose of this thread. However, if my latest understanding of your argument is correct, it doesn't seem to serve in demonstrating anything about the reliability of your epistemology or if you are applying it consistently. It will help me if you could demonstrate how you apply your epistemology to another claim. If I'm mistaken in identifying this apparent discrepancy, please offer a clarification. Thanks.

William: Are you saying that a Theist cannot hold an Agnostic position regarding his or her epistemology?

If not, then I do not understand your questioning me about that.

[bluegreenearth]

[Replying to post 68 by William]

I'm not saying that a Theist cannot hold an Agnostic position regarding his or her epistemology. However, now that you mention it, it is an interesting question to ponder because an epistemology is usually required in order to determine if agnosticism is a justified position. In other words, a theist would need to utilize an epistemology in order be agnostic about an epistemology. Nevertheless, I'm asking how the application of your epistemology to this one claim can yield results that equally support both the agnostic and theistic position. Shouldn't the application of a reliable epistemology to a single claim be able to produce a single result? The claim is either unknowable (agnosticism), known to be true (theism), or known to be false (non-theism). If the truth value of the claim is unknowable, than it can't also be known without violating the law of non-contradiction.