The "Supernatural": Burden of Proof?

[boatsnguitars]

Question:
Why should the burden of proof be placed on Supernaturalists (those who believe in the supernatural) to demonstrate the existence, qualities, and capabilities of the supernatural, rather than on Materialists to disprove it, as in "Materialists have to explain why the supernatural can't be the explanation"?

Argument:

Placing the burden of proof on Supernaturalists to demonstrate the existence, qualities, and capabilities of the supernatural is a logical and epistemologically sound approach. This perspective aligns with the principles of evidence-based reasoning, the scientific method, and critical thinking. Several key reasons support this stance.

Default Position of Skepticism: In debates about the supernatural, it is rational to start from a position of skepticism. This is in line with the philosophical principle of "nullius in verba" (take nobody's word for it) and the scientific principle that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Therefore, the burden of proof should fall on those making the extraordinary claim of the existence of the supernatural.

Presumption of Naturalism: Throughout the history of scientific inquiry, the default assumption has been naturalism. Naturalism posits that the universe and its phenomena can be explained by natural laws and processes without invoking supernatural entities or forces. This presumption is based on the consistent success of naturalistic explanations in understanding the world around us. After all, since both the Naturalist and Supernaturalist believe the Natural exists, we only need to establish the existence of the Supernatural (or, whatever someone decides to posit beyond the Natural.)

Absence of Empirical Evidence: The supernatural, by its very nature, is often described as beyond the realm of empirical observation and measurement. Claims related to the supernatural, such as deities, spirits, or paranormal phenomena, typically lack concrete, testable evidence. Therefore, it is incumbent upon those advocating for the supernatural to provide compelling and verifiable evidence to support their claims.

Problem of Unfalsifiability: Many supernatural claims are unfalsifiable: they cannot be tested or disproven. This raises significant epistemological challenges. Demanding that Materialists disprove unfalsifiable supernatural claims places an unreasonable burden on them. Instead, it is more reasonable to require Supernaturalists to provide testable claims and evidence.

In conclusion, the burden of proof should rest on Supernaturalists to provide convincing and verifiable evidence for the existence, qualities, and capabilities of the supernatural. This approach respects the principles of skepticism, scientific inquiry, and parsimonious reasoning, ultimately fostering a more rational and evidence-based discussion of the supernatural in the context of understanding our world and its mysteries.

If they can't provide evidence of the supernatural, then there is no reason for Naturalists to take their claims seriously: Any of their claims that include the supernatural. That includes all religious claims that involve supernatural claims.

I challenge Supernaturalists to defend the single most important aspect at the core of their belief. We all know they can't (they would have by now), but the burden is on them, and it's high time they at least give an honest effort.

Please note: Arguments from Ignorance will be summarily dismissed.

[alexxcJRO]

You keep repeating the same nonsense.

I asked: "Why is Suffering X that happens to the psychopath considered as bad/evil by him?"
You said: "He considers suffering X to be bad/evil by him because it happens to him and suffering Y is good because it happens to someone else and benefits him".
I said: "The logic that something is bad/evil because it happens to him is stupid for other things happen to him "Someone comes and offers him a chocolate which he eats" and clearly he does not deems them bad/evil.
Ergo pointing to the actual reason why he deems it bad/evil: the fact he is experiences excruciating pain."
Now you say: "his logic was that anything that happens to him is bad/evil, but that things that cause him suffering are bad/evil. "

Circular bad logic:
Suffering X is bad/evil because it happens to him.
Other things happen to him which are pleasurable. Ergo the logic is bad.
Anything that happens to him is bad/evil because is causes suffering.

You are done, finished, hasta la vista bye bye baby.

You got the bolded part wrong. Here is what I actually said: I didn’t say his logic was that anything that happens to him is bad/evil, but that things that cause him suffering are bad/evil.

To translate that for you: I said his logic was not that anything that happens to him is bad/evil; his logic is things that cause him suffering are bad/evil.

Here we go again in circles headless chicken style:

Q: Why is Suffering X that happens to the psychopath considered as bad/evil by him?
You can't say: "things that cause him suffering are bad/evil" because would be like answering to the question: "Why are you hungry?" with "Because I am hungry".
Waiting for the answer.

[The Tanager]

Here we go again in circles headless chicken style:

Q: Why is Suffering X that happens to the psychopath considered as bad/evil by him?
You can't say: "things that cause him suffering are bad/evil" because would be like answering to the question: "Why are you hungry?" with "Because I am hungry".
Waiting for the answer.

Yes, when you word the question that way (which isn't the question I was answering before), then it would be like that. So, let's translate my previous answer into this new form of your question. You'll probably want to say I'm changing my answer, but it is the exact same answer. Suffering (whether X or Y) is deemed bad/evil by Peter if it thwarts his desired end and it is considered good by him if it bolsters his desired end. Peter is okay with the suffering attached to getting his wisdom teeth removed because it'll cost less money in the long run and he'll also be able to avoid lengthy problems that could take away from his psychopathic tendencies (or whatever). Peter doesn't like being tortured because he doesn't see personal benefit in it. Peter is okay with torturing others and causing them suffering because it bolster's his desired end.

This is the same thing I've said all along. Peter judges something as good if it benefits him and something bad if it hurts him. His calculus doesn't care about whether it hurts someone else. Our calculus does. You still haven't answered why we are right and Peter is wrong.

This isn't like answering "why are you hungry" with "because I'm hungry". It's like saying that being hungry goes against his desired end of being full and could just as well be like saying that being hungry bolsters his desired end of fasting to train his body or whatever.

[alexxcJRO]

Yes, when you word the question that way (which isn't the question I was answering before), then it would be like that. So, let's translate my previous answer into this new form of your question.

Dishonesty. There is no new form of my question.
I asked: "Q: Why is Suffering X that happens to the psychopath considered as bad/evil by him?" back in post #429. I kept repeating the same question.

You'll probably want to say I'm changing my answer, but it is the exact same answer. Suffering (whether X or Y) is deemed bad/evil by Peter if it thwarts his desired end and it is considered good by him if it bolsters his desired end.
Peter is okay with torturing others and causing them suffering because it bolster's his desired end.
Peter judges something as good if it benefits him and something bad if it hurts him. His calculus doesn't care about whether it hurts someone else. Our calculus does. You still haven't answered why we are right and Peter is wrong.

Still in delulu land.
Dear sir the psychopath Pete is considering the Suffering X as bad for its causing excruciating pain to him. Suffering (whether X or Y) is deemed bad/evil by Peter if it thwarts his desired end: avoid pain.
Everybody knows this.
Ultimately pain -> evil.
If pain->suffering->evil when happens to human A(Pete) then is pain->suffering->evil when it happens to human B(non-moral agent).
The problem is psychopath does not considers Suffering X he inflicts on the non-moral agent as evil. Ergo a contradiction.
We have the universe having this feature: existence of psychopathy where it leads to a contradictory moral system. Were we can't justify its(psychopathy) existence through some good moral reason.
We could easily envision a better universe where the universe does not have this feature: psychopathy is not a thing. Ergo the exemplified Gratuitous suffering does not exist.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to alexxcJRO in post #453]

You are still simply begging the question. You are saying Peter's wrong because he doesn't agree with you because your view is the obvious one. With you just repeating yourself, there is nothing for me to add to my thoughts. Thanks for sharing your thoughts and letting me share mine here.

[alexxcJRO]

[Replying to alexxcJRO in post #453]

You are still simply begging the question. You are saying Peter's wrong because he doesn't agree with you because your view is the obvious one. With you just repeating yourself, there is nothing for me to add to my thoughts. Thanks for sharing your thoughts and letting me share mine here.

Q: So Pete is not considering the Suffering X as bad for its causing excruciating pain to him? What other reason is there?
Q: In what world anyone rational believe this? Delulu land?

[The Tanager]

Q: So Pete is not considering the Suffering X as bad for its causing excruciating pain to him? What other reason is there?
Q: In what world anyone rational believe this? Delulu land?

Pete is considering the suffering as bad, not for it simply causing someone excruciating pain but for it causing him excruciating pain without a higher benefit to himself. If excruciating pain doesn't happen to him but that pain to another gives him any kind of benefit, Pete is fine with that kind of suffering.

You and I don't think that reasoning is good. But that only counts for something (in this discussion) if there is an objective standard to judge between us and Pete. Atheism doesn't provide an objective standard.

If there is no objective standard, then the difference between Pete and ourselves concerning torture of others is that he likes pistachio ice cream and we like chocolate chip cookie dough ice cream. We would be the irrational ones to scream at Pete for liking pistachio ice cream. And if that sounds absurd to you, then don't be a subjectivist and find something to rationally ground objective morals.

[William]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #456]

In attempting to grasp the idea of "objective morality" in relation to it being evidence to place alongside evidence of us existing in a created reality, ultimately pointing us toward a realisation that a creator exists I am still left wondering about what it is being claimed about that creator being supernatural.

I have mentioned in passing that the idea of a supernatural creator brings to mind the same type of creator as the idea of the Deist God.

One such example of a description of the deist position I found and use here is that "Deism holds that a god must exist, based on the evidence of reason and nature only, not on supernatural evidence. Some deists believe that a god created the world but is indifferent to it. Theism holds that there is one God who is still actively engaged with the universe in some way."

Now the part that reminds me of your style of argument is worded "based on the evidence of reason and nature" (your having provided reason and nature through the Kalam) yet you also appear to conflate (from a Deist position/view) that evidence as being evidence of "supernaturalism" and express your beliefs in a way that has one thinking that you believe God is not indifferent.

However, your base-argument appears to be that God is unchanging and unmoving and timeless and eternal as necessary things, so how do you explain why such a God would not be indifferent in that it appears to be (by your current ongoing description of It/Him) that It must be indifferent in order to remain those things attributed to Him.

I think that is my underlying concern with a supposed supernatural cause - it remains as it always has - the base reality for all subsequent realities and must stay that way in order for it to be this - what you call "supernatural" position (and what some Deists think of as "a god created the world but is indifferent to it") as one can't be both.

The only logic I can come up with to integrate these two contradictions (a timeless unchanging cause and a God who is actively engaged with the universe (and specifically with human personalities), is that The Cause created the active God which then can do the engaging.

(Hopefully I worded the above adequately enough for you to understand what I am pointing out/asking of you.)

[The Tanager]

In attempting to grasp the idea of "objective morality" in relation to it being evidence to place alongside evidence of us existing in a created reality, ultimately pointing us toward a realisation that a creator exists I am still left wondering about what it is being claimed about that creator being supernatural.

I actually haven’t been arguing for the supernatural through objective morality. I proposed the Kalam for that. I’ve been responding to claims from alex (and others) concerning what they see as an objective ground for morality outside of a God.

Now the part that reminds me of your style of argument is worded "based on the evidence of reason and nature" (your having provided reason and nature through the Kalam) yet you also appear to conflate (from a Deist position/view) that evidence as being evidence of "supernaturalism" and express your beliefs in a way that has one thinking that you believe God is not indifferent.

However, your base-argument appears to be that God is unchanging and unmoving and timeless and eternal as necessary things, so how do you explain why such a God would not be indifferent in that it appears to be (by your current ongoing description of It/Him) that It must be indifferent in order to remain those things attributed to Him.

I think that is my underlying concern with a supposed supernatural cause - it remains as it always has - the base reality for all subsequent realities and must stay that way in order for it to be this - what you call "supernatural" position (and what some Deists think of as "a god created the world but is indifferent to it") as one can't be both.

Help me to see the problem you see better. Why couldn’t God be eternally interested in us? Why do you think being interested involves change (change from what...being disinterested?) or being temporal or not being eternal? Why don’t you think it can be both things?

[William]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #458]

In attempting to grasp the idea of "objective morality" in relation to it being evidence to place alongside evidence of us existing in a created reality, ultimately pointing us toward a realisation that a creator exists I am still left wondering about what it is being claimed about that creator being supernatural.

I actually haven’t been arguing for the supernatural through objective morality. I proposed the Kalam for that. I’ve been responding to claims from alex (and others) concerning what they see as an objective ground for morality outside of a God.

Are you arguing then that the idea of objective morality is separate from the idea of a supernatural cause?

Help me to see the problem you see better. Why couldn’t God be eternally interested in us?

I did not say that. I said that the (supernatural) Cause couldn't interact with us without somehow changing which would contradict the unchanging (Timeless) attribute you have proposed re the Cause.

Why do you think being interested involves change (change from what...being disinterested?) or being temporal or not being eternal? Why don’t you think it can be both things?

My question to you had to do with why you think it can be both things, and the solution to the contradiction I gave was the suggestion that God (The mind which created the universe we are experiencing and personally engages with human personalities) was created by The Cause.

Re that, I just had this interaction "Bridging the Concept of a Caused Universe Creator" which expands upon the idea of God (The creator of and engager with our universe) being created by The Cause.

[alexxcJRO]

Q: So Pete is not considering the Suffering X as bad for its causing excruciating pain to him? What other reason is there?
Q: In what world anyone rational believe this? Delulu land?

Pete is considering the suffering as bad, not for it simply causing someone excruciating pain but for it causing him excruciating pain without a higher benefit to himself. If excruciating pain doesn't happen to him but that pain to another gives him any kind of benefit, Pete is fine with that kind of suffering.

You and I don't think that reasoning is good. But that only counts for something (in this discussion) if there is an objective standard to judge between us and Pete. Atheism doesn't provide an objective standard.

If there is no objective standard, then the difference between Pete and ourselves concerning torture of others is that he likes pistachio ice cream and we like chocolate chip cookie dough ice cream. We would be the irrational ones to scream at Pete for liking pistachio ice cream. And if that sounds absurd to you, then don't be a subjectivist and find something to rationally ground objective morals.

Sir we are not talking of atheism or other things. We are talking of an certain instance of Gratuitous suffering-Gratuitous evil as a result of psychopathy-description of the universe. That cannot be justified with psychopathic "morality".
Sir Pete considers Suffering X bad because of the excruciating pain he is experiencing. There is no higher benefit. The benefit is not experiencing the excruciating pain.
Pete: Experiencing excruciating pain because of physical torture: bad.
Pete: Experiencing excruciating psychological pain because of psychological torture: bad.
Pete: Experiencing excruciating pain because of cancer: bad.

Ultimately Pete considers the above things as bad for the same reason any other person considers them bad for its an objective reason.
Pete can't say Suffering X is bad if it happens to him but good when it happens to others. For that would contradict reality and not be consistent.
But he does so for psychopathy is a disease resulting from brain functioning differently because of physical differences. Its a pathology.
Pathologies give abnormal behaviour that often leads to illogical and contradictory behaviour.