The Permissibility of Faith

[spetey]

Hi folks!

In my experience, when debating with those who believe in God, my interlocutors will inevitably appeal to faith as their justification for belief. (Some don't call it "faith"--some call it "intuition", or "trust" or some such.) I'm very wary of such appeals, because I hear it as "I will continue to believe despite lack of evidence or argument for my position (at least, of the kind that I can share with anyone who disagrees)." I think such behavior is impermissible. Faith to me is just dogmatism, and to me, dogmatism of any kind is very dangerous.

For comparison: imagine, for example, that you met a rabid racist. You give a carefully reasoned argument to the effect that skin color doesn't matter to who a person is or what rights they have, etc. The racist responds: "Although I have no answer to your argument, or arguments that I can share with you for my own position, I just believe; I have faith that my race is superior." You would be at an impasse, right? Should you come to disagree over some important social policy measure, there is no way to reason out your disagreement. Instead you have to see who has more money for PR, or who has more tanks, or what have you. I assume that in these cases we all agree that "faith" is in an important sense impermissible. We think the racist is being dogmatic, and we think that it's destructive not to be open to reasoning.

So why might appeal to faith be permissible when it comes to discussions of religion? Or have I somehow misconstrued what it is to appeal to faith?


spetey

[harvey1]

Are we coming closer to establishing that I am secretly a dogmatist despite myself, Harvey? Because if not, I'm really not sure why you are still pressing me on this thread--we at least think we agree that it's important to give reasons for controversial beliefs, and you have yet to show me that I don't think this after all!

Dogmatists rarely if ever ask you just to believe what they say from some kind of "faith" alone. Rather, they will give you reasons for that belief, and if one is persistent, they might answer by an appeal to what you call "faith." However, if they were to use your justification for a belief, dogmatism could survive by using loopholes that your view might be promoting. For instance, they could cite standards of coherentism and internal pragmatism they see as being satisfactorily met. Instead of arguing those standards are materialistic based standards (e.g., what you might attempt to do), they could argue that the "correct" basis of rationalism is whatever coheres to their dogmatic stance.

Whoa... How about the answer to my question? Are basic beliefs always a direct consequence of perceptions at some point in history, or not?

First, notice that's a new question--before it was whether core beliefs are "caused by the world", which you now want to assume:

For now, let's just assume that perceptions give us an approximately good notion of the world and that there are no Maxwell demons out there deceiving physicists about the nature of physical law (at least for now).

You're confusing two different discussions in two different threads. Here we are talking about epistemology, so we cannot assume anything, including evil demons deceiving us. As for this thread, I want to get to the core of your epistemological views which I think you need to defend so that it doesn't appear you are throwing stones from a glass house yourself. Since I've already shared and defended my views, I need to know how you hold beliefs accountable to the world. Thus, I need to know how you see beliefs being held accountable to the world via perceptions or some creative approach.

As for your new question: are "basic beliefs" always a direct consequence of perceptions? I'm not sure what you mean by "basic beliefs". Are they what you called "core beliefs" earlier (that is, those nearer the center of your web of belief, the ones less likely to be revised)?

I'm sorry, I used "basic beliefs" synonymously with "core beliefs." I hope that's not confusing for you. These are a set of beliefs which one utilizes in deciding what to believe about the world. For example, I'm typing on a keyboard right now is not a "basic belief," but the belief that in most cases I can trust my perceptions as real is a "basic belief," hence I can feel safe with a non-basic belief that I'm typing on a keyboard.

If so, then no, some basic beliefs will be rather abstract, such as logical laws and principles against dogmatism and the like. These are not directly caused by perceptions--if caused by perceptions at all, they are several layers of abstraction removed. Some "basic beliefs" could be innately believed, and so not caused by perceptions at all. In principle however they could be revised due to contravening perceptual input.

In asking this question, I'm not suggesting that "basic beliefs" are "directly" caused by perceptions in any kind of technical sense of "direct." That would be ridiculous since a direct cause might be a hot iron touching your skin, however a hot iron can only directly cause a disturbance in the molecules in your skin (or something along those lines and without getting too caught up on the nature of causation...). I don't see how a disturbance in your skin molecules can directly cause a basic belief.

I'm fine with an indirect cause as long as you think your basic beliefs are indirectly caused by perceptions such that you could not justify that belief as being correct without having had that particular perception experience at some point in the past (involving some biological, genetic, psychological, evolutionary, etc., factor) that links that past to your "basic belief" of today. Can you agree that all justified beliefs that happen to be "basic beliefs" are causally connected to perceptions in this manner?

As I have said previously, a belief is ultimately "connected to the outside world" through the initial inputs to the system from the world, which we call perceptions. (And here we are assuming, as you ask, that perceptions do connect us to the world as it is.) And I'm not sure what a "negative answer" would be to a "what connects?" question.

A negative answer would be one in which one believes that basic beliefs may have no indirect link to the world as it appears to us in a manner that could justify that belief as true. For example, if you thought your materialism was derived from a basic belief about how everything as "matter" made "sense," and after reasoning further we found out that "everything as matter" made sense because it was founded on another basic belief that sensible things are always material explanations, then you have a basic belief founded on circular reasoning. In this example, no particular perception is claimed to justify a belief as valid.

Of course, there's an external cause for why someone is using circular reasoning in a given situation, but that external cause is not in support of the basic belief it is in support of why they are using circular reasoning. For example, maybe that materialist reasons circularly like that because the priest they knew as a child abused them. Circular reasoning is perhaps more of a comfort to avoid thinking about their earlier abuse in life. In such an example, their basic belief of materialism (that is founded on circular reasoning) is not supported by the abuse, but the circular reasoning is supported by abuse since it provides a sufficient reason for why someone would elect to think in fallacious terms. Therefore, when I say indirectly caused, I mean caused in the sense that it externally justifies the basic belief, and not in the sense of a descriptive cause (e.g., why did he do it...).

Let me ask again, do you think a basic belief must ideally be connected to the world (indirectly and in the justificatory sense of causation) for every and all basic beliefs?

[spetey]

Dogmatists rarely if ever ask you just to believe what they say from some kind of "faith" alone. Rather, they will give you reasons for that belief ...

This is an odd definition: a dogmatist is someone who can give reasons for their beliefs? If they can give reasons for the belief, and believe because of those reasons, they not dogmatic in any sense relevant to the current discussion. You might not like their beliefs or reasons, but that alone doesn't make them dogmatic!

Also, I grant that there are people who are good at rationalizing--they are good at coming up with reasons for a position they would hold anyway. You presumably think I am rationalizing my atheism. I of course think you are rationalizing your theism. So how do we figure out who's rationalizing, and who really believes according to reasons? The best way, I think, is to try the reasons out and see what others think of them. If you find that people can object to your reasoning consistently, and find flaws in them, then it is likely you are rationalizing, since you believe according to reasons that do not withstand critical evaluation.

Anyway as long as someone is willing to try to give reasons for her position, and is willing to adjust her degree of belief when she can't give reasons, that's all I really care about for this thread. And do you agree that's important or do you not?

Instead of arguing those standards are materialistic based standards (e.g., what you might attempt to do), they could argue that the "correct" basis of rationalism is whatever coheres to their dogmatic stance.

Why do you assume this is the direction of causation? Because I came up with a conclusion with which you disagree? Maybe I became a materialist because it seemed the most reasonable. It sure seemed like that was the order of events to me, when I rejected theism. I didn't reject the existence of God and then start coming up with reasons. (Perhaps my reasons got more finely articulated over the years, but that's all; I assume that same happens to you on forums like these.) The fact that I changed my mind based on reasons is good evidence I have that my position is based on reasons. I also think that if my reasons were shown wrong, and if I were given good reasons to believe in God, then I would change my mind again. I have changed my mind many times based on philosophical reasoning: on whether God exists, on whether there's free will, etc. I think this is a good sign that I'm responsive to reasons.

Out of curiosity: did you come to believe Christianity because you carefully considered all the available religious and non-religious options, weighed them up, and Christianity scored highest on the rationality scale? Or did you start believing as a kid because your caretakers told you to?

Whoa... How about the answer to my question? Are basic beliefs always a direct consequence of perceptions at some point in history, or not?

First, notice that's a new question--before it was whether core beliefs are "caused by the world", which you now want to assume:

For now, let's just assume that perceptions give us an approximately good notion of the world and that there are no Maxwell demons out there deceiving physicists about the nature of physical law (at least for now).

You're confusing two different discussions in two different threads. Here we are talking about epistemology, so we cannot assume anything, including evil demons deceiving us.

No, I was responding directly to your immediately previous post in this thread. That's where you asked to assume what I quoted. If you want to rescind this assumption, that's fine too. Neither way does it seem to have much impact on the real issue before us.

Since I've already shared and defended my views, I need to know how you hold beliefs accountable to the world.

I must have missed this part. You have many times shared your views about whether it's okay to believe without reason--you say it's not. But then you keep pressing me on this thread anyway despite our apparent agreement. It's utterly mysterious to me.

If you've shared how you think your beliefs are "accountable" to the world, I don't see it. You hope your beliefs have pragmatic efficacy, but (a) that doesn't obviously demonstrate that they are true and in that sense "accountable to the world" (an issue we'll set aside) and (b) like any external epistemology, you are unable to demonstrate that your beliefs actually are pragmatically effective without appealing to other beliefs.

Cutting past many irrelevant confusions again...

Can you agree that all justified beliefs that happen to be "basic beliefs" are causally connected to perceptions in this manner?

I don't actually hold that super-empiricist view, since I think some fundamental beliefs may simply result from hard-wiring (such as, roughly speaking, the belief that contradictory representations can't both be true). But I guess I can probably safely grant it here if it's so important to you. At any rate I will say that in principle any belief could be revised in light of new inputs.

For example, if you thought your materialism was derived from a basic belief about how everything as "matter" made "sense," and after reasoning further we found out that "everything as matter" made sense because it was founded on another basic belief that sensible things are always material explanations, then you have a basic belief founded on circular reasoning. In this example, no particular perception is claimed to justify a belief as valid.

Luckily I myself do not reason like that, as anyone can see over on that other thread. If I did you might have cause to question me there.

For example, maybe that materialist reasons circularly like that because the priest they knew as a child abused them. Circular reasoning is perhaps more of a comfort to avoid thinking about their earlier abuse in life. In such an example, their basic belief of materialism (that is founded on circular reasoning) is not supported by the abuse, but the circular reasoning is supported by abuse since it provides a sufficient reason for why someone would elect to think in fallacious terms.

I find it very insulting when you suggest, as in this thread, that atheism is the result of some abuse. I did not respond to that thread because I didn't want to dignify such an ugly and blatant ad hominem. I came to be an atheist because I thought about it. (And just in case you still think such ad hominem appeals hold weight: I am someone who was fortunate enough not to have suffered any abuse from religion, except perhaps being made to dress up for church on Sundays as a kid. I am, however, very worried about those many who do suffer the abuse resulting from religious dogmatism.)

Do you not believe in the Invisible Pink Unicorn because you were sexually abused by a horse as a child? Do you have some glimmering of why it might be insulting to suggest the equivalent for atheists?

I am charitably assuming that your view is based on reasons, and ask what they are. (Or, in this thread, I give you a chance to explain why it's okay not to have reasons for a controversial belief, for those who think it is okay.)

Let me ask again, do you think a basic belief must ideally be connected to the world (indirectly and in the justificatory sense of causation) for every and all basic beliefs?

What's the "justificatory sense of causation"? It sounds like you're asking if I think that ideally every basic belief should be true. My answer to that is yes.


spetey

[harvey1]

I find it very insulting when you suggest, as in this thread, that atheism is the result of some abuse. I did not respond to that thread because I didn't want to dignify such an ugly and blatant ad hominem. I came to be an atheist because I thought about it. (And just in case you still think such ad hominem appeals hold weight: I am someone who was fortunate enough not to have suffered any abuse from religion, except perhaps being made to dress up for church on Sundays as a kid. I am, however, very worried about those many who do suffer the abuse resulting from religious dogmatism.)

I'm sorry you are offended by it. Some people once in a while will answer that their atheism is a response to abuse (usually if later they become theists), so that is something that I thought I would ask. I don't think it is ad hominem since I wasn't using that argument to suggest that atheism was false as a result.

Dogmatists rarely if ever ask you just to believe what they say from some kind of "faith" alone. Rather, they will give you reasons for that belief ...

This is an odd definition: a dogmatist is someone who can give reasons for their beliefs? If they can give reasons for the belief, and believe because of those reasons, they not dogmatic in any sense relevant to the current discussion. You might not like their beliefs or reasons, but that alone doesn't make them dogmatic!

It wasn't a definition, it was a clarification that dogmatists often don't say right from the start of a discussion that they are dogmatists.

So how do we figure out who's rationalizing, and who really believes according to reasons? The best way, I think, is to try the reasons out and see what others think of them.

I think the best way is to understand their epistemology. Dogmatists should have one thing in common, their epistemology allows it. Once you get past this issue, then it is to understand their reasons and make sure that their reasons for a belief is consistent with their stated epistemology.

Instead of arguing those standards are materialistic based standards (e.g., what you might attempt to do), they could argue that the "correct" basis of rationalism is whatever coheres to their dogmatic stance.

Why do you assume this is the direction of causation? Because I came up with a conclusion with which you disagree? Maybe I became a materialist because it seemed the most reasonable.

Don't misunderstand me. I said that dogmatists would argue from their own dogmatic stance. If a materialist were basing their views on a materialist dogma, then that would be their particular "dogmatic stance."

Out of curiosity: did you come to believe Christianity because you carefully considered all the available religious and non-religious options, weighed them up, and Christianity scored highest on the rationality scale? Or did you start believing as a kid because your caretakers told you to?

I became a Christian after being something close to an agnostic... I wasn't a member of any church and I didn't attend any church from childhood all the way through teenage years (at least I have no memories of church attendance more than a few times), etc.

No, I was responding directly to your immediately previous post in this thread. That's where you asked to assume what I quoted. If you want to rescind this assumption, that's fine too. Neither way does it seem to have much impact on the real issue before us.

Oops. I thought that was in the other thread. Not to worry, I really don't want to talk about doubts about perceptions at this point...

If you've shared how you think your beliefs are "accountable" to the world, I don't see it. You hope your beliefs have pragmatic efficacy, but (a) that doesn't obviously demonstrate that they are true and in that sense "accountable to the world" (an issue we'll set aside) and (b) like any external epistemology, you are unable to demonstrate that your beliefs actually are pragmatically effective without appealing to other beliefs.

Neither of those objections qualifies as real barriers in showing beliefs are not accountable to the world. However, you have to demonstrate that you are even making an honest effort beyond lip-service.

Can you agree that all justified beliefs that happen to be "basic beliefs" are causally connected to perceptions in this manner?

I don't actually hold that super-empiricist view, since I think some fundamental beliefs may simply result from hard-wiring (such as, roughly speaking, the belief that contradictory representations can't both be true). But I guess I can probably safely grant it here if it's so important to you. At any rate I will say that in principle any belief could be revised in light of new inputs.

That's not a super-empiricist view. It's not even a necessarily an empiricist view. Empiricism is basically the view that "all knowledge is sense experience." Usually that philosophy connotes that this sense experience is demonstrable and repeatable. That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that all justified knowledge must somehow be causally connected to the world, otherwise how can we even think about claiming it as knowledge?

Let me ask again, do you think a basic belief must ideally be connected to the world (indirectly and in the justificatory sense of causation) for every and all basic beliefs?

What's the "justificatory sense of causation"? It sounds like you're asking if I think that ideally every basic belief should be true. My answer to that is yes.

No, that's not what I'm asking. Of course everyone wants their belief to be true! What would be the point of having this discussion if we didn't think our beliefs were true?

As I mentioned in my last post, a basic belief might be causally dependent on some earlier perception, but that doesn't mean the basic belief is a justified interpretation of the perception thereby making it a "true belief." I think even dogmatic beliefs are based on a set of perceptions that caused one to eventually end up as a dogmatic person. This is just a (causal) consequence of living in the world.

On the other hand, in order for the basic belief to be true (i.e., justified to believe it is true), it must be causally connected to a perception in a "justificatory sense of causation." By that, let me state again, "you [cannot] justify that belief as being correct without having had that particular perception experience at some point in the past (involving some biological, genetic, psychological, evolutionary, etc., factor) that links that past to your 'basic belief' of today." This involves a counterfactual theory of causation. To be specific, as a rough framework I'll use Lewis' theory where c equates to an indirect cause of a correct basic belief and e equates to a correct interpretation event of c that leads to a correct basic belief:

• (7) Where c and e are distinct events, c influences e if and only if there is a substantial range of c1, c2, ... of different not-too-distant alterations of c (including the actual alteration of c) and there is a range of e1, e2, ... of alterations of e, at least some of which differ, such that if c1 had occurred, e1 would have occurred, and if c2 had occurred, e2 would have occurred, and so on.

Therefore, if c1, c2, ... (causes) do not occur, then the correct interpretational events e1, e2, ... (of those causes) do not occur either. Hence, without this causal-event relationship there is no means to acquire that particular true basic belief that is based on c and built from e. Do you agree? If not, then what relationship do you envision between c and basic beliefs?

[spetey]

I'm sorry you are offended by it.

Thank you. Are you also sorry for the suggestion itself (that atheism comes from religious abuse)?

Neither of those objections [to my view] qualifies as real barriers in showing beliefs are not accountable to the world. However, you have to demonstrate that you are even making an honest effort beyond lip-service.

Oh, I didn't understand that we were allowed to respond to objections like that. Oh, okay. None of your objections "qualif[y] as real barriers" to my view, either. Whew, that was much easier than I expected.

Empiricism is basically the view that "all knowledge is sense experience."

No, that does not even make sense. (Knowledge all consists of things like "red-patch here"?) I like much better the rest of the sentence in the source you're quoting: "the origin of all knowledge is sense experience" (emphasis mine). That's much closer to what empiricism is.

And no, I do not insist on empiricism; I think it's at least possible that some knowledge is a priori. As for a posteriori beliefs, yes I think ideally they were caused by the world in some way, of course. Ideally, they have external justification as well as internal. (Incidentally counterfactual accounts of knowledge like Nozick's have very serious difficulties, such as the denial of deductive closure and ugly counterexamples.)

Now, to get back on track: do you think it's permissible to continue to believe an important proposition when you can no longer give reasons for that belief, nor respond to reasons opposed to it? I do not. (For some reason, you won't take me at my word on this point, but I have yet to see why.)


spetey

[harvey1]

I'm sorry you are offended by it.

Thank you. Are you also sorry for the suggestion itself (that atheism comes from religious abuse)?

I'm sorry you were offended by it.

Neither of those objections [to my view] qualifies as real barriers in showing beliefs are not accountable to the world. However, you have to demonstrate that you are even making an honest effort beyond lip-service.

Oh, I didn't understand that we were allowed to respond to objections like that. Oh, okay. None of your objections "qualif[y] as real barriers" to my view, either. Whew, that was much easier than I expected.

Okay, then, I guess we're going to be giving this thread lots of new life...

If you've shared how you think your beliefs are "accountable" to the world, I don't see it. You hope your beliefs have pragmatic efficacy, but (a) that doesn't obviously demonstrate that they are true and in that sense "accountable to the world" (an issue we'll set aside) and (b) like any external epistemology, you are unable to demonstrate that your beliefs actually are pragmatically effective without appealing to other beliefs.[my emphasis, see below]

I can still set (a) aside, right?

As for (b), the key word is "demonstrate." You don't demonstrate pragmatic effectiveness anymore than you demonstrate that a joke is funny. The joke is funny because people laugh that's what makes it a joke, and true beliefs are pragmatically effective because they work and that's what makes them true beliefs. Sure, jokes are probably funny because they have some kind of inherent logic that actually makes them "precisely the way it is" funny, but that's neither here nor there. We decide on jokes being funny - not necessarily because we have access to some kind of inherent proven logic that exists "out there" - we decide they are funny because we laugh (or at least enough people laugh in a certain venue or "society"). We can even come up with our own logic as to why a joke is funny, but that logic doesn't allow us to produce all the funny ones that can possibly exist, so it is a very unreliable process by which to make people laugh. It's a hit or miss kind of thing which has a form of logic to it (I guess, since some individuals create jokes much better than others), but ultimately jokes are decided by the "society" of people who laugh at them.

Now, let me translate the above paragraph into a statement about true beliefs:

• joke=pragmatic belief
  funny="true"
  laugh=see that the belief works in practice

The [pragmatic belief] is ["true"] because people [see that the belief works in practice] that's what makes it a [pragmatic belief]... Sure, [pragmatic beliefs] are probably ["true"] because they have some kind of inherent logic that actually makes them "precisely the way it is" [true], but that's neither here nor there. We decide on [pragmatic beliefs] being ["true"] - not necessarily because we have access to some inherent proven logic that exists "out there" - we decide they are ["true"] because we [see that the belief works in practice] (or at least enough people [see that the belief works in practice] in a certain venue or "society"). We can even come up with our own logic as to why a [pragmatic belief] is ["true"], but that logic doesn't allow us to produce all the ["true"] ones that can possibly exist, so it is a very unreliable process by which to make people [see that the belief works in practice]. It's a hit or miss kind of thing which has a form of logic to it (I guess, since some individuals create [pragmatic beliefs] much better than others), but ultimately [pragmatic beliefs] are decided by the "society" of people who [see that the belief works in practice].

So, as you can see, it really makes no sense to overly judge pragmatic externalism by cogent internalist standards. You might as well spend your time studying jokes and write books as to why comedians:

"are unable to demonstrate that [their jokes] [will] actually [make people laugh] without appealing to other [jokes]."

Empiricism is basically the view that "all knowledge is sense experience."

No, that does not even make sense. (Knowledge all consists of things like "red-patch here"?) I like much better the rest of the sentence in the source you're quoting: "the origin of all knowledge is sense experience" (emphasis mine). That's much closer to what empiricism is.

That's fine, it doesn't change my views to necessarily an empiricist view. In my view, perceptions can be things that are strictly non-empirical sensory inputs e.g., dreams, ESP, visions, etc. Also, many of the perceptions that happened eons ago can be encoded in the DNA (or RNA, etc.) via natural selection and other evolutionary mechanisms, and in that way, those sense impressions should actually be treated as a priori knowledge in a genetic sense. I think these qualifications show that I'm not an empiricist, but I am causally committed to the world for any basic belief.

And no, I do not insist on empiricism; I think it's at least possible that some knowledge is a priori. As for a posteriori beliefs, yes I think ideally they were caused by the world in some way, of course. Ideally, they have external justification as well as internal. (Incidentally counterfactual accounts of knowledge like Nozick's have very serious difficulties, such as the denial of deductive closure and ugly counterexamples.)

How does a priori knowledge come to be about knowledge of the world? Are you suggesting that God inputs knowledge into the minds of humans?

Now, to get back on track: do you think it's permissible to continue to believe an important proposition when you can no longer give reasons for that belief, nor respond to reasons opposed to it? I do not. (For some reason, you won't take me at my word on this point, but I have yet to see why.)

Because, Spetey, you say things like "a priori" knowledge which I translate to mean "I have a priori knowledge that my materialist dogma is correct and this is my reason for you to believe it too." That's the platform of a dogmatist, at least a nice guy one such as yourself.

[spetey]

Hi Harvey and anyone else who might read this...

The analogy of (jokes, funny, laughs) to (beliefs, truth, efficacy) is pretty good, Harvey. Sometimes what's funny doesn't get laughs (as when students can't laugh or they'll get in trouble), and sometimes what gets laughs isn't funny (as when the boss says it). There's a similar problematic relation between efficacy to truth, which we agreed to put aside. As for "demonstrating" that one's beliefs are efficacious, the analogy is better to a comedian broadcasting solo over the radio. Whether that comedian's jokes are funny might be tracked pretty well by the laughs the comedian is getting, but the comedian has no direct "access" to whether or not the jokes are in fact getting laughs, and so the comedian must rely on other signs to figure out whether the jokes were funny.

But I'm glad that you wanted to try to respond to my objections. For this thread anyway, I'm really not concerned about your Rescher-like pragmatist epistemology. I don't agree with the view, but it's a reasonable one to hold, and it's perfectly consistent to hold it and be anti-dogmatic, which is the issue at hand. I'll take you at your word that you are not a fan of dogmatism, and are dedicated to giving reasons for your views. I'm still not sure why you won't give me the same benefit of the doubt!

How does a priori knowledge come to be about knowledge of the world?

A priori beliefs are, by definition, not knowledge about the world. You may want to look up this admittedly esoteric term--I recommend the link provided.

Now, to get back on track: do you think it's permissible to continue to believe an important proposition when you can no longer give reasons for that belief, nor respond to reasons opposed to it? I do not. (For some reason, you won't take me at my word on this point, but I have yet to see why.)

Because, Spetey, you say things like "a priori" knowledge which I translate to mean "I have a priori knowledge that my materialist dogma is correct and this is my reason for you to believe it too." That's the platform of a dogmatist, at least a nice guy one such as yourself.

That is a drastically incorrect translation. First of all, I only said it's possible that there is such a thing as a priori knowledge, and that's why I'm not ready to commit to empiricism as standardly understood. Second of all, my belief in materialism is neither a priori (since it is about this world), nor is it dogmatic (since I have given reasons for it in this this other thread).

You were trying to demonstrate that despite myself, I endorse dogmatism? Are we getting any closer?


spetey

[harvey1]

But I'm glad that you wanted to try to respond to my objections...

I not only wanted to respond to your objections, I think I did respond to your objections. You seemed to agree at first, but you said this, so I'm not sure if you think I skirted the question or not.

I'm still not sure why you won't give me the same benefit of the doubt!

I'm not happy with your epistemology, obviously. I find it to be in contradiction to your point in this thread as you'll see shortly...

How does a priori knowledge come to be about knowledge of the world?

A priori beliefs are, by definition, not knowledge about the world. You may want to look up this admittedly esoteric term--I recommend the link provided.

When I say "knowledge of the world" I'm not just talking about knoweldge of physical things in the world, I'm talking about any kind of justified belief in anything of anything ("the world"). So, for example, a priori knowledge about the axioms of mathematics is "knowledge of the world" since math is as much a part of the world as anything else is.

So, let me state this again so there is no confusion:

How does a priori knowledge come to be about knowledge of whatever it is that you could possibly have knowledge about?

...I only said it's possible that there is such a thing as a priori knowledge, and that's why I'm not ready to commit to empiricism as standardly understood. Second of all, my belief in materialism is neither a priori (since it is about this world), nor is it dogmatic (since I have given reasons for it in this this other thread. You were trying to demonstrate that despite myself, I endorse dogmatism? Are we getting any closer?

We're as close or as far as you want to be depending on how you answer these questions. I want to see if you think that all basic beliefs about anything (e.g., math axioms) must be causally connected to experience. If not, then that is "faith" since there is nothing that connects the ideas that basic belief spawns of the world, and therefore how can you call it knowledge?

[spetey]

But I'm glad that you wanted to try to respond to my objections...

I not only wanted to respond to your objections, I think I did respond to your objections. You seemed to agree at first, but you said this, so I'm not sure if you think I skirted the question or not.

One objection we agreed we would put aside, so you did not have to answer it; as I indicated, I think you skirted the other by drawing an analogy that was good but inappropriate when it came to exactly the issue at hand (whether the actual efficacy of beliefs is "accessible"--whether the comedian can hear the laughs). But again, your epistemology seems consistent with anti-dogmatism, so it's not at issue here.

I'm still not sure why you won't give me the same benefit of the doubt!

I'm not happy with your epistemology, obviously. I find it to be in contradiction to your point in this thread as you'll see shortly...

I didn't see any contradiction you've pointed out, rather you're just pressing the view further ("but why do you think p?"), trying to find out more about it. It seems to me you are hoping to find tensions at some point. And even if you did find tensions in my epistemology, as I did in yours, that is not enough on its own to show that my view endorses dogmatism. Again, even if you somehow came to the point where you understood my own epistemology better than I do, and showed that despite myself it endorsed dogmatism, I would be more likely to adjust my epistemology than to accept that consequence. So my epistemology is irrelevant to the issue of this thread, which is whether dogmatism is good in some cases. You have said you do not wish to defend dogmatism. Good, neither do I. Let's clear this thread for those who do.

When I say "knowledge of the world" I'm not just talking about knoweldge of physical things in the world, I'm talking about any kind of justified belief in anything of anything ("the world"). So, for example, a priori knowledge about the axioms of mathematics is "knowledge of the world" since math is as much a part of the world as anything else is.

Okay. An unusual way to use the phrase. "Knowledge of the world" in your mouth is just synonymous with "knowledge", I guess.

How does a priori knowledge come to be about knowledge of whatever it is that you could possibly have knowledge about?

On a standard picture of knowledge, it must be at least true and believed and justified. Are you asking how a priori beliefs (if any exist) are justified? That's tough to say. Maybe, as you say in this post, they are beliefs formed by hard-wired mechanisms which have a kind of justification through their being shaped by ancestors' experiences. Maybe pure reason alone is enough to justify them. Maybe some truths like that of logic are necessary, and so we can conclude they must be the case no matter how the world is.

My own view, again though, is that in principle any belief should be subject to revision through experience; we should not hold any belief as unrevisable. We should remain open to the possibility that even our belief that 1+1=2 should be revised in the light of new experience. (Does this sound like a dogmatic view to you?)

But we have gone way off-topic again. Why does this matter? I'm not even committed to the possibility of a priori beliefs (but nor am I committed to their absence). So even if you showed that a priori beliefs were not "responsive to the world", that would not be to show something wrong with my epistemology, and even if you showed something wrong with my epistemology, that would not be to show that I endorse dogmatism.

I want to see if you think that all basic beliefs about anything (e.g., math axioms) must be causally connected to experience. If not, then that is "faith" since there is nothing that connects the ideas that basic belief spawns of the world, and therefore how can you call it knowledge?

Myself, I think all beliefs should be responsive in at least some degree to other beliefs. But even if I were a "rationalist" instead of an empiricist--even if I thought that some beliefs are a priori and cannot be revised by experience--that would not show that I am a dogmatist about empirical claims such as whether God or the IPU exist. Although I am not, one could be a "dogmatist" about the a priori while being rigidly anti-dogmatist on the a posteriori (like, I would say, Descartes).

For the sake of this thread, please summarize why you are so confident that I am, despite myself, a dogmatist.


spetey

[harvey1]

And even if you did find tensions in my epistemology, as I did in yours, that is not enough on its own to show that my view endorses dogmatism.

Dogmatism can basically be defined as, "X is asserted to be true, X is held as a justified belief, but there are no commitments to causal connections of an external experience (offerable in principle) to support X, nor is there an impulse in the epistemology of one holding that view to do so." Let me break that down by quoting from Merriam-Webster:

• 1) "X is asserted to be true"
  
  "positiveness in assertion"
  
  2) "X is held as a justified belief"
  
  "of opinion"
  
  3) "there are no commitments to causal connections of an external experience (offerable in principle) to support X, nor is there an impulse in the epistemology of one holding that view to do so"
  
  "especially when unwarranted or arrogant"

It's your epistemology that defends (2) while agreeing to (3) that makes your view the basis of a dogamatic stance. You seem to be arguing, "X is revisable in my epistemology therefore I'm not supporting the epistemology of a dogmatist." You also argue, "one could be a 'dogmatist' about the a priori while being rigidly anti-dogmatist on the a posteriori." But, your lack of commitment is a wink, wink to the dogmatist who adopts your epistemology that you will look the other way depending on whether it is a materialist or a theist (for example) that walks through the door.

On the other hand, I am committed to this kind of epistemology:

• 4) "X is asserted to be true"
  
  "positiveness in assertion"
  
  5) "X is held as a justified belief"
  
  "of opinion"
  
  6) "there are important commitments to causal connections of an external experience (offerable in principle) to support X, and there is an impulse in the epistemology of one holding that view to also establish firm causal connections to solidify one's beliefs"

Do you see the difference between the arrogant approach that won't commit to their beliefs being grounded in experience, and one in which a belief can be revisable -- but without commitment.? It is because you won't make that commitment to a causal connection that it makes your epistemology one that is in support of dogmaticism.

Again, even if you somehow came to the point where you understood my own epistemology better than I do, and showed that despite myself it endorsed dogmatism, I would be more likely to adjust my epistemology than to accept that consequence.

Haven't we both agreed that you are not necessarily committing a belief to external conditions (i.e., what I call a causal connection)? If that is so, then by (3) you give an option to the dogmatist that she should not have. What's worse, you even give the dogmatist an option to revise a belief without a causal commitment, so even those beliefs that were founded on a casual connection are now revisable without a better causal connection than what was already existing.

So my epistemology is irrelevant to the issue of this thread, which is whether dogmatism is good in some cases. You have said you do not wish to defend dogmatism. Good, neither do I.

Look at (3)...

Let's clear this thread for those who do.... But we have gone way off-topic again. Why does this matter? I'm not even committed to the possibility of a priori beliefs (but nor am I committed to their absence).

You are not committed to an a priori belief, but (3) allows the dogmatist to have such beliefs. This is bad since your epistemology allows the very thing that you want to condemn. It matters here because when we go to discuss our views on the other thread it is important that you understand that reasons are, and must ultimately be, causal connections to an experience. Or, to use my analogy, they cannot be justifications of a laugh, they must be real laughs.

So even if you showed that a priori beliefs were not "responsive to the world", that would not be to show something wrong with my epistemology, and even if you showed something wrong with my epistemology, that would not be to show that I endorse dogmatism.... My own view, again though, is that in principle any belief should be subject to revision through experience; we should not hold any belief as unrevisable. We should remain open to the possibility that even our belief that 1+1=2 should be revised in the light of new experience.

That's great that you hold that position of revising a belief in light of new experience, but why not take the added leap and just say that every belief must be committed to some kind of experience (e.g., a distant evolutionary past kind of experience)? Why do you resist this very straightforward request?

(Does this sound like a dogmatic view to you?)

YES! It sounds like the politician who comes into office saying that he won't commit *not* (correction) to raise taxes. Of course that guy is going to raise taxes, otherwise he would commit not to do it. One of the first signs of a dogmatist is one who won't commit to a belief being confirmable by experience. They don't want experience to confirm a belief, they want to be the final authority. They want to decide the criteria so they will rarely give you exact criteria by which to decide an issue. Decision is power, and whoever controls the criteria of a decision can easily become a dogmatist. This is what the Roman Catholic Church did in the Middle Ages. They went from one of a number of central churches in the Christian religion to being the one that controlled the entire religion.

Although I am not, one could be a "dogmatist" about the a priori while being rigidly anti-dogmatist on the a posteriori (like, I would say, Descartes). For the sake of this thread, please summarize why you are so confident that I am, despite myself, a dogmatist.

Who decides what is a priori and what is a posteriori?

Okay, I don't want to beat this horse much longer. Obviously you will continue to think that it's okay for a belief to be considered knowledge even if there is no commitment made to the world, so, we'll have to leave this subject. However, this subject will haunt us because I will refer back to c1, c2, c3, etc., and since you hold this "I am King" epistemology I don't think this is going to go very far.

[spetey]

Dogmatism can basically be defined as, "X is asserted to be true, X is held as a justified belief, but there are no commitments to causal connections of an external experience (offerable in principle) to support X, nor is there an impulse in the epistemology of one holding that view to do so."

Let's review: you first learn that I don't commit to causal connections to the external world for every belief (but I don't rule it out either); I say maybe there are a priori beliefs. You then define 'dogmatism' to include "no commitments to causal connections of an external experience...". You then use this definition to show that I'm a dogmatist. And by that definition, I agree that I'm a dogmatist. Also, if you define "dogmatic" as "being real smart", I'll grant I'm dogmatic in that sense. (And if you define 'God' as a good bowl of coleslaw, then I believe in God too.)

To your credit, you try to back up your definition some; you equate the dictionary phrase "unwarranted" with "no commitments to causal connections of an external experience". But wouldn't you say that's just a tiny bit of a stretch? I don't think the dictionary is the final word on philosophical disputes, but their definition of dogmatism isn't so bad. Let's see what it says about "warrant": "justification, ground". Huh, it doesn't specify anything about causal connections to the world. It's almost as though Webster doesn't take justification to be synonymous with your theory of justification. Maybe Webster's wants to leave open the possibility that a priori beliefs can possibly be justified, since many smart philosophers today and through the ages defend such a possibility.

So the best way to read 'dogmatism' as per Webster's is the view that you don't need justification for your belief. I accept this and deny that I am a dogmatist in this sense. I leave open the possibility that some justification could be a priori. That does not make me (or BonJour, or Peacocke, or ... ) a dogmatist. It means I do not have exactly the same view of justification you do, but that's not at issue. If you define "dogmatism" to be whatever disagrees with your empiricist epistemology, then that strikes me as a bit dogmatic!

But if I were really convinced that allowing the very possibility of a priori beliefs thereby made me a dogmatist, I would reject the possibility. Okay? Are we agreed that neither of us are dogmatists--that both of us think beliefs need justification?

That's great that you hold that position of revising a belief in light of new experience, but why not take the added leap and just say that every belief must be committed to some kind of experience (e.g., a distant evolutionary past kind of experience)? Why do you resist this very straightforward request?

Because it might not be true. It's hard to say whether set theory is amenable to experience of the world, for example. It's a hard question (whether some beliefs are justified a priori) and you've given me no reason to settle it one way or another. For that matter, in this thread, you allow for the possibility of some kind of a priori beliefs. Does that make you a dogmatist by your own lights?

Who decides what is a priori and what is a posteriori?

Oh yikes, the classic "who decides" appeal to ignorance that I probably hear twice a week on college campuses. Imagine asking "who decides whether the earth is flat or round?" No one decides, it's flat or it's not, and we have to try to figure it out. Similarly there is a priori justification or there's not--no one decides, we figure it out. It's hard to figure out. That doesn't mean there's no answer.

Are you positive I'm a dogmatist despite my repeated insistence that I think it's important to give reasons for beliefs? Can you please give me some idea why I'm a dogmatist in this much more standard sense--in the sense that I don't think it's important to give reasons for a belief?

Better still, let's agree that neither of us are dogmatists, and go on to the process of actually giving the reasons. You are committed to giving reasons. Please give them on this thread. If I'm a dogmatist then it'll soon show there, when I hold a belief and refuse to give reasons for it. If neither of us are dogmatists then we can actually have a discussion about a topic of the type we both came here to discuss. Meanwhile, frankly, this discussion looks like an evasive distraction on your part. If you have reasons for your belief, give them. If you see me being dogmatic in practice, point it out. But let's please get to it.


spetey