If God wants to destroy evil...

[Zarathustra]

God created everything that has been, is, and is going to be in existence. He created the Earth and the Heavens. He created the Lake of Fire in which he casts sinners. He created Good, and He created evil. Does not the old adage says "I have created you, and so can I destroy you"?

If God wanted to, couldn't He, in theory, destroy evil with no need for the battle of the apocalypse?

[harvey1]

The fact that we have to conclude without knowing the final outcome or all the factors involved is assumption. If God decided that we were little more than a terminal disease on this earth, total eradication could be seen as all good from the point of view of the rest of the lifeforms on this planet.

Very good point, Curious. Spetey assumes he knows when he doesn't know. Just like he assumed he knows that physical possibility cannot supervene onto logical possibility, when in fact his assumptions are wrong. Good point.

[Nyril]

Just like he assumed he knows that physical possibility cannot supervene onto logical possibility, when in fact his assumptions are wrong. Good point.

You know Harvey, it is considered extremely poor debating style to cut off a debate with someone, and then spend your time ridiculing his exact position without having even bothered to respond to it in the first place. That's like quitting and declaring yourself a winner.

[harvey1]

You know Harvey, it is considered extremely poor debating style to cut off a debate with someone, and then spend your time ridiculing his exact position without having even bothered to respond to it in the first place. That's like quitting and declaring yourself a winner.

I'm not declaring myself the winner. I'm only pointing out how Spetey makes assumptions about things he has very little knowledge. That's all. Besides, I didn't quit, Spetey acted rudely.

[spetey]

You never asked me if I thought the tsunami was bad but if it was (net) good. My answer was in response to this question. Obviously it was tragic but if the conscience is pricked by such an event and ultimately results in tens of millions of lives being saved in famines throughout the world (due to donations) then that might be seen as (net) good. I realise this is scant consolation to those involved. Ask me again in twenty years and I might, with hindsight, have an opinion on whether or not it was (net) good.

Actually I was asking what reason you had to think it was net good, given how horribly evil it sure seems to have been. And you have a response to that question--good. This is a classic "higher-order goods" response to the PoE. According to this response, perhaps the evil that was the tsunami was actually (net) good because it encouraged charity, forgiveness, faith, etc. It's called the "higher-order goods" response because these kind of goods need certain evils first, to make any sense.

There are a few problems with this classic response.

1. Do you have good empirical evidence that the lives saved by the "pricked consciences" comfortably outweigh the evil that was the tsunami? Can you cite statistics about the increase of lives saved in Africa as a direct result of the tsunami, for example? If not, why would you believe that this is the case, save in order to rescue your antecedent assumption that God must be good, and must have had a reason?
2. Evils not only allow for higher-order goods, but also for higher-order evils: indifference to suffering, stinginess, vengeance, etc. The US government, for example, has been horrifyingly stingy in its response to the tsunami, spending orders of magnitude more in Iraq. Even the small pittance that was promised has not been paid. That cruel indifference is just further evil that the tsunami caused! So don't forget to factor that in!
3. If you genuinely believe the good of such tsunamis outweigh their evils, you should hope for more of them. Do you? Perhaps other natural disasters more close to your home? After all, think of the net good they would create!
4. Someone who wished to defend an all-powerful, all-evil being (despite the existence of good) can respond similarly. Someone objects to this demon-defender, "but what about all the good in the world, like the amazing art at MoMA?" The demon-defender need merely say: "oh, that's best explained by its allowance for higher-order evils, such as ignorance of culture, greed over painting prices, and so on." If this response doesn't help defend the existence of such a demon, why does it work for God?

The fact that we have to conclude without knowing the final outcome or all the factors involved is assumption. If God decided that we were little more than a terminal disease on this earth, total eradication could be seen as all good from the point of view of the rest of the lifeforms on this planet.

It's not an assumption--it's well-reasoned. I see lots of evil resulting and little if any good. That's all I have to go on in forming my beliefs.

Consider again the "Hitler Freak defense":

• Hitler Freak: Hitler was really good!
  Me: It sure seems like the war, the Holocaust, and so on were all (net) evil.
  Hitler Freak: That's an assumption! You have no reason to say that! Maybe Hitler was trying to help the Jewish cause, for example, by making people rally around their culture after such a disaster!
  Me: That's possible, but I have no reason to believe it's true. According to the reasons available to me, and I would think pretty obvious reasons at that, the war and the Holocaust were net bad, and so is Hitler.

Do you Hitler Freak has a good argument for Hitler's being good? If not, what's different about HF's argument and your response?


spetey

[Curious]

Actually I was asking what reason you had to think it was net good, given how horribly evil it sure seems to have been. And you have a response to that question--good. This is a classic "higher-order goods" response to the PoE. According to this response, perhaps the evil that was the tsunami was actually (net) good because it encouraged charity, forgiveness, faith, etc. It's called the "higher-order goods" response because these kind of goods need certain evils first, to make any sense.

There are a few problems with this classic response.

1. Do you have good empirical evidence that the lives saved by the "pricked consciences" comfortably outweigh the evil that was the tsunami? Can you cite statistics about the increase of lives saved in Africa as a direct result of the tsunami, for example? If not, why would you believe that this is the case, save in order to rescue your antecedent assumption that God must be good, and must have had a reason?
2. Evils not only allow for higher-order goods, but also for higher-order evils: indifference to suffering, stinginess, vengeance, etc. The US government, for example, has been horrifyingly stingy in its response to the tsunami, spending orders of magnitude more in Iraq. Even the small pittance that was promised has not been paid. That cruel indifference is just further evil that the tsunami caused! So don't forget to factor that in!
3. If you genuinely believe the good of such tsunamis outweigh their evils, you should hope for more of them. Do you? Perhaps other natural disasters more close to your home? After all, think of the net good they would create!
4. Someone who wished to defend an all-powerful, all-evil being (despite the existence of good) can respond similarly. Someone objects to this demon-defender, "but what about all the good in the world, like the amazing art at MoMA?" The demon-defender need merely say: "oh, that's best explained by its allowance for higher-order evils, such as ignorance of culture, greed over painting prices, and so on." If this response doesn't help defend the existence of such a demon, why does it work for God?

Of course, such data is beyond my ken. I think however that you mistake my position. I have no assumption that God is all-good or indeed all-powerful. I merely pointed out that the reasoning you gave did not prove that God is not these things. If I was to refute an argument that stated fruit A was an apple it does not automatically follow that I claim the said fruit is an orange, I simply disagree with the classification of the fruit as an apple. My argument was not intended to defend the existence of God but to show that your assumption that God is not all-powerful or all-good was being limited by scope.

It's not an assumption--it's well-reasoned. I see lots of evil resulting and little if any good. That's all I have to go on in forming my beliefs.

But it is limited, as I said above, by scope. I do understand your point and I do not suggest that you are incorrect in your reasoned assumption, but it proves nothing one way or the other except for the fact that shit does indeed happen.

Consider again the "Hitler Freak defense":

I must admit, that made me laugh. So I will be equally ridiculous and say that God is only part GOoD and the dEVIL is mainly evil.

[harvey1]

You know Harvey, it is considered extremely poor debating style to cut off a debate with someone, and then spend your time ridiculing his exact position without having even bothered to respond to it in the first place. That's like quitting and declaring yourself a winner.

And, Nyril, if you're gonna pipe up about debating behavior, then your comments are a few days too late. Why curiously were you strangely silent when these comments were uttered by our philosopher friend?:

Your ideas (in this case) aren't just "weird" and "different", they are just plain demonstrably wrong, as wrong as "the earth is flat", "skin color determines moral worth", and "2+2=5". I am "open-minded" to the possibility that there is some kind of deity (although I think I have very good arguments against it, of which the PoE is just one). I am not "open-minded" to ideas like that the physical supervenes on the logical. I can only demonstrate how wrong they are--obviously wrong to anyone who knows what the word that you insist on actually means.

[harvey1]

I merely pointed out that the reasoning you gave did not prove that God is not these things. If I was to refute an argument that stated fruit A was an apple it does not automatically follow that I claim the said fruit is an orange, I simply disagree with the classification of the fruit as an apple. My argument was not intended to defend the existence of God but to show that your assumption that God is not all-powerful or all-good was being limited by scope.

So, do you think there are things that humans just might not know right now? For example, is it possible that yin and yang could be principles that the universe adheres to, and this might be beyond the grasp of people who make these kind of arguments about God's omnipotence/omnibenevolence?

I do understand your point and I do not suggest that you are incorrect in your reasoned assumption, but it proves nothing one way or the other except for the fact that shit does indeed happen.

So, you think like Plantinga (well-known philosopher) that the problem of evil is a non-starter:

Many philosophers have claimed to find a serious problem for theism in the existence of evil, or of the amount and kinds of evil we do in fact find. Many who claim to find a problem here for theists urged the deductive argument from evil: they have claimed that the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good God is logically incompatible with the presence of evil in a world... For their part, theists have argued there is no inconsistency here. I think the present consensus, even among those who urge some form of the argument of evil, is that the deductive form of the argument from evil is unsuccessful. More recently, philosophers have claimed that the existence of God is... at any rate unlikely or improbable with respect to it... Let's agree that it is unlikely... that the world has been created by a God... What is supposed to follow from that? How does the objector's argument go from there? It doesn't follow, of course, that theism is false... Suppose that we say that T is the relevant body of total evidence for a given theist T; and suppose we agree that a belief is rationally acceptable for him only if it is not improbable with respect to T... However we characterize this set T, the question I mean to press is this: why can't belief in God be itself a member of T? Perhaps the theist has a right to start from belief in God... He has a right to take the existence of God for granted and go on from there... just as [others] take for granted the existence of the past, say, or other persons, or the basic claims of contemporary physics.

It seems this is what you're basically saying, is that correct? If so, I entirely agree. Plantinga is a pretty smart guy, huh?

[spetey]

Of course, such data is beyond my ken. I think however that you mistake my position. I have no assumption that God is all-good or indeed all-powerful.

Oh! It sounds like you're saying you don't believe there is an all-good, all-powerful being. If so, I'm glad to hear you agree with my conclusion! Let's see if we can convince others!

If not--if you're saying it's not an "assumption" but that you do believe in such a being, then I'd like to hear your reasons, and your response to my reasons against.

I merely pointed out that the reasoning you gave did not prove that God is not these things.

It is not a deductive proof. There are three claims that are (logically) inconsistent:

1. There is an all-good, all-powerful God.
2. If there is an all-good, all-powerful God, then all evil present is absolutely necessary.
3. There is unnecessary evil (indeed, in abundance, as the tsunami demonstrates).

You have to throw one of these out on pain of contradiction. Of course I think it's most reasonable to throw out (1). Most theodicists (defenders of God in the face of evil) want to throw out (3). But they owe us some reason for thinking that evils like the tsunami were necessary--that the tsunami was really (net) good. On the face of it this is a remarkable claim. Usually the defense for throwing out (3) ends up sounding just like Hitler Freak's defense: in essence, theodicists throw out (3) only because they can't bear giving up (1). But this begs the question against the atheist.

I do understand your point and I do not suggest that you are incorrect in your reasoned assumption, but it proves nothing one way or the other except for the fact that shit does indeed happen.

Well, it's not just that. It seems also to be a good argument that since such stuff does happen, that is very good reason to think there is no all-good, all-powerful God. You agree with this too, right? I'm no longer clear on your position. Perhaps you could clarify. Do you believe there is an all-good, all-powerful being?

Consider again the "Hitler Freak defense" ...

I must admit, that made me laugh. So I will be equally ridiculous and say that God is only part GOoD and the dEVIL is mainly evil.

I'm glad I made you chuckle, but I'm not sure what you mean here. Of course I think the Hitler Freak defense is ridiculous, but my point wasn't ridiculous, I think--my point was that it's hard to tell why that defense is bad but the claim "God is good, God surely had reasons for the horrors of the tsunami" is a good one, given that structurally they look like identical arguments.

Are you suggesting that evil in the world is the result of Satan? This of course makes us ask: is God powerful enough to stop Satan? If so, why doesn't God? If not, then how is God all-powerful? In other words, positing a Satan doesn't solve the Problem of Evil--it just restates it.


spetey

[harvey1]

Here's something that I'd like to point out related to this discussion (anyone friendly in their tone is welcome to reply).

If God's existence is unlikely because of the problem of evil, then does that mean that God not existing is sufficient to explain the existence of evil, or does it mean that the existence of evil necessarily restricts God from existing? If evil necessarily restricts God from existing, then what is the deductive proof that shows that this is necessarily the case?

If God not existing is sufficient to explain the existence of evil, then please tell me what is sufficient to explain the existence of evil. My understanding is that philosophers have ruled out sufficiency as a sole means to explain an effect from its cause. For example, if a short circuit causes a fire to burn down a factory building, then the short circuit is sufficient to explain how it is the factory building could burn down, but it is not sufficient in itself to show the factory must (or is guaranteed to) burn down. Not every factory building having a short circuit burns down. Sprinklers could stop the fire, or the short circuit might not be near any flammable materials, etc.. All of these conditions show that a short circuit is not sufficient.

Hence, it would seem this dilemma posed by the atheist is a problem for the atheist as well. No particular cause is sufficient to explain the existence of an effect. So, why are the atheists asking theists to show God's existence (or X) is sufficient to explain evil, when they cannot pose an X that can explain the existence of evil either? It seems hypocritical on the atheist's part.

[McCulloch]

If God's existence is unlikely because of the problem of evil, then does that mean that God not existing is sufficient to explain the existence of evil, or does it mean that the existence of evil necessarily restricts God from existing? If evil necessarily restricts God from existing, then what is the deductive proof that shows that this is necessarily the case?[...]
Hence, it would seem this dilemma posed by the atheist is a problem for the atheist as well. No particular cause is sufficient to explain the existence of an effect. So, why are the atheists asking theists to show God's existence (or X) is sufficient to explain evil, when they cannot pose an X that can explain the existence of evil either? It seems hypocritical on the atheist's part.

From the atheist perspective there are two versions of what what might be called evil.
Firstly random events. Many random events must be interpreted by theists as being evil but without the existence of a supernatural god, they are simply amorally random. Thus, unlike the theist, we do not need to struggle to find the meaning or purpose of tsunami or earthquakes or other natural disasters.
Secondly caused events. People have done bad things. Some people have done really bad things. Theists must answer why their god allows bad people to do bad things and why good people must suffer because of the actions of the bad ones. Atheists do not.
Without god, the explanation of why some events can be interpreted as evil is elementary. With god (the personification of Good), one has to explain Evil. We do not posit the existence of any kind of platonic Evil idealized or christian Evil personified. Evil is just a way to interpret the results of events.