The Trinity and Personhood

[theopoesis]

A few weeks back I discussed briefly the doctrine of the Trinity with McCulloch. I lacked the time then to fully provide an acceptable level of attention to the matter, but have taken some time now. Please forgive the length of the OP, but I need to present an idea before I can ask the questions necessary.

I believe that the writings of John Zizioulas, a contemporary Orthodox theologian, might shed some interesting light on the doctrine of the Trinity. Or, perhaps it will be pointless. Regardless, here is discussion of Zizioulas' Being as Communion. I will follow up my discussion of Zizioulas with some brief comments on Constantin Scouteris.

The Language:

Theology has traditionally claimed that the Trinity is the notion of a God of one substance/being (ousia) but three persons (hypostases). This is in the creeds, and Zizioulas takes it as granted. He also notes that the development of the philosophical idea of the "person" originated in the writings of the Cappadocian Fathers in their attempt to understand the three hypostases or persons in the Godhead.

The East/West Dispute:

Zizioulas points to the division between conceptions of the Trinity in the East among the Orthodox, and in the West among Catholics and Protestants. In the East, the Person of the Father is the source of the Son and the Spirit. The Second and Third Persons of the Trinity find their being in and through the First Person, the Father, who is the unifying principle. In the West, the unifying principle is being. The son is from the Father, and the Spirit from the Son and the Father, but all tend to be conceptualized as arising out of a nature or being - God. This seems trivial, but to Zizioulas, it is critical to understand. Zizioulas suggests correct theology is only done by the Orthodox in this area.

Personhood

To Zizioulas, to be a person or hypostasis is to exist in relation to others on one's own terms, separate from the other and yet capable of experiencing the other positively. In a biological sense, Zizioulas suggests that personhood is impossible insofar as the person is a product of biological nature. The ontological ground of "personhood" is the biological nature of the person. This is true in that the biological "person" comes to exist through a biological act of procreation, and in that the "person" ceases to exist when the biological substance of that "person's" body itself ceases to function. The will and identity of the "person," biologically speaking, is constrained by the nature of that "person" genetically, hormonally, mentally, bodily, etc.

Socially, one might also try to construct a conception of the person, but the "person" here exists only artificially. Rather, the "person" is in fact reduced to the social nature. This is true insofar as the social "person" exists in a role (plumber, architect, trend setter, outcast) only as a result of that individual's participation in the nature of society itself. Though in a small degree, an individual might influence society, society as a whole seems the stronger influence on the identity and will of the "person" itself. Thus, the "person" only exists as a manifestation of a particular social current. Here again, personhood collapses into nature/being.

Ecclesially, however, Zizioulas argues that it is possible to be a person through the theological concept of the Trinity as understood by the Eastern Church. In the Trinity, the first person of the Trinity, the Father, acts by will to eternally beget the Son and to send forth the Spirit. The Spirit and Son maintain the full nature or being of the Father, but this being or nature is not the determinative principle. Differentiation of personhood is possible through the Father's sovereign will despite the perfect identity of nature. Whereas a human being is differentiated through biological diversity or through divergent social roles and positions, the Father and Son are differentiated not by differences in nature but by will. And therefore, through the eternal begetting of the Father, within the Godhead itself three persons exist which can relate to one another on their own terms, separate from one another and yet capable of experiencing one another positively through love. The diversity of the Godhead conversely allows for unity and authentic relationship insofar as the nature of the three persons is identical. Were there no similarity of nature, there would be no basis for communication or communion.

Through participation in the divine communion (the Greek term for this is theosis or theopoiesis - from which my name is derived) the Christian, theologically speaking, claims to develop an identity through a "rebirth" in relation to God. The Son, Jesus Christ, through assuming the human nature, offers the opportunity for that nature to come into communion with the nature of the Father, thereby establishing the grounds for relationship despite the infinite divide between the infinite, eternal God and the human being. This relationship is continually unfolding, but offers the eschatological hope of personhood, wherein the human being relates to God as other in an unconstrained way, effected no longer by biological determinism (the body) or by social location (society itself having ceased to exist). Rather, the human exists independently, willingly, and autonomously, and yet is capable of relation to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit through love as a result of the assumption.

Therefore, to Zizioulas, the primary question is not "how can something be three persons in one nature?" Instead, the question becomes, how can the concept of "person" have any meaning if the "person" can be reduced to an epiphenomenon of biology or sociology or some other nature?

I might point out that I have just summarized chapter 1 of Zizioulas's book, just one of many solid books on the Trinity. But this brief introduction is sufficient for now in terms of Zizioulas.

Here I would add a few brief points from another Orthodox thinker, Constantine Scouteris in his book Ecclesial Being. Scouteris notes several points worth considering. Salvation when understood as a restoration to true personhood involves not simply a rational understanding of the work of Christ, but a participation in that work unto restored personhood. Therefore, the Church itself is not the gathering of those who share a set of ideas, but rather is the union of those beings which are saved into a communion of persons. Jesus restores the image of God onto humanity through defeating the sinful nature as represented in the biological and social and even spiritual nature of human beings, but this defeat entails both the offering of a new nature which is shared among all believers and also the creation of humans as persons in communion, no longer constrained to finitude as a result of their impending biological death, nor constrained to social inequality, but subsisting eternally in equality as independent wills and not as social roles, biologically determined bodies, or otherwise as a result of natures.

I hope these thoughts will be helpful. If nothing else, they would seem to open up a host possible of debate topics:

(1) If personhood is not grounded in being, is it illogical to speak of one being subsisting in three persons?
(2) Can personhood exist when grounded in being? How might we define this personhood?
(3) Can a non-Christian affirm or explain personhood apart from the Trinity?

[theopoesis]

.

...does the Cappadocian definition of a person exempt the Trinity from accusations of being illogical?

Yes, but so does the analogy of the two-dimensional "flatlander" who can't quite grasp the concept of a "cube," which consists of multiple distinct "two-dimensional" squares all comprising a single "three-dimensional" object. While the flatlander can understand two dimensions, she can't quite grasp the implications of three dimensions.

It would be very simple to SHOW the "flatlander" a cube. Cubes exist and can be demonstrated. They are not imaginary or hypothetical.

Can the same be said for a "triad god"?

EduChris's purposes and my own might be distinct...

I seek to prove nothing, as I am a fideist. The OP presents Trinitarian doctrine in an attempt to refute any claims of necessary problems of logic. I am curious whether you see any. After repeated accusations of the illogical nature of the Trinity, I felt the need to start this thread.

I grant that I cannot prove the Trinity, but I am curious whether you would grant that there is no inherent contradiction in the Trinity, given the OP.

[Cathar1950]

.

...does the Cappadocian definition of a person exempt the Trinity from accusations of being illogical?

Yes, but so does the analogy of the two-dimensional "flatlander" who can't quite grasp the concept of a "cube," which consists of multiple distinct "two-dimensional" squares all comprising a single "three-dimensional" object. While the flatlander can understand two dimensions, she can't quite grasp the implications of three dimensions.

It would be very simple to SHOW the "flatlander" a cube. Cubes exist and can be demonstrated. They are not imaginary or hypothetical.

Can the same be said for a "triad god"?

EduChris's purposes and my own might be distinct...

I seek to prove nothing, as I am a fideist. The OP presents Trinitarian doctrine in an attempt to refute any claims of necessary problems of logic. I am curious whether you see any. After repeated accusations of the illogical nature of the Trinity, I felt the need to start this thread.

I grant that I cannot prove the Trinity, but I am curious whether you would grant that there is no inherent contradiction in the Trinity, given the OP.

Tertullian - "I believe because it is absurd"
Being a fideist it really doesn't matter if it is rational.
In philosophy a paradox is a problem when you hold two opposing positions where in religion it is doctrine.
I see it as what happens when you insist a human was fully divine and fully human and God. You can go through all kinds of rationalizations and redefinitions of person and then you can figure out what you mean by persons then project them upon models of God. Notice I didn't write modals. So it looks like doctrine and dogma redefine God so that their doctrine doesn't seem irrational because it is doctrine.
It is still called a mystery and that should be a dead giveaway.

[theopoesis]

Tertullian - "I believe because it is absurd"
Being a fideist it really doesn't matter if it is rational.
In philosophy a paradox is a problem when you hold two opposing positions where in religion it is doctrine.
I see it as what happens when you insist a human was fully divine and fully human and God. You can go through all kinds of rationalizations and redefinitions of person and then you can figure out what you mean by persons then project them upon models of God. Notice I didn't write modals. So it looks like doctrine and dogma redefine God so that their doctrine doesn't seem irrational because it is doctrine.
It is still called a mystery and that should be a dead giveaway.

Cathar:

Perhaps you should look at the following thread:

http://debatingchristianity.com/forum/v ... hp?t=15130

Later on in the thread I develop my understanding of presuppositional fideism. Here (or perhaps elsewhere) I also make the distinction between relativistic fideism and nihilistic fideism. The former recognizes rationality as arising within particular conditions, and validates the rationality through its own ability to maintain internal coherence. The latter is the branch of fideism that reduces rationality to nothingness.

When I defend the inner coherence of the Trinity, I do so to suggest that my rationality is not inferior to yours in that, I suspect, both maintain a degree of internal coherence.

However, in this thread I begin to make a new move, one that theologians like John Milbank and Stephen Long have begun to advance: I demonstrate that Western Secularism is parasitic on Christianity.

Yes, you can post your rants about the rationalization of dogma, but I suggested that (and have yet to have a single individual respond) the idea of a "person" is vacuous apart from its context in Trinitarian thought. The Christian did not offer "redefinitions of the person." The Christian offered the first definition of the person, and if the secularist is to maintain the idea of personhood apart from Christian theology, he or she does so parasitically, as a heretic or as an unwitting advocate of Christian personalism.

Thus, when I view your responses, I do not see them as much a product of your emotional distaste for Christianity. Instead, I see them as a result of the completely barren nature of the secular narrative, which still clings feebly to a tradition of Christian theology and philosophy in the area of terms like "person" but which has failed to develop its own discourse and narrative of the world apart from that which it has assumed from my tradition.

Yes, I am a fideist, and I recognize that rationalities are historically embedded and presuppositionally shaped, but this knowledge of history allows me to understand the degree to which personalism is steeped in Christian thought. Perhaps there are alternatives, but apart from blanket dismissals of theology, I have seen nothing here to suggest their existence.

[bernee51]

I find it informative, albeit mildly amusing, when attempts are made to shoehorn later mythic beliefs in to ancient philosophies. The idea of the trinity predates the earliest codified religions.

The ancients cognized the nature of being:
The knower " god the father (cf. Brahman " the creator)
The known " god the son (cf. Vishnu " the sustainer)
The act of knowing " the holy spirit (cf. Shiva " the destroyer)

(1) If personhood is not grounded in being, is it illogical to speak of one being subsisting in three persons?
(2) Can personhood exist when grounded in being? How might we define this personhood?
(3) Can a non-Christian affirm or explain personhood apart from the Trinity?

So being is indeed all thre.

Individual self - personhood, however, is an illusion derived in the apparent separateness of the aspects of being.

[Zzyzx]

.

I seek to prove nothing, as I am a fideist. The OP presents Trinitarian doctrine in an attempt to refute any claims of necessary problems of logic. I am curious whether you see any. After repeated accusations of the illogical nature of the Trinity, I felt the need to start this thread.

I grant that I cannot prove the Trinity, but I am curious whether you would grant that there is no inherent contradiction in the Trinity, given the OP.

Theo,

I am a realist rather than a philosopher (which may account for my infrequent responses to your very thoughtful posts). I studied and taught sciences (long ago), particularly Earth science and geology. Thus, most of my thinking refers back to the real world.

That said, I regard discussions of "god" to be hypothetical for lack of evidence to indicate otherwise. Supernatural beings may or may not exist and may, if they do exist, be very different from any concepts put forth by Theists. The "Triad God" concept may be without internal contradiction if proper hypothetical assumptions are made. Frankly, however, it makes no sense at all to me -- and seems akin to the condition known as "Dissociative Personality Disorder" (formerly known -- as you are aware but some readers may not be -- "Multiple Personalities").

That seems to come the closest that I can come to "understanding" the "Trinity" concept. Further, it seems to me as though that concept of a "monotheistic god in three parts" was necessitated by fusion of the New Testament writings about Jesus onto earlier Jewish writings about "god" without evoking polytheism (which had fallen out of favor).

When does the Trinity first appear in Christian writings?



Z

[EduChris]

...It would be very simple to SHOW the "flatlander" a cube...

How do you propose to get the three-dimensional cube into the two-dimensional flatland?

[Zzyzx]

.

...It would be very simple to SHOW the "flatlander" a cube...

How do you propose to get the three-dimensional cube into the two-dimensional flatland?

Magic -- "a miracle".

Those who propose that dead bodies come back to life after days in the grave, stars stop over a birthplace, people walk on water, donkeys converse with humans, etc should have no difficulty with that proposal.

[theopoesis]

I find it informative, albeit mildly amusing, when attempts are made to shoehorn later mythic beliefs in to ancient philosophies. The idea of the trinity predates the earliest codified religions.

The ancients cognized the nature of being:
The knower " god the father (cf. Brahman " the creator)
The known " god the son (cf. Vishnu " the sustainer)
The act of knowing " the holy spirit (cf. Shiva " the destroyer)

I'm not sure what you are suggesting. Are you suggesting that Brahman, Vishnu, and Shiva were described as three persons but one being? If so, please cite a source.

Furthermore, your depictions of the Trinity seems a bit off (though I grant it does sound a bit Augustinian and I wouldn't be surprised to find it in On the Trinity I do believe Augustine and the West has fallen short of the East here, as said clearly in the OP). If the Father is the knower, the Son the known, and the Holy Spirit the act of knowing, it seems the Trinity would be three aspects of one being, and not three persons subsisting in one being. This is not the orthodox position.

Also, granting a precedent for the Trinity in terms of the threeness of being is no problem for me. My question is regarding personhood, and it is there that the Trinity as a doctrine succeeds or fails.

(1) If personhood is not grounded in being, is it illogical to speak of one being subsisting in three persons?
(2) Can personhood exist when grounded in being? How might we define this personhood?
(3) Can a non-Christian affirm or explain personhood apart from the Trinity?

So being is indeed all thre.

Individual self - personhood, however, is an illusion derived in the apparent separateness of the aspects of being.

I don't understand your first statement. Can you elaborate?

I also appreciate your second statement. I agree that, apart from Trinitarian presuppositions, personhood is an illusion. However, if we attempt to build a concept of personhood ecclessially and theologically we must have the Trinity, and this Trinity is not illogical. You've made some assertions with little to back it up, but your conclusion ultimately affirms my position. No Trinity, no personhood.

[theopoesis]

.
Theo,

I am a realist rather than a philosopher (which may account for my infrequent responses to your very thoughtful posts). I studied and taught sciences (long ago), particularly Earth science and geology. Thus, most of my thinking refers back to the real world.

You'll likely note an absence on my part from the science threads for a similar reason. Beyond philosphy of science and some cosmology and basic evolutionary theory, I know little. That being said, it is unfortunate we do not have the opportunity for more direct dialogue.

That said, I regard discussions of "god" to be hypothetical for lack of evidence to indicate otherwise. Supernatural beings may or may not exist and may, if they do exist, be very different from any concepts put forth by Theists. The "Triad God" concept may be without internal contradiction if proper hypothetical assumptions are made. Frankly, however, it makes no sense at all to me -- and seems akin to the condition known as "Dissociative Personality Disorder" (formerly known -- as you are aware but some readers may not be -- "Multiple Personalities").

That seems to come the closest that I can come to "understanding" the "Trinity" concept. Further, it seems to me as though that concept of a "monotheistic god in three parts" was necessitated by fusion of the New Testament writings about Jesus onto earlier Jewish writings about "god" without evoking polytheism (which had fallen out of favor).

Surprisingly, your analogy of multiple personality disorder is a decent one for discussion. The Triune God is in some ways akin to this, except it is a matter of a higher level of order rather than an introduction of mental disorder, so to speak. Further, rather than two personalities coexisting in one being but sequentially manifesting, all three persons are simultaneously manifest and coexisting in one being.

It is almost an escalation of self-consciousness to consciousness of the self, the self-as-other, and the self-as-other-to-other. (That's off the top of the head and might be heretical.)

When does the Trinity first appear in Christian writings?

Quite the tough question. The Trinity is a doctrine that unfolded over time. Its rudiments are in the NT, where "Father, Son, and Holy Spirit" becomes a formula, where John 1 and other passages introduce the ideas necessary for the Trinity, and where the divinity of Christ emerges. Some would say the ideas go further back into the OT, but these interpretations are certainly open to even more debate than the NT ones. Still, there is a degree of continuity there.

In terms of the term "Trinity", the word originated in the writings of Tertullian in the second century. The basic ideas were in place by this time, but the full orthodox development only occurred with the advent of the Cappadocian formula introduced by Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Nazianzus, and Basil the Great in the fourth century. The filioque controversy, which divided the East and the West in their views of the Trinity permanently, was not until the 6th century if memory serves right. Around this time, the "Athanaisian Creed" further clarified the Trinity. There have been some small developments even in the last century through the works of Karl Rahner, Zizioulas, and Robert Jensen.

Trinitarian thought is perhaps best understood as a tradition of thought much akin to physics as a tradition (i.e. only in the way it unfolds over time). When did physics really begin? Was it with Aristotle, or more properly with Newton? That's a tough line to draw. There are continuities and discontinuities. Same for the Trinity.

Best wishes to you, Zzyzx,

theopoesis

[EduChris]

...After repeated accusations of the illogical nature of the Trinity, I felt the need to start this thread...

Is the following example from McCulloch an example of the sort of claim you wish to address here? If so, could you please show how your proposal avoids McCulloch's charge of Trinitarian abandonment of logic:

"X is not Y" and "X is Y" cannot both be true at the same sense at the same time

Can "X is Z", "Y is Z" and "X is not Y" all be true in the same sense at the same time, where Z is a single entity not a set?

For example, substitute "1" for X, "2" for Y and "an integer" for Z.

• 1 is an integer, 2 is an integer, 1 is not 2.

This is a true and valid statement because integer refers to a set, not an individual item.
Second example, substitute "Barak Obama" for Z, "The President of the United States" for X and "the commander-in-chief of the United States armed forces" for Y.

• The President of the United States is Barak Obama.
  The commander-in-chief of the United States armed forces is Barak Obama.
  The President of the United States is not the commander-in-chief of the United States armed forces.

This is a false and invalid statement, because Barak Obama is a single entity.
Third example, substitute "God" for Z, "Jesus" for X and "the Holy Spirit" for Y.

• Jesus is God.
  The Holy Spirit is God.
  Jesus is not the the Holy Spirit.

This is a false and invalid statement, because God is a single entity, God is one. Unless Trinitarians accept polytheism, or that God is a set, they must abandon logic.