Is Theism Justified?

[LiamOS]

In the thread 'Can evidence lead to belief in god(s)?' EduChris wrote:

[...] theism is at least as justified (and probably more justified) than non-theism.

For Debate:
-Is Theism justified?
-If so, is it more justified than Non-Theism?

[Goat]

Rephrasing Pascal's wager doesn't mean one ain't doing the same with different words.

In my opinion, when someone goes out of their way to basically rephrase a bad argument to just use more complicated words, but the exact same concept, it shows a weakness in the original concept. By using these more complicated terms, rather than come up with a more concise and more understandable idea, it engages in doublespeak.

One reason I am skeptical on much of the 'elitist' talk (not everyone, but many) is the assumption that the bible must be interpreted by the intellectuals for the masses. It's one thing if you go on an intellectual and mystical journey for your own spiritual needs, but to look down upon those who are less versed in the highfalutin talk leaves much to be desired.

[Cathar1950]

...CNorman's comment, btw, seemed to be addressing the specific benefit of an afterlife, not the entirety of your argument that theism offers upside without downside.

The "upside" has nothing to do with our status before "God." I am talking only about an "upside" in terms of being able to justify our position logically--in other words, I am only refuting the nontheist's assertion that nontheism is more justifiable than theism.

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It still looks like a straw man and any argument about theism would be directed against specific arguments not general ones not yet invented.

[ChaosBorders]

Rephrasing Pascal's wager doesn't mean one ain't doing the same with different words.

Though properly modified, Pascal's wager is potentially more useful than the original. The original fails for specific reasons, such as the possibility of a God who only allows non-believers into heaven, but the general concept of holding a belief that has upsides if correct but no downsides if one is wrong isn't entirely without merit. It should also be noted that the original was not meant to stand on its own, as Pascal had made arguments for why if there was true religion it'd have to be Christianity (thus removing the possibilities that make his wager so faulty when by itself).

I haven't been following this debate closely enough to know whether EduChris is actually making a modified version or if his modifications are sufficient to overcome the deficiencies of the original if he his. But I figured this might be worth mentioning.

[JoeyKnothead]

Rephrasing Pascal's wager doesn't mean one ain't doing the same with different words.

Though properly modified, Pascal's wager is potentially more useful than the original. The original fails for specific reasons, such as the possibility of a God who only allows non-believers into heaven, but the general concept of holding a belief that has upsides if correct but no downsides if one is wrong isn't entirely without merit. It should also be noted that the original was not meant to stand on its own, as Pascal had made arguments for why if there was true religion it'd have to be Christianity (thus removing the possibilities that make his wager so faulty when by itself).

I haven't been following this debate closely enough to know whether EduChris is actually making a modified version or if his modifications are sufficient to overcome the deficiencies of the original if he his. But I figured this might be worth mentioning.

As always, I 'preciate your reasoned and learned take on things. I'll try to incorporate this information into my own.

As it stands, the only "benefit" I see from the particular argument is that it allows the "conversation" to continue - where the "not god" angle would have us move on to other (read non-religious) topics.

[Zzyzx]

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Rephrasing Pascal's wager doesn't mean one ain't doing the same with different words.

Though properly modified, Pascal's wager is potentially more useful than the original.

How can Pascals wager become useful when one is aware that there are at least two thousand gods proposed, worshiped, feared, etc " many of which are mutually exclusive (as the Christian god that supposedly demands to be worshiped as the only true god)? If the "wager" had any validity, the proper response would be to worship as many non-exclusive gods as possible in hopes of hitting the right one.

The original fails for specific reasons, such as the possibility of a God who only allows non-believers into heaven, but the general concept of holding a belief that has upsides if correct but no downsides if one is wrong isn't entirely without merit.

Has any god worship been shown to be free of downsides in the real world (and the only life we know we have)? Belief itself imposes and entails certain requirements and limitations " which CAN legitimately be considered downsides (even if readily accepted by believers).

[EduChris]

...the general concept of holding a belief that has upsides if correct but no downsides if one is wrong isn't entirely without merit...

Precisely.

...It should also be noted that the original was not meant to stand on its own, as Pascal had made arguments for why if there was true religion it'd have to be Christianity (thus removing the possibilities that make his wager so faulty when by itself)...

Good point.

...I haven't been following this debate closely enough to know whether EduChris is actually making a modified version or if his modifications are sufficient to overcome the deficiencies of the original...

Pascal's Wager was addressing the issue of our standing before God, and the consequences for us in the afterlife. Neither of these have anything to do with my argument, which addressed one issue and one only--which is, the relative merits for theism and nontheism, insofar as our own powers of logic and reason are concerned.

Much fuss has been generated about my position, but this fuss really has nothing to do with what I have said (and what I have intentionally left unsaid) but rather more to do with people importing their own presuppositions into the argument, and treating those presuppositions as though they had anything at all to do with my argument.

I have been arguing my case on three separate threads, and now it appears that Zzyzx has added a fourth thread on this same topic. I'm going to focus on writing my thoughts in a more of an "essay" format, which if it doesn't end up being too long, I might post here later. In the meantime, I simply say that every attempted refutation of my position (thus far) has failed to keep the discussion within the very limited parameters which I established for my argument. The intention was not to avoid other matters which follow from the original argument, but rather to establish some necessary distinctions before going on to consider and compare other matters of importance (in software terms, this methodology is referred to as "separation of concerns").

[ChaosBorders]

How can Pascals wager become useful when one is aware that there are at least two thousand gods proposed, worshiped, feared, etc " many of which are mutually exclusive (as the Christian god that supposedly demands to be worshiped as the only true god)?


If the "wager" had any validity, the proper response would be to worship as many non-exclusive gods as possible in hopes of hitting the right one.

Regarding specific gods, the wager in its original form would only be useful if you could narrow it down to one. Pascal thought he'd done that. I've not read his specific arguments for why, if any religion is true, it would have to be Christianity, but I suspect I would not agree with his arguments being sound.

However, the concept of holding a belief that has an upside if correct, but little to no downside if wrong, is a very important one. Besides being the basis of many evolutionary adaptive traits (optimism, for instance), it is also an important idea for developing statistical models such that getting it wrong leads to as little damage as possible while maximizing the benefit of being right.

The original fails for specific reasons, such as the possibility of a God who only allows non-believers into heaven, but the general concept of holding a belief that has upsides if correct but no downsides if one is wrong isn't entirely without merit.

Has any god worship been shown to be free of downsides in the real world (and the only life we know we have)? Belief itself imposes and entails certain requirements and limitations " which CAN legitimately be considered downsides (even if readily accepted by believers).

The key there is that they can be considered downsides. But the perceived downsides are subjective opinions about what should be considered a downside. If someone does not consider something to be a downside (due to personality, time-frame orientation, etc.) then for that individual there is none. And if there is little to no downside, or if the individual considers worship to have a greater inherent upside (such as psychological well-being resulting from hope, the feeling of being cared about, etc.) then the pragmatically reasonable course of action for them is to engage in that worship.

Because people's subjective opinions regarding downsides and upsides differ, I don't think a general statement "theism is thus more reasonable than non-theism" can be made. However, this makes the opposite faulty as well "non-theism is more reasonable than theism." Whether one is more reasonable than the other depends entirely upon the individual and why they believe or do not believe what they do.

As always, I 'preciate your reasoned and learned take on things. I'll try to incorporate this information into my own.

Thank you. I appreciate the appreciation.

[Zzyzx]

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However, the concept of holding a belief that has an upside if correct, but little to no downside if wrong, is a very important one.

I would agree IF there is basis in fact for the claim that there is an "upside" (and/or a "downside") -- and that the whole matter was something more than imagination at work.

To illustrate:

Anyone can claim that leprechauns provide eternal life to those who worship them. A worshiper can then propose: It is more reasonable to believe in leprechauns than to not believe, because belief has an "upside" possibility while disbelief has none.

Exactly the same thing can be applied regarding each of the thousands of proposed "gods".

Should one worship all of the "gods" and leprechauns because someone CLAIMS there is an "upside" in doing so?

The critical issue, as I see it, is the validity of a claim for an "upside" -- that it be something more substantial than imagination (as the leprechaun example is intended to illustrate).

[ChaosBorders]

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However, the concept of holding a belief that has an upside if correct, but little to no downside if wrong, is a very important one.

I would agree IF there is basis in fact for the claim that there is an "upside" (and/or a "downside") -- and that the whole matter was something more than imagination at work.

To illustrate:

Anyone can claim that leprechauns provide eternal life to those who worship them. A worshiper can then propose: It is more reasonable to believe in leprechauns than to not believe, because belief has an "upside" possibility while disbelief has none.

Exactly the same thing can be applied regarding each of the thousands of proposed "gods".

Should one worship all of the "gods" and leprechauns because someone CLAIMS there is an "upside" in doing so?

The critical issue, as I see it, is the validity of a claim for an "upside" -- that it be something more substantial than imagination (as the leprechaun example is intended to illustrate).

Imagination may well BE the Upside for many people. Heaven cannot be shown to exist, but whether it does or not, for many people the belief it does gives them hope. The psychological benefit of that alone is, for many people, considerable.

[Zzyzx]

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Imagination may well BE the Upside for many people.

I agree 100%

Heaven cannot be shown to exist, but whether it does or not, for many people the belief it does gives them hope. The psychological benefit of that alone is, for many people, considerable.

Again, I agree.

However, that does not justify any version of Pascal's Wager no mater how construed, worded or modified -- and it certainly does not justify use of the wager as a selling tool or debate point for Christianity.

If one is selling "hope" to those who need hope, I have no objection. I would prefer (and require for myself) that the promised reward be something more than imaginary. In fact, I do not object to selling the "hope" of religion to the hopeless -- but question the legitimacy of selling "hope" to those who are not hopeless (particularly efforts made to cajole those who are not hopeless to accept possibly imaginary "hope" by attempting to denigrate their existing convictions and/or world view -- as we may see being attempted in these threads and elsewhere).

An excellent business plan is to create a "need" and offer a solution -- for a price.