Is Theism Justified?

[LiamOS]

In the thread 'Can evidence lead to belief in god(s)?' EduChris wrote:

[...] theism is at least as justified (and probably more justified) than non-theism.

For Debate:
-Is Theism justified?
-If so, is it more justified than Non-Theism?

[EduChris]

...You're presenting a false dichotomy. General theism on average is not less reasonable than non-theism. But nor can it be shown to be more reasonable on anything more than an individual, case by case basis.

There is no false dichotomy. What my thought-experiment does is change the starting point for debate.

No particular theism can be reasonable unless theism is in general reasonable. Once the general reasonableness of theism is demonstrated, any particular theism might be reasonable as well--but only to the extent that it is: 1) internally coherent, 2) relatively consistent with other scholarly disciplines, and 3) possessing sufficient explanatory scope.

In other words, if theism is in general unreasonable, then all particular theisms become automatically unreasonable as well. This is in fact what the JoeyKnotheads and Zzyzx's of the world always try to claim. But if theism is not unreasonable (and even more reasonable than non-theism) then it becomes possible to reasonably examine the relative merits of each particular theism.

In the end, it might still be possible for someone to claim they can't decide between the various particular theistic options; it might still be possible for someone to claim that none of the particular theistic options pass the three criteria mentioned above. But in order to make such claims, they will have to at least grant the reasonableness of theism's starting position, which is:

...there is an ultimate, absolute, necessary and non-contingent Reality which affords the contingent reality of our lives and of the entire universe and to which we humans (individually or collectively) might actually matter in some way, whether by personal Divine response or by Divinely-established autonomic reaction.

[EduChris]

...Unless God was evil...

It wouldn't be reasonable to assume that God was evil, given the fact that none of the major theistic faiths make such a claim (in fact, I could add the word "non-malevolent" to my description of God and still find acceptance for this among Jews, Christians, Muslims, and many Hindus).

It might be theoretically possible for God to be evil, but unless that is known for sure, Board's point about taking our lumps (if need be) will still be valid.

[Board]

Another hard question. If one knows the truth, but is aware that telling it will cause significant harm to innocent others, why should they not speak out against the truth and promote the lie?

The classic example here I think is those who hid Jews from the Nazis.

But in your example what is the truth? The truth to me is the Nazi's were wrong and the working towards the beneficial is undermining them at any possible chance.

When I speak of truth it is more of the search for objective truth than it is lesser facts.

I have always said I struggle with getting my ideas out of my head at times. I do best with questions though so I love the discussion so far.

[scourge99]

Now if someone can know the truth and still live in the lie then more power to them... as long as they do not speak out against the truth and promote the lie.

Another hard question. If one knows the truth, but is aware that telling it will cause significant harm to innocent others, why should they not speak out against the truth and promote the lie?

The classic example here I think is those who hid Jews from the Nazis.

Kant may agree that one should tell Nazi's of hiding Jews. There is a lengthy discussion of such a conundrum if you wiki "categorical imperative inquiring murderer".

Personally I believe that it is irrational to follow some strict and rigid hierarchy of rules such as "don't lie", "never kill", etc because inevitably there are exceptions. (E.G., lying to nazi's, self defense). At best we have GUIDELINES for our actions and should strive for actions which, to the best of our knowledge, result in optimal results.

[Board]

Given non-theism, irrelevant and potentially harmful truth cannot be a reasonable goal. Given non-theism, truth is only of incidental value, to the extent it supports the absolute value that humans go extinct later rather than sooner.

When is the truth ever irrelevant?

Now I do agree that relevant truth, truth which has as much potential of helping rather than hurting--that sort of truth is a very reasonable goal, but in the scenario I presented, such truth is only available if theism is true.

So you are proposing that relevant truth or beneficial truth is only available if theism is true? That given non-theism, no beneficial or relevant truth can be found?

[EduChris]

...When is the truth ever irrelevant?...

If you were (temporarily) brought to the objectively certain understanding that theistic belief is false, and if you can then choose between telling people the truth about this (with the potential for harm to result) or not telling the truth about about this (and thus maximizing human flourishing) the truth would be irrelevant--it would be contrary to the only absolute value available to the non-theist: evolutionary selective adaptation.

...So you are proposing that relevant truth or beneficial truth is only available if theism is true? That given non-theism, no beneficial or relevant truth can be found?

May I ask you to go back and carefully read the thought-experiments in my post?

If non-theism is true, then the matter of God becomes irrelevant altogether, since in that case only human flourishing (evolutionary selective advantage) remains as an absolute value. In this case, the truth about (no) God can't help, but it can hurt.

On the other hand, if theism is true, then it becomes of utmost importance to learn the truth about this God and about how we might matter to God. In this case, the truth about God can't hurt, but it might very well help.

[Board]

If you were (temporarily) brought to the objectively certain understanding that theistic belief is false, and if you can then choose between telling people the truth about this (with the potential for harm to result) or not telling the truth about about this (and thus maximizing human flourishing) the truth would be irrelevant--it would be contrary to the only absolute value available to the non-theist: evolutionary selective adaptation.

Right, I get what you are proposing but I disagree. How does the possible truth that there is no god ultimately lead to human suffering if it is exposed? How is Theism the only way to maximize human flourishing? I completely disagree with the conclusions you are trying to draw.

If non-theism is true, then the matter of God becomes irrelevant altogether, since in that case only human flourishing (evolutionary selective advantage) remains as an absolute value. In this case, the truth about God can't help, but it can hurt.

If non-theism is true then theism (in this case a lie) can only hurt.

On the other hand, if theism is true, then it becomes of utmost importance to learn the truth about this God and about how we might matter to God. In this case, the truth about God can't hurt, but it might very well help.

If Theism is true then Theism (in this case the truth) can't hurt...

In both cases the truth about theism or non-theism is what matters. Maybe I'm just not getting what you are trying to say... but I feel as though there is meaning being implied in these examples that is just not clear to me.

[EduChris]

...If non-theism is true then theism (in this case a lie) can only hurt...

This is speculation, and runs counter to the fact that theism seems to provide evolutionary selective advantages. If it didn't, it would have been selected out long ago.

Now I suppose you could argue that, in your opinion, the selective advantages of theism have run their course, and now evolution will start deselecting theistic thought--but that would be an article of faith (not reason) and again it would seem to run counter to current trends.

The fact is, given the non-theistic scenario I present, you don't even have to worry about whether the truth about (no) God will help or hurt; all you have to do is select the option for maximized human flourishing--and the truth will become known if it is relevant, and it will remain hidden if it would cause harm.

[JoeyKnothead]

From Post 71:

In other words, if theism is in general unreasonable, then all particular theisms become automatically unreasonable as well. This is in fact what the JoeyKnotheads and Zzyzx's of the world always try to claim.

Please do not attempt to make my claims for me. If you wish I make a statemtent, PM me and request I put in my two cents. I ask this to ensure I'm not held responsible for claims I've not made and to ensure I am able to respond to folks who claim to speak on my behalf who may not include certain qualifiers or context or such I may present if allowed to speak for myself.

I will report your post here to the moderators as a dishonest, dishonorable attempt to make statements on my behalf.

That said, how on God's green earth can conclusions borne of the unreasonable be reasonable?
^notice there is no claim either way here, so again, I would expect you wouldn't say I'm claiming something I've not claimed.

[Cathar1950]

...I do agree that it is no typically no less justifiable from a truly objective standpoint. And part of that is nothing can truly be shown as objective...

Suppose during your sleep a wrinkle in the fabric of space-time transports you into an altered state of consciousness in which you all of a sudden know with objective clarity that theistic belief is false. In this altered state of consciousness, you have amnesia so you don't know who you are or what your belief system was when you went to sleep, but you do have an otherwise normal view of the world and culture. Given perfect objective knowledge that theistic belief is false, you can choose one of the following belief systems which will become your belief system once you return from this altered state. Once you awake, you will not remember what has happened to you. You will hold your newly chosen belief system, but only with the same degree of subjectivity as is common to all humanity (that is, you will no longer have the objective certainty you had during your altered consciousness). Here are your choices:

1) You may choose to adopt whatever belief system which best provides for truth, and only secondarily for this-worldly human flourishing.

2) You may choose to adopt whatever belief system which best provides for this-worldly human flourishing, and only secondarily for truth

Given non-theism, which choice is more reasonable? Operating strictly according to reason, you would have to choose option 2--and this option, in terms of evolutionary advantage, could go either way for theism or non-theism (since neither can be shown to offer any definite adaptive advantage over the other).

Now, repeat this exercise except that this time your altered state of consciousness informs you that theistic belief is true. You again have the same two choices. In this case, given theism, which choice is more reasonable? If you operate strictly by reason, you would have to choose option 1.

To summarize, given objective (but temporary) certainty of non-theism, the reasonable choice is for this-worldy human adaptive advantage rather than for truth (and here theism is no less favored than non-theism). On the other hand, given objective (but temporary) certainty of theism, the only reasonable choice is for truth (which will be theism, since theism is true in this scenario).

Thus, theism is objectively more reasonable than non-theism. This is not to say that theism is objectively proven true, but it is more reasonable since it is definitely favored under theistic assumptions, and no less favored under non-theistic assumptions. That theism is objectively more reasonable than non-theism is the best explanation for the fact that most people are theists.

Note: here is my working definition of theism:

The belief that there is an ultimate, absolute, necessary and non-contingent Reality which affords the contingent reality of our lives and of the entire universe and to which we humans (individually or collectively) might actually matter in some way, whether by personal Divine response or by Divinely-established autonomic reaction.

I would say that God may not only contain or be a "non-contingent Reality" but also all "contingent reality" too if God is going to be of any meaning to us.
There are an unlimited non-theistic assumptions and possibilities and any claim to being more reasonable is meaningless unless you are comparing specifics which are being avoided here projecting theism as more then just rejection of a specific theism even if it is one at a time.