Lessing's Ditch

[theopoesis]

If no historical truth can be demonstrated, then nothing can be demonstrated by means of historical truths. That is: accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason... That, then, is the ugly, broad ditch which I cannot get across, however often and however earnestly I have tried to make the leap

Post-modernity argues that many intellectual fields are a result of particular historical processes. Specific contexts, events, decisions, discoveries, and thinkers led to a specific conclusion as part of that particular unfolding of history.

Questions for debate:

(1) Are historical events necessarily an impediment to absolute claims of truth? Is Lessing's ditch real?

(2) Are post-modernists correct in claiming that particular worldviews or intellectual fields emerge primarily out of particular histories or genealogies (or as a result of these histories or genealogies)?

(3) Does the historical embeddedness of many fields of knowledge lead to problems for the secularist? For the theist?

[EduChris]

...Are historical events necessarily an impediment to absolute claims of truth? Is Lessing's ditch real?...

Absolute claims of truth face numerous and insuperable impediments; historical events are only one example of the impediments we humans face.

...Are post-modernists correct in claiming that particular worldviews or intellectual fields emerge primarily out of particular histories or genealogies (or as a result of these histories or genealogies)?...

Yes. Today's multiculturalism demonstrates this fact.

...Does the historical embeddedness of many fields of knowledge lead to problems for the secularist? For the theist?

The secularist is faced with complete subjectivity, since even the desire for truth-apprehension is a subjective desire having no correlation with the secularist's view of "what actually is." By contrast, the theist has at least some conceptual basis for hoping that truth might actually trump pragmaticism--at least with respect to how and why we might matter to Ultimate Reality.

[scourge99]

Questions for debate:

(1) Are historical events necessarily an impediment to absolute claims of truth? Is Lessing's ditch real?

I would agree that proving absolute claims appears an impossible task.

(2) Are post-modernists correct in claiming that particular worldviews or intellectual fields emerge primarily out of particular histories or genealogies (or as a result of these histories or genealogies)?

Perhaps. What are we to make of this ditch if its conclusions are applicable to itself? Doesn't Lessing's ditch buries itself.

(3) Does the historical embeddedness of many fields of knowledge lead to problems for the secularist? For the theist?

Only if we are claiming absolute truth. I believe that is one reason there is so much emphasis on WHY one believes rather than just WHAT one believes.

[EduChris]

...Perhaps. What are we to make of this ditch if its conclusions are applicable to itself? Doesn't Lessing's ditch buries itself...

Is the claim "not to know" itself a claim to knowledge?

...there is so much emphasis on WHY one believes rather than just WHAT one believes.

For the secularist, the WHY is every bit as subjective as the WHAT.

[Grumpy]

EduChris

For the secularist, the WHY is every bit as subjective as the WHAT.

For the theist as well, we only have one reality, at least the secularist ADMITS that any why is subjective.

Grumpy

[EduChris]

...at least the secularist ADMITS that any why is subjective...

I think most theists here also admit that their "evidence" for God is subjective; the difference is that we believe that this subjective evidence offers hope for an objective Reality beyond our subjectivity, an objective Reality to whom we owe our being and to whom we actually matter. For the theist then, truth (however subjectively perceived) at least potentially trumps pragmatism.

For the non-theist, truth is "whatever seems to work at the moment"; for the theist, Truth is a You.

[bernee51]

...at least the secularist ADMITS that any why is subjective...

I think most theists here also admit that their "evidence" for God is subjective; the difference is that we believe that this subjective evidence offers hope for an objective Reality beyond our subjectivity, an objective Reality to whom we owe our being and to whom we actually matter. For the theist then, truth (however subjectively perceived) at least potentially trumps pragmatism.

For the non-theist, truth is "whatever seems to work at the moment"; for the theist, Truth is a You.

This non-theist holds that subjective reality, based as it is on thoughts, beliefs, ideas, anticipations, etc, is an illusion. All that exists is the objective reality of the universe, to which we owe our being and to which we matter in that we are, not only part, of its evolution and also having evolved the ability to consiously particiapte in that evolution

[scourge99]

...Perhaps. What are we to make of this ditch if its conclusions are applicable to itself? Doesn't Lessing's ditch buries itself...

Is the claim "not to know" itself a claim to knowledge?

That depends. Is it justified?

...there is so much emphasis on WHY one believes rather than just WHAT one believes.

For the secularist, the WHY is every bit as subjective as the WHAT.

Only for those who obsessively doubt the very ground they walk upon.

[theopoesis]

If no historical truth can be demonstrated, then nothing can be demonstrated by means of historical truths. That is: accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason... That, then, is the ugly, broad ditch which I cannot get across, however often and however earnestly I have tried to make the leap

In some ways this is a softball to the non-theists. Lessing applied the "ugly ditch" to Christianity, suggesting that purported historical events like miracles or the resurrection could not be used as proof in defense of Christianity. Demonstrability (which eventually translated into scientific empiricism) was impossible for the historical, thereby undermining Christianity as anything other than faith. There weren't quite the hard hits against Christianity on this thread that I was expecting.

That being said, I have recently been pondering whether Lessing's critique can now be leveled more strongly against secularism than against Christianity.

(1) Are historical events necessarily an impediment to absolute claims of truth? Is Lessing's ditch real?

Lessing does raise real problems insofar as it is impossible to recreate and thereby demonstrate historical processes. History itself is non-repeatable (despite many similar cycles). Therefore, if claims of truth are rooted in demonstration, history cannot yield claims of truth.

(2) Are post-modernists correct in claiming that particular worldviews or intellectual fields emerge primarily out of particular histories or genealogies (or as a result of these histories or genealogies)?

Scourge99 has raised the best critique of Lessing and the postmodern perspective by wondering whether Lessing falls into his own ditch. There is a sense when this might be true, but at the same time Lessing does seem to offer two forms of truth: accidental truths and necessary truths. A necessary truth is true in all situations regardless of origin, but an accidental truth arises out of historical particularity. It is true, but only because of the way that things have developed.

Lessing does not say that there are no necessary truths, and seems to consider the requirement of demonstration to be a necessary truth (that seems to be a theme around here too). What he does suggest is that accidental truths (a historical event might have been different) cannot prove necessary truths because they are contingent, and grounding the necessary in the contingent makes no sense. If Lessing undermines himself, the empiricist on this forum also necessarily undermines himself, and there is no required link between demonstration and truth.

Postmodernism contributes to things by suggesting that most (or perhaps all) fields of knowledge spring from historical situations. I consider this a valid insight. Certain thinkers, certain discoveries, certain theories all of a seemingly contingent nature lead to further discoveries, theories, or thinkers. If this is the case, the content of the thinker's theories are contingent.

(3) Does the historical embeddedness of many fields of knowledge lead to problems for the secularist? For the theist?

The situation discussed above seems to create major problems for the secular non-theist (particularly of an empiricist bent). If one accepts Lessing's claim that accidental truths or isolated, non-repeatable, non-demonstrable events of history cannot yield necessary truths, then secularists have a problem. Either all aspects of a secular worldview/paradigm outside of scientific tests cannot be considered true (and one might even argue that particular scientific paradigms are historical in nature), and therefore the secularist necessarily has an arbitrary perspective on anything beyond a general understanding of nature, or else one rejects Lessing's claims and thereby opens up the door for theism. If accidental truths of history can yield necessary truths of reason, then religious experiences or historical events like the resurrection (which are both non-demonstrable) can be grounds for a worldview just as equally as the accidental historical developments of the secular perspective can be.

The theist seems to have an additional advantage. Whereas accidental truths of history to the secularist are, in fact, accidental (there being no guiding force), accidental truths according to the theist are guided by a Personal God whose interactions in history link the "accidental" with One who works according to the purpose of necessity and necessary truth. The Christian, operating within his or her own assumptions, can endorse the historical tradition of Christianity as divinely guided and therefore linked to necessary truth, but the secularist can make no such link and so is left with arbitrary assertion and basic knowledge of science (which is available to the theist as well).

This is just what I've been pondering recently, and I look forward to an expect major challenges here as I consider whether to abandon or accept this perspective.

[Goat]

If no historical truth can be demonstrated, then nothing can be demonstrated by means of historical truths. That is: accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason... That, then, is the ugly, broad ditch which I cannot get across, however often and however earnestly I have tried to make the leap

Post-modernity argues that many intellectual fields are a result of particular historical processes. Specific contexts, events, decisions, discoveries, and thinkers led to a specific conclusion as part of that particular unfolding of history.

Questions for debate:

(1) Are historical events necessarily an impediment to absolute claims of truth? Is Lessing's ditch real?

Lessing's ditch is real for Lessing.. However, it sounds like an excuse to be able to make any sort of claim you can, without being reasonable . When it comes to ancient historical claims, there can be no answer that is perfect, however, there are many
factors that can make a claim stronger or lessen it. Often , there is archeological evidence that can be found to either strengthen or cast doubt on an account.

For example, there was the account of Alexander the Great's battle with the Persians.
Not only does archeological evidence show a battle was in the proper place, using the
proper weapons, at about the proper time, but there is the account of the astronomical diaries that have astronomy observations that nail the exact time it happened, but has commentary about what happened that day. We have the original diaries cast in clay.

(2) Are post-modernists correct in claiming that particular worldviews or intellectual fields emerge primarily out of particular histories or genealogies (or as a result of these histories or genealogies)?

That sounds like a complicated way of saying that peoples personal experiences color their ideas. People's world view don't happen in a vacuum, but it sounds like the post modernists are taking it to the next level and making that a principle rather than an influence.

(3) Does the historical embeddedness of many fields of knowledge lead to problems for the secularist? For the theist?

People build on what is known before. The difference between the field of knowledge for the scientists, and the 'field of knowledge' for the theist is that for the secular studies, there is a mechanism to test and verify claims. When there is no evidence, then there is the tendency to filter out opposition, rather than arrive at a methodology to get to the facts.