Lessing's Ditch

[theopoesis]

If no historical truth can be demonstrated, then nothing can be demonstrated by means of historical truths. That is: accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason... That, then, is the ugly, broad ditch which I cannot get across, however often and however earnestly I have tried to make the leap

Post-modernity argues that many intellectual fields are a result of particular historical processes. Specific contexts, events, decisions, discoveries, and thinkers led to a specific conclusion as part of that particular unfolding of history.

Questions for debate:

(1) Are historical events necessarily an impediment to absolute claims of truth? Is Lessing's ditch real?

(2) Are post-modernists correct in claiming that particular worldviews or intellectual fields emerge primarily out of particular histories or genealogies (or as a result of these histories or genealogies)?

(3) Does the historical embeddedness of many fields of knowledge lead to problems for the secularist? For the theist?

[theopoesis]

If no historical truth can be demonstrated, then nothing can be demonstrated by means of historical truths. That is: accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason... That, then, is the ugly, broad ditch which I cannot get across, however often and however earnestly I have tried to make the leap

Post-modernity argues that many intellectual fields are a result of particular historical processes. Specific contexts, events, decisions, discoveries, and thinkers led to a specific conclusion as part of that particular unfolding of history.

Questions for debate:

(1) Are historical events necessarily an impediment to absolute claims of truth? Is Lessing's ditch real?

Lessing's ditch is real for Lessing.. However, it sounds like an excuse to be able to make any sort of claim you can, without being reasonable . When it comes to ancient historical claims, there can be no answer that is perfect, however, there are many factors that can make a claim stronger or lessen it. Often , there is archeological evidence that can be found to either strengthen or cast doubt on an account.

For example, there was the account of Alexander the Great's battle with the Persians.
Not only does archeological evidence show a battle was in the proper place, using the proper weapons, at about the proper time, but there is the account of the astronomical diaries that have astronomy observations that nail the exact time it happened, but has commentary about what happened that day. We have the original diaries cast in clay.

It was unfair of me to post the conclusion of an argument without the full argument. Lessing does not suggest that history cannot be demonstrated one way or the other. Rather, Lessing argues that there is no way to connect a contingent historical event with a necessary truth. He leveled this attack on Christianity to say that (even if we could historically reconstruct conclusively) a historical resurrection, that contingent event, that "accidental truth" could not be the basis for a necessary perspective on truth.

In other words, we might (in theory) be able to establish the truth historically of the resurrection or of a particular battle by Alexander the Great, but we cannot build a theory of what is, what ought to be, or how what is and what ought to be relate to one another based on that historical event. If Alexander's battle was contingent, we cannot base a necessary truth on it.

The way to establish a necessary truth, for Lessing, is to demonstrate it. Empiricism has worked in the hard sciences (biology, chemistry, physics, etc), but can we repeatedly demonstrate anything historical in order to build a worldview?

(2) Are post-modernists correct in claiming that particular worldviews or intellectual fields emerge primarily out of particular histories or genealogies (or as a result of these histories or genealogies)?

That sounds like a complicated way of saying that peoples personal experiences color their ideas. People's world view don't happen in a vacuum, but it sounds like the post modernists are taking it to the next level and making that a principle rather than an influence.

I am not just talking about people's views here. I am talking about how cultures' experiences and histories shape their ideas. Many ideas are products of historical processes. Culture and a broad worldview containing elements beyond basic science seem to be products of historical processes. I think the cultural or community element is more important for what I am wondering here.

(3) Does the historical embeddedness of many fields of knowledge lead to problems for the secularist? For the theist?

People build on what is known before. The difference between the field of knowledge for the scientists, and the 'field of knowledge' for the theist is that for the secular studies, there is a mechanism to test and verify claims. When there is no evidence, then there is the tendency to filter out opposition, rather than arrive at a methodology to get to the facts.

You reduce secularism to "science." If secularism only makes claims as to how the world operates under normal conditions, it is not a worldview.

When I refer to "Secularism" I speak of a non-theistic worldview, typically of a modernist slant. If a non-theist wishes to move beyond the statement "we don't see evidence for a God" and beyond descriptions of nature into anything constructive (i.e. into any positive proposition about ethics, politics, economics, anthropology, culture, aesthetics, or sociology), then the secularist builds a worldview. Building this worldview steps beyond the bounds of demonstration, and therefore runs into Lessing's ditch (if it exists).

When I speak of "fields of knowledge" I am talking about specific academic fields, as mentioned above. Sociology, anthropology, ethics, politics, etc. These fields seem to be based upon "accidental truths" of history. The question is, can a secularist who wants to say anything beyond what the world naturally does do so in a way that his perspective is a necessary truth? Or, does secularism lead to pure conjecture beyond what we observe of the natural?

I'm not trying to rehash the same old mundane "theists can't empirically prove God" argument that floods these forums. I'm trying to ask whether the non-theist can construct anything near a worldview, or if, in the end, the non-theist is left with science and silence. By connecting the transcendent God of necessary truths to the contingent human being Jesus Christ, Christianity has a theoretical (albeit undemonstrable) way to defend a worldview as necessary truth despite its historical nature assuming Christian axioms. Can the non-theist construct or justify a worldview that is more than an arbitrary result of history.

In otherwords, this thread isn't theists vs. scientists. This thread is theism as a world view vs. secularism as a worldview.

[Goat]

If no historical truth can be demonstrated, then nothing can be demonstrated by means of historical truths. That is: accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason... That, then, is the ugly, broad ditch which I cannot get across, however often and however earnestly I have tried to make the leap

Post-modernity argues that many intellectual fields are a result of particular historical processes. Specific contexts, events, decisions, discoveries, and thinkers led to a specific conclusion as part of that particular unfolding of history.

Questions for debate:

(1) Are historical events necessarily an impediment to absolute claims of truth? Is Lessing's ditch real?

Lessing's ditch is real for Lessing.. However, it sounds like an excuse to be able to make any sort of claim you can, without being reasonable . When it comes to ancient historical claims, there can be no answer that is perfect, however, there are many factors that can make a claim stronger or lessen it. Often , there is archeological evidence that can be found to either strengthen or cast doubt on an account.

For example, there was the account of Alexander the Great's battle with the Persians.
Not only does archeological evidence show a battle was in the proper place, using the proper weapons, at about the proper time, but there is the account of the astronomical diaries that have astronomy observations that nail the exact time it happened, but has commentary about what happened that day. We have the original diaries cast in clay.

It was unfair of me to post the conclusion of an argument without the full argument. Lessing does not suggest that history cannot be demonstrated one way or the other. Rather, Lessing argues that there is no way to connect a contingent historical event with a necessary truth. He leveled this attack on Christianity to say that (even if we could historically reconstruct conclusively) a historical resurrection, that contingent event, that "accidental truth" could not be the basis for a necessary perspective on truth.

In other words, we might (in theory) be able to establish the truth historically of the resurrection or of a particular battle by Alexander the Great, but we cannot build a theory of what is, what ought to be, or how what is and what ought to be relate to one another based on that historical event. If Alexander's battle was contingent, we cannot base a necessary truth on it.

The way to establish a necessary truth, for Lessing, is to demonstrate it. Empiricism has worked in the hard sciences (biology, chemistry, physics, etc), but can we repeatedly demonstrate anything historical in order to build a worldview?

(2) Are post-modernists correct in claiming that particular worldviews or intellectual fields emerge primarily out of particular histories or genealogies (or as a result of these histories or genealogies)?

That sounds like a complicated way of saying that peoples personal experiences color their ideas. People's world view don't happen in a vacuum, but it sounds like the post modernists are taking it to the next level and making that a principle rather than an influence.

I am not just talking about people's views here. I am talking about how cultures' experiences and histories shape their ideas. Many ideas are products of historical processes. Culture and a broad worldview containing elements beyond basic science seem to be products of historical processes. I think the cultural or community element is more important for what I am wondering here.

(3) Does the historical embeddedness of many fields of knowledge lead to problems for the secularist? For the theist?

People build on what is known before. The difference between the field of knowledge for the scientists, and the 'field of knowledge' for the theist is that for the secular studies, there is a mechanism to test and verify claims. When there is no evidence, then there is the tendency to filter out opposition, rather than arrive at a methodology to get to the facts.

You reduce secularism to "science." If secularism only makes claims as to how the world operates under normal conditions, it is not a worldview.

When I refer to "Secularism" I speak of a non-theistic worldview, typically of a modernist slant. If a non-theist wishes to move beyond the statement "we don't see evidence for a God" and beyond descriptions of nature into anything constructive (i.e. into any positive proposition about ethics, politics, economics, anthropology, culture, aesthetics, or sociology), then the secularist builds a worldview. Building this worldview steps beyond the bounds of demonstration, and therefore runs into Lessing's ditch (if it exists).

When I speak of "fields of knowledge" I am talking about specific academic fields, as mentioned above. Sociology, anthropology, ethics, politics, etc. These fields seem to be based upon "accidental truths" of history. The question is, can a secularist who wants to say anything beyond what the world naturally does do so in a way that his perspective is a necessary truth? Or, does secularism lead to pure conjecture beyond what we observe of the natural?

I'm not trying to rehash the same old mundane "theists can't empirically prove God" argument that floods these forums. I'm trying to ask whether the non-theist can construct anything near a worldview, or if, in the end, the non-theist is left with science and silence. By connecting the transcendent God of necessary truths to the contingent human being Jesus Christ, Christianity has a theoretical (albeit undemonstrable) way to defend a worldview as necessary truth despite its historical nature assuming Christian axioms. Can the non-theist construct or justify a worldview that is more than an arbitrary result of history.

In otherwords, this thread isn't theists vs. scientists. This thread is theism as a world view vs. secularism as a worldview.

As far as I am concerned, as soon as someone starts using the label 'Necessary' <insert noun here> , you delve into the realm of word games and nonsense. You can't show anything is a 'Necessary truth' with pure logic. You can only provide evidence that something is more likely or less likely to be true with empirical evidence. You can provide evidence for one view or another, but to invoke a 'Necessary Truth' is just making an unsupported claim. I am not sure that the term "Necessary Truth" has any semantic meaning outside of weaving obscure arguments that have no way to verify the accuracy of.

[scourge99]

...Even if theism was equally favored as some other worldview in every possible worldview, that does NOT not mean it is a more reasonable choice than another worldview. You simply can't get from PointA to PointB with that...

The two options are theism, or anything other than theism. Since theism is favored (given theistic presuppositions) and equally valid (given presuppositions that are not theistic) theism is clearly the better justified option.

I disagree with your use of "reasonable" and "justified". Theism may have less disastrous consequences than non-theism if it is wrong but that doesn't make it more reasonable to be a theist or more justified of a belief system.

E.G., if theists are wrong and god doesn't exist then there is no "hell-like" punishment for theists (though there still are consequences depending on the theist. E.G., not using condoms because your theistic beliefs say they are wrong and then contracting HIV). However, if non-theists are wrong then all sorts of hells are proposed for non-believers.

This doesn't make theism more reasonable than non-theism because it does not address the TRUTH of either system. It only shows that the consequences of being wrong within particular theistic systems.

...Why would the theist choose option 1 if there is only a potential benefit? Why wouldn't the theist choose option 2 and receive the certain benefit of "flourishing"?...

Some timid theists might choose option 2, but this would not be the most reasonable choice. Given our seemingly indomitable quest for meaning, the question of whether and how we humans might matter to Ultimate Reality is important enough to justify any potential this-worldly suffering.

. Why wouldn't the non-theist also wish to know Ultimate Reality, even though it contains no gods? Seems like it would be valued by the non-theist just as much as the theist.

...you ignore the possibilities that...Truth and flourishing may be compatible within some non-theistic belief systems...

Given non-theism, evolution provides the only window on "reality as it is," and evolution cares nothing for truth. The non-theist might subjectively desire truth, but this desire could only be subjective, since it is grounded on a reality which cares nothing for truth.

Theists are NOT free from the problem of subjective desires. A theist's subjective desires may or may not coincide with that of a god's.

If there is a god and that god created humans for some purpose, that doesn't mean that people are zombies to that purpose. As discussed by Woodman and Jester, god could inform us of his intended purpose for us, but that doesn't mean we would value his purpose for us anymore than our own subjective one. At the most, our subjective desires would ALIGN with a god's intended purpose.

Whether there is a god or not we are all still left with our subjective desires.

...you ignore the possibilities that...Conflicts between truth and flourishing may be largely over unimportant matters...

That possibility is not ignored at all. I have addressed it at length in my previous posts. My claim is precisely that, given non-theistic presuppositions, the matter of God or no-God becomes trivial compared to the overarching matter of pragmatic subjective benefit. And here the non-theist cannot demonstrate any possible advantage of non-theism over theism--nothing that would justify their choosing option 1. There is simply no advantage at all for the non-theist to risk unnecessary human suffering over a trivial truth which cannot even be known, but rather only believed.

Let's see if this is true with examples:

God exists:
Case 1) non-theist. Chooses option 2.
Case 2) non-theist. Chooses option 1.
Case 3) theist. Chooses option 1
Case 4) theist. Chooses option 2

God does not exist:
Case 1) non-theist. Chooses option 2.
Case 2) non-theist. Chooses option 1.
Case 3) theist. Chooses option 1
Case 4) theist. Chooses option 2

...you ignore the possibilities that...In some cases non-theists would prefer truth and in others flourishing...

The non-theist may resort to subjective preferences, but as soon as he does so, theism automatically becomes as equally justified as non-theism.

...Why would a theist risk the possibility of a malevolent God over his guaranteed flourishing?...

Of the main world theisms, none posits a malevolent God. So while the possibility exists that God might be malevolent, it's an unlikely possibility--and in such case we're all screwed anyway, no matter what we do or think or believe. So the theist is still justified in taking the risk because of the potential benefits it provides. It is a risk, but there is a potential payoff in knowing how and why we matter to Ultimate Reality. By contrast, the non-theist has absolutely nothing to gain by choosing option 1.

...Medicine, virology, vaccinations, gene therapy, computers, cars, planes, etc, don't provide benefits? These are all benefits made possible by discovering "truth"...

Not "truth," but rather, "What works." And such are available equally to theist and non-theist alike.

So if god doesn't exist and a catholic theist chooses #2 or #1 then they magically won't contract HIV because they refuse to use a condoms when they have sex with an HIV infected person?

When a Jehovah's Witness refuses a blood transfusion, they magically won't die?

When you give 10% (or more) of your paycheck to the church, it is magically just as beneficial as giving it to a soup kitchen? If theism is false then is $500,000 spent to build a church equivalent to spending $500,000 on building a school? None of it is wasted paying for irrelevant rituals, extravagant palaces of worship, and study into holy-books filled with false claims?

If theism is false then there is nothing that religion can provide that cannot be provided by strictly secular means. If theism is false then at BEST, religion is superfluous--a waste of finite resources. At worst, it is harmful to the individual and society.

...Your wager: "it is more reasonable [to be a theist] since it is definitely favored under theistic assumptions, and no less favored under non-theistic assumptions."

You have correctly stated the conclusion of my argument, but you have not demonstrated how it applies to Pascal's Wager any more than any other decision-making system in which one option has possible upside with no downside, vs. the other option with a possible downside and no upside.

that IS one of the flaws of Pascals Wager. Even if theism offers many more advantages, that in and of itself does not provide the TRUTH for the belief. It is merely playing off fears and fantasies of punishment and reward.

The wager doesn't promote true, deep faith; it promotes a fake faith. The person simply pretends to be convinced because they're afraid of the punishment for not believing. The wager is simply an attempt to force the person to believe (see argumentum ad baculum). (Or, perhaps more accurately, it attempts to force the person to act as if he or she believes"that is, it serves as an instrument of social control.)

An analogy to this would be a child that professes belief in Santa Claus out of fear that they will not otherwise receive presents, knowing full well that the presents left under the tree are really from his or her parents. Moreover, can we truly choose what we believe?... If the reward for believing in the existence of unicorns was a ton of gold, would you believe? Or would you simply say you believe.

...What is the potential benefit of truth for a theist? That they MIGHT believe in the correct God and are rewarded?...

The potential benefit for the theist is that they might come to know how and why they matter to Ultimate Reality.

ONLY, if their god is the correct one. If Quetzalcoatl is the one true god then you are equally, if not more in the pooper than non-theists.

Not to mention all the time, money, and energy wasted on rituals, palaces of worship, and holy book study for a false god.

...knowledge of evolution has drastically effected our understanding and prevention of infection.

Again, this is a pragmatic benefit, available to theist and non-theist alike.

If theism is false then pragmatism (not the philosophical theory) is the primary concern. That is, if theism is false then for many non-theists then our life in this world is the ONLY concern. (Possible exception to buddhists and other atheists which believe in an afterlife).

If it could be shown that placebos help people, then placebos would have pragmatic benefit as well.

Placebos only have a chance to work if the patient believes the placebo is real. How do you propose hiding the falsity of a religion as a means to utilize the placebo effect? Why do you suppose something like that is NOT currently done?

Evolution demonstrates over and over again that we humans cannot know objectively; we are subjective creatures and this is to our benefit. Truth becomes an incidental afterthought within the world of evolution.

Your argument is a fallacious:

1) Humans have evolved the way they are because of evolution.
2) Humans cannot know anything objectively.
3) Therefore evolution prevents life from knowing anything objectively.

Bacteria, for example, flourished long before humans, and in all likelihood will continue to flourish after humans have finished their blip on the evolutionary radar. Bacteria survive and flourish without any concern at all for truth.

Consciousness is not a characteristic of the most prolific and arguably "successful" organisms. I agree. So what?

[theopoesis]

As far as I am concerned, as soon as someone starts using the label 'Necessary' <insert noun here> , you delve into the realm of word games and nonsense. You can't show anything is a 'Necessary truth' with pure logic. You can only provide evidence that something is more likely or less likely to be true with empirical evidence. You can provide evidence for one view or another, but to invoke a 'Necessary Truth' is just making an unsupported claim. I am not sure that the term "Necessary Truth" has any semantic meaning outside of weaving obscure arguments that have no way to verify the accuracy of.

Ok, so you object to the term "necessary truth." This seems to be sidestepping an argument with the too frequent accusation of "word games", but I'll humor you and try to keep talking. You dismiss the term, but are you trying to understand the principles and argument behind Lessing's thought?

We'll scratch the term "necessary truth." Let's think of it this way:

Can a historical event X lead to a theoretical premise Y?

For example, can Alexander's conquest lead us to conclude anything about human nature? Can it lead us to know anything about true politics, or economics, or sociology?

Can a random historical incident result in a worldview that might be considered truth?

If you stand by your claim that "You can only provide evidence that something is more likely or less likely to be true with empirical evidence" do you cede the fact that the vast majority of the components of a worldview cannot be considered "true" by a secularist? Is my claim that non-theists have science and silence accurate? If not, perhaps you'll engage my arguments instead of simply dismissing them as "word games" because you disagree with a particular term that I took from a non-theist critique of theism.

[Goat]

As far as I am concerned, as soon as someone starts using the label 'Necessary' <insert noun here> , you delve into the realm of word games and nonsense. You can't show anything is a 'Necessary truth' with pure logic. You can only provide evidence that something is more likely or less likely to be true with empirical evidence. You can provide evidence for one view or another, but to invoke a 'Necessary Truth' is just making an unsupported claim. I am not sure that the term "Necessary Truth" has any semantic meaning outside of weaving obscure arguments that have no way to verify the accuracy of.

Ok, so you object to the term "necessary truth." This seems to be sidestepping an argument with the too frequent accusation of "word games", but I'll humor you and try to keep talking. You dismiss the term, but are you trying to understand the principles and argument behind Lessing's thought?

We'll scratch the term "necessary truth." Let's think of it this way:

Can a historical event X lead to a theoretical premise Y?

For example, can Alexander's conquest lead us to conclude anything about human nature? Can it lead us to know anything about true politics, or economics, or sociology?

Can a random historical incident result in a worldview that might be considered truth?

If you stand by your claim that "You can only provide evidence that something is more likely or less likely to be true with empirical evidence" do you cede the fact that the vast majority of the components of a worldview cannot be considered "true" by a secularist? Is my claim that non-theists have science and silence accurate? If not, perhaps you'll engage my arguments instead of simply dismissing them as "word games" because you disagree with a particular term that I took from a non-theist critique of theism.

A historical event such as Alexander's conquest can lead us to conclude people liek power. But, we can see that same behavior in today's world, happening now.

Of course, any conclusions we draw about the society of the time, and that are conclusions, not 'truths'. They are approximations, built on our current understanding of human nature, and seeing which patterns are similar to that time period.

And, of course, it is all up to being revised as new information comes in.

[theopoesis]

A historical event such as Alexander's conquest can lead us to conclude people like power. But, we can see that same behavior in today's world, happening now.

Can we claim that "people like power" in a way that is anything other than arbitrary? Alexander was an accidental or contingent historical event that was one among many which set Western Culture on a specific path which was oriented toward power. Other cultures and other histories seem to have produced different results. Can we say that there was anything in this path suggesting humans must like power, or could we just as easily construct an alternate anthropology were an alternate course of history taken? Could we not alter the course of history now? In other words, do we learn anything real from the historical event on which to build anything?

Moreover, the link between Alexander's and demonstrable behavior today (which I doubt is as demonstrable as presumed) shifts the main point of the argument I am making. I am asking whether historical contingent events can lead to any significant truths (or since you've rejected that word, significant conclusions) that are anything more than arbitrary. If you link the claim that people want power to current demonstrable trends, you do nothing to establish that historical occurrences can lead to truths (i.e. universally applicable conclusions). However, I think the "demonstrability" of human nature today is itself a historical incident.

Arguably, cultural "reality" is socially constructed. Humans and cultures are not like nature and do not operate according to specific uniform and mathematically measurable principles. An arbitrary past event is repeated through teaching and imitation through time until it is accepted as a cultural convention. Soon, a random contingent historical event defines and shapes all future events until such a time as a different random historical act breaks the trajectory and starts a new one. Can this arbitrary event which led to the observation of the common drive for power actually offer us any understanding of what humans are qua human being? Or does it simply describe a historical occurrence and then universalize an arbitrary contingency? That is the question.

Of course, any conclusions we draw about the society of the time, and that are conclusions, not 'truths'. They are approximations, built on our current understanding of human nature, and seeing which patterns are similar to that time period.

And, of course, it is all up to being revised as new information comes in.

I take this to be another restatement of the basic empirical principle underlying much of the secular world. But I have challenged above the application of empiricism to human events today as being able to construct even an approximation that correlates to what the human must be, or actually is in all situations. Science seeks to construct exactly such a narrative of nature, and thus science's approximations are of a different nature than approximations offered by you above. They are also different from any approximation which is based on historical contingency. This is Lessing's point.

The Christian, I believe, can escape this problem through the incarnation. In the incarnation, God is linked to a particular history thereby setting that history on a track that attempts to link the arbitrary contingency of past events with the actual reality of human nature qua human being, and not qua historical contingency. This is the meaning of Jesus' restoring the image of God into human nature.

This solution is based on non-verifiable axioms, but these axioms allow for the Christian capacity within its own framework to speak realistically about what exists as "truth" and thereby present valid "conclusions" that are not based on historical arbitraryness. I am wondering whether the secular worldview within its own axioms can construct a similar narrative of human nature (anthropology), human society (sociology), and human cultural growth (history) that is anything other than arbitrary.

If the secular can make such an argument, or if the secularist can undermine the Christian perspectives on such matters granting Christian axioms, then they are on equal footing. However, if the secularist has no answer within his own axioms that bears equal weight to the Christian, then the Christian would seem to have a leg up on the secularist in terms of ability to formulate a comprehensive worldview that is something more than arbitrary.

[EduChris]

...I am wondering whether the secular worldview within its own axioms can construct a similar narrative of human nature (anthropology), human society (sociology), and human cultural growth (history) that is anything other than arbitrary...

If our universe is deterministic--that is, if we could return to the same initial conditions and "replay" history forward, such that everything would necessarily happen exactly the same as before--then is secular arbitrariness maintained? Or does history become non-arbitrary within determinism?

Personally, I don't see how the secularist can avoid arbitrariness either way. Thus the old saying, "Either theism is true, or else non-theism is absurd (i.e., arbitrary)."

Edit: I wonder what determinism does to theism and the problem of arbitrariness?

[theopoesis]

If our universe is deterministic--that is, if we could return to the same initial conditions and "replay" history forward, such that everything would necessarily happen exactly the same as before--then is secular arbitrariness maintained? Or does history become non-arbitrary within determinism?

Personally, I don't see how the secularist can avoid arbitrariness either way. Thus the old saying, "Either theism is true, or else non-theism is absurd (i.e., arbitrary)."

If history is fully deterministic, then it is fully necessary. Since Christianity is a part of history, Christianity is as necessary as non-theism. Therefore, attempts to invalidate Christianity seem absurd.

I believe all discourse that attempts to persuade one from Christianity toward non-theism assumes a degree of freedom whereby society does not necessarily have to include Christian elements, and whereby the non-theist attempts to change the course of an individual's life (i.e. a micro-history) and a society's (i.e. macrohistory).

[EduChris]

...If history is fully deterministic, then it is fully necessary. Since Christianity is a part of history, Christianity is as necessary as non-theism. Therefore, attempts to invalidate Christianity seem absurd...

But absurdly necessary, given determinism.

See also my edit regarding determinism and theism.

[Goat]

A historical event such as Alexander's conquest can lead us to conclude people like power. But, we can see that same behavior in today's world, happening now.

Can we claim that "people like power" in a way that is anything other than arbitrary? Alexander was an accidental or contingent historical event that was one among many which set Western Culture on a specific path which was oriented toward power. Other cultures and other histories seem to have produced different results. Can we say that there was anything in this path suggesting humans must like power, or could we just as easily construct an alternate anthropology were an alternate course of history taken? Could we not alter the course of history now? In other words, do we learn anything real from the historical event on which to build anything?

Please show me other cultures and other histories that show different results. Can you back up that claim?

Moreover, the link between Alexander's and demonstrable behavior today (which I doubt is as demonstrable as presumed) shifts the main point of the argument I am making. I am asking whether historical contingent events can lead to any significant truths (or since you've rejected that word, significant conclusions) that are anything more than arbitrary. If you link the claim that people want power to current demonstrable trends, you do nothing to establish that historical occurrences can lead to truths (i.e. universally applicable conclusions). However, I think the "demonstrability" of human nature today is itself a historical incident.

I have no idea what you mean by 'historical contingent events' and 'significant truths'. Please describe what you mean by these terms. Do they have any meaning in the real world what so ever, or are those terms gobbledygook?




Arguably, cultural "reality" is socially constructed. Humans and cultures are not like nature and do not operate according to specific uniform and mathematically measurable principles. An arbitrary past event is repeated through teaching and imitation through time until it is accepted as a cultural convention. Soon, a random contingent historical event defines and shapes all future events until such a time as a different random historical act breaks the trajectory and starts a new one. Can this arbitrary event which led to the observation of the common drive for power actually offer us any understanding of what humans are qua human being? Or does it simply describe a historical occurrence and then universalize an arbitrary contingency? That is the question.
[/quote]

To me, that sounds like mystical nonsense. I challenge you to show that 'Humans and cultures are not like nature', because that is exactly what they are. Humans and cultures reflect their environment, and their need for survival.

And, when it comes to past events (calling it a random arbitrary event is nonsense, because you don't know it's random, or arbitrary, it just is), can we see patterns of behavior happen. Events don't just happen in a vacuum.. but it happens as a result of cultural development. Sometimes this is due to environmental changes, other times it is due the exchange and development of ideas/technology. The term 'arbitrary contingency' seems someone is over thinking things, and trying to attribute characteristics to reality that just don't exist.

Of course, any conclusions we draw about the society of the time, and that are conclusions, not 'truths'. They are approximations, built on our current understanding of human nature, and seeing which patterns are similar to that time period.

And, of course, it is all up to being revised as new information comes in.

I take this to be another restatement of the basic empirical principle underlying much of the secular world. But I have challenged above the application of empiricism to human events today as being able to construct even an approximation that correlates to what the human must be, or actually is in all situations. Science seeks to construct exactly such a narrative of nature, and thus science's approximations are of a different nature than approximations offered by you above. They are also different from any approximation which is based on historical contingency. This is Lessing's point.

When terms like 'historical contingency' are used, the conversation to me becomes meaningless, because that term has not meaning to me. Science is a tool, and there are things that science does not handle.. such as 'what should ethics be', or 'should there be restrictions against <insert favorite taboo here> . Science CAN describe the results of various ethics, and we can use data to attempt to analyse the results of things. We can see the 'unintended consequences' of attempts to enforce certain ethics.. (prohibition for example, and the war on drugs).


[quote[
The Christian, I believe, can escape this problem through the incarnation. In the incarnation, God is linked to a particular history thereby setting that history on a track that attempts to link the arbitrary contingency of past events with the actual reality of human nature qua human being, and not qua historical contingency. This is the meaning of Jesus' restoring the image of God into human nature.
[/quote]

Again, this sounds like total gobbledygook to me. 'Historical contingency' is nonsense. As for 'restoring the image fo God into Human Nature', can you show that this is anything more than unsupported claims and wishful thinking? Can you show that this is more than rationalizing about what you want to be?

If you can't, then,.. you can't escape any problem, because your solution is based on unsupported claims, and you have no way to find out what the 'image of God' is, or the Meaning of Jesus' besides what is made up by man.

This solution is based on non-verifiable axioms, but these axioms allow for the Christian capacity within its own framework to speak realistically about what exists as "truth" and thereby present valid "conclusions" that are not based on historical arbitraryness. I am wondering whether the secular worldview within its own axioms can construct a similar narrative of human nature (anthropology), human society (sociology), and human cultural growth (history) that is anything other than arbitrary.

How can you verify the results? If you can't verify the axioms, or show how the process works, is anything more than wishful thinking? If you can't demonstrate that the axioms are true, how do know that your claims aren't arbitrary.?

If the secular can make such an argument, or if the secularist can undermine the Christian perspectives on such matters granting Christian axioms, then they are on equal footing. However, if the secularist has no answer within his own axioms that bears equal weight to the Christian, then the Christian would seem to have a leg up on the secularist in terms of ability to formulate a comprehensive worldview that is something more than arbitrary.

The problem is that you can't show your claims are any better than unsupported claims , how can you show that you results are not in the same class as the 'secularist' ? There are religious claims when it comes to certain Christians sects that have been shown to be false when it comes to that nature of the world, such as the literal reading of Genesis. If the Christian shows that their 'comprehensive world view' includes things that are demonstrative false, or is totally non-verifiable, how does that give them a 'leg up' on the ability to formulate a 'comprehensive world view'. When the Christian has to resort to unsupported claims, and the use of doublespeak , how does that give them a leg up?