Arguments against God

[EduChris]

The thought recently occurred to me that all of the arguments against God seem to be variants of the following logical fallacies:

1) The argument from ignorance

2) The argument from personal antipathy

3) The argument from personal incredulity

4) The genetic fallacy

5) Assuming the consequent (circular reasoning)

Question for debate: Are there any arguments against God which do not fall into one of these five categories?

[Ragna]

Theists and non-theists alike have to stop somewhere, lest our explanations fall into the trap of infinite regress. Theists posit for our universe an ultimate explanation which is "other than" or "beyond" our universe (or any putative multiverse). Non-theists typically posit that our universe (or multiverse) is its own explanation, and that no further explanation is needed. Which of these proposed explanation is more likely? How we could even begin to calculate the odds for either option? At any rate, our universe appears to be winding down and there appears to be nothing about it that would imply or suggest its non-contingence. If our universe is contingent, then either something else (other than our universe) must be non-contingent, or else we are left with the possibility that entire universes simply pop out of nothing for no reason and without any cause. Given that scenario, Occam's razor would lead to solipsism (i.e., a single mind) rather than to an actual universe/multiverse scenario (i.e., billions of minds). And again, in any event it is not at all clear how we could begin to calculate the probabilities for any of these proposals.

This is great logic and philosophy, but when you're talking about the beginning of the universe and you want to put causality in we should really take into account science and quantum physics. I don't think if it's the place to talk about this, but M-theory models have universes that pop into existence for no apparent reason, and even if it sounds like nonsense to you they have hard mathematical reasonings behind, which have to do with the net energy needed to create a universe. If our universe is flat, it would be 0, and everything currently points that it's a flat universe. So I personally think this is true and that universes pop into existence for no reason, which I think favours multiverse theory as well. I don't really follow what you called solipsism here and what you mean by "mind".

As far as I know, a multiverse cannot be detected or examined by science, and so it is more of a hypothesis than an explanation. Moreover, a multiverse which is finite simply pushes the question of ultimate origins back one step, without really providing an explanation. But if the multiverse is not finite, then every conceivable universe would necessarily have an infinite number of instantiations--including an infinite number of universes in which a man named Jesus of Nazareth actually comes back to life after having been dead for portions of three days. In other words, a finite multiverse explains nothing, and an infinite multiverse explains too much.

The number of multiverses, according to some theories, is about 10^500 and has to do with how internal dimensions are curved, which changes fundamental forces values. I will repeat this requires a lot of mathematical work, not just speculation. I guess it's a hypothesis, yes, but... can God even be considered a hypothesis? This makes universes with things really more different than a president being elected. The differences would be of the kind: "helium cores are not stable", so life wouldn't arise. But I don't find any reason for one of those universes to make Jesus of Nazareth be revived... that's a miracle. Each universe can have multiple histories, but all of them natural. And none of the multiverses need to have unicorns. That you can imagine something doesn't mean it's possible.

I haven't made the argument that humans are special, and for the purposes of this thread I would only care to comment on that topic if it were necessary in order to demonstrate that there exists some particular argument against God which could only be countered by demonstrating the "specialness" of humans.

I will say that there appears to be a qualitative progression from mineral to vegetable to animal to human--but I'm not sure this is relevant to my debate question. Is it relevant? Do you have an argument against God which can only be countered by some demonstration that humans are special?

Again I don't really know what to say for "arguments against God", it's too generic. But if God is based in that humans are special then an argument would be that humans are not special, that simple. No, it's not relevant at the moment.

In terms of a definition of omniscience, I wouldn't want to rule out the possibility that God might know what God will do, and that God could make a universe with the specific intention of providing space and time for intelligent creatures to help create their own future via the free choices which are available to them.

1) God exists outside the universe and creates it with a specific intention.
2) God, even if he has created free will, doesn't know how his children will use it. So God can create something about whose development he won't know. Here you are supposing that free will is such a thing but not chance I guess, because of the intention for God to create humans. Humans can act out of nothing determined, out of free will, but matter follows strict determinism.

1) is totally speculative, plus it pushes back the question: Why is there God instead of there being no God? (Don't say because he's non-contingent, that's the definition, not the explanation). Or, why does a non-contingent/necessary being have to exist in the first place?
2) Why are humans not subject to causality? Why is matter and the development of the universe subject to it? Why this discrepancy? I guess here comes human speciality.

I don't particularly care to rehash the argument from evil unless it is relevant in some way to my debate question. However, I will say that most natural evils are compounded by human evil and shortsightedness. Moreover, as a parent I might very well choose to allow my child to suffer provided there were some compensating benefit which could best be realized as a result of that suffering.

Ok, I don't think this is relevant now so I won't answer, but I see your thought.

My point is that God's omniscience does not logically constrain God from creating a universe in which intelligent creatures enjoy the God-given capacity to participate in the creation of their future via the free choices they make from the available options.

I have addressed this above. If God doesn't know the choices but knows humans will arise in the universe you are making a discrepancy including free will in humans but not chance uncertainty in the universe.

Occam's razor is useful to a point, but it can't be applied indefinitely or else we're left with solipsicm. And beyond that, I believe my thoughts on "omniscience" cast doubt on any necessary preference for deism over theism.

I still need you to defend your view of omniscience and how it can follow from any reasoning. I guess you have first to believe in free will, so I need now your definition of free will. No need to say I'm more of a determinist.

If fairies or leprechauns are non-contingent (and I don't know of anyone who actually claims that they are) then what you really have is a specific, particular sort of God. I would argue that the general concept of God must be established as a legitimate option first, and only then can we begin to debate the merits of particular conceptions of God. What advantages does a "Fairy God" or a "Leprechaun God" have over other more established conceptions of God? If there are no advantages, then why not start with discussions of God-conceptions which vast numbers of people have actually found to be useful?

I still don't get why a non-contingent mind with intention is needed to explain the universe, I find it redundant. And usefulness is not a valid reasoning.

Now you are getting to the second part of my definition of God--i.e., the possibility that "we humans (individually or collectively) might actually matter in some way" to this God. And in terms of the debate question I have proposed for this thread, what arguments do you offer in support of the contention that we humans cannot possibly matter to the "ultimate, absolute, necessary and non-contingent Reality which affords the contingent reality of our lives and of the entire universe"?

Again, why is it a "ultimate, absolute, necessary and non-contingent Reality which affords the contingent reality of our lives and of the entire universe"? Until I get to accept this then what argument can I add against it? In other words, how can I say why humans don't mind to something which I think doesn't exist?

And, I still don't see how there is no burden of proof here. Science doesn't know the beginning, it proposes theories from reasoning within a universe. God somehow would include all this and add consciousness, intention, ... Do you still defend there is no burden of proof?

[EduChris]

...The leprechaun argument is used a couple of ways...there is no reasons based on any evidence to believe there is a God...To then attribute either contingent or non-contingent existence to leprechauns or God is a meaningless attribution because on this view attention to how the narrative is constructed means we should not be treating them as potentially real...Together the two forms of leprechaun argument form a powerful argument against belief in God...there is no fallacy of assuming the consequent committed here...

The leprechaun's (non)existence doesn't really address the question of ultimate origins, which means that it is a red herring as far as the question of ultimate origins is concerned.

By contrast, God is posited as the answer to the question of ultimate origins--and for this question science cannot provide any evidence one way or the other.

In other words, there is some ultimate origin for the cosmos. Either God is the ultimate origin, or God is not. Science and leprechauns are equally irrlevant to the question. We cannot calculate the probabilities either way, and since the cosmos does not even give the appearance of constituting its own explanation, there is no obvious way to determine where the burden of proof lies.

[Ragna]

By contrast, God is posited as the answer to the question of ultimate origins--and for this question science cannot provide any evidence one way or the other.

In other words, there is some ultimate origin for the cosmos. Either God is the ultimate origin, or God is not. Science and leprechauns are equally irrlevant to the question. We cannot calculate the probabilities either way, and since the cosmos does not even give the appearance of constituting its own explanation, there is no obvious way to determine where the burden of proof lies.

But "goddidit" cannot explain the universe, it just moves the question! You can call "God" the unknown phenomena that led to the creation of the universe if you want, but the burden of proof is for the one who claims it's supernatural and adds characteristics to it, not for the non-theist, who just accepts it's that - unknown phenomena.

And this: since the cosmos does not even give the appearance of constituting its own explanation.

Something exterior to the cosmos cannot count as an explanation.

[McCulloch]

There is some ultimate origin for the cosmos. Either God is the ultimate origin, or God is not.

I think that you are equivocating. If we start by defining god as the ultimate origin, then we cannot attribute to god the attributes, intelligence, will, volition and so on, based on that definition. However, if you start with some kind of theistic definition of god, then, and only then, does the statement "Either God is the ultimate origin, or God is not. " make sense.

If you define god as the ultimate origin, then let's debate about what can be known about the ultimate origin.

If you define god as the Christian deity, then let's debate about whether this god is the ultimate origin.

But let's not muddle or confuse these two separate debates.

[EduChris]

...when you're talking about the beginning of the universe and you want to put causality in we should really take into account science and quantum physics...

All that does is raise the question, "What is the ultimate origin of quantum physics?" And for that we have no answer, other than perhaps to propose that quantum physics--or scientific theory X (where X is whichever version of physics corresponds to reality-as-it-is) is "God." But we have no evidence for such a proposal, nor do we have any evidence that we ever will know or can know what "scientific theory X" actually is.

...I don't think if it's the place to talk about this, but M-theory models have universes that pop into existence for no apparent reason, and even if it sounds like nonsense to you they have hard mathematical reasonings behind, which have to do with the net energy needed to create a universe. If our universe is flat, it would be 0, and everything currently points that it's a flat universe. So I personally think this is true and that universes pop into existence for no reason, which I think favours multiverse theory as well. I don't really follow what you called solipsism here and what you mean by "mind"...

If the answer to the question of ultimate origins is, "there is no apparent reason," does that really count as an answer? It sounds more like an admission of ignorance than an actual answer. Not that admissions of ignorance are wrong, per se, but we're still left with an element of cognitive dissonance which seeks resolution.

...The number of multiverses, according to some theories, is about 10^500 and has to do with how internal dimensions are curved, which changes fundamental forces values...

So our particular "multiverse" is finite, according to the latest theory. But as we know, scientific theories are always on the move, always changing and adapting, and so we don't know what tomorrow's science will be. And besides that, we don't know if ours is the only multiverse, or one of an infinite number of multiverses.

...I will repeat this requires a lot of mathematical work, not just speculation. I guess it's a hypothesis, yes, but... can God even be considered a hypothesis?...

Since science cannot even in principle address the matter of ultimate origins, it follows that no particular proposal regarding such origins could ever qualify as a scientific hypothesis.

...I don't find any reason for one of those universes to make Jesus of Nazareth be revived... that's a miracle. Each universe can have multiple histories, but all of them natural. And none of the multiverses need to have unicorns. That you can imagine something doesn't mean it's possible...

What is "natural" is simply a matter of probabilities within a given space and time. Given an infinite number of universes, what seems "natural" in our universe would seem supernatural in other universes, and vice-versa. Dawkins (Blind Watchmaker, p. 160) concedes that given a large enough sample of time and matter, eventually a cow would actually jump over the moon, and a marble statue would wave its hand.

...But if God is based in that humans are special then an argument would be that humans are not special, that simple. No, it's not relevant at the moment...

It may not be relevant, but in any case the human brain is, as far as I know, the most complex thing known to science.

...So God can create something about whose development he won't know. Here you are supposing that free will is such a thing but not chance I guess, because of the intention for God to create humans. Humans can act out of nothing determined, out of free will, but matter follows strict determinism...

I have only been trying to show that arguments involving contradictions between various attributes of God fail because the attributes are defined in such as way as to be incompatible. My specific defense of "omniscience" simply suggests that God could logically know what God will do in response to the choices that each person will freely make from the possibilities presented to them by the universe in which we exist.

...it pushes back the question: Why is there God instead of there being no God? (Don't say because he's non-contingent, that's the definition, not the explanation). Or, why does a non-contingent/necessary being have to exist in the first place?...

One of the implications of Godel's ontological theorem is that if anything at all exists, something must exist necessarily (i.e., non-contingently).

...Why are humans not subject to causality?...

I'm sure we are subject to causality in a number of ways. This does not logically entail that we cannot in at least some way rise above material causality--and this would be the case whether or not God exists.

...Why is matter and the development of the universe subject to it? Why this discrepancy? I guess here comes human speciality...

As I understand it, quantum physics does allow for some wiggle room in the fabric of causality.

...If God doesn't know the choices but knows humans will arise in the universe you are making a discrepancy including free will in humans but not chance uncertainty in the universe...

There is nothing in the notion of "omniscience" that prohibits God from choosing certain ends, while leaving other aspects to be co-created by God's creation (within the broad parameters established by God).

...I still need you to defend your view of omniscience and how it can follow from any reasoning. I guess you have first to believe in free will, so I need now your definition of free will. No need to say I'm more of a determinist...

I have simply responded to a particular criticism of God (a criticism which argues against God on the basis of certain posited logical contradictions between the proposed attributes of God). My only point has been to show that there are ways of understanding omniscience which do not entail contradictions. Basically, my response has been that there is nothing inherently illogical in the idea that God could create an environment in which intelligent beings could participate in the creation of their own future. In such a case, God could logically know all of the future possibilities and contingencies, and God could logically know how God might respond to the specific actualities as they are chosen (co-created) by these intelligent beings.

...I still don't get why a non-contingent mind with intention is needed to explain the universe, I find it redundant...

In the end it gets down to where the individual human mind finds rest from cognitive dissonance. Some humans find cognitive rest by avoiding any recourse to anything other than or beyond this universe; most do not. I don't see that reason or logic is capable of deciding the matter, or even determining the burden of proof. The point of this thread is simple: most non-theists stake their claims on the basis of "reason" and "scientific evidence," but in actual fact there is no scientific evidence either way, and the actual arguments of the non-theist all rely on logical fallacies.

...And usefulness is not a valid reasoning...

Science depends on the usefulness of its results. Are you saying that science rests on a foundation of invalid reasoning?

...Again, why is it a "ultimate, absolute, necessary and non-contingent Reality which affords the contingent reality of our lives and of the entire universe"? Until I get to accept this then what argument can I add against it? In other words, how can I say why humans don't mind to something which I think doesn't exist?...

My point in this thread is not to argue for theism, or prove in some way that theism is true. Rather, my point is that: 1) arguments against God flounder on fallacies, 2) there is no scientific evidence either way, and 3) the burden of proof is impossible to determine since we have no way to calculate probabilities based on evidence either way.

In other words, logic and reason and scientific evidence may help us think more clearly about the issues of ultimate origins, but they cannot in principle decide the matter either way. The answer depends on reason plus something else. Theists refer to this "something else" as "faith"; non-theists seem reluctant to name (or even acknolwedge) this "something else."

...And, I still don't see how there is no burden of proof here. Science doesn't know the beginning, it proposes theories from reasoning within a universe...

This is an example of the Streetlight Effect. Science searches for answers within its limited domain, but there is no reason to suppose that the answer must lie within that limited domain.

...God somehow would include all this and add consciousness, intention, ... Do you still defend there is no burden of proof?

If there were any evidence at all that the universe/multiverse/cosmos were capable or providing its own explanation, then there would be a burden of proof in favor of non-theism. But since science cannot even in principle address the matter of ultimate origins, then it becomes impossible to determine where the burden of proof lies.

[EduChris]

...But "goddidit" cannot explain the universe, it just moves the question!...

The ultimate origin of the universe lies beyond the realm of scientific inquiry. If the scientific answer is, "There is no apparent answer," then the question still remains unresolved.

...Something exterior to the cosmos cannot count as an explanation.

What logic are you using to arrive at this conclusion? And how do you avoid the "streetlight effect"?

[EduChris]

...I think that you are equivocating. If we start by defining god as the ultimate origin, then we cannot attribute to god the attributes, intelligence, will, volition and so on, based on that definition. However, if you start with some kind of theistic definition of god, then, and only then, does the statement "Either God is the ultimate origin, or God is not. " make sense.

If you define god as the ultimate origin, then let's debate about what can be known about the ultimate origin.

If you define god as the Christian deity, then let's debate about whether this god is the ultimate origin.

But let's not muddle or confuse these two separate debates.

My definition of (theistic) God is as follows:

The belief that there is an ultimate, absolute, necessary and non-contingent Reality which affords the contingent reality of our lives and of the entire universe and to which we humans (individually or collectively) might actually matter in some way, whether by personal Divine response or by Divinely-established autonomic reaction.

My claim is that only a generic, minimalist definition of God can be logically evaluated (apples to apples) against the simple claims of the non-theist. Once a minimalist definition of God is shown to be no less reasonable than non-theism, then the debate can proceed to evaluating how particular worldviews compare and contrast with respect to the criteria of: 1) greater explanatory scope, 2) better overall fit with other scholarly disciplines, and 3) internal coherence.

[sarabellum]

It seems to me that if you are a christian that you would have some arguments against say the Hindu God(s)....

Would these arguments be fallacies?

If I granted that all arguments against God(s) are logical fallacies how does anyone ever choose a God?

[EduChris]

It seems to me that if you are a christian that you would have some arguments against say the Hindu God(s)....

Would these arguments be fallacies?

If I granted that all arguments against God(s) are logical fallacies how does anyone ever choose a God?

My definition of theism is generic enough to be accepted as a bare minimum starting point by all of the major world theisms, including Hinduism.

But when the move is made from the basic theistic axiom (i.e., that the theistic God exists) toward any particular worldview (such as Hinduism or Christianity or Judaism or Islam) there is the need to compare and contrast the respective detailed worldviews according to the criteria of: 1) greater explanatory scope, 2) better overall fit with other scholarly disciplines, and 3) internal coherence.

And of course, particular non-theistic worldviews (to the extent that they can be specified in any detail) can be evaluated against these same criteria.

In other words, I don't argue against the "God part" of Hinduism, though I might wish to argue against the particulars of Hinduism vs. the particulars of Christianity (or even some particular non-theistic worldview).

[Ragna]

If the answer to the question of ultimate origins is, "there is no apparent reason," does that really count as an answer? It sounds more like an admission of ignorance than an actual answer. Not that admissions of ignorance are wrong, per se, but we're still left with an element of cognitive dissonance which seeks resolution.

I don't believe there is no apparent reason, I believe that there is no reason at all. Reasoning and looking for causes are not valid for the beginning of the universe, this is sounding to me like a cosmological argument again. It's not an admission of ignorance, it's that in my opinion the question is meaningless. This is a topic debatable itself of course. And about the ultimate origin of quantum physics, what? I'm lost here, it's a complete non sequitur. Quantum physics describes reality, it's not an event, it's a science: it has no origin whatsoever, unless you are talking about when it was discovered .

So our particular "multiverse" is finite, according to the latest theory. But as we know, scientific theories are always on the move, always changing and adapting, and so we don't know what tomorrow's science will be. And besides that, we don't know if ours is the only multiverse, or one of an infinite number of multiverses.

It's irrelevant that you posit existence outside our multiverse. But to talk about this we should both have a wider knowledge of quantum physics and multiverse theory. Of course science is always changing. What's with that? Science is about making mistakes, theories and seeing how they are true or false. Your position, on the other hand, looks circular to me and not really answering anything.

Since science cannot even in principle address the matter of ultimate origins, it follows that no particular proposal regarding such origins could ever qualify as a scientific hypothesis.

"ultimate origins"... sounds too metaphysical to me. Science can and does propose hypothesis and theories for the beginning of the universe. All of them are falsifiable, that's why they are science. What makes you think that any "logical" reasoning that doesn't take science into account will do any better, or in fact will do at all, instead, like God?

What is "natural" is simply a matter of probabilities within a given space and time. Given an infinite number of universes, what seems "natural" in our universe would seem supernatural in other universes, and vice-versa. Dawkins (Blind Watchmaker, p. 160) concedes that given a large enough sample of time and matter, eventually a cow would actually jump over the moon, and a marble statue would wave its hand.

I don't know what Dawkins actually meant there, but Dawkins's word is not a bible for me. I say again that the fact you can imagine Jesus resurrecting doesn't mean it's possible, and that multiverse theory is surely not what you are imagining. In fact, all imaginations you can have are conceivable alternate realities with similar traits to your own universe's set of laws and physical constants, but other possible universes multiverse theory works on are not that at all. There is no way we could imagine that, it's outside our experience.

I have only been trying to show that arguments involving contradictions between various attributes of God fail because the attributes are defined in such as way as to be incompatible. My specific defense of "omniscience" simply suggests that God could logically know what God will do in response to the choices that each person will freely make from the possibilities presented to them by the universe in which we exist.

You can only defend that with free will, and a very special free will. Humans can make choices not related to the physical world or to anything at all (or else they'd be predictable by God), but this kind of chance ex nihilo doesn't apply for matter or the development of the universe. You indeed have to think we are very special. Your defense is the one which requires very precise and discriminatory definitions, not mine.

One of the implications of Godel's ontological theorem is that if anything at all exists, something must exist necessarily (i.e., non-contingently).

What if I don't agree with that in the first place? Or, if I say that the universe is necessary itself.

I'm sure we are subject to causality in a number of ways. This does not logically entail that we cannot in at least some way rise above material causality--and this would be the case whether or not God exists.

You should be very careful here, as it is the key point of my criticism of your ideas. Either you think that we follow causality strictly or you think at some point we make choices ex nihilo. "material causality"... Living beings are also matter. Will you also defend a soul at this point?

As I understand it, quantum physics does allow for some wiggle room in the fabric of causality.

Unpredictability doesn't imply indetermination, but it's true that at some times quantum events don't follow causality. However I don't imagine how this can relate to free will in humans, or the ability of prediction (more like foretelling) of the creator of this system. Quantum physics is one of the reasons why I think God wouldn't have known that humans would exist, which makes deism go over theism again. And it favors multiverse theories, by the way.

There is nothing in the notion of "omniscience" that prohibits God from choosing certain ends, while leaving other aspects to be co-created by God's creation.

You are speculating too much. Co-created by God's creation means God took part, since it's his creation, so he would know how it works. Or are you saying he can stop knowing what will happen when he so pleases?

...Basically, my response has been that there is nothing inherently illogical in the idea that God could create an environment in which intelligent beings could participate in the creation of their own future. In such a case, God could logically know all of the future possibilities and contingencies, and God could logically know how God might respond to the specific actualities as they are chosen (co-created) by these intelligent beings.

I think this understanding has to assume a series of things that are much more contradictory (the free will problem) than simply having a deist god, or atheism itself. You can believe that, but why would you?

...The point of this thread is simple: most non-theists stake their claims on the basis of "reason" and "scientific evidence," but in actual fact there is no scientific evidence either way, and the actual arguments of the non-theist all rely on logical fallacies.

Nothing in science points to a God, and nothing suggests or even could suggest that the universe needed special aid for coming into existence. There is no atheist argument against a "God's existence" because usually the God concept is contradictory itself or else it's a void name.

Science depends on the usefulness of its results. Are you saying that science rests on a foundation of invalid reasoning?

X is true because X is useful is a fallacious reasoning. Science doesn't work like that, I don't know what you are saying. I can't even wonder how something false can be useful. Or are you saying that the atomic bomb's scientific reasoning is false because it's not useful?

...The answer depends on reason plus something else. Theists refer to this "something else" as "faith"; non-theists seem reluctant to name (or even acknolwedge) this "something else."

The answer to what question? If I don't think the question: "Why does the universe exist?" is a meaningful question at all, I won't acknowledge the something else because for me there's not anything else meaningful.

This is an example of the Streetlight Effect. Science searches for answers within its limited domain, but there is no reason to suppose that the answer must lie within that limited domain.

There is a reason when the "limited domain" is all domains possible, everything.

If there were any evidence at all that the universe/multiverse/cosmos were capable or providing its own explanation, then there would be a burden of proof in favor of non-theism. But since science cannot even in principle address the matter of ultimate origins, then it becomes impossible to determine where the burden of proof lies.

That the total net energy for creating a flat universe is 0 doesn't suggest you anything? I actually wonder how could anything suggest you that the universe needed some supernatural explanation.