Arguments against God

[EduChris]

The thought recently occurred to me that all of the arguments against God seem to be variants of the following logical fallacies:

1) The argument from ignorance

2) The argument from personal antipathy

3) The argument from personal incredulity

4) The genetic fallacy

5) Assuming the consequent (circular reasoning)

Question for debate: Are there any arguments against God which do not fall into one of these five categories?

[EduChris]

...In my opinion, existence simply is, through all times and everywhere...

Agreed.

...When we say something is contingent we mean a particular arrangement of matter is contingent...

Non-sequitur. I agree that particular arrangements of matter are contingent, but there is no evidence that matter itself is non-contingent.

...The Sun, as we label it, could very well not have existed. But could the matter of the sun have not existed? This very soon takes us to the first moments of existence, where the matter of the sun was already present...

Existence, if it is non-contingent, cannot have any "first moments." Where there are "first moments," there is contingency.

...So if by the universe we take the usual definition that it is "all which can interact", I would accept that it, itself, has necessary existence...

This "all which can interact," to you, might be vastly greater than our finite universe. The problem which we're really concerned with here, however, is what lies beyond our finite universe? Is it just more of the same, or is there something else--an Ultimate Reality to which or to whom we might actually matter. Your definition tells us absolutely nothing (for or against) about this possibility.

...Isn't Godel's argument simply stating that there must be existence (by definition necessary) if it is possible for existence to exist, which it obviously is?

No, Godel was concerned with determining "positive" (i.e., non-arbitrary) properties--properties which are entailed for all conceivable universes. When we find these non-arbitrary properties, we are learning about Ultimate Reality.

[Ragna]

...When we say something is contingent we mean a particular arrangement of matter is contingent...

Non-sequitur. I agree that particular arrangements of matter are contingent, but there is no evidence that matter itself is non-contingent.

...The Sun, as we label it, could very well not have existed. But could the matter of the sun have not existed? This very soon takes us to the first moments of existence, where the matter of the sun was already present...

Existence, if it is non-contingent, cannot have any "first moments." Where there are "first moments," there is contingency.

I probably didn't express myself so well. The point for translating the Sun into matter, or more appropriately matter-energy, is because this is the fundamental "thing" we call existence. So the Sun's arrangement is contingent, but no existence is contingent. The existence of all arrangements in the universe could be contingent, but existence can never be said to be contingent meaningfully. Or can it?

I disagree that when there are first moments, there is contingency. Because I think that there is no contingency for existence itself, and I define all existence, all that can interact, as the universe. We would have to find the most coherent list of things that can interact. As expected, I would go for matter, energy and space-time. When time is part of existence, then first, prior or posterior as descriptions of events don't tell anything about their existent nature. The events simply exist, and contingent, necessary, prior, posterior... are all descriptions of the concepts we draw from particular instances of existence, not from existence itself.

This "all which can interact," to you, might be vastly greater than our finite universe. The problem which we're really concerned with here, however, is what lies beyond our finite universe? Is it just more of the same, or is there something else--an Ultimate Reality to which or to whom we might actually matter. Your definition tells us absolutely nothing (for or against) about this possibility.

Actually we are still in position to investigate the set of things which can interact. You already know my definition. The theist proposes other reality. What is its nature? (not properties) How do we know it? Once and only after this nature is defined, we might wonder if it has human-like mind with volition, intention and desires. What would be the rational basis for thinking that a reality can have these? It's obviously only answerable after we know about the reality. So clearly my definition doesn't account for something like this, because it's not in context.

Aside, postulating possibilities of properties would have no explanatory scope unless the something it applies to was known. Certainly the set of all existence, be it the universe like I think, or be it God and the universe like you think, needs to be necessary or causeless at some point to avoid an infinite regress. So the explanation for ultimate origins somewhat needs something causeless, which is the set of all existence itself. I have proposed the universe as this, now what else do you add, why do you add it and how do you reason it?

...Isn't Godel's argument simply stating that there must be existence (by definition necessary) if it is possible for existence to exist, which it obviously is?

No, Godel was concerned with determining "positive" (i.e., non-arbitrary) properties--properties which are entailed for all conceivable universes. When we find these non-arbitrary properties, we are learning about Ultimate Reality.

Yes, I know. But be careful with all conceivable universes. Certainly all conceivable scenarios have something in common: they all exist. This is what I see as the Godelian non-arbitrary ""property"". The other properties would then just be accidental depending on our concepts of the arrangements of the existent components, our mental structures. But this property so far can apply for the set of all existence, and in my opinion the universe (matter, energy, space-time) is the best candidate.

I have read your other thread on this topics (very interesting read, by the way) and found that you often, with Abraxas, when discussing this, talked about different universes, sometimes using the word meta-structure to refer to something we could call multiverse. I'm not using this point of view. I prefer to say, like universes, instances of existence. All of them have the same structure of space-time. But they are not like coexisting in different realities. I see them as instances of the same reality. Like an alternative story of this world where my wooden table doesn't exist (but there would exist several trees, in compensation).

Since the different instances of existence could be, or more appropriately have been, universes with different arrangements of matter, or even different values for matter-energy constants, the only non-arbitrary property is itself existence, but the rest are derived from the instances of existence. In my scenario, it can be clearer seen that relationality and differentiation are just accidental in existence, because reality could very well be homogeneous, and relation is just a mental structure.

The defense that there is a need to differentiate (and relate) between the different universes simply doesn't hold when they are understood as different arrangements of the same existence in alternate, non-simultaneous (by definition of time), views, which are simply our imagination of the possible different realities, which are just real in our word-play.

[EduChris]

...Certainly the set of all existence, be it the universe like I think, or be it God and the universe like you think, needs to be necessary or causeless at some point to avoid an infinite regress. So the explanation for ultimate origins somewhat needs something causeless, which is the set of all existence itself. I have proposed the universe as this, now what else do you add, why do you add it and how do you reason it?...

Proposing that our own finite universe is uncaused and eternal simply fails the straight-face test. That is why scientists are scrambling to add "something more" to the only universe which we can observe. This is why we hear about multiverses, quantum nothings, etc. The problem for science is twofold: 1) postulating other universes and "quantum nothings" is not science, but rather metaphysical speculation; and 2) simply adding more material to a strictly materialistic metaphysical worldview doesn't actually explain anything.

So since the "chance" or "necessity" arguments from strict materialism fail to actually provide any ultimate explanation at all, the option of "purposeful agency" remains the only viable explanation. The non-theist can reject the only possible explanation in favor of the bare assertion that such explanations are meaningless--but there is no way to demonstrate why this assertion should be preferred over the alternative.

[Ragna]

Proposing that our own finite universe is uncaused and eternal simply fails the straight-face test.

Uncaused is my logical induction. Eternal has nothing to do. Always existing can do, though, since time is part of the universe.

That is why scientists are scrambling to add "something more" to the only universe which we can observe. This is why we hear about multiverses, quantum nothings, etc.

I guess you shouldn't so readily demean theories you probably haven't studied deeply. Quantum fluctuations and virtual particles are a fact, regardless of "questions of ultimate origins", and quantum mechanics weren't developed to avoid God, but rather like all science from observation. They developed independently of how they affect the simplistic CA.

The problem for science is twofold: 1) postulating other universes and "quantum nothings" is not science, but rather metaphysical speculation;

Quantum fluctuations are real and science. Multiverse theory is not about other universes in the way you think, but rather about different probability spectra within every quantum event in reality. Since you seem to keep using this as a sort of weak point of science, I'll try to explain it.

Quantum is about that, after some experiments, particles seem to go "all the ways possible". This makes particles don't have a specific position at a given time. Observing modifies the past. The Big Bang happened in a quantum scale. This means there were a lot of unobserved possibilities for space to have. Logically now only those that can allow for the present state happened, but what with the rest? This is what multiverse theory is about. If you are curious I can expand.

All this is part of the same definable existence or nature: matter, energy and space-time, so it's not "metaphysical".

and 2) simply adding more material to a strictly materialistic metaphysical worldview doesn't actually explain anything.

My position has nothing to explain. I think we agree that we don't want an infinite regress. You stop at an unfalsifiable plane, where the nature of things are unknown. I propose the existence we know is, like all existence, simply existing, and therefore not caused.

Cause of existence looks an incoherent statement to me, since all causes and effects are part of the experience of existence.

What does theism explain that it doesn't presuppose to add?

[EduChris]

...Cause of existence looks an incoherent statement to me, since all causes and effects are part of the experience of existence...

I agree that the cause of non-contingent existence is incoherent. The question is, "Does our universe exhibit non-contingent existence?" To me, the answer is, "Clearly not."

...What does theism explain that it doesn't presuppose to add?

Science and common sense can tell us that the material world exists. Science can also show that our finite universe, as we know it, came into existence some 13-15 billion years ago. Science cannot even in principle tell us why the material world exists, and it cannot even in principle tell us anything concrete about what exists beyond our finite universe. Theism provides the only possible explanation: the material world exists because of the purposeful agency of an Ultimate Reality beyond our finite material universe.

[Ragna]

...Cause of existence looks an incoherent statement to me, since all causes and effects are part of the experience of existence...

I agree that the cause of non-contingent existence is incoherent. The question is, "Does our universe exhibit non-contingent existence?" To me, the answer is, "Clearly not."

Can you see what point I'm trying to make? When the universe is existence, which is its most coherent definition, there's not a possibility for "existence" to be contingent. Existence will simply exist. It doesn't have to exist, it might not have not existed, because these all can't be applied to existence itself. Existence exists.

Asking "What is the cause of the universe?" can prove itself to be a really absurd question. It hides: "Why does the universe exists?", in the most coherent definition: "Why does existence (what exists), exist?" That's like saying "Why is green green?" Might green have been blue? Well, then it would not be green! I'm not talking about a green object but rather the concept of green. It's simply its definition.

Science and common sense can tell us that the material world exists. Science can also show that our finite universe, as we know it, came into existence some 13-15 billion years ago. Science cannot even in principle tell us why the material world exists, and it cannot even in principle tell us anything concrete about what exists beyond our finite universe. Theism provides the only possible explanation: the material world exists because of the purposeful agency of an Ultimate Reality beyond our finite material universe.

And so it explains something it needs to add: existence beyond existence. For me, it's void.

"Theism proposes that the universe is not all existence, and so it is contingent because it's an expression of existence, so then there must be something beyond, causeless, that can account for it. This explains why the universe, which is contingent, exists."

Can you see the circularity? It explains the cause, which arises from our contingency, presupposing that there is other existence so that the universe can effectively be contingent.

The key point is still:

What is the set of all existence? I say: Nature - aka matter, energy and space-time. This is my position unless it's proven incoherent or wrong without circularity.

Remember that whatever the set of all existence is, it will have to be causeless to avoid infinite regress, and so to prove that the universe has a cause you have to show some other coherent existence. As far as I know, it's coherent for Nature as above defined to be all existence.

[EduChris]

...there's not a possibility for "existence" to be contingent...Existence exists...

Agreed.

...Asking "What is the cause of the universe?" ... "Why does existence (what exists), exist?"...

You are equating "the universe" with "existence." This is where the circularity comes in for you. You simply assume that the physical universe is all there is, even though this assumption precludes any possibility of explanation.

...For me, it's void...

For you, perhaps, but such an assumption is hardly "scientific"; instead, it is simply an unfounded assumption.

...The key point is still...What is the set of all existence? I say: Nature - aka matter, energy and space-time. This is my position unless it's proven incoherent or wrong without circularity...

The problem for you is, this universe--the only universe we can observe scientifically--is contingent. Whatever may have existed outside or beyond this universe is not open to scientific inquiry, but certainly the simple addition of a physical, material realm beyond or outside this universe will never, even in principle, be able to provide a coherent explanation.

...Remember that whatever the set of all existence is, it will have to be causeless to avoid infinite regress...

No need to remind me of this, since I have been arguing this very point for months now.

...and so to prove that the universe has a cause you have to show some other coherent existence...

There is nothing incoherent about purposeful agency.

...As far as I know, it's coherent for Nature as above defined to be all existence.

You are free to continue making this assumption, but until you come up with something beyond or outside of this universe, which is not itself just a larger set of the same "stuff" as our universe, your assumptions will only be running circles around themselves.

[Ragna]

...Asking "What is the cause of the universe?" ... "Why does existence (what exists), exist?"...

You are equating "the universe" with "existence." This is where the circularity comes in for you. You simply assume that the physical universe is all there is, even though this assumption precludes any possibility of explanation.

The circularity is not mine. Please refer back to this:

"Theism proposes that the universe is not all existence, and so it is contingent because it's an expression of existence, so then there must be something beyond, causeless, that can account for it. This explains why the universe, which is contingent, exists."

Can you see the circularity? It explains the cause, which arises from our contingency, presupposing that there is other existence so that the universe can effectively be contingent.

...For me, it's void...

For you, perhaps, but such an assumption is hardly "scientific"; instead, it is simply an unfounded assumption.

I think I already argued this was all about what is more reasonable (not scientific), I use inductive reasoning and you still defend other existence, though you are never able to prove it non-circularly or define its nature.

The problem for you is, this universe--the only universe we can observe scientifically--is contingent. Whatever may have existed outside or beyond this universe is not open to scientific inquiry, but certainly the simple addition of a physical, material realm beyond or outside this universe will never, even in principle, be able to provide a coherent explanation.

This is what we are arguing. Since I can inductively conclude the universe to be all existence, the universe is not caused or contingent. You have to assume it is not for theism - baselessly.

...and so to prove that the universe has a cause you have to show some other coherent existence...

There is nothing incoherent about purposeful agency.

How can there be? You are going further than your reach is. You are attempting to include agency on a reality you can't even in principle prove to exist non-circularly. Try to define its nature and only then you will be able to claim volition, of course after having an adequate reason to personify it.

...As far as I know, it's coherent for Nature as above defined to be all existence.

You are free to continue making this assumption, but until you come up with something beyond or outside of this universe, which is not itself just a larger set of the same "stuff" as our universe, your assumptions will only be running circles around themselves.

Theism is circular, because it's baseless. You cannot conclude that the universe is contingent because you cannot define things beyond. What is the reason to look for existence beyond matter, energy and space-time?

If my current inductive reasoning allows for me to define existence in such a way that it leads me to conclude that the universe is uncaused, then I have to remain there until a reason is provided to doubt it, since it has the same consequences any other position would have: at some point, something must be uncaused.

Also, your doubts about what "material" can and cannot do seem to come from religion rather than reason. Like for existence, why to look beyond material without any reason to do so? The only way you can conclude that material has to be contingent is presupposing there is other thing which can allow for its existence, therefore needing it to be contingent - circularly.

[EduChris]

...What is the reason to look for existence beyond matter, energy and space-time?...

The reason is simple: matter, energy, and space-time (as we know them) began to exist a finite span of time ago. You are free to argue that there was some unthinking, non-purposeful, non-contingent material reality from which our universe (as we know it) sprang into being, but this does not explain anything, it only pushes the argument back to where nothing can be demonstrated by any means whatsoever, so that any further questioning becomes meaningless.

By contrast, the theistic idea that there is a thinking, purposeful, non-contingent trans-material reality--while subject to some of the same limitations as the non-theistic paradigm--gives us a fruitful avenue of exploration which corresponds to our innate sense that we humans are indeed special.

[Ragna]

...What is the reason to look for existence beyond matter, energy and space-time?...

The reason is simple: matter, energy, and space-time (as we know them) began to exist a finite span of time ago. You are free to argue that there was some unthinking, non-purposeful, non-contingent material reality from which our universe (as we know it) sprang into being, but this does not explain anything,...

Yes of course... if time began it's finite. But that something has a beginning doesn't prove it has a cause unless there was something before it, which is what we are arguing. So you're explaining it in a circular fashion.

I'm not arguing that it sprang from nothing (because quantum fluctuations are something), but rather that the universe needs no cause so it didn't spring from anything, it simply is (which is according to the definition existence). Think about it the same way you think about God's necessary reality.

By contrast, the theistic idea that there is a thinking, purposeful, non-contingent trans-material reality--while subject to some of the same limitations as the non-theistic paradigm--gives us a fruitful avenue of exploration which corresponds to our innate sense that we humans are indeed special.

I accept it gives a lot of room for the mind to play, but that's far from making it more reasonable, it makes it fun to explore (I myself was interested to read through Gödel's thing thread). Like we discussed in another thread, I feel humans are special in some things, but that in no way has to do with whether there's a personified transcedent reality to which/whom we matter.

Personal Opinion: I feel it's even more exciting to be intrinsecally special, and indeed the natural world is very interesting for me. I personally feel no human-relevant difference in the end between both scenarios.