Who and what are we as human beings? Specifically, do we possess any measure of genuine volition—some causal mechanism which is not strictly reducible to the causal mechanisms of chance and necessity—whereby we can, in certain cases and in some degree, take ownership and responsibility for our thoughts and behaviors by intentionally using our volition to alter some causal chain?
If we do have some measure of genuine volition, as rational beings we will attempt to find some epistemologically justified explanation for it. What is the best epistemically justified explanation for volition? I believe theism is the best and only epistemically justified explanation.
For this debate, I will define theism as the claim that the explanation for all contingencies (including our universe and our selves) ultimately derive from some non-contingent reality which involves at least some volition. Since we cannot subject this non-contingent reality to empirical testing, and since we cannot know precisely what it is, we will wrap this non-contingent reality up inside a tool of logic known as a black box. There could be anything inside this black box, but for simplicity’s sake we will start with the following minimal definition of the contents of the black box:
1) It undergirds all contingent existence
2) It is not arbitrarily limited by any physical or spatio-temporal dimensions
3) It is not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle or process information
4) It is not arbitrarily limited in causal efficacy
I believe the above definition is both simple and capable of producing any possible world. If I am correct, then there is no need (and no epistemological warrant) to postulate additional entities inside the black box.
Question for debate: if some genuine volition exists within our universe, does theism—volitional non-contingent reality as defined above—provide the best epistemically justified explanation?
Volitional Non-contingent Reality?
Moderator: Moderators
Re: Volitional Non-contingent Reality?
Post #2I don't see why taking ownership and responsibility for our thoughts and behaviors should be in conflict with causality, unless you were to prove that true metaphysical freedom of this sort is in fact a prerequisite to such actions being authoritative - as I think it is. How could genuine volition of this type be a "causal mechanism" by the way? Wouldn't it have to be in complete opposition to any such causality?EduChris wrote:Who and what are we as human beings? Specifically, do we possess any measure of genuine volition—some causal mechanism which is not strictly reducible to the causal mechanisms of chance and necessity—whereby we can, in certain cases and in some degree, take ownership and responsibility for our thoughts and behaviors by intentionally using our volition to alter some causal chain?
Are you saying humankind is free because humankind is the same as, or non-different from, God? If so, I have a lot to say here.If we do have some measure of genuine volition, as rational beings we will attempt to find some epistemologically justified explanation for it. What is the best epistemically justified explanation for volition? I believe theism is the best and only epistemically justified explanation.
For this debate, I will define theism as the claim that the explanation for all contingencies (including our universe and our selves) ultimately derive from some non-contingent reality which involves at least some volition. Since we cannot subject this non-contingent reality to empirical testing, and since we cannot know precisely what it is, we will wrap this non-contingent reality up inside a tool of logic known as a black box.
That of course assumes whether this universe came about as a result of will.
There could be anything inside this black box, but for simplicity’s sake we will start with the following minimal definition of the contents of the black box:
1) It undergirds all contingent existence
2) It is not arbitrarily limited by any physical or spatio-temporal dimensions
3) It is not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle or process information
4) It is not arbitrarily limited in causal efficacy
I believe the above definition is both simple and capable of producing any possible world. If I am correct, then there is no need (and no epistemological warrant) to postulate additional entities inside the black box.
I would wonder where you are getting these assumptions from. That said, I agree with them.
Only if our true selves were synonymous with that volitional non-contingent reality. A paradox comes along however, and says "well, if we are at heart necessary and not contingent, how are our choices not necessary?" That seems to me to undercut the project of freedom for the self.Question for debate: if some genuine volition exists within our universe, does theism—volitional non-contingent reality as defined above—provide the best epistemically justified explanation?
Post #3
Hey, I don't know how relevant this is to your own project - which I can't entirely discern - but here is something I wrote up a while ago which might be applicable to some extent:
"Is it even in the least viable now to consider that by telling me to "go get a life" or "get my act together" or "do something practical" that something fruitful will be effected, either internally or externally, regarding my self? How is that even possible when there is not a viable self to speak of? No. What must be done, prior to any practical identity I may embrace and then act upon, is provide a theoretical grounding for the acting self, thus instantiating said self from that of a mere possibility, to an actual living power with authority over itself and its actions. Otherwise we are not doing anything but casting dice and firing blankly into the abyss, and any 'action' is as good as any other.
What needs to happen is to show that there is a foundational claim on, not the practical human self, but for the self as it exists unconditionally. This is the self which is 'pure existence' and without any kind of fixed essence, human or otherwise. This is the self which sees all actions as the same, being unqualified by any values which make necessitating or normative demands. If the tempestuous and a-rational freedom of this primal self, which stands apart from the contingencies of the human agent, can be tamed, and made to abide by a code external to itself, then we can at least make headway on our path to establishing a connection (and ultimately bridging the gap) between the human and the "Other" or what some may term the "Soul" or the "Divine."
But it seems at least from the outset that this endeavor should be doomed from the very start. After all, how do you condition the unconditioned? If something by definition is incapable of being made to act a certain way, how do you obligate - command - it to do so? It seems as though any possible claim would ipso facto end in failure since the self could merely reply: "you have no sanction over me for it is in my very nature (so to speak) to do as I may, and any one direction is as valid as another from my absolute perspective." If the essence of existence is its own reason for being, than why be any other way? Things simply "are" and they could not be any other way given this implication of A - B. An indeterminate identity thus vents into perfectly indeterminate activity. What exists occurs because the self willed it. Nothing more could be said.
But on the flip-side, while things could not be any other way than as the self wills, what belies this is the very issue of freedom which lies in antagonism to such claims which partake of necessity. The very self which thought itself free now falls into the unsettling position of having to question its very freedom which it considers itself to be the paramount expression of. To illustrate this an example would be useful. Consider that the action of ordering a burger instead of a hot dog is free. The act itself in becoming is, as I said, an indeterminate action stemming from an indeterminate being (pure freedom). But once it (the decision) is actualized it immediately becomes a fixed thing, a fact which historically could not be rewound, or even if could be rewound would not be the same act. This is not to say that you could not have ordered a hot dog instead of the burger, indeed it may have been the other way around; that is in truth not the relevant point. What matters is the issue of the action being free (that is, mirroring in congruous fashion the indeterminacy of A with the indeterminacy of B as a direct implication) instead of merely being an action free in becoming, which is the obvious and straightforward uncertainty of the act not in question. This is a highly subtle but extremely crucial point. An action cast is necessarily so cast by the nature of its act being a specific given act as opposed to another. This may be called the 'form' of the free action which necessitates itself regardless of the autonomy of the agent. The matter or content is, on the other hand, the natural indeterminacy of the deciding itself, before collapsing into a given possibility. This is contingent. The question is, how does a self that is necessarily free, allow itself this contingency which, by virtue of its modal collapse, forces it, pigeonholes it as it were, into one specified and therefore necessitated outcome?
And so we see that the unconditioned self cannot pull itself by its own autonomous bootstraps so as to vouchsafe its own freedom. For in every possible case it is not acting according to its own indeterminacy or "nature" but according to the dictates which the very form of the decision imposes on it; namely, the modal collapse which contingency inveighs as a result - or, in other words, the ultimatum which abuts itself against the self, demanding, wringing, either yes, no, or neutrality. How then can freedom for the self be preserved? If all actions end in diminution of freedom because of self-diminution of possibility, how then can the self prevent sanctions which come upon it? They appear to come from all sides, whenever any possibility is fielded! Thus, the pure and unqualified autocratic freedom of the unconditioned self appears to be refuted by the simple logical law of modus tollens: A may lead invincibly to B, but if B (an act free in being) is not (since it does not reflect A which 'truly' or 'authentically' purports to be free) then A is rendered false. Unbridled freedom of this character is proved untrue and a self-contradiction. Indeed, it is little more than a myth."
"Is it even in the least viable now to consider that by telling me to "go get a life" or "get my act together" or "do something practical" that something fruitful will be effected, either internally or externally, regarding my self? How is that even possible when there is not a viable self to speak of? No. What must be done, prior to any practical identity I may embrace and then act upon, is provide a theoretical grounding for the acting self, thus instantiating said self from that of a mere possibility, to an actual living power with authority over itself and its actions. Otherwise we are not doing anything but casting dice and firing blankly into the abyss, and any 'action' is as good as any other.
What needs to happen is to show that there is a foundational claim on, not the practical human self, but for the self as it exists unconditionally. This is the self which is 'pure existence' and without any kind of fixed essence, human or otherwise. This is the self which sees all actions as the same, being unqualified by any values which make necessitating or normative demands. If the tempestuous and a-rational freedom of this primal self, which stands apart from the contingencies of the human agent, can be tamed, and made to abide by a code external to itself, then we can at least make headway on our path to establishing a connection (and ultimately bridging the gap) between the human and the "Other" or what some may term the "Soul" or the "Divine."
But it seems at least from the outset that this endeavor should be doomed from the very start. After all, how do you condition the unconditioned? If something by definition is incapable of being made to act a certain way, how do you obligate - command - it to do so? It seems as though any possible claim would ipso facto end in failure since the self could merely reply: "you have no sanction over me for it is in my very nature (so to speak) to do as I may, and any one direction is as valid as another from my absolute perspective." If the essence of existence is its own reason for being, than why be any other way? Things simply "are" and they could not be any other way given this implication of A - B. An indeterminate identity thus vents into perfectly indeterminate activity. What exists occurs because the self willed it. Nothing more could be said.
But on the flip-side, while things could not be any other way than as the self wills, what belies this is the very issue of freedom which lies in antagonism to such claims which partake of necessity. The very self which thought itself free now falls into the unsettling position of having to question its very freedom which it considers itself to be the paramount expression of. To illustrate this an example would be useful. Consider that the action of ordering a burger instead of a hot dog is free. The act itself in becoming is, as I said, an indeterminate action stemming from an indeterminate being (pure freedom). But once it (the decision) is actualized it immediately becomes a fixed thing, a fact which historically could not be rewound, or even if could be rewound would not be the same act. This is not to say that you could not have ordered a hot dog instead of the burger, indeed it may have been the other way around; that is in truth not the relevant point. What matters is the issue of the action being free (that is, mirroring in congruous fashion the indeterminacy of A with the indeterminacy of B as a direct implication) instead of merely being an action free in becoming, which is the obvious and straightforward uncertainty of the act not in question. This is a highly subtle but extremely crucial point. An action cast is necessarily so cast by the nature of its act being a specific given act as opposed to another. This may be called the 'form' of the free action which necessitates itself regardless of the autonomy of the agent. The matter or content is, on the other hand, the natural indeterminacy of the deciding itself, before collapsing into a given possibility. This is contingent. The question is, how does a self that is necessarily free, allow itself this contingency which, by virtue of its modal collapse, forces it, pigeonholes it as it were, into one specified and therefore necessitated outcome?
And so we see that the unconditioned self cannot pull itself by its own autonomous bootstraps so as to vouchsafe its own freedom. For in every possible case it is not acting according to its own indeterminacy or "nature" but according to the dictates which the very form of the decision imposes on it; namely, the modal collapse which contingency inveighs as a result - or, in other words, the ultimatum which abuts itself against the self, demanding, wringing, either yes, no, or neutrality. How then can freedom for the self be preserved? If all actions end in diminution of freedom because of self-diminution of possibility, how then can the self prevent sanctions which come upon it? They appear to come from all sides, whenever any possibility is fielded! Thus, the pure and unqualified autocratic freedom of the unconditioned self appears to be refuted by the simple logical law of modus tollens: A may lead invincibly to B, but if B (an act free in being) is not (since it does not reflect A which 'truly' or 'authentically' purports to be free) then A is rendered false. Unbridled freedom of this character is proved untrue and a self-contradiction. Indeed, it is little more than a myth."
Re: Volitional Non-contingent Reality?
Post #4A causal mechanism produces effects. People have become accustomed to speaking of three causal mechanisms: chance (it just happened); necessity (it happened according to some law of nature); and volition (she intended to do it). Strictly speaking, we cannot prove that any of these three causal mechanisms isn't reducible to one or both of the others. And "chance" is really a euphemism that we use when we lack a full explanation for the precise effect we observe. Still, to the extent that these three terms represent independent causal mechanisms, any one of them might indeed operate at cross purposes with one or both of the others.Kismet wrote:...How could genuine volition of this type be a "causal mechanism" by the way? Wouldn't it have to be in complete opposition to any such causality?...
I am saying that if genuine volition exists to any extent in our universe, then the epistemically preferred explanation is that the black box of necessary reality contains volition, in which case theism would be true.Kismet wrote:...Are you saying humankind is free because humankind is the same as, or non-different from, God?...
I don't think my argument hinges on whether this universe came about as a direct or indirect result of volition; the issue is where did volition come from, if in fact it exists to any degree in our universe? Rational beings seem to have a duty to seek epistemically justified explanations for phenomena--wherever such explanations can be found.Kismet wrote:...That of course assumes whether this universe came about as a result of will...
I am pleased you agree with my definitions. Note that if volition is a genuine causal mechanism, then the black box does contain volition (per item #4). I realize that many people will wish to claim that genuine volition does not exist at all within our universe, but it seems to me that such claims would be difficult if not impossible to prove--and even if it could be "proven," then so what? What is to be gained by "proving" some "fact" which we cannot live with anyway? It seems that volition is (at the very least) a "necessary conceit" which we cannot do without as we go about our daily life--and this provides strong prima facie reason to treat volition as though it actually exists.Kismet wrote:EduChris wrote:...There could be anything inside this black box, but for simplicity’s sake we will start with the following minimal definition of the contents of the black box:
1) It undergirds all contingent existence
2) It is not arbitrarily limited by any physical or spatio-temporal dimensions
3) It is not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle or process information
4) It is not arbitrarily limited in causal efficacy
I believe the above definition is both simple and capable of producing any possible world. If I am correct, then there is no need (and no epistemological warrant) to postulate additional entities inside the black box.
I would wonder where you are getting these assumptions from. That said, I agree with them...
If we are somehow "necessary," rather than contingent, then we would inhere within the black box. But it certainly does not appear that we are necessary, for it is quite easy to think of possible worlds in which no humans exist.Kismet wrote:...if we are at heart necessary and not contingent, how are our choices not necessary?" That seems to me to undercut the project of freedom for the self.
Re: Volitional Non-contingent Reality?
Post #5I don't see "chance" as a causal mechanism at all. It's more in the way of an "occasioning." Like you say, it "just happens." Causality then may be hitched with such a brute fact, though. So a spoon that just so happens to exist might be thrown against a wall and leave a dent, or something. I agree though that seemingly everything physical that is observed isn't just chanced but has a reason for its being that extends into more complicated sub-reasons. At some point I'm willing to say it bottoms out though: into God, or freedom, or something else.EduChris wrote: People have become accustomed to speaking of three causal mechanisms: chance (it just happened); necessity (it happened according to some law of nature); and volition (she intended to do it). Strictly speaking, we cannot prove that any of these three causal mechanisms isn't reducible to one or both of the others. And "chance" is really a euphemism that we use when we lack a full explanation for the precise effect we observe. Still, to the extent that these three terms represent independent causal mechanisms, any one of them might indeed operate at cross purposes with one or both of the others.
What I was wondering about volition was whether our (metaphysically free) will was somehow constrained by causality. But this doesn't seem to be what you mean, and I do agree there is a type of cause and effect which governs decisions if not the content of decisions. First one reflects on a decision, then he assents to a certain course. Of course that's just the form. What determines the matter or content is totally chanced or "occasioned" by ..freedom, I guess. Like Schopenhauer said, you can't will what you will...but you can still will, sure.
I'm still not getting it.. but, it's late. I'll have to reflect on your argument in the morning.
I am saying that if genuine volition exists to any extent in our universe, then the epistemically preferred explanation is that the black box of necessary reality contains volition, in which case theism would be true.
Re: Volitional Non-contingent Reality?
Post #6Just for a bit of context, this thread was initiated as a spin-off of issues raised on another thread.Kismet wrote:...I'm still not getting it.. but, it's late. I'll have to reflect on your argument in the morning.
Re: Volitional Non-contingent Reality?
Post #7Property three seems far from minimal, in my opinion. Given the extreme difficulties inherent in defining information to begin with, as well as the fact that, as best we can tell, information is limited causally, spacially, and temporally, this would be adding to the minimal set an infinite span of other viable options.EduChris wrote:1) It undergirds all contingent existence
2) It is not arbitrarily limited by any physical or spatio-temporal dimensions
3) It is not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle or process information
4) It is not arbitrarily limited in causal efficacy
I'd be interested to see your reasoning for including this.
Re: Volitional Non-contingent Reality?
Post #8How would you go about demonstrating that mathematics, logic, and physical laws are limited "causally, spatially, and temporally"?AkiThePirate wrote:...extreme difficulties...in defining information...as best we can tell, information is limited causally, spacially, and temporally...
And if information is so terribly difficult to define, why would you suggest that it is limited in the manner(s) you assert?
Is there any information which is not ultimately derived from mathematics, logic, and physical laws? How would you demonstrate this, one way or the other?
Re: Volitional Non-contingent Reality?
Post #9Item #1 pretty much just defines what non-contingent means. Items #2 through #4 identify (as best I can tell) the minimal set of properties which would make the black box capable of producing any/all possible world(s). If anyone wanted to propose some sort of arbitrary limitation(s), then such limitation(s) would add complexity to the hypothesis--and this complexity would have to be justified in some way in order to stay within the boundaries of Occam's Razor and epistemic warrant. Ditto for any assumption of additional entities beyond the minimal set needed to create any/all possible world(s).Kismet wrote:EduChris wrote:1) It undergirds all [contingencies]
2) It is not arbitrarily limited by any physical or spatio-temporal dimensions
3) It is not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle or process information
4) It is not arbitrarily limited in causal efficacy
I believe the above definition is both simple and capable of producing any possible world. If I am correct, then there is no need (and no epistemological warrant) to postulate additional entities inside the black box.
I would wonder where you are getting these assumptions from. That said, I agree with them...
Re: Volitional Non-contingent Reality?
Post #10Volition seems to involve opportunity (real or perceived or imagined) and preference and capability and the assumption of ownership (or responsibility) for the decision.Kismet wrote:...I do agree there is a type of cause and effect which governs decisions if not the content of decisions...
At the finite level, "opportunity" and "capacity" might reduce down to some admixture of chance and/or necessity. It is a bit more problematic to identify how "preference" and "perception" and "imagination" and "ownership" and "responsibility" might reduce down to impersonal causality. If the (at least partially) autonomous self is an illusion, then there is no one to prefer or perceive or imagine or take ownership/responsibility for any resulting causal chain. And we can hardly imagine our very self to be nothing more than an illusion. Logically speaking, can an illusion dismiss itself? If it could, then in what sense was it ever really an illusion?
Last edited by EduChris on Mon Apr 09, 2012 5:45 pm, edited 1 time in total.
