Are there any non-fallacious arguments for non-theism?

[EduChris]

Let's assume for sake of argument that if non-theism were the objective reality, we would be able to offer some positive and non-fallacious argument to support the philosophical viewpoint known as non-theism.

In this discussion, we will use the following definitions:

Theism: the philosophical viewpoint that the non-contingent source and fount of all possibility is not less than personal.

Non-theism: the philosophical viewpoint that theism need not be the case.

God: the non-contingent, not-less-than-personal source and fount of all possibility.

Our universe and our selves constitute the evidence, and we must provide arguments as to why, given this evidence, we should adopt the philosophical viewpoint known as non-theism. In this thread we are not allowed to rely on some supposed "default position of non-theism"; rather, we must provide an actual, non-fallacious argument for non-theism.

After all, if non-theism can be asserted (or adopted, or held) without evidence, then non-theism can be dismissed without evidence.

[EduChris]

...The Evolutionary Argument Against Theism...

...The Problem of Natural Evil...

I have deliberately avoided addressing Haven's arguments until now.

At this point, I think I have adequately addressed all of the main ideas and objections put forward other than the two arguments (which are really the same argument) in Haven's post. If anyone thinks I have bypassed or missed some other critical issue(s), please let me know.

Otherwise, I will begin addressing the "Problem of Evil" argument against God later today or tomorrow. Both of Haven's arguments boil down to the "Problem of Evil."

The POE ("Problem of Evil") argument against God is unique in that it is the only argument, out of all of the other arguments put forward on this thread, that actually requires the addition of corollaries to the bare philosophical theism that I put forward in the OP. For now I will just say that these corollaries add a bit of complexity to theism, but not too much complexity, and I believe that the corollaries empty the POE of any logical force (while leaving the emotional force to be addressed through resources other than logic and reason).

[Alchemy]

...The Evolutionary Argument Against Theism...

...The Problem of Natural Evil...

I have deliberately avoided addressing Haven's arguments until now.

At this point, I think I have adequately addressed all of the main ideas and objections put forward other than the two arguments (which are really the same argument) in Haven's post. If anyone thinks I have bypassed or missed some other critical issue(s), please let me know.

Otherwise, I will begin addressing the "Problem of Evil" argument against God later today or tomorrow. Both of Haven's arguments boil down to the "Problem of Evil."

The POE ("Problem of Evil") argument against God is unique in that it is the only argument, out of all of the other arguments put forward on this thread, that actually requires the addition of corollaries to the bare philosophical theism that I put forward in the OP. For now I will just say that these corollaries add a bit of complexity to theism, but not too much complexity, and I believe that the corollaries empty the POE of any logical force (while leaving the emotional force to be addressed through resources other than logic and reason).

What of Justin108's argument

Ok well in that case if the only question is to formulate an argument for "theism need not be the case" then I can argue that the fact that there are alternatives is sufficient.

In other words, if I can go left then I need not go right.

If there can exist a universe without god, there need not be a god.

If there can exist a god that is not personal, there need not be a god that is personal.

[JoeyKnothead]

From Post 101:

I have deliberately avoided addressing Haven's arguments until now.

"I have deliberately avoided any notion that goes against the one I'm fancy about, but dangitall, I'm set to fretting that maybe Haven ain't done set us straight."

At this point, I think I have adequately addressed all of the main ideas and objections put forward other than the two arguments (which are really the same argument) in Haven's post. If anyone thinks I have bypassed or missed some other critical issue(s), please let me know.

I propose that if you'd "adequately addressed" it, folks wouldn't be asking ya to do it.

Otherwise, I will begin addressing the "Problem of Evil" argument against God later today or tomorrow. Both of Haven's arguments boil down to the "Problem of Evil."

Rock on, brotherman, rock on.

The POE ("Problem of Evil") argument against God is unique in that it is the only argument, out of all of the other arguments put forward on this thread, that actually requires the addition of corollaries to the bare philosophical theism that I put forward in the OP. For now I will just say that these corollaries add a bit of complexity to theism, but not too much complexity, and I believe that the corollaries empty the POE of any logical force (while leaving the emotional force to be addressed through resources other than logic and reason).

I'm of the position that the "problem of evil" ain't near as much the "problem of theists being incapable of showing they speak truth".

[LiamOS]

Such has not and cannot be shown. At best, we have a "he said, she said" scenario where some folks assert "yes" and some folks assert "no."

Agreed. Debating this here seems pointless. Hence my bolding the 'if'.

There is no need to suppose that our consciousness is of a different form than God's. It may be that our consciousness is limited in degree and therefore cannot be the source and fount of all possibility, but a difference in degree does not entail a difference in form.

Precisely. In fast, supposing that it is different would be absurd.

What is "matter"? What "precedes" matter? What is the difference between the two, such as would permit consciousness in the one, but not the other?

Matter, in the preceding usage, encompasses the observable universe. That which precedes it would be some sort of necessary condition for this universe, should one exist.

Your entire argument consists of one speculation after another. Speculation does not count as a non-fallacious argument.

And your argument is no different, containing a lot of if. I don't see why this makes a difference.

[EduChris]

Your entire argument consists of one speculation after another. Speculation does not count as a non-fallacious argument.

And your argument is no different, containing a lot of if. I don't see why this makes a difference.

I'll take this as your admission that you have been unable to formulate, per the parameters of the OP, a non-fallacious argument for the assertion that "theism need not be the case."

Or would you like to make another attempt?

[Fuzzy Dunlop]

...if we don't know what caused our universe, how can we know whether or not our universe is logically necessary?...

We are compelled by force of logic to say that the "source of all possibility" exists necessarily. To say otherwise is to say that there was some state of affairs in which nothing was, and nothing could ever be. But since we obviously are here, we know that the "source and fount of all possibility" cannot not be, which is to say it is logically necessary (i.e., non-contingent).

But notice that we are not compelled by any force of logic to say that our universe and our selves are logically necessary. It is perfectly reasonable to say, "Our universe might not have been," or "it might have been other than it is." No logical contradiction is entailed by those statements. Of course we might be factually wrong--perhaps for some unknowable reason our universe and our selves are logically necessary. But until such facts can be established, the only rational option is to make a decision according to the normal epistemic principle that we do not assume something is logically necessary when we are not compelled to do so. To assume, without any basis, that something is logically necessary is to commit the worst sort of epistemological error.

So in other words, we don't know whether or not our universe is logically necessary. Theism thus relies upon an unproven assumption while agnostic atheism does not.

Also, I would ask you to define some of your terminology:

What do you mean by the "source" of all possibility?

What do you mean by the "fount" of all possibility?

What is the distinction between these two terms?

...what is the logical contradiction in the statement "our universe might not have been created by God"?

Given the definition of God proposed in the OP, your question is equivalent to the following: "What is the logical contradiction in the statement, 'our universe might have come about through strictly impersonal means'." There is no logical contraction in the statement, but it does involve the epistemic error of assuming necessity without sufficient warrant or need or reason.

This is the shifting of the burden of proof fallacy. There is no assumption of necessity to say that "the universe may or may not be necessary." This is simply the default position where no possibilities have yet been ruled out. The burden of proof is on those whose positions would exclude the possibility of the universe being necessary.

That said, since the universe not being created by God is not a logical contradiction, doesn't this show theism to be unnecessary?

...you're setting aside the default position so that we can get on with the proactive task of seeing if there are any non-fallacious arguments for the default position...

I think we can agree that the initial or "default" position to just about anything is, "I don't know." What I am trying to do on this thread is find out what might happen if we were to venture forth, if we were to stop clinging to our comfortable perch of ignorance, in order to discover what we might come to know if we were to exert proactive due diligence.

In other words, I am suggesting that we temporarily, for the sake of argument, use "I'm working on that, and I'll let you know what I find" as our default position on this thread.

It may be that after we have performed due diligence, we will find that "I don't know" is still the best option.

It seems to me that "I don't know because I haven't done due diligence" is less enlightened than "I don't know even though I've performed due diligence." Maybe, just maybe, some worthwhile knowledge might ensue from having performed our due diligence.

It is not "proactive due diligence" to proceed towards conclusions when sufficient evidence is not available. It is an exercise in exploring a topic on a fallacious foundation, and any "knowledge" gained should be considered accordingly. There seems to be some implicit assumption here that the question of God is somehow an inherently worthwhile question to pursue, but this is nothing more than a subjective preference held by some individuals.

[EduChris]

...This argument refutes theistic religions...

We are not here trying to refute "religions" of any kind, whether theistic or non-theistic. Rather, your task (per the OP) is to formulate a non-fallacious argument for the assertion that "theism need not be the case."

...“God� is defined as (more-or-less) the perfect being of classical theism: omniscient (all-knowing), omnipresent (all-located), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnibenevolent (all-kind), and maximally great (possessing all “great-making� properties in their maximum amounts and lacking all “lesser-making� properties)...

On this thread, you need to stick with the definition of God I provided in the OP; namely, "the logically necessary, not-less-than-personal source and fount of all possibility." Within this definition, since God is the source of all possibility, it follows that: 1) God is not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle and process information (analogous, perhaps, to the term "omniscience"); 2) God is not arbitrarily limited by any spatio-temporal dimensions (analogous, perhaps, to the term "omnipresent"); and 3) God is not arbitrarily limited in causal efficacy (analogous, perhaps to the term "omnipotent").

But I think your "omnibenevolence" is an imprecise term. Perhaps it can be tightened up as, "unlimited in the capacity to exercise benevolence." This would mean that God does not suffer from compassion fatigue. But I think you mean more than just this. I think you mean that in every instance where benevolence is possible and desirable within the context of pursuing a satisfactory goal, benevolence will be exercised (as opposed to neglect or even malevolence). I think this could easily be derived from the definition of God provided in the OP. Is this what you mean by "omnibenevolence"? If not, please explain what you mean--but remember to stay within the parameters of the OP, using nothing but the definition of God put forward there, along with whatever follows logically from that definition.

...random mutation...

How do we know that the mutations are "random." Does random mean "uncaused"? If so, is cause-and-effect thereby nullified as a scientific principle? Or does it simply mean that we, in our limited capacity to process and handle information, cannot predict (or retrodict) these mutations?

...positing theistic evolution to rebut this argument would be question-begging because it would assume God created through evolution, when that is exactly the thing in question...

There is no question-begging at all. If there is an argument that God cannot have created through evolution, then there can also be an argument that God could have created through evolution. If this were not the case, then to posit that evolution must be non-theistic is also to have begged the question, since again, this is exactly the thing in question.

...“Great-making property�...“Lesser-making property�...“Maximally great�...

Does "maximally great" include the ability to overcome adversity and opposition? If so, how does one overcome adversity and opposition, without actually experiencing adversity and opposition?

...Premise 1: God is said to be a perfect being (as defined above)...

Again, please stick with the definition of God provided in the OP, along with whatever can be logically extrapolated from that definition.

...Premise 2: God desires to create life...

Yes, God makes choices based on value, and life is something to be valued.

...Premise 3: Following (1), God, as a perfect being, would create life by a method that entailed no lesser-making properties...

Or perhaps God might choose to create the sort of life which incorporates the value of overcoming adversity and opposition. Given that many people say that their greatest joys came about only as a result of great adversity and opposition, why should God not choose to "aim high," to aim for the highest possible joys?

...Premise 4: Evolution, in order to function, depends on lesser-making properties such as death and pain...

Can you think of anything positive to be gained from the process of evolution? Does an evolved (and evolving) life form enjoy perhaps a greater degree of self-determination and autonomy than a life form created perfect from the start, with no opportunity for additional development and advancement as a result of overcoming adversity and opposition?

...Conclusion 1: Therefore, God would not create life via evolution...

Perhaps God would not allow God's creatures to undergo any pains that God himself would refuse to undertake. If God were to provide an example of God's own struggle to defeat and overcome death itself, that might strengthen the case for God's decision to "aim high" so that maximum joys might be attained through great struggle.

...Premise 5: Evolution is true...

Perhaps, but we must always remember that every previous scientific theory has been found to be wrong or incomplete.

...Conclusion 2: Therefore, God did not create life...

It will be interesting to see if this conclusion follows, after the aforementioned items have been cleared up.

...denying evolution. This is irrational...because the theory of evolution is supported by a tremendous amount of biological evidence. It is every bit as well-supported as gravity...

Every bit as well supported as gravity? Surely you overstate the case. Be that as it may, more Christians (including a majority of Christian scholars) accept evolution than deny it. Even many proponents of Intelligent Design allow for descent with modification.

...denying that God is perfect (as defined above)...

As mentioned above, there is a bit of tidying up to do with your definition of God.

...causing lesser-making properties to obtain is itself a negation of maximal greatness...

If the greatest joys come through overcoming adversity and opposition, then it seems perfectly reasonable to assume that "lesser-making properties" might be the secret ingredient of maximal greatness--particularly if God were willing to take upon himself the same risks, and demonstrate that death--the sine qua non of "lesser-making properties"--will not have the last word.

...accepting value nihilism; that is, denying the concept of great-making and lesser-making properties altogether. This is probably the believer’s best shot at defeating the argument, but taking this route is philosophically controversial...

Actually, nihilism seems more related to non-theism than to theism.

...gratuitous suffering...

What do you mean by, "gratuitous suffering"? How do we know that any suffering is gratuitous if we do not know the ultimate goal of our journey?

...innocent sentient beings...

What do you mean by, "innocent sentient beings..."? How do we know that such beings exist?

...An omnipotent god would have the power to stop all natural evil...

If "omnipotence" means only the lack of arbitrary limitations, then there certainly might be "natural evils" which which cannot be stopped, given the non-arbitrary context of a satisfactory goal.

...An omnipresent god would be everywhere to stop all natural evil...

Perhaps, but again there might be non-arbitrary factors which necessitate natural evils within the context of an overall satisfactory goal.

...An omnibenevolent god would want to stop all natural evil...

Given the same qualifiers as before, yes. But these qualifiers are hardly insignificant.

...Natural evil exists...

Agreed, at least if theism is the case.

...P6 conflicts P2-P5...Therefore, an omnimax god does not exist.

There is no conflict if the qualifiers are valid.

My conclusion is that the POE fails to refute theism, although it does cause us to tease out the sense in which "omnibenevolence" can be understood and extrapolated from the bare philosophical definition of God presented in the OP. It also requires us to tweak theism a bit so as to allow for: 1) an ultimate goal for human existence which lies beyond our present experience; and 2) the personal participation of the Creator in the adversity and opposition of this present world, so that we can better understand and appreciate God's overriding benevolence despite the adversity and opposition that we creatures experience.

[LiamOS]

I'll take this as your admission that you have been unable to formulate, per the parameters of the OP, a non-fallacious argument for the assertion that "theism need not be the case."

Or would you like to make another attempt?

Evidently I didn't over-format that 'if' enough.

You readily admitted that it is not something agreed on, but I think it's pretty clear that if that is the case, Theism is not.
So Theism need not be the case.

Your assertion that my argument consisted of "one speculation after another" is false, as it consists of only one(More if we include your evident misunderstanding of my point).

[EduChris]

...I think it's pretty clear that if that is the case, Theism is not..

Even if your speculation is true (and we have no good reason to suppose that it is) your argument still involves a non-sequitur:

...If consciousness in humans can be shown to be entirely the product of matter-energy interactions, no other form of consciousness is known. Given this, one would logically default to the position that anything preceding matter cannot be conscious

I see nothing to suggest that your conclusion follows. It is simply a bare assertion without any connecting tissue of argument.

What is "matter"? Is "matter" created? What precedes "matter"? What actual evidence do you have to show that "pre-matter" cannot provide a context for consciousness?

Any answers you might offer will be necessarily speculative (as I think even you would admit). And speculation does not count as a positive argument for anything.

[EduChris]

...It is not "proactive due diligence" to proceed towards conclusions when sufficient evidence is not available...

Unless you exercise due diligence, how do you know that the evidence and/or arguments are insufficient? The evidence certainly is not lacking--it is all around us. The evidence consists of our universe and our selves.

Anyway, on this thread the "default position," if we may use that term, is "I will recuse myself without prejudice to any position until after I have performed due diligence." No position of any kind is allowed until after due diligence has been performed.