Brain / Mind

[InReverse]

Here are some facts (the list should be longer but it can be extended if needed):
-Damage to certain brain areas causes predictable loss of function. There is list with types of agnosias here.
There are also documented cases of damage to functions such as memory formation.(H.M.)
-Split brain patients cannot verbally relate to information presented only to their right hemisphere, but can nonetheless react to it unconsciously. (ref)
-Certain substances alter the function of the brain (by known mechanisms) and also the state of consciousness (alcohol, drugs, anesthetics)

Question: "Is evidence from neuroscience sufficient for one to reject the mind-brain dualism?"
If not, how does one reconcile the facts above (and many others) with the separation between mind and brain. Also, how would you disprove "minds are what brains do".

[scourge99]

I came across this Richard Feynman quote:

"What I cannot create, I do not understand." That sums my attitude to consciousness.

We can't create stars or hurricanes or bacteria. Do we not understand these things?

[instantc]

I certainly do not and agree with Dawkins when he says that he feels a "deep suspicion of any line of reasoning that reached such a significant conclusion without feeding in a single piece of data from the real world."

Also, Dawkins is wrong about this, there are lots of conclusions we can make about the real world without feeding in a single piece of extra data.

[mgb]

I came across this Richard Feynman quote:

"What I cannot create, I do not understand." That sums my attitude to consciousness.

We can't create stars or hurricanes or bacteria. Do we not understand these things?

I admire Feynman but here he is just being woolly minded. He is making no sense.

[scourge99]

I certainly do not and agree with Dawkins when he says that he feels a "deep suspicion of any line of reasoning that reached such a significant conclusion without feeding in a single piece of data from the real world."

Also, Dawkins is wrong about this, there are lots of conclusions we can make about the real world without feeding in a single piece of extra data.

You can philosophize about what might be real without using data from the real world but you cant KNOW its true about the real world until you get out there and test it, model it, or otherwise verify it in some way. Until you do, its just conjecture.

[instantc]

I certainly do not and agree with Dawkins when he says that he feels a "deep suspicion of any line of reasoning that reached such a significant conclusion without feeding in a single piece of data from the real world."

Also, Dawkins is wrong about this, there are lots of conclusions we can make about the real world without feeding in a single piece of extra data.

You can philosophize about what might be real without using data from the real world but you cant KNOW its true about the real world until you get out there and test it, model it, or otherwise verify it in some way. Until you do, its just conjecture.

An example of such a conclusion would have to do with Aristotle's theory of gravity, which held that heavier objects fall faster than lighter. Without any additional testing or data from the real world, one could figure out by logic alone that this is not the case. Similarly, in my view one can build a strong case against reductionism without feeding additional information or performing tests. So it seems that a priori knowledge alone can rule out some theories about the real world, such as reductionism and Aristotelian gravity theory, while in order to find out how things in fact are, one would have to perform physical tests.

Property dualism is the outcome of physical evidence showing that the mind does not exist as a separate entity on the one hand, and a priori knowledge concluding that it cannot be reduced to physical brain activity on the other hand.

[mgb]

I certainly do not and agree with Dawkins when he says that he feels a "deep suspicion of any line of reasoning that reached such a significant conclusion without feeding in a single piece of data from the real world."

Also, Dawkins is wrong about this, there are lots of conclusions we can make about the real world without feeding in a single piece of extra data.

You can philosophize about what might be real without using data from the real world but you cant KNOW its true about the real world until you get out there and test it, model it, or otherwise verify it in some way. Until you do, its just conjecture.

You are talking about the difference between inductive and deductive knowledge. Once we learn inductively we can use that knowledge to make abstract deductions that don't depend on empirical knowledge. Mathematics is almost entirely deductive.

[Ooberman]

I came across this Richard Feynman quote:

"What I cannot create, I do not understand." That sums my attitude to consciousness.

We can't create stars or hurricanes or bacteria. Do we not understand these things?

I admire Feynman but here he is just being woolly minded. He is making no sense.

Or is he being completely honest? Maybe you understand all those things, but he doesn't.

BTW, can you tell us when and where the next hurricane will hit?

[mgb]

I came across this Richard Feynman quote:

"What I cannot create, I do not understand." That sums my attitude to consciousness.

We can't create stars or hurricanes or bacteria. Do we not understand these things?

I admire Feynman but here he is just being woolly minded. He is making no sense.

Or is he being completely honest? Maybe you understand all those things, but he doesn't.

BTW, can you tell us when and where the next hurricane will hit?

Ok I'll chalk up a mark for you on that one but I still find his statement unclear.

[scourge99]

I certainly do not and agree with Dawkins when he says that he feels a "deep suspicion of any line of reasoning that reached such a significant conclusion without feeding in a single piece of data from the real world."

Also, Dawkins is wrong about this, there are lots of conclusions we can make about the real world without feeding in a single piece of extra data.

You can philosophize about what might be real without using data from the real world but you cant KNOW its true about the real world until you get out there and test it, model it, or otherwise verify it in some way. Until you do, its just conjecture.

An example of such a conclusion would have to do with Aristotle's theory of gravity, which held that heavier objects fall faster than lighter. Without any additional testing or data from the real world, one could figure out by logic alone that this is not the case.

How?

Notice that i didn't say that philosophizing necessarily produces wrong answers. I said that philosophizing does not produce knowledge about the real world. Guessing correctly or accidentally getting the answer right does not count as knowledge as the Gettier problem points out. Likewise, you can't get knowledge about the real world by imagining unprecedented things like some new realm of existence where" mental properties" reside. Your imagination may be correct but you can't KNOW it is until you get out in the world and demonstrate it.

Similarly, in my view one can build a strong case against reductionism without feeding additional information or performing tests.

"reductionism" is a concept. It doesn't "exist" as a thing in the real world. So i have no problem with raising logical or philosophical objections to concepts. What i have a problem is positing that something unprecedented "exists" in the real world because you can imagine it "exists" without having any data from the real world as validation.

So it seems that a priori knowledge alone can rule out some theories about the real world, such as reductionism and Aristotelian gravity theory, while in order to find out how things in fact are, one would have to perform physical tests.

A priori knowledge can only rule out theories if the a priori knowledge points out logical problems, inconsistency, incoherence, etc. I.E., if it shows the theory as invalid.

But i don't see how you can use a priori knowledge to rule out a posteriori conclusions that are valid.

Property dualism is the outcome of physical evidence showing that the mind does not exist as a separate entity on the one hand

Separate from what?

and a priori knowledge concluding that it cannot be reduced to physical brain activity on the other hand.

This is a negative claim. What POSITIVE claims does property dualism make?

[scourge99]

No, its not. As i explained before, simply conceiving of something in your head does not make that something existent or real. Or do you suggest that ontological arguments are sound?
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontological_argument

You keep misunderstanding the argument, we know for certainty that our minds exist (cogito ergo sum).

I'm trying to point out that your use of the term "exist" is problematic. Our minds "exist" where? Cogito ergo sum tells us that something must be doing the thinking. But it doesn't tell us what thinking actually is or in what manner the thing that is thinking exists.

We know from experience that things exist physically and things exist conceptually. You seem to be implicitly arguing that there is some other type of "existence" where mental properties "exist". What is this other realm of existence and how do you know it actually exists? How do you know it isn't, for example, a mental construct or an illusion? What positive evidence do you have for this unprecedented realm of existence where mental properties reside? It seems that the only thing propping it up is word games and question begging because whenever i ask you to explain what mental properties actually are (I.E., what they are made of. What they fundamentally are.), you shy away from answering directly and give vague and nonspecific answers like "its not physical".

In addition there also seem to be physical objects called brains. The question is whether the mind is in fact identical to physical brain activity

I have repeatedly rejected this strawman. The brain is not identical to the mind. A mind is an EMERGENT PROPERTY of a brain. Emergence does not equate to "identical". Emergence is not a synonym for "identical".

You previously said that flocking is equivalent to the movement of many birds. Yes, it is. But flocking is not "identical" to many birds. Likewise, a bunch of neurons is not "identical" to a mind. The neurons actually have to be working and in a certain configuration just as birds have to be moving in a certain configuration to be considered "flocking".

The entire concept of emergence is that some new property emerges that no individual part possesses. That is why saying that the thing that emerges (minds, flocking, hurricanes) is identical to its constituent parts (neurons, birds, water molecules) is to completely misunderstand emergence. If it was identical then it wouldn't be emergence because there would be nothing emerging.

, and the conceivability argument contends that it is not. So the argument is not that something exists because we can conceive it, but that two things are not identical if we can conceive them separately.

I agree that the mind is not "identical" to the brain. Emergence does not imply identical by definition.

If you want to challenge the argument, at the very least you have to be able to point out which premise it is that you doubt. Are you challenging the law of identity or the fact that what can be conceived can at least POSSIBLY exist.

1) who cares what we can conceive to exist? We only care about what ACTUALLY exists. Does your objection boil down to an appeal to imagination?

2) if i can conceive of X existing without Y that does NOT necessitate (a) that X is not contingent upon Y or (b) that X is not emergent from Y.

Materialists on the other hand have no evidence on their side about the physical properties of the brain,

What? We don't know anything about the brain? How is it then that scientists can predict simple decisions by looking at the brain, or treat depression with medication, or control machines simply by thinking about moving?

These show that the mind is a property of the brain, that is also what property dualism holds. Whether the mind is a physical or non-physical property of the brain is entirely different issue, not even slightly touched by your evidence.

I beg to differ.
1) What is the fundamental nature of non-physical properties exactly?
2) How do we know they actually exist in and of themselves and aren't something else, for example, merely constructs or purely imaginative?
3) What verifiable evidence do you have of "non-physical properties"? Philosophical conjecture?

which is why most of them base their convictions on the ongoing success of materialism in other fields.

You can repeat this false accusation as much as you like but it doesn't make it anymore true.

In his book 'The Subjective Qualities of Experience' 1986 Michael Tye criticizes property dualism for positing unnecessarily complicated metaphysics. He defaults to reductionism because successful reductions in the other fields of science should outweigh the conceivability argument.

I don't have that book to reference in context, don't know who Michael Tye is, don't know why i should care who he is, nor does a single data point make a strong case. Especially a data point from nearly 30 years ago. Furthermore, i notice he is a PHILOSOPHER, not a neuroscientist, or psychologist, or brain surgeon or any type of scientist for that matter. As i said before, I'm unimpressed with armchair philosophizing.

This point of view I can understand,

That's because he offers philosophical objections instead of a scientific one based in evidence. I, on the other hand, am more interested in what happens in the real world because i don't think the mysteries of the universe will reveal themselves by sitting on the couch naval gazing.

and offering evidence, such as the fact that we can alter the mind with medication, which is equally consistent with both property dualism and property reductionism and does not offer any criticism to either direction.

My criticism of property dualism is that its a bunch of word games and question begging. I'm not surprised you think that property dualism is compatible with what i say because you've yet to explain what "mental properties" actually are. The only descriptions you've put forth are vague and nebulous so you can move the goal posts whenever its convenient.

Can you point out a single author who criticizes property dualism and has other arguments than this one?

I haven't looked into the matter so no. Though i did notice Wikipedia cites Searle's "why i am not a property dualist."
http://www.imprint.co.uk/pdf/searle-final.pdf

Lastly you argue that we know that "intentional states of mind" "exist" because we experience them. Ok. Please tell me what an experience of an "intentional state of mind" is like and how i can verify their existence. And in what manner it "exists". For example, i know that my keyboard exists because i see it and feel it. It PHYSICALLY "exists". How does one know that "intentional states of mind" exist? In what manner do they "exist" and how do you know?

For example, I am thinking about your argument right now, my mind is in an intentional state. I intend to craft a response to it.

Which of my above questions do you think this answers? It doesn't seem to address any of them.

A chunk of material is a chunk of material, it isn't about anything or of anything.

I agree. So what?

Neurons are neurons, they aren't thinking about anything or intending to do anything.

Ok. So what are intentions exactly? They are a mental property? If so, what are mental properties exactly? I don't want examples, i want a damn explanation of what they actually are, what they are made of, where they "exist" and how you know they exist. So far you just keep going in circles.

However, my main argument for property dualism is not this, but rather the conceivability argument, which contends that since one can be conceived without the other, the mind is not identical to brain activity.

For the sake of argument, lets say that the mind is identical to brain activity. How does the ability to conceive of one without the other PROVE they are not identical? It seems the only thing that it does is leave the door open to say that they aren't necessarily identical. There is a major leap in logic from "i can imagine they aren't identical" to "therefore they are not identical". Unless you subscribe to modal logic, in which case i wouldn't have even bothered starting this debate with you.

I asked pretty direct questions but you are dancing around them like a politician. The best i can make of it is that you identify a "mental property" called "intentions". But that doesn't explain or reveal anything about what "mental properties" or "intentions" are or what their fundamental nature is. So you are avoiding my questions.

Why do I have to know what the fundamental nature of mental properties are,

Because if you don't define what exactly it is you are talking about then you are literally talking nonsense. And this constant dodging and avoidance of my questions makes me all the more suspicious.

all I contend it that they are not physical properties of the brain.

This is a negative description. What is a positive description of "mental properties" ?

For example, I am not a toaster and I am not a dolphin. But those descriptions tell you very little about what I actually am. A positive description of me would be that I'm a human male. Is there some way to positively describe what "mental properties" are and where/how they exist and what they are made of?