Are there good reasons to believe that a god exists?

[Jashwell]

"Are there good reasons to believe that a god exists?"

Doesn't seem like much preamble is needed, but expect this largely to be filled (if at all) with arguments in favour of the existence of a God and counter-arguments. (Because the question is not "Are there good reasons to believe that a god does not exist?"). Though if you do think you have a good argument that shows it is reasonable to believe God does not exist, that is also valid.

This question comes up a lot in other threads where various classical arguments (e.g. ontological, axiological, cosmological) have been given in those threads.

If possible, try not to shotgun debate by raising lots of arguments at once. One sound argument should be sufficient.

[kenblogton]

[Replying to post 135 by Divine Insight]

I have no comments to your post. I perceive it as only containing issues to which I have previously responded adequately.
kenblogton

[Jashwell]

[Replying to post 133 by Jashwell]
I have no comment on your post. But I do have a question for you.
Why do you believe in empty sets? The empty set is the set containing no elements. In mathematics, and more specifically set theory, the empty set is the unique set having no elements; its size or cardinality (count of elements in a set) is zero.
Something coming from nothing is an empty set, as are the sets unicorns and tooth fairies.
An empty set specifies things which do not exist. To my way of thinking, the only reason to believe this unbelievable is an unwillingness to face the emptiness of the belief and a desire to maintain the fiction of atheism.
What do you say?
kenblogton

I don't see how this is relevant to a single point I've made, I've explained multiple times that there are consistent alternatives and that the cosmological argument is inconsistent. You haven't even tried to address the fact that you can't say there was a state before the big bang, while believing time begun with the big bang, nor can you say there was a state and then the big bang, as both of these imply time where you do not believe it exists.

As for empty sets, they're an abstraction. They exist in the same sense that numbers do. Not in reality, but in a shared subjective (universal) experience.

"Not being a thing" is a property by previous definition

Please address previous comments on the potentiality of nothing?
(If something has potential A, and nothing doesn't have potential A, then nothing has potential [Not A])"

Exactly, nothing has potential "Not A", as you say, which means that nothing DOES NOT have that property.

You said potential was a property.
Having the potential for [Not A] is a property.

An example: "What is the parity of the temperature of nothing?"
Well, temperature is the measure of the amount of heat.
So the temperature of no heat is 0K.
That itself is a property.
And then you have the properties of that property.
The parity of 0 is even. The parity of the temperature of nothing can only be odd or even. Either one is describable as a property.

You can't escape having properties.
What is and isn't a property is an abstract conception.
Defining nothing as "no thing" is much more obvious and clear than "empty set", if not more correct.

Here is the crux of the argument. When I say potentiality for A to come about, I do not mean the ability of A to begin to exist, for how could A have that ability before it exists? Therefore the potentiality for A to begin to exist must be attributed to something else than A.

I don't see why you're attributing the ability to A.
It's more like the word means reality has that ability. That seems to be what's meant by potentiality.

We agree that the ability cannot be attributed to A. Now you suggest that it should be attributed to 'reality', which I find a bit odd, but I don't even want to comment on that.

No, I said that's what appears to be meant by potentiality.
"The potential for A to occur" is the ability of reality to produce A

If you wish to continue making use of the abstract conception of properties and objects, this can still be reached.
Anything that could have the ability for A, aside from reality (we are excluding it for the argument), would be an element of reality.
Given that we have one object that is a subset or element of another object, we can describe the abilities of that object as abilities of the superset (though taking caution not to extrapolate the scope in a composition fallacy). For example - my arm has the ability to throw a ball. Therefore, I have the ability to throw a ball (through the use of my arm, this bit is implicit though is important to avoid composition fallacies).

So anything real that has the ability A, would mean reality has the ability A (through the use of that thing)

My point stands that in the abovementioned scenario, prior to A existed the potentiality for A to come about. That is not nothing. Therefore, if A begins to exist, something rather than nothing existed prior to A.

Potentiality is an abstract concept that does not avoid circular logic.
One can assign any number of abstract properties to nothing, as this is abstractly considering nothing as a thing.

"Prior to A existed the potentiality for A to come about".
1) Potentiality, being an abstract concept, exists in the same sense that ideas and fictional characters exists, not in reality.
2) Why prior?
3) How is this a meaningful concept - what use does it have beyond tautology?

More on them since I don't think I phrased them well.
If potentiality is merely the ability or possibility or capability of A occurring, it is a meaninglessly abstract way of taking "A occurred" and inscribing it onto other objects as a property. You then take the unjustified leap of saying that it must be prior, and then combine them to require something to ascribe A's occurence onto.
You're just projecting your own imaginative descriptive concept (potential) onto reality as prescriptive and using that to justify demanding an object.

[Mithrae]

If I may leap a little late into the discussion...

Seems to me humans began believing in gods as an outgrowth of belief in spirits, and believed in spirits as a rudimentary explanatory tool. Why or how do I eat or talk or walk around? Because my mind or spirit decides to do so. So why or how do clouds move, rain fall, animals move, sun rise and set? 'Obviously' because some other minds or spirits make them do so.

If I can just steal this comment here:

You're just projecting your own imaginative descriptive concept (potential) onto reality as prescriptive and using that to justify demanding an object.

For this very reason it's important to remember that the laws of nature or laws of physics used by the science of this or previous centuries are simply consistent, unified descriptions of how reality behaves. We can now 'explain' the behaviour of clouds and rain and moon and sun in much broader and more detailed descriptions of molecular chemistry, thermodynamics, mass and gravity. But ultimately, we do not have a fundamental answer to those prehistoric question any more than our ancestors did.

The theistic 'theory' has been refined over the millenia, from animism to polytheism to monotheism and pantheism. But it seems that in one of those latter forms it still holds considerable merit. Not only are alternative metaphysical views equally unproven, but there's actually a reason to elevate theism above alternatives. That's the fact that there is only one causal process which we experience without mediation by our senses, which we directly engage in: Choice.

Any other form of causation (chance and determinism seem the only logical alternatives) can only be inductively inferred from observation. If I flip a coin a hundred times and get 47 heads and 53 tails, I might decide that it's governed by chance. Or perhaps, if I could precisely measure every minute variation in my hand's movement and position, every change in air molecules and temperature and every difference in the landing surface, I might instead decide that the coin's landing is determined by all these factors. But in both cases, I'm simply making inferences from observation - and I cannot say with certainty that the 101st toss won't simply turn into a pigeon and fly away.

Even with those limitations of our understanding of causality in mind, the universe does not appear to be entirely random. On the other hand, at least on the quantum level the case for an entirely deterministic universe seems shaky at best, from what I gather. And this is just from observations in a tiny corner of a single galaxy across a measly few centuries of the universe's timeline!

Can we really say with any confidence at all that any causal process exists besides choice?

I don't think so. Until we can, the notion that we humans are weird anomalies - thinking, choosing beings in a non-thinking, non-choosing reality - is not justified. It's a strange kind of anthropocentrism that we are special or unique; that just because we don't see the same kind of processes going on in the rest of the universe, they probably aren't there. Of course, we don't even see other people's thoughts or choices! Obviously the more reasonable presumption, until we find reason to believe otherwise, is that we are not special or unique; that the basic principles of how we operate are pretty similar to the way the universe in general operates.

[instantc]

You said potential was a property.
Having the potential for [Not A] is a property.

While the choice of words adopted by the Google dictionary may allow for your absurd use of the word 'property', nobody would ever take you seriously. So you'd define it in such a way that every negation of a property is also a property. In other words, you and I both have the property of not being an elephant, and as such, everything has unlimited amount of properties and the whole purpose of the word is defeated. Even if you choose to define the term in such a way, my argument stands as it is, and you are simply creating a linguistic obstacle for me, as I need to redefine nothing as an empty set of such properties that are not mere negations of positive attributes of a thing.

Potentiality is an abstract concept that does not avoid circular logic.
One can assign any number of abstract properties to nothing, as this is abstractly considering nothing as a thing.

One cannot assign any properties to nothing, apart from negations of actual properties.

"Prior to A existed the potentiality for A to come about".
1) Potentiality, being an abstract concept, exists in the same sense that ideas and fictional characters exists, not in reality.

Two completely different things. Abstract concept exist in minds, potentiality is an ability of a thing to do something.

2) Why prior?

Because the potentiality for A to come about exists before A comes about, otherwise it is logically impossible for A to come about.

3) How is this a meaningful concept - what use does it have beyond tautology?

Anyone can make whatever use of it they want, it shows that anything that begins to exists does so out of something rather than nothing.

If potentiality is merely the ability or possibility or capability of A occurring, it is a meaninglessly abstract way of taking "A occurred" and inscribing it onto other objects as a property.

Not at all, it begs the question of how to explain that capability of A occurring and rules out the traditional skeptic explanation that A occurred out of nothing.

[Jashwell]

You said potential was a property.
Having the potential for [Not A] is a property.

While the choice of words adopted by the Google dictionary may allow for your absurd use of the word 'property', nobody would ever take you seriously. So you'd define it in such a way that every negation of a property is also a property. In other words, you and I both have the property of not being an elephant, and as such, everything has unlimited amount of properties and the whole purpose of the word is defeated. Even if you choose to define the term in such a way, my argument stands as it is, and you are simply creating a linguistic obstacle for me, as I need to redefine nothing as an empty set of such properties that are not mere negations of positive attributes of a thing.

Hence is the problem with use of the word property. What is or isn't a property is easily debatable. Please provide a more concrete definition.

The definition you want would eliminate any properties that must be possessed, e.g. parity with regard to integers, or temperature with regard to anything.

As for "negations of positive attributes", these are not things like belief where there is a middle ground of no belief. These are things where either way it is a positive attribute.

For example, the things you call positive could be rephrased as negations themselves.

And once again, I fail to see any objections to "no thing" being a clearer, simpler and more appropriate definition of nothing. You are effectively trying to argue that an empty set of properties is equivalent to no thing. (I don't see you as trying to argue that no thing isn't nothing)

2) Why prior?

Because the potentiality for A to come about exists before A comes about, otherwise it is logically impossible for A to come about.

"Why does the potentiality for A to come about have to be prior?"
"Because the potentiality for A to come about exists before A comes out"

... so, why does the potentiality for A to come about exist before A comes out?

3) How is this a meaningful concept - what use does it have beyond tautology?

Anyone can make whatever use of it they want, it shows that anything that begins to exists does so out of something rather than nothing.

If you change to add the clause "begins to exist", then yes.
Not coming (not coming from anything) IS coming from nothing.

If potentiality is merely the ability or possibility or capability of A occurring, it is a meaninglessly abstract way of taking "A occurred" and inscribing it onto other objects as a property.

Not at all, it begs the question of how to explain that capability of A occurring and rules out the traditional skeptic explanation that A occurred out of nothing.

"How to explain the capability of A occurring" is begged as much as "How to explain the purpose of A occurring" is.

Not to mention that the very use of the phrase "coming into existence" is significantly troublesome scientifically and philosophically as soon as you need to escape the A-theory of time, e.g. in quantum, relativistic and beginning-of-time scenarios.

As I have repeatedly tried to show, the existence of next page of a book is in no way contingent on the previous one. The same with the next frame of a film. If I say 'the potentiality for this next page to exist depends on the previous page', why would anyone believe me? I could however say 'there is a correlation between this page and the next page to produce a reading experience'. That the probability of events on the next page is significantly higher given the occurrence of certain events on the previous page.

I take it you believe in an infinite potential/causal chain? Otherwise, your definition of nothing must not be "no thing".

This would be easier to discuss if you had a better definition for potentiality, though.

[Goat]

Please show that 'Logic' dictates this.

'Nothing' is an empty set of properties by definition. If we are talking about properties, then we are already talking about something rather than nothing. Potentiality to produce something is a property, and therefore if prior to A there was something that had the potentiality to produce A, then A did not begin to exist out of nothing but out of something. If prior to A there was no potentiality to produce A, then it is impossible for A to exist.

Please define 'has a beginning'.

Let me use the following definition, A begins to exist on a given moment if, and only if, A has not existed prior to that moment, or if A has existed and ceased to exist prior to that moment.

Let me be more specific.

Do you mean a beginning because of the reformation of existing material, or out of nothing.

Can you show anything that has a beginning that is not out of pre existing material?

[kenblogton]

[Replying to post 152 by Jashwell]

Jashwell, until you can provide an example of something coming from nothing, our debates are over. I believe the fiction that something can come from nothing is necessary to your maintaining an atheistic position, because it makes a spontaneously generated universe possible, and it is a fiction, with no exemplars.
I have shown you that something coming from something is the only defensible position' and that a god with no beginning is logically essential.
You reject my viewpoint and I yours.
Let's agree to disagree.
All the best
kenblogton

[Jashwell]

[Replying to post 157 by kenblogton]

At this point I'm starting to wonder if you even read my posts.
As I have said multiple times, when I say "coming from nothing" I mean "coming from no thing", AKA "not coming from a thing", a subset of which is "not coming" (for example, not beginning, or being eternal), e.g. your God.

[kenblogton]

[Replying to post 157 by kenblogton]

At this point I'm starting to wonder if you even read my posts.
As I have said multiple times, when I say "coming from nothing" I mean "coming from no thing", AKA "not coming from a thing", a subset of which is "not coming" (for example, not beginning, or being eternal), e.g. your God.

And, as I've said multiple times, God is, God does not come from anything or nothing or no thing. God is, everything else comes from something.
kenblogton

[Mithrae]

And, as I've said multiple times, God is, God does not come from... no thing.

If it's not the case that God comes from no thing, then logically God comes from some thing.

I wonder if you can provide any examples of something with no beginning?