Is not invoking supernaturalism a reason to reject religion?

[harvey1]

HughDP stated here:

Specifically what, in fact, is outside the realms of science? If the combination of constants required to get our universe is rare, then one of the most logical assumptions is that it would take a number of attempts to hit on that combination. Either there is nothing extraordinary about the combination of constants in our universe, or the number of attempts at getting this combination is large, or - as you suggested - it's just incredibly lucky. I'd be surprised if it was the latter, but if it is and if it's within the realms of science, then so what? Still no need to invoke anything supernatural. I think we need more than extraordinary coincidence to invoke the supernatural. If one day scientists declare that our universe is totally impossible, then we'd have to consider the supernatural to make the impossible possible, but I think we're a long way off that point now, don't you? My point is that there's still a lot of science to do. Scientists do not have all the answers, but much work is being done to find them. They haven't all given up their jobs and become Elvis impersonators instead yet. I think we're considering the idea of a Creator way too early in our history.

So, my question is the following: Is postulating a Creator to account for the amazing facts of the world (e.g., the physical constants seeming to be extremely coincidental to the universe's becoming) necessarily invoking a supernatural explanation, and is a Creator explanation for these features premature given our current knowledge of science?

[Cathar1950]

Plantiga seems to be committing this fallacy of misplaced concrescence. I wonder if he is senile or crazy. But senile crazy people can be right too. What could a proposition that is unrelated to anything or related to nothing even mean? It seems here all you are doing is deciding truth is nothing more the semantics.
You have failed to show a ground for your propositions.
If relationships were not properties of things in themselves what would make the connection, Magic? You say God but this seems to be the biggest question begging of all time. Your answer seems to be some sort of idea that God makes the connection because he is the ground. It seems like an unnecessary step and I see no reason not to give the satisfaction to the very deepest level of reality at somewhere below the sub-atomic level. Every “thing “ would be related to that ground and an expression becoming with causes related to experience.
But if you are groundless then I can see why you are apt to believe in anything including a groundless being.
I guess your going to have to someday separate yourself from your two worlds of Gods one being the platonic the other being the Hebrew. The two seem as far apart as your propositions seem to be from meaningfulness. It seems at this point you are only playing lip service to YHWH. But maybe your propositions of nothingness are needed to hold on to this tribal God.

Timelessness is not the same thing as the ancient of days.
Eternal does not mean timeless but everlasting or enduring.
Timelessness is different then the the first and the last.
Even an incarnate God is historical.

My God idea may not be any more then the universe or the cosmos. But you seem to have taken God out of your tradition
and replaced it with a platonic God which connection is only in some rune like fashion. This might be why you see the fall as some ”truth” expressed in fable to explain freedom’s(possibilities) consequences to save your commitment to Christ(atonement) as something sensible. This might stem from your fear of denning Christ or God which you feel your soul and its survival are dependent. You want your cake and eat it too. This not Nessesarly a bad thing. Your creativity may find a solution that overcomes your neuroses. Much the same way Paul did. You may end up with a bunch of Harvites some day singing your praises.
Weirder things have happened. This is not meant to be an ad hominem attack. I am just guessing. I am open to correction.

I need a nap my head hurts.

[QED]

Wow, Cathar's doing enough thinking for the lot of us. This bit sparked off a new thought in my head:

Why didn’t God create the world 20 billions years ago, or a 100 billion?
It seems to me a timeless God with out limitations all knowledge, and all good may be a limitation on your view of God not related to the cosmos except to justify your sense of intelligence among other thing such as satisfaction principle, Thruthmaker and organizing principle (logos). By blending a Hebrew God with Platonism these things are built into you thought system and you take them of being self-evident. You see that way because you see that away.

I'm still a bit hazy about Harvey's concept, but this work of creation we call the universe is being put forward as some sort of ultimate truth about what can exist. Looking at what popped out of the process seems to me to be too stylized to be anything like the perfect plan or the only possible plan. If God is something akin to a clever engineer who uses his skills and intellect to produce the universe to a plan then we might expect a stylized universe, but then where did the skill and intellect evolve from? This is why I think Harvey talks more in terms of platonic concepts dictating the shape of the world, as per Leibniz's Best of all possible worlds. Perhaps were seeing a reincarnation of Dr Pangloss -- Votaire's satirical character who was "a teacher of metaphysico-theologico-cosmo-lonigology."

[harvey1]

This is why I think Harvey talks more in terms of platonic concepts dictating the shape of the world, as per Leibniz's Best of all possible worlds.

One of the major differences being that I view the Omega state as the best of all possible worlds. One of the (Feynman) paths that get us to that point are not necessarily the best, it's the sum over histories is the best possible path:

Enter through the narrow gate. For wide is the gate and broad is the road that leads to destruction, and many enter through it. But small is the gate and narrow the road that leads to life, and only a few find it. (Matt. 7:13-14)

Dr Pangloss-- Votaire's satirical character who was "a teacher of metaphysico-theologico-cosmo-lonigology."

What is lonigology?

[harvey1]

Cathar,

We'll, something in you must have snapped and here we are with a stream of arguments suddenly coming from you. Okay, rather than me spending all day replying to you (and chatting with Bugmaster), let's focus on the issue of "propositions existing" which is where you seem to have the main problems with my dualistic view. Here are the main complaints as I see them:

1. How are propositions meaningful without reference?

"It seems strange to me that propositions exist with out qualities properties or existence"

"I cannot imagine a proposition with out a relationship existing first."

"If relationships were not properties of things in themselves what would make the connection, Magic?")

"...propositions are a function of language and language even if it is built into our brains thru our genes it is still a human construct and has been developed thru our experiences. Experience is the ground."

"Proposition are about something or they are not real. But they should not be equated with reality. Propositions are tools."

"What often makes your argument seem sophist is you inability to show a connection between your propositions and reality."

2. Do only propositions exist?

"Now you think only propositions exist."

3. Shouldn't I be committed to anti-realism of physics?

"If propositions are the groundless cause of virtual particles 'then this commits you to an anti-realistic view of physics in my opinion'"

4. Is truth nothing more than semantics?

"It seems here all you are doing is deciding truth is nothing more the semantics."

5. Can't satisfaction be grounded in some sub-sub-atomic level of the universe?

"Your answer seems to be some sort of idea that God makes the connection because he is the ground. It seems like an unnecessary step and I see no reason not to give the satisfaction to the very deepest level of reality at somewhere below the sub-atomic level. Every “thing “ would be related to that ground and an expression becoming with causes related to experience."

Let's take it one question at a time:

1. How are propositions meaningful without reference?

As I stated before, propositions are hierarchial structures that incorporate the meaning of the primitive propositions that are underneath them. Therefore, the reference of a higher up proposition is the more primitive propositions that compose that higher up proposition.

The reason why Tarski defines satisfaction directly, and then deduces a definition of truth, is that satisfaction obeys recursive conditions in the following sense: if F is a compound formula, then to know which assignments satisfy F, it's enough to know which assignments satisfy the immediate constituents of F... As it stands, Tarski's definition of satisfaction is not an explicit definition, because satisfaction for one formula is defined in terms of satisfaction for other formulas. So to show that it is formally correct, we need a way of converting it to an explicit definition... We say that S is a satisfaction relation if for every formula G, S meets the conditions put for satisfaction of G by Tarski's definition. For example, if G is ‘G1 and G2’, S should satisfy the following condition for every assignment a:

S(a,G) if and only if S(a,G1) and S(a,G2).

We can define ‘satisfaction relation’ formally, using the recursive clauses and the conditions for atomic formulas in Tarski's recursive definition. Now we prove, by induction on the complexity of formulas, that there is exactly one satisfaction relation S.

So, notice that with this hierarchial structure of all the propositions that exist refer to some base state of reality. This base state of reality doesn't have to be material. There are many state of affairs to refer to which are not material. For example, the propositions could refer to the basic nature of reality (e.g., the nature of possibility, the nature of nothing, the nature of truth, etc.,).

2. Do only propositions exist?

No. If a proposition exists that causes a material thing to exist, then the material thing exists. This view is a dualist perspective, not a monistic perspective.

3. Shouldn't I be committed to anti-realism of physics?

No, it's exactly the opposite. Since I believe that the propositions of physics have reality, I am committed to the study of physics producing real equations that tell us really what the material universe is like. The uncertainty principle is really a fundamental principle of the universe, and it has a real causal effect. Just like physics suggests that it does. (By the way, you criticize my understanding of physics, but you have to show where my understanding is incorrect. So far all you've cited is your opinion.)

4. Is truth nothing more than semantics?

No. As a dualist I'm committed to there being a world.

5. Can't satisfaction be grounded in some sub-sub-atomic level of the universe?

No. The reason is pointed out by Lewis:

Whatever N may be, I cannot see how it could be absolutely impossible to have N(F,G) and Fa without Ga. (Unless N just is constant conjunction, or constant conjunction plus something else, in which case Armstrong's theory turns into a form of the regularity theory he rejects.) The mystery is somewhat hidden by Armstrong's terminology. He uses ‘necessitates’ as a name for the lawmaking universal N; and who would be surprised to hear that if F ‘necessitates’ G and a has F, then a must have G? But I say that N deserves the name of ‘necessitation’ only if, somehow, it really can enter into the requisite necessary connections. It can't enter into them just by bearing a name, any more than one can have mighty biceps just by being called ‘Armstrong’ (1983, 366).

If the satisfaction relation (N) is some sub-sub-atomic state of affairs, then if sub-sub-atomic law F exists, then there's no reason why law G should be the case. If that's true, then N is superfluous. Just say that F and G are constantly conjuncted together as a brute fact. In that case, it's not because N satisfies F and G, rather F and G occur together because that's just the way it is--tomorrow (or in 5 minutes) it might not be so. Hence, if you go that route you might as well dump the satisfaction relation altogether. But, then you are left with constant conjunction where there is no reason why anything happens. It just does. And, there's also no reason why things should continue to happen--it might not.

I realize these issues are complicated, but I think if someone takes the time to think these issues out they'll see why God must exist as a truthmaker to this N relation, and therefore it becomes understandable why the Universe cannot exist without there being a God (indeed the whole notion of "reality" is altogether incoherent without the existence of God). I realize that few are apt to worship God as a result, but I tell you honestly that you should. But, alas, the human mind is at enmity with God. Too bad it has to be that way.

[MichaelGerard]

I'm sure even you'd agree that it isn't an infinite regress per se that's the problem; it's the traversal of a linear infinite regress of atomic causes/events that's the problem.

That's correct. I agree with Aquinas that if God (or platonic reality) instantiated an infinite timeline, then I'd have no problem with it since the infinite is not be traversed.

I can agree that the timeless superspace must contain something which conditions our universe for creation. I see this as a Platonic set of numbers and a mind-independent wave-function; you see this as God. Why must this be God?

Well, let's look at pantheism very carefully:

Unity is explained in various ways that are often interrelated. These connections range from mutual entailment, to different types of causal and contingent relations. Roughly, Unity is interpreted 1) ontologically; 2) naturalistically � in terms of ordering principle(s), force(s) or plans; 3) substantively � where this is distinguished from "ontologically"; and 4) genealogically � in terms of origin... Unity may have to be explained partly in terms of divinity. The all-inclusive whole may be a Unity because it is divine � either in itself (Spinoza's substance), or because of a divine power informing the whole � as with the Presocratics... Can Unity be a basis for attributing divinity to the whole? If divinity is the basis for Unity, as it may be for the Presocratics; or alternatively if Unity is the basis for divinity; then there is something of a redundancy in the definition of pantheism as the belief that everything that exists constitutes a divine Unity. A simpler non-redundant definition would be that pantheism holds that "everything is divine". "Divine" is defined as pertaining to God ("of, from, or like a god"), but also as "sacred" or "holy"... There is no reason to suppose the idea of "divinity" relevant to pantheism should be modelled after a specific tradition's concept of divinity-like Christianity... Whatever criteria are decided upon as necessary for attributing divinity to something, one cannot decide a priori that the possession of divinity requires personhood without ruling out the possibility of the most typical types of pantheism (i.e. non-personal types). After all, theism is what pantheism is most of all trying to distance itself from.

I would first argue that this platonic reality qualifies as a pantheistic Unity for the world since it would act as an ordering principle. Given the mathematical rules that the universe appears to follow, I would argue that the ordering principles are mathematical, and therefore "God" would at least be the collective logical truths of the world acting as a kind of Logos in the world. This is certainly pantheism and not atheism.

Secondly, as I mentioned earlier, I revert to Plantinga's first argument that platonic propositions (i.e., abstract structures) that "exist" are a property of mind or thoughts.

Please forgive me for jumping in here (as most of this is over my head), but I have a question.

You seem to be postulating a pre-big bang "sub-space" that has a mind, but that's more than mind.

Personal, but not wholy personal, is that right?

Would that be compatible with the Christian concept of God?

[LiamOS]

Expecting a reply to a thread over four years old will almost certainly lead to disappointment.

[MichaelGerard]

I didn't notice it was over four tears old, and it's ashame it is (as it's a very interesting thread.)