Emergent Dualism

[AgnosticBoy]

I've read, listened to, and watched many debates on consciousness between Christians and atheist philosophers and so far I'm left with more questions than answers. Then I read a book by Dr. David Chalmers called The Conscious Mind and realized that his position accounts for a lot of the evidence and objections that seem to plague the materialist and non-materialist sides.

In short, emergent dualism is the position that consciousness/mind is an emergent nonphysical property of the brain. Under this view, the brain is primary in that the mind depends on the brain, but what starts out as a physical process gives rise to a nonphysical nonphysical effect (i.e. the mind and its attributes). Another add-on to this position is that the mind has causal powers which it exerts on the brain - commonly referred to as 'downward' or 'top-down' causation. This turns the deterministic worldview (which also includes materialism) on its head.

After reviewing the arguments for emergent dualism, I'm left to conclude that materialism is incomplete when it comes to explaining consciousness. Substance dualism simply goes too far.

Debate requests: Leave materialism or explain why anyone should remain a materialists after learning about consciousness.

Have you considered emergent dualism? What are your objections?

[Divine Insight]

[Replying to post 70 by Divine Insight]
Well I don't know about "divine" insight but you certainly have good well-rounded insight. I certainly don't count you among some of the dogmatic materialists that I've encountered at school and other forums. I'm a strict empiricist, in that I strive to have everything empirically verified and I hope with better technology, we can focus more on examining the brain itself rather than drawing inferences or analogies from computer systems. Either way, if anyone thinks that reductive materialism explains and solves the mind/body problem then let them demonstrate it by following this point:

Finally, the famous physicist Richard Feynman once said if you really want to show you understand how something works, build it. And it is here that we can clearly identify the limits of our knowledge regarding consciousness. I put experienced in quotes earlier because no one knows how to engineer the flow of information into emergent states of first person experience (i.e., sentience). The engineering problem of consciousness remains a great mystery.

Source: https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/th ... s-the-mind

I totally agree with Richard Feynman on his point. And I would love to build an analog brain to show my understanding of it.

Unfortunately the electronic device I need to build one hasn't been invented yet. We have the technology to build one. It's just that no company has yet designed and built one. Apparently no one is aware of how useful this device would be.

Are you into electronics? If you are familiar with FPGA's (Field Programmable Gate Arrays) and how they work then perhaps I could explain to you the device I would need to build a functioning analog brain.

[Divine Insight]

By the way, the idea of using an analog computer to do what our brains do is not uniquely my idea. Lots of other people are recognizing this as well.

Here are just two articles I found in a quick Google Search.

This first article actually recognize that analog computing is the way to go if we hope to create computing systems that are similar to biological systems.

MIT News: Analog Computer Returns

This second article recognizes that analogy computers will generally beat out digital computers in all forms of processing.

Why Algorithms Suck and Analog Computers are the Future

(as a side note I might add here also that "Quantum Computing" will also be a form of analog computing, and this is why it will be extremely fast and powerful. Although in theory "Quantum Computing" will also have no speed limit concerning the speed of light. I won't try to explain why that is the case, but it is.)

In any case, it's not like I am the first, or only person, to recognize that analog computers are the answer to replicating biological systems including the human brain. There are actually quite a few other people working on this already. However, their plan of attack is not the same as mine. Understanding that analog computers are the answer and knowing how to go about using them is two different things.

However, in all cases, everyone has recognize that analog computer technology simply hasn't progressed. Once digital computers were found to be easy to program they got all the attention. And so all the technological companies rushed off designing digital technology, and that's the technological world we are now living in.

Analog computing is not going to take the same path. For one thing analog computers are not going to be attractive to the general public as a personal computer. Why not? Because to program an analog computer you need to know differential calculus, which most people have no clue about.

In any case, I've known that analog computer are the answer for many decades. The problem is that we just don't currently have decent analog technologies readily available because they've gone undeveloped because digital computers won the early computer wars.

[Bust Nak]

The most obvious differences are subjective experience, mental causation, will or intentionality, etc.

Sure, but is it a fundamental difference? And if it is, what does it mean for a potential explanation of the mind?

The reason behind my point of choosing the correct level is that a system can have different levels of interactions. The reason that you can't rely on the lower level interactions to sufficiently account for emergence is because a variable that contributes to causation/interaction may come into play at an intermediate or higher level of interaction...

Then pick the right level of interactions. I don't see what the problem of explaining things at the right level. Why are we even talking about this, why would anyone want to explain things at the wrong level of interaction? How would an explanation even work if it is at the wrong level?

I disagree with your premise. The two concepts start at different directions because of where each presumes that determination of the system lies...

I can write software that changes the hardware it is running on, which in turn changes the software. Determination goes both ways in this example and there is nothing there that can't be explained with simple reductive materialism. What exactly are you gaining by introducing a new concept and fixing the direction to one or the other?

The point is that none of those physical components are present when it comes to mental images. This precisely why I consider mental images to be nonphysical.

The same applies to digital images, no new concepts required to explain that.

True, but the ones generated by the mind aren't physical. And we only perceive them through subjective experience, which also can't be said to be physical - no sensory organs, etc but yet we can perceive mental images.

The software that are generated by computers aren't physical either. The only thing that is missing from your typical home computer, is subjective experience, and unless you are suggesting that is fundamentally different from software, you aren't saying anything that require anything more than materialism.

If anything, I think scientists would do some good incorporating both types of explanations, as some are already doing.

Give me an idea of what explanations are the typical scientists are missing. I am still failing to see what advantage there is for introducing emergence as something other than the reverse of reductionism.

[Divine Insight]

True, but the ones generated by the mind aren't physical. And we only perceive them through subjective experience, which also can't be said to be physical - no sensory organs, etc but yet we can perceive mental images.

The software that are generated by computers aren't physical either. The only thing that is missing from your typical home computer, is subjective experience, and unless you are suggesting that is fundamentally different from software, you aren't saying anything that require anything more than materialism.

I definitely hold that subjective experience is necessarily fundamentally different from software. So the idea that you can point to software as the thing that is having an experience doesn't fly with me.

I also disagree that software is "non-physical". It may be highly organized physically structured matter, but it's certainly not non-physical.

If I have an digital computer that has no software on it and you come to me saying that you have some software to run on it the first thing you'll need to do is physically give me your software so I can load it into the computer. If you didn't bring any physical software with you I can't load it. At best you can claim to have the software in your physical mind and you are willing to physically type the software into the physical memory of my computer.

The bottom line is that no matter how hard you try you cannot have any software that isn't physical. Non-physical software is software that doesn't exist.

Also, how are you going to explain that software can have a subjective experience? Exactly when and how would that happen? Let's say that you bring the software on a thumb drive. Is the software currently 'having an experience' sitting on the thumb drive? I don't think anyone would argue for that.

Therefore the software can't have an experience at least until it's loaded into a computer and processed. But then the software is only processed a few bytes at a time and those bytes are necessarily nothing more than machine code (i.e. only instructions that the CPU was designed to execute.) The CPU cannot execute any instructions that it wasn't designed to execute.

So at that point what is 'having an experience'? The CPU? Is so, then the CPU can only experience having executed it's own limited number of machine instructions. It could have even have a clue what the larger software program might be doing on the larger scale picture.

So the CPU is "out" as the thing that could be having the experience of what the software is all about.

The only thing left would be the entire computer system, including the sensors and output actuators. Only those physical objects could be "experiencing" what the overall program is causing to happen. But this brings us right back to the basic physics. Where is there anything in basic physics that suggests that physical objects can have an experience? The fact that there is nothing in basic physics that can account for this is the crux of the problem.

~~~~~

Note, this problem is significantly different when we move over to analog computers because in analog computers the situation is entirely different.

I'm not saying that analog computers solve the problem, but I am suggesting that they change the situation dramatically in ways where the answers to the question we asked about digital computers have totally different answers when asked about analog computers. In fact, the entire concept of "software" is extremely different. In a way there is no "software" in an analog computer. All that exists in an analog computer is "hardware". You can't upload software to it, and you can't download software from it. You can exchange information with it, but that would be "data" not program software.

In fact, these computer scientists who are proposing that we could "download" the software from a human brain and run it on a digital computer have got to be kidding themselves. Apparently even they aren't aware that the human brain is not a digital computer.

[AgnosticBoy]

Sure, but is it a fundamental difference? And if it is, what does it mean for a potential explanation of the mind?

There must be a big difference considering we have plenty of software that are developed everyday, but yet we have not shown how information can be converted to subjective/sentient experience. This is what needs to be explained - it's part of the mind/body problem. In terms of your side, it could mean that we've discovered yet another approach that doesn't completely work to explain consciousness.

The reason behind my point of choosing the correct level is that a system can have different levels of interactions. The reason that you can't rely on the lower level interactions to sufficiently account for emergence is because a variable that contributes to causation/interaction may come into play at an intermediate or higher level of interaction...

Then pick the right level of interactions. I don't see what the problem of explaining things at the right level. Why are we even talking about this, why would anyone want to explain things at the wrong level of interaction? How would an explanation even work if it is at the wrong level?

Ask reductionists this question. They're the ones that presume that all the answers to understanding phenomena lies at the basic constituents of matter.

I disagree with your premise. The two concepts start at different directions because of where each presumes that determination of the system lies...

I can write software that changes the hardware it is running on, which in turn changes the software.

If true, this would support my view of top-down causation, however software is not completely determined by hardware like many believe the mind is in relation the brain. In a sense, computer hardware is made to play a passive role since it is controlled by the operating system software.

Determination goes both ways in this example and there is nothing there that can't be explained with simple reductive materialism. What exactly are you gaining by introducing a new concept and fixing the direction to one or the other?

Under reductionism, determination is at the bottom level. Perhaps it might help if you state your position because it is clearly not the standard view in science. You can't have it both ways. So far, I've noticed that you accept the existence of nonphysical properties, top-down causation, etc, etc. Anything else I'm missing or that you want to change up from traditional reductive materialism?

The point is that none of those physical components are present when it comes to mental images. This precisely why I consider mental images to be nonphysical.

The same applies to digital images, no new concepts required to explain that.

Simply put, digital images are viewed via physical means, mental images are not viewed using physical means because they lack physical characteristics.

You said in post #72 the following, "We do view images physically using light, screens, monitors, and most importantly, sensory organs."




Digital images work by transmitting information to a matrix of dots (pixels). These images are physical since they utilize physical characteristics, light, pixels, a monitor, etc.

True, but the ones generated by the mind aren't physical. And we only perceive them through subjective experience, which also can't be said to be physical - no sensory organs, etc but yet we can perceive mental images.

The software that are generated by computers aren't physical either. The only thing that is missing from your typical home computer, is subjective experience, and unless you are suggesting that is fundamentally different from software, you aren't saying anything that require anything more than materialism.

Materialism is the view that everything is composed of matter.

It seems that you're twisting the common definition of materialism to fit your argument.

[AgnosticBoy]

Sure, but is it a fundamental difference? And if it is, what does it mean for a potential explanation of the mind?

The difference between software and mind? Software is code so it is not nonphysical as you say. It occupies space - disk space. In terms of your view, it would mean that your approach is just a number of many that can not account for subjective experience.

The reason behind my point of choosing the correct level is that a system can have different levels of interactions. The reason that you can't rely on the lower level interactions to sufficiently account for emergence is because a variable that contributes to causation/interaction may come into play at an intermediate or higher level of interaction...

Then pick the right level of interactions. I don't see what the problem of explaining things at the right level. Why are we even talking about this, why would anyone want to explain things at the wrong level of interaction? How would an explanation even work if it is at the wrong level?

I'm for reductionism and emergence whenever applicable. It tends to be reductive materialists that want to start at the bottom for every phenomena.

I disagree with your premise. The two concepts start at different directions because of where each presumes that determination of the system lies...

I can write software that changes the hardware it is running on, which in turn changes the software. Determination goes both ways in this example and there is nothing there that can't be explained with simple reductive materialism. What exactly are you gaining by introducing a new concept and fixing the direction to one or the other?

I'm not sure how software would qualify as a higher level property seeing that it is not a product of the lower level properties of computer hardware. The software is being added to the computer and you made the rules or code to run the hardware.

The point is that none of those physical components are present when it comes to mental images. This precisely why I consider mental images to be nonphysical.

The same applies to digital images, no new concepts required to explain that.

??????????? Physical components aren't present for "digital images"??????
That's your best rebuttal?

I just can't understand what's difficult in understanding that the digital images you refer to are viewed via physical means and mental images are not. Your attempt at a rebuttal doesn't even address my argument regarding hallucinations.

True, but the ones generated by the mind aren't physical. And we only perceive them through subjective experience, which also can't be said to be physical - no sensory organs, etc but yet we can perceive mental images.

The software that are generated by computers aren't physical either. The only thing that is missing from your typical home computer, is subjective experience, and unless you are suggesting that is fundamentally different from software, you aren't saying anything that require anything more than materialism.

Materialism is the view that everything is composed of matter. Your attempt to change the definition does not validate your point. Again, anything nonphysical is not compatible with matter.

[Divine Insight]

I just can't understand what's difficult in understanding that the digital images you refer to are viewed via physical means and mental images are not. Your rebuttal doesn't even touch my argument regarding hallucinations.

I realize the above comments were made in response to Bust Nak, but I'm wondering how you know that "mental images" even exist at all?

When we physically see an "image" this is because our sensors (i.e. our eyes) are being stimulated to create electrical pulses in the brain. We assume that these pulses then create "images" within the brain that are then experienced.

However, is that really what's happening? Is there a screen on the back of our brains that produce images that we then experience?

When we imagine an image in our brain do we really know what's going on?

Is the electrical activity that we see in the brain during this time actually creating a mental image? Or is it just creating the experience of having seen an image?

If the electrical activity is just creating the experience of having seen an image, then no image is actually required when we imagine a "mental image".

No only this, but if the electrical activity in the brain is actually creating the 'experience' of having seen an image, then the electrical activity is the experience itself.

I'll be the first to agree that there is still the question of how electrical activity can create a subjective experience. This would suggest to me that electromagnetism itself is somehow capable of having an experience, and that isn't covered by basic physics.

But I don't see where there is anything to gain about suggesting that anything "non-physical" has occurred, or is responsible.

How does claiming that something is non-physical "explain" subjective experience?

It seems to me that this doesn't help the problem one iota.

What good is a hypothesis that doesn't explain anything?

[Bust Nak]

The difference between software and mind? Software is code so it is not nonphysical as you say. It occupies space - disk space. In terms of your view, it would mean that your approach is just a number of many that can not account for subjective experience.

I thought you accepted software as non-physical. If you think software is physical, then why not the mind? It occupies space - our brains. We account for subjective experience the same way we account for software, it is the result of our brains.

I'm for reductionism and emergence whenever applicable. It tends to be reductive materialists that want to start at the bottom for every phenomena.

I don't see why you'd think that. We were explaining things with chemistry long before we got stuck into atoms and lower.

I'm not sure how software would qualify as a higher level property seeing that it is not a product of the lower level properties of computer hardware. The software is being added to the computer and you made the rules or code to run the hardware.

Then stop treating the mind as a higher level property, not as a product of the lower level properties of brain. As something that is added to the brain, running in the brain. What is the difference between the mind and software, other than your arbitrary divide?

??????????? Physical components aren't present for "digital images"??????
That's your best rebuttal?

Need I do more?

I just can't understand what's difficult in understanding that the digital images you refer to are viewed via physical means and mental images are not.

But you don't know that - our brains are physical, for all you know, that's all there is to mental images.

No one can tell me what the fundamental difference is between mental image and digital ones; other than the fact that we haven't figured out precisely how mental images results from electro-chemical signals, the way we understand how digital images results from electric signals.

There is no way to know if our inability to explain it, is because there is a fundamental difference between mental image and digital ones; or because we don't have a comprehensive understanding of the brain yet.

Your attempt at a rebuttal doesn't even address my argument regarding hallucinations.

I said 3D digital images exists too, remember?

Materialism is the view that everything is composed of matter. Your attempt to change the definition does not validate your point. Again, anything nonphysical is not compatible with matter.

All that's required is a change of language. If the mind qualify as non-physical, then so does software. If software does not qualify as non-physical, then neither does the mind. I don't care which system to use, I am flexible. What I am challenging, is the seemingly arbitrary distinction between software and mind.

[Divine Insight]

We account for subjective experience the same way we account for software, it is the result of our brains.

I don't see how subjective experience can be accounted for in the same way as software. Software (both logical programming and data) can be explained as nothing more than material in formation. I see no problem with that.

But how do you explain subjective experience as material in formation? How is that supposed to account for subjective experience? What part of physics suggests that any physical material can have an experience?

All that's required is a change of language. If the mind qualify as non-physical, then so does software. If software does not qualify as non-physical, then neither does the mind. I don't care which system to use, I am flexible. What I am challenging, is the seemingly arbitrary distinction between software and mind.

I agree that terms like "mind" are ill-defined. What in the world does that term mean? If it means something different from "brain" then shouldn't we be able to define both of these terms in a way that clearly differentiates between "mind" and "brain"?

Also, if we say that "brain" is the material hardware, and "mind" is what the material hardware does, then wouldn't that definition require that any computer is also a "mind"?

@ Bust Nak: I understand that this isn't your terminology. AgnosticBoy is the one who is using the term "mind". I'm just addressing these terms for the sake of clarification.

@ AgnosticBoy, What exactly is meant by the term "mind"? Can you provide a definition? Also include a definition of the term "brain" so I can see how these terms differ.

[AgnosticBoy]

The difference between software and mind? Software is code so it is not nonphysical as you say. It occupies space - disk space. In terms of your view, it would mean that your approach is just a number of many that can not account for subjective experience.

I thought you accepted software as non-physical.

I don't but I do like the fact that you're open to accepting the existence of nonphysical properties.

If you think software is physical, then why not the mind? It occupies space - our brains. We account for subjective experience the same way we account for software, it is the result of our brains.

The mind has both physical and nonphysical properties. I've already given you the examples of the nonphysical properties and they do not occupy space. Btw, you're sounding more like a dualists and not so much a materialists and I take partial credit for that!
The weaknesses in people's position often causes them to soften up on their worldview.

I'm not sure how software would qualify as a higher level property seeing that it is not a product of the lower level properties of computer hardware. The software is being added to the computer and you made the rules or code to run the hardware.

Then stop treating the mind as a higher level property, not as a product of the lower level properties of brain. As something that is added to the brain, running in the brain. What is the difference between the mind and software, other than your arbitrary divide?

The mind is a result of the brain but software is not a result of hardware. This is very simple logic that explains why software is not a higher level property.

I just can't understand what's difficult in understanding that the digital images you refer to are viewed via physical means and mental images are not.

But you don't know that - our brains are physical, for all you know, that's all there is to mental images.

It's apparent that you don't give scientists enough credit for the understanding of perception that they do have.

No one can tell me what the fundamental difference is between mental image and digital ones; other than the fact that we haven't figured out precisely how mental images results from electro-chemical signals, the way we understand how digital images results from electric signals.

Likewise, no one can tell me how mental images are physical when we perceive them without the physical means of perception.

[

Your attempt at a rebuttal doesn't even address my argument regarding hallucinations.

I said 3D digital images exists too, remember?

That's not a rebuttal because it doesn't explain how mental images can project in 3d and yet still not be physically perceptible.

[

Materialism is the view that everything is composed of matter. Your attempt to change the definition does not validate your point. Again, anything nonphysical is not compatible with matter.

All that's required is a change of language. If the mind qualify as non-physical, then so does software. If software does not qualify as non-physical, then neither does the mind. I don't care which system to use, I am flexible. What I am challenging, is the seemingly arbitrary distinction between software and mind.

What I see from experience is that some materialists giving up some ground to dualists because they see inherent weaknesses in their position. You can not maintain that all that exists is composed of matter and yet want to claim that nonphysical things exists.