Is the god of the gaps a sound argument?

[Difflugia]

But a intelligent engineer can preset the dials to get the results that he wants.

An "intelligent designer" in the way Christian apologists define one can do anything at all. It's taking "I don't know" and assigning it to a god. Like I said, if you don't understand why that's insufficient, I'll start a new topic.

Do what you gotta do.

A number of posters, particularly in the Science and Religion forum, repeatedly offer what they think are arguments against scientific principles and present them as evidence for their particular conception of a god. This is informally known as "the god of the gaps."

Is the god of the gaps argument logically sound? If not, what changes must be made to such an argument to rescue it?

[Difflugia]

I’m always open to learning, so please keep trying.

Then I won't take it personally. Thanks.

Why does it mean it actually sometimes happens? Why is the Heisenberg principle about actuality and not predictability?

In a sense, it is about predictablility, but in the aggregate. In the case of the semiconductors that I mentioned, we can create what should be an inpenetrable barrier in classical physics. If it's thin enough that the electron's quantum uncertainty in position overlaps both sides of the barrier, however, the uncertainty principle means that we can't know that the electron is on only one side of the barrier. Furthermore, we can calculate the probabilities that the electron is on each side. If the probability for a single electron to be on the other side is, say, 0.1%, then for every million electrons in that situation, a thousand of them will appear on the other side in violation of classical physics.

The same is true of ΔE and Δt. Under most circumstances, the virtual particles just cancel out. Like the very narrow electron barrier, we can engineer circumstances that allow us to measure the effects of these virtual particles.

So far, whenever we've identified a situation in which we should be able to measure the effects of uncertainty as a real phenomenon, we've been able to.

My understanding is that there are quite a few different interpretations of quantum mechanics and that they don’t all agree with what you seem to be saying here.

What part do they disagree with?

There are hypothetical models like forms of string theory that posit extra dimensions whose interactions result in what we observe in our universe, but if one of those is real, then that causes problems with Craig's second premise, that the universe "began to exist." In formulations of string theory, the extra dimensions of spacetime exist beyond those of our universe, meaning that either what Craig calls the universe is too small or the higher dimensions of spacetime fill the role of his cause.

The short is that I'm not aware of any explanations of quantum theory that are testable, even if they propose an underlying cause for things like virtual particles. In that view, Craig's first premise is still just an assertion.

No, I’m trying to understand why you say that, in principle, something popping into existence uncaused, couldn’t be falsified. Can you explain that or is it just another assumption you are content with?

Though I think that's true, what we were first discussing as unfalsifiable is Craig's specific objection. Here's his statement again:

Sometimes skeptics will respond to this point by saying that in physics subatomic particles (so-called “virtual particles”) come into being from nothing. Or certain theories of the origin of the universe are sometimes described in popular magazines as getting something from nothing, so that the universe is the exception to the proverb “There ain’t no free lunch.”

This skeptical response represents a deliberate abuse of science. The theories in question have to do with particles originating as a fluctuation of the energy contained in the vacuum. The vacuum in modern physics is not what the layman understands by “vacuum,” namely, nothing. Rather in physics the vacuum is a sea of fluctuating energy governed by physical laws and having a physical structure. To tell laymen that on such theories something comes from nothing is a distortion of those theories.

Properly understood, “nothing” does not mean just empty space. Nothing is the absence of anything whatsoever, even space itself. As such, nothingness has literally no properties at all, since there isn’t anything to have any properties! How silly, then, when popularizers say things like “Nothingness is unstable” or “The universe tunneled into being out of nothing”!

The crux of his objection is that virtual particles aren't uncaused because they arise from the "sea of fluctuating energy" that is the vacuum state of our universe. My main objection to this is that I think he misunderstands what vacuum energy is. What he's calling the "sea of fluctuating energy" is the energy from the virtual particles themselves. If that's true, then he's just wrong about what's going on. I don't actually need to argue with that, though. The vacuum with its vacuum energy is the lowest energy state that we have available to us in our universe. If he's arguing, as I think he is, that virtual particles can't be defined as uncaused because they don't come from nothing (a lower energy state than we have available to us), then there's no way for us to test his assertion.

There's no evidence that virtual particles have a cause. Craig's argument, however, is that he thinks the cause is fluctuating vacuum energy. The only way to disprove his statement would be to look for the presence of virtual particles in the absence of vacuum energy, which we can't do from inside of our universe. I think what he's saying is an oxymoron because the presence of the virtual particles is itself the vacuum energy that he's talking about, but even if it's not, there's nowhere in our universe to test his assertion.

You are the one that won’t explain why “it seems” that science is reliable. You are content with that assumption alone. If it’s a gap; it’s yours in this conversation. You are content with assumptions; I’m not.

If it makes you feel better, call it a premise. In the absence of any specific claim of unreliability, I'm content with assuming that science is reliable. In fact, in order for William Lane Craig to be right about much of anything, I'm pretty sure that science must be unreliable.

[William]

[Replying to Difflugia in post #141]

If we accept the premise that it is impossible for "nothing" or something immaterial to create the material, then any exception to this rule—whether in the context of quantum mechanics or theology—would violate that premise.

Craig critiques scientific explanations of the universe’s origin for relying on "something" (like quantum fields or the vacuum) rather than genuine "nothing." He insists this is a flaw because it fails to explain how "something" can arise from "nothing."
However, his theological argument essentially claims that God, an immaterial being, has the ability to create the material universe from "nothing" through divine power.
This creates a double standard if Craig rejects scientific explanations for failing to adhere to the premise (nothing cannot create something) but allows theology to override the same principle by appealing to a theory of God's omnipotence.

[The Tanager]

In a sense, it is about predictablility, but in the aggregate. In the case of the semiconductors that I mentioned, we can create what should be an inpenetrable barrier in classical physics. If it's thin enough that the electron's quantum uncertainty in position overlaps both sides of the barrier, however, the uncertainty principle means that we can't know that the electron is on only one side of the barrier. Furthermore, we can calculate the probabilities that the electron is on each side. If the probability for a single electron to be on the other side is, say, 0.1%, then for every million electrons in that situation, a thousand of them will appear on the other side in violation of classical physics.

This is one part they seem to disagree on. Some agree with you that this ontologically means that some are in violation, while others disagree that this is an ontological truth; rather it’s just that we can’t measure, say, which side it’s on.

The short is that I'm not aware of any explanations of quantum theory that are testable, even if they propose an underlying cause for things like virtual particles. In that view, Craig's first premise is still just an assertion.

Perhaps I’m still missing what you are saying, but this sounds like you are saying that since we don’t know for certain, any statement would just be an assertion. The way I see it, Craig’s premise is the best explanation, but not certain because of the possibility of different quantum interpretations.

Though I think that's true, what we were first discussing as unfalsifiable is Craig's specific objection.

Correct, I mistyped that as I reversed it in my head.

The crux of his objection is that virtual particles aren't uncaused because they arise from the "sea of fluctuating energy" that is the vacuum state of our universe. My main objection to this is that I think he misunderstands what vacuum energy is. What he's calling the "sea of fluctuating energy" is the energy from the virtual particles themselves. If that's true, then he's just wrong about what's going on.

Correct. I really think this is the crux of the matter. But why think that your view of this is true?

I don't actually need to argue with that, though. The vacuum with its vacuum energy is the lowest energy state that we have available to us in our universe. If he's arguing, as I think he is, that virtual particles can't be defined as uncaused because they don't come from nothing (a lower energy state than we have available to us), then there's no way for us to test his assertion.

Yes, maybe we don’t have the capabilities to scientifically measure it (or maybe we just don’t have that capacity yet, I don’t know the uncertainty principle enough to say it contains this point). But even if we don’t, we still have the philosophical ability to compare alternative theories and come to what the best inference is.

If it makes you feel better, call it a premise. In the absence of any specific claim of unreliability, I'm content with assuming that science is reliable.

Assumed premises are still weak reasons to hold a belief. I agree with you that science is reliable, but that’s only a rational position if there are rational reasons that this is the best inference given the evidence (and that evidence must go beyond science).

[The Tanager]

[Replying to William in post #143]

You are misunderstanding those phrases and points, but you've agreed to one thing at a time, so please hold that thought. As I see this conversation right now, P1 comes down to whether things like virtual particles involve the creation of new energy or the transformation of energy already present. Different interpretations of quantum mechanics disagree on this, but they are empirically equivalent and I don't see any good philosophical reasoning for thinking that quantum events violate how the rest of science works regarding causality. Given that and the three arguments I offered for P1, I think that premise is the best inference.

I'm not sure if Difflugia still has more evidence or reasons to bring to the discussion on this point. If not, we can leave the discussion of P1 at that, if I understand you correctly in that you haven't been critiquing P1. If I've misunderstood you, then please clarify why you disagree with P1. If I haven't, then in the next day or so, I'll look back over your critiques of P2 and we can start discussing those.

[William]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #144]

My comment was in answer to Difflugia's post. At this stage I see no reason to get into it with you as we are currently not even engaged in any discussion and as you point out, we agreed to wait until you are ready to engage with me - once your attention on your discussion with Difflugia has run its course.

[Difflugia]

This is one part they seem to disagree on. Some agree with you that this ontologically means that some are in violation, while others disagree that this is an ontological truth; rather it’s just that we can’t measure, say, which side it’s on.

Can you find an example of someone claiming this?

If you're right, how does quantum tunneling work?

Due to the wave-like aspect of particles, and the ability to describe an object by means of a probability wave, as we have seen, quantum physics predicts that there is a finite probability that an object trapped behind a barrier (without the energy to overcome the barrier) may at times appear on the other side of the barrier, without actually overcoming it or breaking it down. For instance, if an electron approaches an electric field and is repelled by it, there is nevertheless some probability, however small, that it will find itself on the other side of the field.

Since a nonzero number of electrons crosses the barrier, then it cannot be simply an artifact of measurement. I'm not sure what interpretation you're relying on at the moment, but whatever it is must explain the things that we can actually measure. Even so, you're just saying that you can find an interpretation of quantum mechanics that might be compatible with the first premise of the KCA.

The short is that I'm not aware of any explanations of quantum theory that are testable, even if they propose an underlying cause for things like virtual particles. In that view, Craig's first premise is still just an assertion.

Perhaps I’m still missing what you are saying, but this sounds like you are saying that since we don’t know for certain, any statement would just be an assertion. The way I see it, Craig’s premise is the best explanation, but not certain because of the possibility of different quantum interpretations.

The best explanation for what? Everything except for the virtual particles? I'm saying that from the point of view of the KCA, the most favorable interpretation is that we don't know. We can measure the effects of virtual particles without an identifiable cause. How is that explained by an assertion that all things are caused? Craig might be right and there might be an unknown cause, but so far, there's no evidence for one. To the extent that we can know, i.e. interpret the evidence, virtual particles are uncaused. Craig is the one saying that since we don't know for certain, he prefers to maintain that the first premise of the KCA is true, or at least reasonable.

The crux of his objection is that virtual particles aren't uncaused because they arise from the "sea of fluctuating energy" that is the vacuum state of our universe. My main objection to this is that I think he misunderstands what vacuum energy is. What he's calling the "sea of fluctuating energy" is the energy from the virtual particles themselves. If that's true, then he's just wrong about what's going on.

Correct. I really think this is the crux of the matter. But why think that your view of this is true?

I'm saying it doesn't matter whether you do or not. I think my view is probably right, but in any case, Craig's view is logically invalid.

His argument is that if the vacuum isn't nothing, then virtual particles have a cause. It's a non sequitur.

Craig is making a positive assertion about the universe for which the best case is that we have no information, but he's pulling a cause out of thin air, as it were. He wants to discount the information that we do have via special pleading, but even if he's somehow right, he still just has no information. Whether or not he's right is the flip of a coin. I think the evidence is that the coin's seriously weighted against him, but the best argument that he can validly make is that the coin's fair.

The vacuum with its vacuum energy is the lowest energy state that we have available to us in our universe.

Yes, maybe we don’t have the capabilities to scientifically measure it (or maybe we just don’t have that capacity yet, I don’t know the uncertainty principle enough to say it contains this point). But even if we don’t, we still have the philosophical ability to compare alternative theories and come to what the best inference is.

If Craig's wrong about the relationship between the vacuum and virtual particles, the best inference is that the universe doesn't require a cause. If he's right, we don't have enough information to determine which is more likely, and can't in principle.

If it makes you feel better, call it a premise. In the absence of any specific claim of unreliability, I'm content with assuming that science is reliable.

Assumed premises are still weak reasons to hold a belief. I agree with you that science is reliable, but that’s only a rational position if there are rational reasons that this is the best inference given the evidence

The rational reason is that science empirically works.

(and that evidence must go beyond science).

I don't see why that's true.

[The Tanager]

Can you find an example of someone claiming this?

If you're right, how does quantum tunneling work?

This article seems to say what is happening with virtual particles is that the field is simply being disturbed, not that new particles are popping in and out of existence.

Dr. Pete Edwards seems to claim the energy is being borrowed and that even though it appears the conservation of energy is being violated, it’s actually not.

My understanding is that Bohmian mechanics disagrees on your interpretation of what the scientific evidence is telling us regarding the quantum vacuum.

And here are some articles that seem to show there is no logical problem in Bohmian mechanics explaining quantum tunneling:

1. Setting up tunneling conditions by means of Bohmian mechanics

2. Tunneling through bridges

3. Dynamics of tunneling ionization using Bohmian mechanics

4. Aharonov–Bohm effect in the tunnelling...

5. Tunnelling Times in Quantum Mechanics

Even so, you're just saying that you can find an interpretation of quantum mechanics that might be compatible with the first premise of the KCA.

No, I offered 3 arguments for the first premise, one of which is that all known science maintains the truth of P1. As a counter, you offer one interpretation of virtual particles that goes against this that is empirically equivalent to other quantum interpretations that, if true, would not counter this premise. That is you offering a possibility within a debated field with no reason to accept that possibility over its alternative. That is you suggesting an unknown field gives us a counter example. I’m suggesting that since this is still unknown, it isn’t evidence against all of known science, which supports P1.

The best explanation for what? Everything except for the virtual particles? I'm saying that from the point of view of the KCA, the most favorable interpretation is that we don't know.

No, it’s empirically equivalent in its explanation of things like virtual particles and superior in all other areas, so that makes P1 the best explanation of the data we have, since we don’t and can’t have 100% certainty.

We can measure the effects of virtual particles without an identifiable cause. How is that explained by an assertion that all things are caused? Craig might be right and there might be an unknown cause, but so far, there's no evidence for one. To the extent that we can know, i.e. interpret the evidence, virtual particles are uncaused. Craig is the one saying that since we don't know for certain, he prefers to maintain that the first premise of the KCA is true, or at least reasonable.

Without an identifiable cause is not the same thing as having no cause. You are offering that the possibility in this unknown field should cause us to reject P1, which is based on all known science. To the extent that we can interpret the evidence, virtual particles are not shown to be uncaused, but possibly uncaused. I’m offering that in the face of that uncertainty, we rationally stick with how the rest of science has shown to work.

I'm saying it doesn't matter whether you do or not. I think my view is probably right, but in any case, Craig's view is logically invalid.

His argument is that if the vacuum isn't nothing, then virtual particles have a cause. It's a non sequitur.

Craig is making a positive assertion about the universe for which the best case is that we have no information, but he's pulling a cause out of thin air, as it were. He wants to discount the information that we do have via special pleading, but even if he's somehow right, he still just has no information. Whether or not he's right is the flip of a coin. I think the evidence is that the coin's seriously weighted against him, but the best argument that he can validly make is that the coin's fair.

No, his argument is that logic and known science tell us that things don’t come into existence uncaused and that since the vacuum isn’t shown (or even rightly described) to be a true nothing, this isn’t a proven counter-example that should change our mind on that. We should rationally believe that there is something about the nature of the quantum vacuum that gives rise to these virtual particles. That’s not the flip of a coin.

The rational reason is that science empirically works.

What scientific test are you doing to connect that science works with science being true? Show me the experiment and the data.

[The Tanager]

My comment was in answer to Difflugia's post. At this stage I see no reason to get into it with you as we are currently not even engaged in any discussion and as you point out, we agreed to wait until you are ready to engage with me - once your attention on your discussion with Difflugia has run its course.

I'm engaging one premise at a time, not one person at a time. I've tried to engage you on P1. From those attempts, I believe you agree that "everything that begins to exist has a cause" and your critiques lie elsewhere, but let me know if I've misunderstood you.

[William]

My comment was in answer to Difflugia's post. At this stage I see no reason to get into it with you as we are currently not even engaged in any discussion and as you point out, we agreed to wait until you are ready to engage with me - once your attention on your discussion with Difflugia has run its course.

I'm engaging one premise at a time, not one person at a time.

In that case, I call your attention to Post #138 since your neglect in answering that, directly lead me to the assumption.

I've tried to engage you on P1. From those attempts, I believe you agree that "everything that begins to exist has a cause" and your critiques lie elsewhere, but let me know if I've misunderstood you.

I think P1 ("everything that begins to exist has a cause") holds within a certain observational framework, but it is arguably not absolute. When discussing The Universe as a whole—encompassing space, time, consciousness/mindfulness, and causality itself—this premise becomes more of an assumption than a certainty. My critiques focus on the leap from P1 to P2 ("The Universe began to exist"), where the applicability of causation itself is questionable when discussing the totality of existence.

As I see it, the discussion surrounding P1 remains open. While causation applies to observable phenomena within The Universe, applying this principle to The Universe as a whole—particularly under the definition we are discussing—requires further justification. Until we settle whether The Universe can be said to "begin" in any meaningful sense, P1 remains tied to the broader critiques I’ve raised.

Before we can move forward in any constructive manner, we need to resolve the disagreement about the placement of consciousness/mindfulness in the definition of The Universe. Consciousness is an undeniable aspect of reality. Whether it is material, emergent, or something else entirely is a separate question that can and should be explored later. However, excluding consciousness/mindfulness from the definition of The Universe introduces assumptions that align with P4 ("If the universe has a cause, then an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and enormously powerful.").

Leaving consciousness/mindfulness out of the definition:
1. Implies that it is external to The Universe or immaterial, without evidence for such a claim.
2. Biases the argument toward P4's conclusion before we have even begun to address the premises.

If The Universe is defined as the totality of all that exists, then it must include consciousness/mindfulness, as it clearly exists and interacts with space, time, matter, and energy. The definition I have proposed—The Universe: The totality of all the space, time, matter, energy, consciousness/mindfulness, and the physical laws and constants that govern reality—is both comprehensive and neutral. It reflects observable reality without making assumptions about the nature of consciousness/mindfulness or its relationship to the rest of The Universe.

If you disagree with this inclusion, I would ask for clarification: Where would consciousness/mindfulness belong, if not within The Universe? If you have already addressed this, please remind me of that content. Otherwise, without addressing this, I do not see how we can move forward logically.

Would you agree that resolving this is a necessary step before proceeding to P1?

[The Tanager]

In that case, I call your attention to Post #138 since your neglect in answering that, directly lead me to the assumption.

When I look back, I see my post as #138. But your post before and after that seem to make two main points (none of which seem to affect P1 to me):

1. How to define the universe, which I had addressed by saying that whatever terms you want to use, one important concept in this discussion is the spatio-temporal parts of reality while you are talking about all of reality. Traditionally in the literature around the Kalam, the spatio-temporal parts of reality have been referred to by the term ‘universe’. Your definition of ‘universe’ I refer to as ‘reality’ (which includes consciousness). But I’m fine using different terms if you tell me a different term to use for the spatio-temporal parts of reality.

Those could end up referring to the same things, but they are distinct concepts. Thus, separating out talk of the material aspect of reality does not imply the existence of an immaterial aspect and it doesn’t introduce any assumption for P4; it simply avoids begging the question in favor of “matter is all there is”. It’s important to not beg questions.

2. You talk about my concern of self-causation being irrational. That seems to me to be against P2, with you saying the ‘universe’ could be self-caused (in the sense of releasing its potential) and, therefore, doesn't actually begin to exist.

What do these two things (or something I missed) have to do with P1?

I think P1 ("everything that begins to exist has a cause") holds within a certain observational framework, but it is arguably not absolute. When discussing The Universe as a whole—encompassing space, time, consciousness/mindfulness, and causality itself—this premise becomes more of an assumption than a certainty.

How does the universe as a whole call into question that “everything that begins to exist has a cause”?

My critiques focus on the leap from P1 to P2 ("The Universe began to exist"), where the applicability of causation itself is questionable when discussing the totality of existence.

As I see it, the discussion surrounding P1 remains open. While causation applies to observable phenomena within The Universe, applying this principle to The Universe as a whole—particularly under the definition we are discussing—requires further justification. Until we settle whether The Universe can be said to "begin" in any meaningful sense, P1 remains tied to the broader critiques I’ve raised.

There is no leap from one to the other. They are two distinct premises that if both are true lead necessarily to a third premise, so please help me see which premise you are actually disagreeing with and why.

1. Do you think the universe is proof of something that began to exist uncaused?
2. Do you think the universe didn’t begin to exist, but is eternal?

It seems like probably it’s (2) in that you think causality could hold in specific cases, but not in the general whole. That’s disagreeing with P2, not P1.