Ephesians 2:10

[JoeyKnothead]

From Post 9 here:

Ephesians 2:10 (For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them.)

I think you have a poor conclusion here. I don't see your point connected to the verse. Let me go a bit further in this verse for you to comprehend. It said " For we are his workmanship" Human is created by a creator.
...

My emboldenizationin'.

For debate:

Is the notion that we are created by a god the most reasonable and rational conclusion to be had?

[Mithrae]

The "volition" option is the least ad hoc, the most privative, and in best accord with our natural sense of who we are as persons.

While I contend it's a very ad hoc position, given that it refuses to accept that volition, through thought, is seen as a component of a physical brain.

I hope you don't mind me butting in, but as you note this does seem to be a core point of disagreement, and it seems to me that EduChris has offered two points here which you haven't really answered.

In his prior post, the hypothetical suggestion that far-future technologies might possibly produce computers "comprised of pure energy and virtual quantum particles" which possess the capacity for thought/volition some folk say will be achieved by our mundane metal and plastic computers this very century. Obviously even the latter, if it occurred, would show that volition/thought needn't come from a brain. I'm not sure whether you deny or doubt the future possibility of 'computers' with a similar capacity for thought and choice as our own? But assuming for now that you do not, your objection would not really be that thoughts and choices come from brains, but that they come from physical stuff.

• EduChris wrote:
  Physicists seem to be finding newer and smaller particles every year, and now we have begun to speak of "virtual particles" as opposed to "real particles." No one has ever seen a virtual particle, or even a real particle; these are just hypothetical postulates that help us explain and predict results of very complicated experiments and procedures, all of which are multiply mediated through any number of mechanical apparati and any number of human observers, each of whom might interpret the results in various ways. At the end of the day, we don't know what our subjective mental experience really is: we can't measure it or weigh it. We can tamper with it in various ways, by poking around in the brain, but this hardly proves that an actual brain is required for SME, any more than a leaky straw proves that there is no water in the glass.
  
  JoeyKnothead wrote:
  This condition does nothing to show that a volitional agent wouldn't require physicality. What it does is show that where we don't know something, some'll insert a god into that gap. I say that with the full appreciation that I may misunderstand what you're getting at.

I could be misunderstanding him too, but I think what he's getting at is that the word 'physical' - which we associate with tables, houses, planets and so on - can often imply limitations which the available evidence does not support.

To use a different term, what I'm aware of regarding our current knowledge or strong theories about 'stuff' is that:
- there are several different types of 'quarks,' several different types of 'leptons,' and several different types of 'bosons' which, as far as we currently know, make up all the stuff
- there are four fundamental ways in which bits of stuff interact with other bits of stuff (called gravitation, weak interaction, strong interaction and electro-magnetism)
- there are four inter-related 'dimensions,' which don't serve as a mere substrate or place to be for stuff, but are themselves actually affected by it
- there's a great deal more 'dark stuff' in the known universe than there is 'regular stuff,' but we don't know anything much at all about it
- the tables, houses, planets and so on which we see and touch are mostly not stuff at all; there's really very little stuff on earth, let alone in the universe as a whole
- far as we can tell, stuff doesn't have a single discernable nature, instead behaving both as we'd conceive a particle might and as a wave might

Now supposing it's true that volition does have to come from stuff, what have we reliably learned? Or what possibilities can we reliably exclude?

[Flail]

...Positing a volitional agent without physical form is, I contend, not a rational argument...

The "evidence" that we have is our entire physical universe. What we seek is a rational explanation for this universe--particuarly, the "specificity" of the universe (to use ThatGirlAgain's terminology). Our universe is not some amorphous, uninteresting, inert blob, but rather a highly organized, information-laden, consciousness-inhabited spectacle, which, so far as we can tell, didn't have to exist.

No one claims to know all of the precise steps which came together to produce this universe, with all of its very specific physical "laws." However, we have the following general options:

1) Chance. This is the "Poof! It just happened!" option. On the one hand, it's form is like an explanation, but in reality, it is a lack of an explanation. When we explain something in terms of "chance," it means that we do not have a full and complete causal chain for all of the steps involved. As a practical matter, sometimes we might be wrong to attribute something to "chance." In such cases, there really is an explanation, but we just haven't discovered it yet. But I am not using "chance" in this way here; when I speak of "chance" as the explanation for the specificity of our universe, I mean that there literally is no complete causal chain which explains the universe from start to finish. In this scenario, the explanation for our universe is simply that it was somehow possible, and we just happened to pop into existence for no particular reason at all, without any need to address the question of whether any other universe(s) might also have popped into existence.

2) Necessity. This is the "Omniverse" option--all possibilities are necessarily instantiated. We don't know how many universes are actually possible, but the simplest assumption is an infinite number. In this universe, I ate Cheerios for breakfast. Although it might seem like I could have eaten Corn Flakes instead, in reality I could not have done so; that option was already taken in some other universe. This explanation eliminates the need to explain why our specific universe came to be: there wasn't any option. All possible universes just had to become actualized, and it just happens that we are in this universe--with its set of possibilities assigned to become actualized--rather than in one of the multitudes of other universes.

3) Volition. This is the theistic option. In order to rule out this option, we have two options: 1) we could present a very strong argument that our human volition is an illusion, a chimera, an impotent mirage which does not actually cause anything to happen in our universe, wherein absolutely everything derives from chance and/or necessity; or 2) we could present a very strong argument that volition cannot exist in the absence of some highly specific physical substructure (such as our brain).

The first problem with the "volition-as-illusion" option is that we have excellent prima facie evidence that our personal volition does cause (or select) certain things to happen, for the purpose of realizing some subjective value. This prima facie evidence is as direct and unmediated as anything could ever be, and so the burden of proof needed to deny the efficacy of our volition seems insurmountable. The second problem with the "volition-as-illusion" option is that we have a diffiicult time explaining how evolution could have produced conscious thoughts which have no bearing whatsoever on behavior. Conscious thoughts which do not affect behavior in any way cannot have been built and honed according to adaptive advantage, for the very reason that these conscious thoughts produced no behaviors at all. Thus the "evolutionary accident" explanation for SME seems too ad hoc to be taken seriously, especially since we apparently do use our inner conscious subjective thought life to weigh and evaluate arguments, resulting in specific behaviors every single day.

The problem with the "volition-requires-physicality" option is that we don't know this. We can't know this. When it comes right down to it, we don't even know what "physicality" is. We sometimes assume that we know, but yet appearances can be deceiving. We are not solid masses, but rather mostly empty space. Physicists seem to be finding newer and smaller particles every year, and now we have begun to speak of "virtual particles" as opposed to "real particles." No one has ever seen a virtual particle, or even a real particle; these are just hypothetical postulates that help us explain and predict results of very complicated experiments and procedures, all of which are multiply mediated through any number of mechanical apparati and any number of human observers, each of whom might interpret the results in various ways. At the end of the day, we don't know what our subjective mental experience really is: we can't measure it or weigh it. We can tamper with it in various ways, by poking around in the brain, but this hardly proves that an actual brain is required for SME, any more than a leaky straw proves that there is no water in the glass.

So any way we look at it, we apparently have some sort of "possibility reservoir" from which our very specific universe became actualized. The "chance" option doesn't give us an actual explanation, and it seems entirely ad hoc. The "necessity" option requires an infinite number of other universes, the majority of which will be amorphous blobs, in order to avoid the ad hoc problem. But we have no empirical evidence for these other universes, nor can we have ever have any empirical evidence for them, even in principle, since we don't have the luxury of getting outside our own universe to observe these putative universes.

This leaves us with the third option. If this option can be shown to be logically impossible, then we should pick one of the other options--either one, actually, since it wouldn't make any difference if volition is an illusion.

But we don't have any good basis for excluding volition, and every reason for retaining it. The "volition" option is the least ad hoc, the most privative, and in best accord with our natural sense of who we are as persons. This option alone provides the possibility that some answers to some questions are actually better than other answers. This option alone provides the necessary metaphysical framework for the sort of wordview most of us employ in our daily lives. For all of these reasons and more, most people have been, are, and will continue to be, theists.

Excellent and thought provoking summation. I have a question: on what basis do you conclude that theism is the default position from volition as opposed to deism? From my ignostic point of view, the specificity of particular Gods emanating from theism like the BibleGod or KoranGod etc are non-sensical; whereas I could concede some basis or argument for deism (a supreme supernatural creative entity of some sort that chooses not to intervene in the world).

[Xian Pugilist]

It seems the human brain is as much a mystery as what was the first particle of nothing that started this whole process.

We know hoe the brain works. We know the mechanics of it. Its chemical and electrical navigation. If you feel pleasure its two particular components coming together like a puzzle and the result is pleasure. What we can't answer yet is why they come together at certain, repeated times.

Well in a fight or flight scenario you are flooded with the right chemicals....but what told the chemicals that came together to give you the feeling of flight or fight? Something has to direct whicn chemicals do what when and where. You will say the eyes see and register the threat, the brain reacts. We just keep going deeper and deeper, what chemicals had to be connected and why were they suddenly connecting at that moment to cause the brain to release the chemicals to cause the thought that caused the chemicals that.... blah blah, its like how many times can you tear something in parts before there only remains something that can't be torn apart?

So, chemically speaking if we were to reproduce the brain, we could dump the right chemical combinations into a punch bowl and we would get all the combinations our minds can create. But why does the brain produce more of some than others? We controlled the intake to the bowl, but what floods the brain during orgasm or fear. How did the chemicals that connect to make the reaction evident to our brain know to be more, consistently at that point? They don't know....

[Mithrae]

The second problem with the "volition-as-illusion" option is that we have a diffiicult time explaining how evolution could have produced conscious thoughts which have no bearing whatsoever on behavior. Conscious thoughts which do not affect behavior in any way cannot have been built and honed according to adaptive advantage, for the very reason that these conscious thoughts produced no behaviors at all. Thus the "evolutionary accident" explanation for SME seems too ad hoc to be taken seriously, especially since we apparently do use our inner conscious subjective thought life to weigh and evaluate arguments, resulting in specific behaviors every single day.

I suspect this would be a valid argument only against some views. I'm not wholly up to speed on the nuances between epiphenomenalism, emergentism and so on, but I understand that many people consider mental states (SME) to be the same as brain states, but seen from inside. We know that feeling angry is very different from seeing someone yelling and screaming; that being in love is very different from hearing that someone offed themselves because their girlfriend of two weeks was dead. It seems only reasonable to conclude that what we see in neurobiology won't look the same as what the person thinks and feels - but that doesn't mean that they're not ultimately the same thing.

The behaviours which we subjectively associate with conscious thought would therefore be associated with the brain-states which are conscious thought, and therefore be as subject to evolutionary selection as anything else.

[JoeyKnothead]

From Post 23:

I hope you don't mind me butting in...

Heck naw, come one, come all! The more brains we throw at this, the better.

...
In his prior post, the hypothetical suggestion that far-future technologies might possibly produce computers "comprised of pure energy and virtual quantum particles" which possess the capacity for thought/volition some folk say will be achieved by our mundane metal and plastic computers this very century.

I've never considered hypotheticals to be a valid means of determining stuff, where any hypothetical can be framed in such a fashion to support one's position. Further, I deem it not very rational to argue that far-future stuff, of which we can't accurately rely on predictions, should be considered rational as relates to the claims presented in the OP.

Obviously even the latter, if it occurred, would show that volition/thought needn't come from a brain.

If.

That said, my point stands that we have compelling evidence to indicate volition requires physicality, whether it's a computer or a brain behind it (while noting you allude to such here in a spell).

I'm not sure whether you deny or doubt the future possibility of 'computers' with a similar capacity for thought and choice as our own?

While accepting such seems likely, I prefer not to make the case that it will.

But assuming for now that you do not, your objection would not really be that thoughts and choices come from brains, but that they come from physical stuff.

Exactly, and I 'preciatet the more thorough explanation you provide. I'll amend any reference to the brain here to include computers that might possibly end up doing them some volitionin'.

I could be misunderstanding him too, but I think what he's getting at is that the word 'physical' - which we associate with tables, houses, planets and so on - can often imply limitations which the available evidence does not support.

To use a different term, what I'm aware of regarding our current knowledge or strong theories about 'stuff' is that:
- there are several different types of 'quarks,' several different types of 'leptons,' and several different types of 'bosons' which, as far as we currently know, make up all the stuff
- there are four fundamental ways in which bits of stuff interact with other bits of stuff (called gravitation, weak interaction, strong interaction and electro-magnetism)
- there are four inter-related 'dimensions,' which don't serve as a mere substrate or place to be for stuff, but are themselves actually affected by it
- there's a great deal more 'dark stuff' in the known universe than there is 'regular stuff,' but we don't know anything much at all about it
- the tables, houses, planets and so on which we see and touch are mostly not stuff at all; there's really very little stuff on earth, let alone in the universe as a whole
- far as we can tell, stuff doesn't have a single discernable nature, instead behaving both as we'd conceive a particle might and as a wave might

Which, as we see, is nothing more than stuff acting according to its properties. In this fashion then, I contend that proposing some volitional agent as the most rational means of determining a god created humans is not the most rational way to go about things.

So, we can say that I, JoeyKnothead, am composed in part of a heaping pile of empty space (among other less comforting terms), but that there's some physicality to me. My brain, or a computer, doesn't exist entirely of empty space, so we can conclude there's some physical properties involved in being me.

Now supposing it's true that volition does have to come from stuff, what have we reliably learned? Or what possibilities can we reliably exclude?

Such seems more a problem for the claimant, where I present rational explanations that don't require some non-physical, ethereal entity to have produced humans, but that I propose humans are the product of a universe full of complex electro-chemical reactions.

[Xian Pugilist]

Mithrae, you taking your name from the god, or mithradates, one of four persion/greek kings?

For the record, anything proven, ever, starts with a hypothetical.

[Waiting4evidence]

...Is the notion that we are created by a god the most reasonable and rational conclusion to be had?

Depends on what you mean by "a god." If you are referring to "volitional non-contingent reality," then yes, there is no other epistemically justified conclusion so long as human beings possess genuine consciousness and volition. But if we do not possess these qualities, then there are no epistemically justified conclusions at all, just as there are no meaningful questions.

In other words, either theism is true, or else non-theism is absurd.

I have a very simple question for you:
Is it POSSIBLE or is it IMPOSSIBLE for a volitional entity to exist without being contingent on anything?

If it is impossible for a volitional non-contingent entity to exist, then God as you just defined it does not exist.

If it is possible for a volitional non-contingent entity to exist, then WE could be it. No God necessary.

The only way you can avoid this simple reality is by special pleading

All you're saying is this:
1) We exist therefore God created us
2) God exists therefore... err... therefore... mmmm... oops!
3) Let's come up with fancy words like "volitional" and "non-contingent" to cover up the flaw in our argument

[Xian Pugilist]

...Is the notion that we are created by a god the most reasonable and rational conclusion to be had?

Depends on what you mean by "a god." If you are referring to "volitional non-contingent reality," then yes, there is no other epistemically justified conclusion so long as human beings possess genuine consciousness and volition. But if we do not possess these qualities, then there are no epistemically justified conclusions at all, just as there are no meaningful questions.

In other words, either theism is true, or else non-theism is absurd.

I have a very simple question for you:
Is it POSSIBLE or is it IMPOSSIBLE for a volitional entity to exist without being contingent on anything?

If it is impossible for a volitional non-contingent entity to exist, then God as you just defined it does not exist.

If it is possible for a volitional non-contingent entity to exist, then WE could be it. No God necessary.

The only way you can avoid this simple reality is by special pleading

All you're saying is this:
1) We exist therefore God created us
2) God exists therefore... err... therefore... mmmm... oops!
3) Let's come up with fancy words like "volitional" and "non-contingent" to cover up the flaw in our argument

If there was a creator god, that existed before matter and space, and thus in "no-time", why does the atheistic community think that we would be able to define Him in our existance? That is the most ridiculously profound hyperbolic living example I have ever seen. I can give pictures if neededl

[Mithrae]

I could be misunderstanding him too, but I think what he's getting at is that the word 'physical' - which we associate with tables, houses, planets and so on - can often imply limitations which the available evidence does not support.

To use a different term, what I'm aware of regarding our current knowledge or strong theories about 'stuff' is that:
- there are several different types of 'quarks,' several different types of 'leptons,' and several different types of 'bosons' which, as far as we currently know, make up all the stuff
- there are four fundamental ways in which bits of stuff interact with other bits of stuff (called gravitation, weak interaction, strong interaction and electro-magnetism)
- there are four inter-related 'dimensions,' which don't serve as a mere substrate or place to be for stuff, but are themselves actually affected by it
- there's a great deal more 'dark stuff' in the known universe than there is 'regular stuff,' but we don't know anything much at all about it
- the tables, houses, planets and so on which we see and touch are mostly not stuff at all; there's really very little stuff on earth, let alone in the universe as a whole
- far as we can tell, stuff doesn't have a single discernable nature, instead behaving both as we'd conceive a particle might and as a wave might

Which, as we see, is nothing more than stuff acting according to its properties. In this fashion then, I contend that proposing some volitional agent as the most rational means of determining a god created humans is not the most rational way to go about things.

So, we can say that I, JoeyKnothead, am composed in part of a heaping pile of empty space (among other less comforting terms), but that there's some physicality to me. My brain, or a computer, doesn't exist entirely of empty space, so we can conclude there's some physical properties involved in being me.

Now supposing it's true that volition does have to come from stuff, what have we reliably learned? Or what possibilities can we reliably exclude?

Such seems more a problem for the claimant, where I present rational explanations that don't require some non-physical, ethereal entity to have produced humans, but that I propose humans are the product of a universe full of complex electro-chemical reactions.

Trouble is that we don't (or certainly I don't) know that it's just stuff acting according to its properties. What I was trying to get at is that the nature of stuff and what it does and why is still all a big mystery to me, but at each stage what little I've learned has always just seemed to get weirder and more complicated. Even physicists are having to invent 7 extra dimensions to try to understand stuff and its behaviour, which doesn't strike me as being intuitively more reasonable than a volitional agent. Or we could of course presume until further notice that all of it just is and is indeed simply behaving according to its properties - but again, I don't think that presumption could really claim any rational superiority over a theistic alternative.

Whether or not the term 'physical' should be applied to gravity or time or space or dark energy or strings or this god is not, in my opinion, a useful point for discussion. That's nothing more than the question "Is this god made of the type of stuff we can currently detect with instruments, or a type of stuff which we can't currently detect with instruments?" I agree that most theists would tend towards the latter, but unless you're suggesting that there's no stuff we can't detect - or, alternatively, that measurable detection is the only valid basis for knowledge - as far as I can tell the distinction is irrelevant to EduChris' argument.

Mithrae, you taking your name from the god, or mithradates, one of four persion/greek kings?

The god. I found it quite ironic that the ancient Indo-Iranian covenant god Mitra would flourish, persist and evolve through stages, including if memory serves being the son and mediator for the one God Ahura-Mazda, to be a major 2nd/3rd century rival to the sect of a Son of God proclaiming a new covenant.

If it is possible for a volitional non-contingent entity to exist, then WE could be it. No God necessary.

The only way you can avoid this simple reality is by special pleading

I don't think it's special pleading to suppose that my existence depends on prior factors. It seems pretty obvious, unless you're advocating some form of solipsism?

[JoeyKnothead]

From Post 31:

Trouble is that we don't (or certainly I don't) know that it's just stuff acting according to its properties. What I was trying to get at is that the nature of stuff and what it does and why is still all a big mystery to me, but at each stage what little I've learned has always just seemed to get weirder and more complicated. Even physicists are having to invent 7 extra dimensions to try to understand stuff and its behaviour, which doesn't strike me as being intuitively more reasonable than a volitional agent. Or we could of course presume until further notice that all of it just is and is indeed simply behaving according to its properties - but again, I don't think that presumption could really claim any rational superiority over a theistic alternative.

Nor should we claim the theistic alternative is superior, given the arguments I've presented in this regard. At best we have a tie, while I contend the notion that volition is observed in physical agents, and not in non-physical agents, adds just enough added rationality to break the tie.

Whether or not the term 'physical' should be applied to gravity or time or space or dark energy or strings or this god is not, in my opinion, a useful point for discussion. That's nothing more than the question "Is this god made of the type of stuff we can currently detect with instruments, or a type of stuff which we can't currently detect with instruments?" I agree that most theists would tend towards the latter, but unless you're suggesting that there's no stuff we can't detect - or, alternatively, that measurable detection is the only valid basis for knowledge - as far as I can tell the distinction is irrelevant to EduChris' argument.

We have a rational reason to conclude the universe is made of physical stuff. We then have folks positing an entity that is not physical to have, through volition, created this physical universe. I contend such an argument is not rationally superior to the notion, and to the evidence we have that volition is the product of a physical entity. In this regard then, one might say this volitional agent is physical, but that merely begs the question of what made that physical entity.

As well, this volitional entity would ostensibly have to exist for an eternity in order to create time itself, otherwise, there's a time this volitional entity didn't exist, and all the problems that creates. I contend that if such is the argument for this entity, the most rational thing to conclude is that it's the universe itself that is this volitional entity, where there's physicality, and where there's evidence that there it sits. But that's not what we get, we get an argument that this volitional entity - devoid itself of being created - created the universe. Thus, an irrational argument that discludes this entity from being bound to the very rules it seeks to place on the universe. (Granting, thanks to bernee51, that time is merely a series of nows.)

Notice the typical argument against the universe having existed for an eternity into the past is along the lines of there'd be an eternity before humans are created. I contend such a problem exists for anyone who proposes a volitional agent to have existed eternally into the past, where there'd be an eternity before it decided to create humans. So, with two off-setting arguments, I contend the rational thing to conclude, given that we observe the universe, is that the universe should not be bound to any argument this volitional agent is not bound to as well. If the universe could not have existed eternally into the past, neither could this volitional agent. So then, what caused this volitional agent?

There's also the issue of why disclude the universe having existed in a form prior to what we observe, and how such relates to a volitional agent. Is the universe the very volitional agent expressing itself in physical form? I contend this results in a circular argument, where the evidence we have indicates that volition doesn't occur without physical form to begin with.

Where this volitional agent may be proposed to be expressed as the universe itself, there is it's physicality. But, we have no reason to conclude that volition occurs prior to a physical state. So, where a volitional entity is discluded from the rules and limits placed on the universe, and then to propose this entity created humans is, I contend, less than rational than the explanations I've put forth. Namely, there the universe sits, and here we are, so humans were ostensibly created by the universe, with the mechanisms of chemicals combining to produce life, and evolution then 'acting' to form the human species.

But what created the universe? I propose we may never know, but that the rational argument is that it is the product of its own composition, as relates to the interactions of the various known, and even unknown properties of the universe itself, and whatever may have been in existence prior to the universe itself that would have acted on the 'pre-universe'. Circular? Perhaps. More rational than proposing a volitional agent? I contend so.