Is Theism Justified?

[LiamOS]

In the thread 'Can evidence lead to belief in god(s)?' EduChris wrote:

[...] theism is at least as justified (and probably more justified) than non-theism.

For Debate:
-Is Theism justified?
-If so, is it more justified than Non-Theism?

[EduChris]

...There is no rational, conscious reason (that's objective) for continuing the propogation of the species that isn't somehow more rational or objective than genuine altruism and truth-searching...

Given non-theism, there is no such thing as genuinely objective purpose or reason or anything. But the penultimately "objective" purpose of the process that presumably wrought us is larger than us--it doesn't care about us, it will proceed as it must long after we have become extinct. The only "purpose" of evolution is that organisms compete to survive so that they can later become extinct.

...Please justify your assertion that it would be irrational to diminish human flourishing given non-theism. Again, it appears strongly as though you are equivocating "practical" with "rational."

To diminish human flourishing would be to abandon the evolutionary mandate. True, as (apparently?) conscious beings we can choose to do whatever we wish, but given non-theism, there is no objective basis for choosing anything other than this-worldly human flourishing.

...Persuit of the truth in itself can objectively be argued to be beneficial...there is good historical evidence that truth-seeking in itself is extremely beneficial...

Within the confines of ontological non-theism, if the only result of knowing the truth (i.e., no god) results in diminished this-wordly human flourishing, then you have traded an objective good--human flourishing-- for an irrelevant truth that cannot, even in principle, achieve greater human flourishing.

...explain to me why propogation is rational as opposed to practical...

If the "truth" (given non-theism) cannot help us, but may in fact hurt us, then it is irrational to insist on an irrelevant truth which only causes diminished flourishing.

Let's suppose that there is a particular lump of clay on the other side of Mars, and let's suppose (just for sake of argument) that we know about this lump of clay. Let's also suppose that we somehow know that propagating this truth will cause WW3 to ensue. There is absolutely nothing special about this lump of clay, either in its composition or characteristics or position or consequences; but yet somehow knowledge of it causes pandemonium and slaughter on earth. In such a case (admittedly contrived) the pursuit of an irrelevant truth in the face of possible human extinction would be utterly absurd.

Now in my original thought experiment the choice is not quite so pronounced, but yet the principle is exactly the same. If the truth (within the non-theistic paradigm) doesn't hurt, then the truth will be had as a consequence of choosing option 2; but if the truth does hurt, then choosing option 1 becomes the same as choosing to propagate the truth about the irrelevant lump of clay even at the expense of causing WW3.

[Zzyzx]

.

Given non-theism, there is no such thing as genuinely objective purpose or reason or anything.

Given THEISM, there is no such thing as genuine objective purpose or reason for anything.

There is only a CLAIM of "objective purpose" in the OPINION of those who worship one or more of the thousands of proposed "gods".

Neither the "gods" nor an "objective purpose" can be shown to be anything more than imagination -- and are therefore SUBJECTIVE mental constructs of humans.

Many, after reading ancient texts, CONCLUDE they know about such things and claim that their basis is "objective".

[JoeyKnothead]

From Post 262:

Let's suppose that there is a particular lump of clay on the other side of Mars, and let's suppose (just for sake of argument) that we know about this lump of clay. Let's also suppose that we somehow know that propagating this truth will cause WW3 to ensue. There is absolutely nothing special about this lump of clay, either in its composition or characteristics or position or consequences; but yet somehow knowledge of it causes pandemonium and slaughter on earth. In such a case (admittedly contrived) the pursuit of an irrelevant truth in the face of possible human extinction would be utterly absurd.

A lump of clay and organized religion sound a lot alike.

[hatsoff]

EduChris,

I hope you don't mind me jumping in late to this conversation. It looks interesting.

Given non-theism, there is no such thing as genuinely objective purpose or reason or anything. But the penultimately "objective" purpose of the process that presumably wrought us is larger than us--it doesn't care about us, it will proceed as it must long after we have become extinct. The only "purpose" of evolution is that organisms compete to survive so that they can later become extinct.

We can recognize that evolution works a certain way, while having for ourselves an entirely different purpose. There is no reason to non-instrumentally value certain functions of evolution over any other non-instrumental value we might have.

And the same goes for God. God might have a certain plan for us, or purpose if you like, but the only reason to value that plan would be to serve some value(s) we already happen to have, e.g. for self-preservation or expressing love, or something like that.

To diminish human flourishing would be to abandon the evolutionary mandate. True, as (apparently?) conscious beings we can choose to do whatever we wish, but given non-theism, there is no objective basis for choosing anything other than this-worldly human flourishing.

That depends on what you mean by an "objective basis." But we don't need to quibble over definitions: the bottom line is that the existence of God doesn't help us in that department. You're in the same epistemic boat on theism that I am on non-theism.

Within the confines of ontological non-theism, if the only result of knowing the truth (i.e., no god) results in diminished this-wordly human flourishing, then you have traded an objective good--human flourishing-- for an irrelevant truth that cannot, even in principle, achieve greater human flourishing.

If the "truth" (given non-theism) cannot help us, but may in fact hurt us, then it is irrational to insist on an irrelevant truth which only causes diminished flourishing.

Let's suppose that there is a particular lump of clay on the other side of Mars, and let's suppose (just for sake of argument) that we know about this lump of clay. Let's also suppose that we somehow know that propagating this truth will cause WW3 to ensue. There is absolutely nothing special about this lump of clay, either in its composition or characteristics or position or consequences; but yet somehow knowledge of it causes pandemonium and slaughter on earth. In such a case (admittedly contrived) the pursuit of an irrelevant truth in the face of possible human extinction would be utterly absurd.

If by "human flourishing" you mean an evolutionary advancement of the human species, then we probably aren't going to value that very much. I sure don't. But if you're talking about the well-being of conscious creatures, then sure, as morally-upright agents we're going to value that more than truth. And in the case of your hypothetical scenario, I hope you would do the same---suppress the truth which has no significant value in order to protect the well-being of conscious creatures. It would be just as absurd---just as much a horrible violation of ethics---for the theist to tell the truth in that situation as for the non-theist.

[hatsoff]

EduChris,

I hope you don't mind me jumping in late to this conversation. It looks interesting.

Given non-theism, there is no such thing as genuinely objective purpose or reason or anything. But the penultimately "objective" purpose of the process that presumably wrought us is larger than us--it doesn't care about us, it will proceed as it must long after we have become extinct. The only "purpose" of evolution is that organisms compete to survive so that they can later become extinct.

We can recognize that evolution works a certain way, while having for ourselves an entirely different purpose. There is no reason to non-instrumentally value certain functions of evolution over any other non-instrumental value we might have.

And the same goes for God. God might have a certain plan for us, or purpose if you like, but the only reason to value that plan would be to serve some value(s) we already happen to have, e.g. for self-preservation or expressing love, or something like that.

To diminish human flourishing would be to abandon the evolutionary mandate. True, as (apparently?) conscious beings we can choose to do whatever we wish, but given non-theism, there is no objective basis for choosing anything other than this-worldly human flourishing.

That depends on what you mean by an "objective basis." But we don't need to quibble over definitions: the bottom line is that the existence of God doesn't help us in that department. You're in the same epistemic boat on theism that I am on non-theism.

Within the confines of ontological non-theism, if the only result of knowing the truth (i.e., no god) results in diminished this-wordly human flourishing, then you have traded an objective good--human flourishing-- for an irrelevant truth that cannot, even in principle, achieve greater human flourishing.

If the "truth" (given non-theism) cannot help us, but may in fact hurt us, then it is irrational to insist on an irrelevant truth which only causes diminished flourishing.

Let's suppose that there is a particular lump of clay on the other side of Mars, and let's suppose (just for sake of argument) that we know about this lump of clay. Let's also suppose that we somehow know that propagating this truth will cause WW3 to ensue. There is absolutely nothing special about this lump of clay, either in its composition or characteristics or position or consequences; but yet somehow knowledge of it causes pandemonium and slaughter on earth. In such a case (admittedly contrived) the pursuit of an irrelevant truth in the face of possible human extinction would be utterly absurd.

If by "human flourishing" you mean an evolutionary advancement of the human species, then we probably aren't going to value that very much. I sure don't. But if you're talking about the well-being of conscious creatures, then sure, as morally-upright agents we're going to value that more than truth. And in the case of your hypothetical scenario, I hope you would do the same---suppress the truth which has no significant value in order to protect the well-being of conscious creatures. It would be just as absurd---just as much a horrible violation of ethics---for the theist to tell the truth in that situation as for the non-theist.

[EduChris]

...if you're talking about the well-being of conscious creatures, then sure, as morally-upright agents we're going to value that more than truth...

Precisely right. There is absolutely no reason for the non-theist, given the truth of non-theism, to choose option #1.

...It would be just as absurd---just as much a horrible violation of ethics---for the theist to tell the truth in that situation as for the non-theist.

Consider the case that non-theism is known (temporarily, per the thought experiment) to be true. In such case, the "truth" of "no god" becomes irrelevant compared to the overriding value of this-worldly human flourishing.

Now, consider the case that theism is known (again, temporarily) to be true. In such case, the truth of this Ultimate Reality offers great possibility--this is the sort of supreme truth that has the potential, at least, of enough intrinsic worth to offset the risk of some possible diminution of this-worldy human flourishing. The theist, given the truth of theism, is justified in taking the risk of option #1, since there is at least some potential reward in knowing a truth which might be relevant. But for the non-theist, given the truth of non-theism, there is no potential reward to offset the knowledge of the truth which cannot be anything but irrelevant.

[hatsoff]

Precisely right. There is absolutely no reason for the non-theist, given the truth of non-theism, to choose option #1.

Consider the case that non-theism is known (temporarily, per the thought experiment) to be true. In such case, the "truth" of "no god" becomes irrelevant compared to the overriding value of this-worldly human flourishing.

Now, consider the case that theism is known (again, temporarily) to be true. In such case, the truth of this Ultimate Reality offers great possibility--this is the sort of supreme truth that has the potential, at least, of enough intrinsic worth to offset the risk of some possible diminution of this-worldy human flourishing. The theist, given the truth of theism, is justified in taking the risk of option #1, since there is at least some potential reward in knowing a truth which might be relevant. But for the non-theist, given the truth of non-theism, there is no potential reward to offset the knowledge of the truth which cannot be anything but irrelevant.

First of all, the theist still has no special epistemic position here. The existence of God in itself has no significance. For that we would need an expectation that God is a certain type of God---in particular, the type who will reward truth-telling or some consequence thereof, and in such a way as said rewards will off-set the (hypothetical) enormous suffering brought about by it.

But for better or worse, we have no reason to suppose God exists, nor what kind of God he would be if he did. (And this epistemic position is the same regardless of whether or not God exists.)

[otseng]

A lump of clay and organized religion sound a lot alike.

Moderator Comment

This can be considered to be a one-liner response that doesn't add much value to the discussions.

______________

Moderator comments do not count as a strike against any posters. They only serve as an acknowledgment that a post report has been received, but has not been judged to warrant a moderator warning against a particular poster.

[Woland]

EduChris still, of course, hasn't remotely demonstrated that the reality of theism by itself would rationally force someone to choose option #1 or, conversely, that non-theism rationally limits one to choosing option #2.

He also, of course, hasn't demonstrated any knowledge of the relationship between truth and human flourishing. It's entirely possible, for example, that the former limits the latter, in which case EduChris' speculative thought experiment is entirely irrelevant, which it is anyway since it is demonstrably that: mere speculation blatantly based on his own personal expectations of what the "god" and "no god" scenarios imply.

Perhaps a malevolent deity exists.
Perhaps a deity exists who only rewards you if you choose option #2.
Perhaps nothing of value can even potentially be gained by choosing option #1 even if a "god" exists.
And so on.

This whole line of argumentation has more holes than a swiss cheese factory.

EduChris couldn't address these objections when I raised them, and resorted to a never-retracted and irrelevant appeal to authority citing the biggest religions as if their opinion had any bearing on the true nature of a potential deity.

He eventually put me on ignore when I started pointing out his boastful evasion whenever he asserted (with full misplaced confidence, of course) that he'd demonstrated that theism was objectively more justified than non-theism.

That is all I have to say on this poorly designed [strike]argument[/strike] thought experiment.

-Woland

[hatsoff]

Perhaps a deity exists who only rewards you if you choose option #2.

This is an extremely important point. EduChris seems to be posing a kind of Pascal's wager here. Sure, he admits, we don't have the traditional kind of evidence for the existence of God, but we can still be justified in assuming God exists due to the pragmatic benefits. Well of course a pragmatic justification is not the same as an epistemic justification. But even from a purely pragmatic standpoint, until we have a good reason to prefer a God who rewards belief (or punishes unbelief) to a God who rewards unbelief (or punishes belief), then the wager has unknown odds. We might as well choose non-theism.