Ephesians 2:10

[JoeyKnothead]

From Post 9 here:

Ephesians 2:10 (For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them.)

I think you have a poor conclusion here. I don't see your point connected to the verse. Let me go a bit further in this verse for you to comprehend. It said " For we are his workmanship" Human is created by a creator.
...

My emboldenizationin'.

For debate:

Is the notion that we are created by a god the most reasonable and rational conclusion to be had?

[ThatGirlAgain]

...Humans have much more powerful “I�s than other primates. There are thousands of times as many humans around as other primates. From an evolutionary point of view, the human “I� appears to be beneficial so far...

And yet we are outnumbered by ants and amoebas. Are their "I's" more powerful than ours?

But the real question is, how could we ever determine whether we as a species would be even more numerous than we are at present, if we could only abdicate our "I's"?

Different species have different survival tool boxes. For ants and amoebas an important survival trait is the ability to reproduce at prodigious rates. For us an important survival trait is the ability to figure things out, especially in the context of past, present and future. This is a function of our I-ness. Having I-ness is not a necessary pre-condition for survival for all species any more than it is necessary for fish to have wings and tail feathers.

To determine the importance of our I-ness, we are best compared to those creatures most similar to ourselves – other primates. Compared to ourselves they fare much poorer in the survival game. (At least for now. Nothing is certain forever in the wide wide world of evolution). This is despite our having less effective natural defenses such as extreme strength, nastier teeth and natural fur coats. One thing we have in much greater abundance than they is extremely elaborate mental capabilities. Virtually all of the things we have and do that facilitate survival and have led to such a proliferation of our species are related to our ability to form much more sophisticated abstractions and to relate them to the real world. Everything that we lump under the broad title of civilization derives from this. Giving up any portion of our I-ness would make us more like other primates, with reduced survival rates. There is no need for context free philosophical flights of fancy here. Nature has performed the experiment.

...I have never seen evidence of an “I� separate from a physical infrastructure. Many billions of humans that have lived are now dead. Where are their “I�s?...

Sounds like an argument from ignorance.

He: Everything in the world has a conscious spirit: trees, rocks, everything.

She: There are billions of rocks around. If rocks are conscious, why have we seen no indication of conscious activity in rocks?

He: Sounds like an argument from ignorance.

Of course it is not an argument from ignorance, which relies “merely on the fact that the veracity of the proposition is not disproven to arrive at a definite conclusion�. In the case of subjectively conscious entities existing independent of brains and/or residing in rocks, no evidence of such a thing has been seen despite what ought to have been ample opportunities to do so. I could say there is an invisible dragon in every garage in the world. Should you believe this? If you do not, is that an argument from ignorance?

An argument from ignorance asserts that statement A is true because it has not been disproven or that Statement B is false because it has not been proven. I made no assertions. I asked for evidence of a non-obvious claim for which there ought to be ample evidence.

Besides, many people claim to have personally experienced an "I" (or a "thou") which, apparently, is separate from a physical infrastructure. Many people claim to have experienced subjectivity even while their brains were clinically dead. Yes, I know that materialists can always invent "just-so" stories to explain this all away, but at some point this seems to beg the question.

Please provide credible evidence of many instances of a person being clinically brain dead, as verified by the total absence for some significant time of any brain activity observed on a competently performed EEG, and who later resumed brain activity and presented credibly verified evidence that they were in fact subjectively aware during the period in which brain activity was observed to be totally absent.

The reason I ask for such elaborate conditions is that this statement has been presented to me in the past by others, on this site and other sites. Yet when I traced the links provided back to an original source, it turned out that they were talking about a case where the heart had stopped beating for a short period but the person may have remained subjectively aware. There is no reason why brain activity should always cease immediately when the heart stops beating. There was no measurement of brain activity made, this being in the middle of surgery and not an EEG recording session. Yet when the link was given to me it was represented as “the brain being clinically dead�.

But as I alluded to in my previous post, really convincing evidence would be multiple well verified instances of the survival of “I�s well after the brain is definitely and permanently dead. With all the people who have ever died, there should be ample opportunity for this, if it is possible at all. Either that or a good sound reason why such observations could not be made, although that is skating on thin ice, credibility wise.

...We cannot assign genuine reality to any of our abstractions. The map is most definitely not the territory...

Our "I" is completely unlike any other "abstraction." Other abstractions are objects which we study from the outside. Our "I," by contrast, is what we experience internally, and which we use to study all other objects.

Other objects are photographs. Our "I," by contrast, is the camera.

Photographs are a poor analogy. Our memories and other objects of mentation are much fuzzier than that. If they were much sharper it would be difficult to perform the associations with similar objects that constitute so much of our mental life. How do you manage to distinguish between a cat and a dog in poor lighting at a fair distance with high reliability yet do it almost instantaneously? If you had to dredge through every memory of cats and dogs and perform some kind of similarity comparison it would take far too long. Just like it would take far too long to decide if there were a leopard hiding in that berry bush up ahead.

What we work with in our heads is ‘cut down to size’ abstractions that emphasize the similarities between dissimilar things. I imagine all animals do it. My dogs were able to immediately figure out if something was a toy even if they never saw this toy before. Even if I were trying to transfer it from bag to drawer without them seeing it. Things of interest will be recognized quickly. That is a survival trait and presumably appears in anything with a non-trivial brain. Our main strength is the ability to do abstractions at a far greater level of sophistication than other creatures. We also have a much more elaborate neo-cortex than other creatures and the neo-cortex is the part of the brain that ‘lights up’ the most when we do really abstract abstractions.

It is not that we do things that other animals do not do. It is that we do certain things so well. In particular, we form complicated feedback loops among abstractions that even other primates simply do not have enough neo-cortex to support. It is this ongoing and constantly changing set of feedback loops that constitute our I-ness. We are our abstractions.

BYTW do dogs have “I�s? Sure seems like it. If I deny this, it is not too far a leap to denying the I-ness of other humans. Do their “I�s survive the physical death of their brains? Why not?

[Mithrae]

From Post 31:

Trouble is that we don't (or certainly I don't) know that it's just stuff acting according to its properties. What I was trying to get at is that the nature of stuff and what it does and why is still all a big mystery to me, but at each stage what little I've learned has always just seemed to get weirder and more complicated. Even physicists are having to invent 7 extra dimensions to try to understand stuff and its behaviour, which doesn't strike me as being intuitively more reasonable than a volitional agent. Or we could of course presume until further notice that all of it just is and is indeed simply behaving according to its properties - but again, I don't think that presumption could really claim any rational superiority over a theistic alternative.

Nor should we claim the theistic alternative is superior, given the arguments I've presented in this regard. At best we have a tie, while I contend the notion that volition is observed in physical agents, and not in non-physical agents, adds just enough added rationality to break the tie.

I'm not sure that we actually directly observe any form of causation at all, outside our own heads. If a lion came near me I'd no doubt move away, and if my foot gets up close and personal with a ball, the ball moves away: Can we conclude that my foot directly and necessarily caused the ball's movement? Can we conclude that the lion directly and necessarily caused my movement? Or might my movement away from the lion indicate my aversion to it, just as the ball has an aversion to my foot?

While it's not a compelling example, hopefully it illustrates the point that we only observe volition in our own minds and that volition is the only causation we actually observe. To say that this particular causal agent is only observed in 'physical' things, in other words, is not particularly meaningful.

Whether or not the term 'physical' should be applied to gravity or time or space or dark energy or strings or this god is not, in my opinion, a useful point for discussion. That's nothing more than the question "Is this god made of the type of stuff we can currently detect with instruments, or a type of stuff which we can't currently detect with instruments?" I agree that most theists would tend towards the latter, but unless you're suggesting that there's no stuff we can't detect - or, alternatively, that measurable detection is the only valid basis for knowledge - as far as I can tell the distinction is irrelevant to EduChris' argument.

We have a rational reason to conclude the universe is made of physical stuff. We then have folks positing an entity that is not physical to have, through volition, created this physical universe. I contend such an argument is not rationally superior to the notion, and to the evidence we have that volition is the product of a physical entity. In this regard then, one might say this volitional agent is physical, but that merely begs the question of what made that physical entity.

Back in the day, folk believed there was a difference between 'mind' and 'matter' or mind and body. It's easy to see why; one is what we experience in our heads, one is what we experience outside our heads. But I gather that sometime after Descartes' day, philosophers began to agree that something of a certain nature (eg 'mind') could not affect something of a fundamentally different nature (eg 'matter'), or vice versa.

That seems fairly reasonable to me. So if we were forced to pick between saying that the real nature of stuff is best described as what our bodies perceived, or that the real nature of stuff is best described as what our minds conceived, which do we choose?

EduChris would be quick to point out that in strictly epistemic terms, the second option is more parsimonious. I'm not sure myself, especially since there may be a third option that the real nature of stuff might at times be perceived by the body and at others conceived by the mind. Point is that I don't think we have a rational reason to conclude that the universe is made of physical stuff - that's just the side of a discarded duality which happened to prevail. I agree, however, that many theists' views are as you described.

As well, this volitional entity would ostensibly have to exist for an eternity in order to create time itself, otherwise, there's a time this volitional entity didn't exist, and all the problems that creates. I contend that if such is the argument for this entity, the most rational thing to conclude is that it's the universe itself that is this volitional entity, where there's physicality, and where there's evidence that there it sits. But that's not what we get, we get an argument that this volitional entity - devoid itself of being created - created the universe. Thus, an irrational argument that discludes this entity from being bound to the very rules it seeks to place on the universe. (Granting, thanks to bernee51, that time is merely a series of nows.)

Time (and to an extent space) are puzzling questions to me. Time as a continuum of 'now's makes sense, as does space as a continuum of 'here's in different directions. In that sense they could be considered (as I suggested in an earlier post) a place to be for things or stuff. . . . What confuses me is the bit where stuff (eg black holes or near-light speed travel) actually affect and distort these dimensions. The notion of a deity being wholly 'outside time' seems nonsensical, but on the other hand it seems absurd to think that our time is a true measure of anything besides it's own relativistic self within our universe.

Another point of curiousity from my view is what the difference is between this supposed volitional entity creating a 'real' universe, and merely imagining a universe? I suspect that what's 'real' is probably just as fluid and relative a notion as time or physicality. If there were nothing but a thinking thing, then its non-self-referential thoughts would be as distinct and 'real' as anything else imaginable, right? In other words, do we need to suppose that said deity is non-physical, or should we instead be marvelling at the supposedly 'physical' stuff which nevertheless largely meets the conception of our minds through bodily senses?

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3) Not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle and process information

These assumptions are most privative because they explicitly rule out the sort of arbitrary limitations which would demand some further explanation.

Since there are no arbitrary limitations in causal efficacy, volition must be part of the mix--which in turn entails a being which is not less than personal.

Given that this being is not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle and process information, it seems that this being would know precisely what is best for the contingent sentient beings it had caused to exist.

From 'avoiding' an arbitrary limit on knowledge, you have concluded an arbitrarily unlimited capacity for knowledge.

[EduChris]

3) Not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle and process information

These assumptions are most privative because they explicitly rule out the sort of arbitrary limitations which would demand some further explanation.

Since there are no arbitrary limitations in causal efficacy, volition must be part of the mix--which in turn entails a being which is not less than personal.

Given that this being is not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle and process information, it seems that this being would know precisely what is best for the contingent sentient beings it had caused to exist.

From 'avoiding' an arbitrary limit on knowledge, you have concluded an arbitrarily unlimited capacity for knowledge.

What is the alternative? Is an arbitrarily limited capacity for knowledge more privative than what I proposed?

It almost seems to me that "not arbitrarily limited in causal efficacy" entails "not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle and process information."

[Mithrae]

3) Not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle and process information . . . . .

Given that this being is not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle and process information, it seems that this being would know precisely what is best for the contingent sentient beings it had caused to exist.

From 'avoiding' an arbitrary limit on knowledge, you have concluded an arbitrarily unlimited capacity for knowledge.

What is the alternative? Is an arbitrarily limited capacity for knowledge more privative than what I proposed?

It almost seems to me that "not arbitrarily limited in causal efficacy" entails "not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle and process information."

"Not arbitrarily limited" is not the same as [arbitrarily] unlimited. I had hoped this was a simple mistake on your part.

The case might be made that there is not enough justification for presuming an arbitrary limit to what said being might know/process/conceive.

The case cannot be made that said being can therefore "know precisely what is best for the contingent sentient beings it had caused to exist."

[JoeyKnothead]

From Post 47:

I'm not sure that we actually directly observe any form of causation at all, outside our own heads. If a lion came near me I'd no doubt move away, and if my foot gets up close and personal with a ball, the ball moves away: Can we conclude that my foot directly and necessarily caused the ball's movement? Can we conclude that the lion directly and necessarily caused my movement? Or might my movement away from the lion indicate my aversion to it, just as the ball has an aversion to my foot?

I propose the most rational conclusion'd be your foot caused that ball to move. In regards the lion, I contend your aversion to that lion is more at fault for your moving away, but we still oughta tell all the lions to leave us be

If we are to dismiss what we observe as some form of hallucination, I contend then that the OP presents but one more hallucination.

While it's not a compelling example, hopefully it illustrates the point that we only observe volition in our own minds and that volition is the only causation we actually observe. To say that this particular causal agent is only observed in 'physical' things, in other words, is not particularly meaningful.

And evidence indicates that without a brain, there is no mind, so no volition.

Back in the day, folk believed there was a difference between 'mind' and 'matter' or mind and body. It's easy to see why; one is what we experience in our heads, one is what we experience outside our heads. But I gather that sometime after Descartes' day, philosophers began to agree that something of a certain nature (eg 'mind') could not affect something of a fundamentally different nature (eg 'matter'), or vice versa.

Where the mind acts, it is the product of the physical.

That seems fairly reasonable to me. So if we were forced to pick between saying that the real nature of stuff is best described as what our bodies perceived, or that the real nature of stuff is best described as what our minds conceived, which do we choose?

The most rational for a given circumstance. Thus, the OP seeks to determine how rational it is to think an immaterial (as commonly defined) entity could produce an entire population of humans.

EduChris would be quick to point out that in strictly epistemic terms, the second option is more parsimonious. I'm not sure myself, especially since there may be a third option that the real nature of stuff might at times be perceived by the body and at others conceived by the mind. Point is that I don't think we have a rational reason to conclude that the universe is made of physical stuff - that's just the side of a discarded duality which happened to prevail. I agree, however, that many theists' views are as you described.

I prefer not to argue what another'n may or may not say.

Time (and to an extent space) are puzzling questions to me. Time as a continuum of 'now's makes sense, as does space as a continuum of 'here's in different directions. In that sense they could be considered (as I suggested in an earlier post) a place to be for things or stuff. . . . What confuses me is the bit where stuff (eg black holes or near-light speed travel) actually affect and distort these dimensions. The notion of a deity being wholly 'outside time' seems nonsensical, but on the other hand it seems absurd to think that our time is a true measure of anything besides it's own relativistic self within our universe.

Where our perception of time or space is in error, there we go. I propose we shouldn't then try to ameliorate that error with a proposition that raises more questions than it answers, e.g. "there's a god behind all this that is immaterial, but essentially thought all us humans into being".

Another point of curiousity from my view is what the difference is between this supposed volitional entity creating a 'real' universe, and merely imagining a universe? I suspect that what's 'real' is probably just as fluid and relative a notion as time or physicality. If there were nothing but a thinking thing, then its non-self-referential thoughts would be as distinct and 'real' as anything else imaginable, right? In other words, do we need to suppose that said deity is non-physical, or should we instead be marvelling at the supposedly 'physical' stuff which nevertheless largely meets the conception of our minds through bodily senses?

I can sure see that angle. I propose that where we propose a thinking or acting entity that is also immaterial, that entity doing all that thinking or acting can't exist. Thought or action is a product of the physical.

So, the god in question must most rationally be argued as a physical entity, but then that gets us right back to what created that physical entity, if the requirement is that that physical entity had to be there to cause the creation of humans (beyond them being simply the product of their physical properties).

[Mithrae]

From Post 47:

I'm not sure that we actually directly observe any form of causation at all, outside our own heads. If a lion came near me I'd no doubt move away, and if my foot gets up close and personal with a ball, the ball moves away: Can we conclude that my foot directly and necessarily caused the ball's movement? Can we conclude that the lion directly and necessarily caused my movement? Or might my movement away from the lion indicate my aversion to it, just as the ball has an aversion to my foot?

I propose the most rational conclusion'd be your foot caused that ball to move. In regards the lion, I contend your aversion to that lion is more at fault for your moving away, but we still oughta tell all the lions to leave us be

If we are to dismiss what we observe as some form of hallucination, I contend then that the OP presents but one more hallucination.

Agreed that the lion 'caused' my movement and my foot 'caused' the ball's movement; but to the observer, these are (reasonable) inferences, not direct observations, the actual nature of that causation (if any) is not clear. I don't suggest dismissing observation, merely recognising the distinctions between observation, extrapolation, inference, analysis and so on.

Where the mind acts, it is the product of the physical.

. . . .

Thought or action is a product of the physical.

There may have been a breakdown in communication, or perhaps our minds just work in fundamentally different ways. It's possible that mind-actions and thoughts are products of the physical - but as far as this discussion goes (and, to my knowledge, cultural or 'pop'-philosophy in general) the presumption of physicalism is just that: Not irrational, but by no means a conclusion to anything. It's at least as likely that the real nature of stuff is best described as what our minds conceive.

[EduChris]

..."Not arbitrarily limited" is not the same as [arbitrarily] unlimited...The case cannot be made that said being can therefore "know precisely what is best for the contingent sentient beings it had caused to exist."

Okay, I understand now, and I agree with you. There might well be limitations to the capacity to handle and process information--so long as these limitations are not arbitrary. To take just one common example from Christian theology, the doctrine of Kenosis allows God to empty or divest himself of certain powers and privileges for the sake of genuine human autonomy, freedom, and dignity.