Scientism and Theology

[theopoesis]

An Analysis of "Scientism"

I've been asked to present my ideas on what I call "Scientism." I'll do so in three stages. First, I need to present my definition of science and the scientific method. We need to know what science is in order to determine whether all knowledge is scientific. Second, I'll discuss "Scientism" or "Consilience" in an attempt to define the position that I reject. Third, I'll explain reasons why I reject scientism, and reasons why this rejection is linked to debates regarding Christianity. I'll then conclude with how this discussion relates to Christianity and to theology.

Definition of Science

As I understand it, Science and the scientific method is a particular form of knowing that follows particular traits and possesses particular attributes. In brief, these are as follows:

(1) Scientific Methodology: As I was taught it, a fundamental aspect of the scientific revolution was the codification of a scientific methodology consisting of (roughly) four steps: Identify the Problem, Develop a Testable Hypothesis, Test the Hypothesis, Form Conclusions. With repeated testing, the hypothesis can be held with increasing confidence, though it necessarily remains a theory capable of being replaced by a better hypothesis at a later time. This is fairly bread and butter science, so I don't have much of a source here except my high school/college science classes and Wikipedia.

(2) Falsification: One of the main reasons why the scientific method is so valuable is that it offers a hypothesis that can be falsified or proven incorrect. A hypothesis whose predictions do not occur after testing is demonstrated to be false and rejected. For this reason, a hypothesis is only considered valid in the scientific community if it can possibly be falsified. Karl Popper is a good source for this, but again, this is widely accepted as far as I know.

(3) Scientific Community: Jean Francois Lyotard offers an interesting analysis of "scientific" knowledge and "narrative" knowledge in his book The Postmodern Condition. Lyotard suggests that one important aspect of scientific knowledge is the community in which it must occur. To put it simply, scientific methodology implies peer review. This suggests two things. First, there must be "peers" who have attained a roughly equivalent level of scientific expertise. In this specialized world, this implies that discussions of truth concerning the science of _____ must be limited to a specialized group of individuals with expertise in ______. Laity can only contribute to a lesser degree. Second, peer review implies "review." This indicates that peers must be capable of speaking the same language, or understanding one another's research so as to be able to evaluate it. By way of example, consider philosophy in comparison with science. Philosophy in the West has retained a wide divergence of languages/methods; therefore, we can see "continental philosophy" and "analytic philosophy" and so forth. The fundamental language of each is different, but for a "continental" to truly dialogue with an "analytic" philosopher, he or she must step outside of her mental framework into an entirely different framework. Science, in contrast, pushes toward a normative, universal framework for the sake of peer review. Each scientist cannot have his or her own language and background theory. Rather, the community as a whole develops a relatively homogenous theory which then allows all peers to operate within the same framework. In situations where divergent theories exist, they are either hybridized (as in Particle and Wave theory being united in Wave-Particle theory for light) or one theory is abandoned. Two different theories cannot be held for long simultaneously without great strain to the scientific community. This aspect of scientific knowledge is somewhat less well known, but it can be found in the writings of Lyotard, Michael Polanyi, and Thomas Kuhn (among many others).

(4) Autonomy: A final aspect of science is what I label as "autonomy", or as the ceteris paribus (all things equal) criterion. This aspect of science is derived necessarily from the other three aspects of science. In short, it means that the object of study is autonomous or independent from significant influence by the scientist. All things being equal, regardless of the observer, things should play out the same way over and over again. This is deduced for several reasons: First, testing can only be considered valid if the test is thought to reproduce or demonstrate what is hypothesized independently of the tester's intervention. If the hypothesis passes the test only because the scientist caused the test to work through intervention, the scientific method gives us no reason to trust the validity of the hypothesis. Instead, we can only trust the scientists ability to create the outcome he or she desires. Second, falsification is increasingly difficult if there is no experimental autonomy. If all scientists significantly shape the outcomes of their experiments, a failed test does not indicate a failed hypothesis as much as it indicates an inadequate experiment. The scientist could do better the next time around by influencing things the way he or she desired. However, this no longer bears resemblance to falsification. These two reasons (and there are probably others) explain why research typically seeks to minimize the influence of the researcher and maximize the autonomy of the object of study from the influence of that study itself. To be sure, Heisenberg's principle suggests to us that some domains of science are (currently?) outside of the possibility of complete autonomy, but we can at least attempt to minimize our interference. Otherwise, the entire scientific endeavor seems to fail. This would seem to be the most contentious aspect of my definition (and I have not read a direct philosopher of science on the subject). However, the logic behind the claim seems sound, and I have heard statements to this effect in the soft sciences.

This, then, is my definition of science: the pursuit of knowledge by the scientific community through the development of falsifiable hypotheses, repeated autonomous testing, and peer reviewed conclusions.

What is "Scientism"?

If science is just a method of knowing accepted by a certain community according to specific criteria, it seems that science itself is not philosophical as much as it is pragmatic. Science is not something one primarily thinks about or speculates over. Instead, science is something one does. In this respect, Science is decidedly pragmatic. On the other hand, science itself has a foundation which is philosophical in nature. By this, I mean that science has certain epistemological and philosophical commitments (for example there is a commitment to falsification) which are themselves philosophical and pre-scientific. One must justify through philosophy these commitments in order to validate science as a pragmatic pursuit. For this reason we have philosophy of science, which has roots as far back as Aristotle and Galileo up to the present with thinkers like Karl Popper or Imre Lakatos. These thinkers have quite aptly justified the philosophical foundations for science as a pragmatic pursuit.

Quite often a completely valid philosophical perspective finds itself in the hands of advocates who seek to universalize the particularity of a philosophical justification. In this sense, we have nationalism as a universal preference for the concerns of the state over the concerns of the individual, the species, or the corporation. We have feminism as a commitment to universal analysis of all fields from the perspective of feminine interests and perspectives. Thus, it seems at least possible that scientism might exist as a universal commitment to the epistemology and methodology of science. Scientism in this instance would exist when and if the particular philosophical justifications for science had been universalized as justifications (and restrictions) for all human knowledge and method.

What would "scientism" look like? There are several possibilities. First, scientism might be an universalization of method, whereby all pursuits of knowledge would be reduced to scientific pursuits of knowledge through hypothesis, testing, and conclusions in a peer reviewed context. Second, scientism might reduce all knowledge to that which can be falsified. Third, scientism might restrict knowledge to that which exists only in specific communities with academic credibility and shared framework. Fourth, scientism might reduce assume or require all knowledge to be autonomous from the study itself. Of course, there might be combinations of these four variants, and these four aspects might manifest themselves in different degrees.

Now, we have suggested that scientism might exist, but this is a far cry short of demonstrating that scientism does exist. A universalization of the sort that scientism would be is only a problem if there is, in fact, a real universalizing tendency. Here, one could point to theoretical groundwork for scientism, such as E.O. Wilson's Consilience, in which he argues that all human endeavor and knowledge can and should be reduced to scientific analysis. Essentially, Wilson suggests that all other fields of inquiry can be reduced to the study of physics.

Scientism is manifest today in a scope well beyond that of a simple proposal by E.O. Wilson. Forces in various fields of academic study are already transforming themselves according to the principles of science. I'll offer a few brief examples, which will be relevant in future analysis. First is the tendency in the social sciences to move toward scientific methodology. Early work in liberal political thought by Hobbes, Locke, and others was based on deductive logic, historical analysis and/or thought experiments like the "state of nature" analyses. To be sure, some parallels still exist today in the thought of men like John Rawls, but the dominant political science paradigm is that of "rational choice theory" which seeks scientifically and mathematically model election outcomes. Similarly, we see a move in economics toward complete preference for testable models to the exclusion of more basic philosophical discussions on the terms analyzed (as Ricardo and Smith and Marx and Mills were prone to do). In these fields and others, there seems to be a trend toward scientific methodology.

In conjunction with the methodological trend, we can identify a clear bias against non-falsifiable fields ranging from philosophy and theology to the humanities. In general, these subjects are viewed with increasing skepticism, and it is common (especially on these forums) to denigrate non-scientific fields as completely worthless. This is a trend which, from my personal experience, seems to be common in the three universities in which I have taken courses. These trends alone suggest to me that "Scientism" has increasing influence in our culture, and several cultural analyses by Christians and non-Christians indicate the same.

At first glance, these trends seem to be beneficial, and I must admit that my initial encounter with them was quite positive and affirming. However, after more intensive study and analysis, I began to question "scientism" as a valid philosophical posture. I'll begin to explain why...

The Problem with Scientism

Scientism has been challenged on a wide range of fronts from a wide range of sources, including theologians like John Milbank, economists like Donald McKenzie, and scientists like Stephen J. Gould (The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Magister's Pox). The criticisms leveled at scientism can be categorized in the following basic categories: (1) Lack of autonomy; (2) False limits on knowledge; and (3) Priority of non-scientific knowledge. I will address each in detail

(1) Lack of Autonomy: I start with the most contentious point first. I'm verbose (if you hadn't noticed) so I don't want you to grow weary before you get here. You might miss some valid critiques of this perspective. I begin with the assumption that science includes a criterion of autonomy. Again, this means that the object of scientific study is not itself created or significantly influenced by that study. Otherwise, science is not objectively testing the world that exists, but rather is constructively creating that world.

Given recent developments in thought in the fields of sociology and economics, I have reason to believe that when scientism applies the scientific method to social sciences, it cannot fully maintain this autonomy from the object of its study. I'd like to begin by pointing to a book by Donald Mackenzie, Do Economists Make Markets?. Basing his ideas on the linguistic analysis of J.L. Austin, MacKenzie notes that speech is actually a "speech act." In other words, when we speak we do something. This is called "performativity." In terms of economics, MacKenzie (and the other economists in this anthology) suggest that when economists speak about a theory, they actually are doing something performative. Here's how it works: An economist attempts to apply the scientific method to the economy, modeling human behavior and economic transactions in order to develop a mathematical/statistical model to explain these interactions. A model is developed that best approximates reality, and then the model is published. Thus far, this is very similar to science. However, when a scientist publishes her findings on mitosis, cells do not react to the findings. On the other hand, when an economist publishes his findings on markets, the market responds. Investors, brokers, and financial regulators use the most widely accepted model to determine when to buy and sell. If the model says an asset is overpriced, then brokers sell. If the model says an asset is underpriced, brokers buy. Through this process and the gradual acceptance of the theory, an economic model that once only approximated reality suddenly represents reality almost perfectly. However, reality is conforming to the model, not the model to reality. Thus, theory is performative and "scientific" economics is not, in fact, autonomous from markets themselves. MacKenzie studies Options trading primarily (this is cutting edge economics, so it's hard to tell how widespread performativity is). He has clear examples of this cycle of performative options pricing, and the performativity usually lasts until a panic, recession, or scandal, when the model is abandoned for a replacement.

The phenomenon of performativity shouldn't be all that surprising if we pause to reflect on the nature of economics (and other fields in which performativity arguably operates, such as political science). I'm thinking about the work of John Searle in his book The Construction of Social Reality. I'm vague on the details, but as I recall Searle argues that many aspects of human social reality are actually constructed through convention. After all, things like the "body politic" or the "market" or the "nation-state" do not exist as biological or physical realities, per se. Rather, human groups aggregate through consensus and verbal affirmation to "create" a social reality known as "the market" or "the body politic." These institutions only exist through the performative utterances of the people themselves, and through these people's continual compliance with the rules of the reality which they have created. If such entities come into being through performative utterance, it should be no surprise that continual speech in the fields of economics or politics should continue to be performative and constructive of those entities themselves. The findings of MacKenzie or the debate between James Stimpson (Public Opinion in America ) and Lawrence Jacobs (Politicians Don't Pander) suggesting some degree of performativity in politics or economics are entirely logical.

I also want to differentiate between two levels of performativity. In fields such as economics or political science, there are clear individuals with the authority and audience necessary to make dramatic influence on the object of study. Economists have the audience of key decision makers and opinion influencers. Politicians are the same way, but to a lesser degree. In a field like sociology, hardly anyone has the degree of influence needed to shape the object of sociological study completely and immediately. However, if the thought of individuals such as Peter Berger (The Social Construction of Reality) is correct, much of society as we know it is the result of a gradual accumulation of social decisions. One individual (sociologist or otherwise) makes a decision or a declaration about how things are, and through his or her gradual influence, people adopt this decision or declaration no longer as a "hypothesis" or an expression of opinion. Rather, this event is mirrored and repeated until it is custom (how things are done) and eventually culture. If this is correct, there might be short-term performativity, whereby an economic model or political persuasion is "performed" in the marketplace or body politic to "create" a reality that otherwise would not exist. On the other hand, long-term (or slow-acting) performativity would be a gradual process whereby theory, declaration, and hypothesis gradually shapes reality in subtle, but clear, ways. I believe such a trajectory can be traced through the philosophical influence of political liberalism, for example.

What does performativity mean for scientism? First, it suggests that scientific study of social reality cannot be an autonomous, objective matter of hypothesis, test, conclude. Rather, what is studied is actually shaped by study. What is hypothesized might actually cause the test to confirm the hypothesis. If this occurs, what testing means in soft sciences is completely different from what is the case in the hard sciences. To be sure, science still has a place in these fields (in helping identify performativity, for example), but insofar as scientism denies legitimacy to any non-scientific, non-falsifiable knowledge, it fails to recognize the distinction between performativity and description, construction and analysis. Why does this matter? On to point two.

(2) False Limits on Knowledge: In many respects, science is built on a philosophical standpoint which finds its basis in Descartes. The Cartesian system is built upon skepticism and (relative) certainty as a criterion for knowledge, and reduces those things which are neither (relatively) certain nor readily demonstrable to non-knowledge. This is built into science's methodology, and its concern for falsification. If something hasn't been tested to a point of plausible certainty, then it isn't knowledge. If something isn't understood comprehensively enough to be articulated in a way capable of falsification, it isn't knowledge. Such Cartesian certainty has its place in the field of science, but I think it falsely limits knowledge where knowledge is more comprehensive.

I began thinking about such things when I ran into Michael Polanyi's Knowing and Being. Polanyi introduces the idea of "tacit knowledge" as a means of knowing that is distinct from a certain or explicit knowledge. Explicit knowledge would be a form of transferable knowledge that is known comprehensively and with a degree of certainty. For example, a scientific experiment could be understood in all of its minutiae and re-created over and over again for a uniformity and transferable object of analysis. In this way, explicit knowledge often moved from particulars to universals through a (relatively) certain comprehension of how the particulars fit together to form a universal. On the other hand, tacit knowledge often moves from particulars to universals without having a clear means of articulating the particulars, how they fit together, or what they signify. There is certainly little which could explicitly be explained in the form of a hypothesis which was testable or falsifiable. Examples of tacit knowledge are widespread. Language, playing the piano, and dancing all are examples of tacit knowledge. However, Polanyi suggests that another category of tacit knowledge includes propositional ideas (as opposed to skills or abilities) that are apprehended in a comprehensive fashion without the ability to yet understand the particular or explicitly explain the knowledge. Explicit knowledge is understood in an atomistic, deductive fashion, but tacit knowledge is only known holistically and (usually) experientially. Polanyi makes the interesting case that such knowledge is vital in the hypothesis-forming stage of scientific methodology (I find him convincing). Scientism, in seeking to extend a Cartesian model of knowledge through the universalization of scientific methodology, would undermine the validity of such tacit knowledge.

Another aspect of the limitation which science places on knowledge is in denying the positive/normative divide. Typically, a positive analysis is one that considers what is but a normative analysis is one suggesting what ought to be. In politics, for example, rational choice theory is a scientific analysis of voter dynamics, but it is incapable of moving from the realities of this voter dynamic to the necessities of a well governed state. Rational choice ends up positing vote maximization (power) as the only end of political interactions. I once had a political science professor - Jurg Steiner - who dedicated his career to trying to prove within the rational choice framework that non-vote maximizing action occurred. After years of research and publication, he had found once incident that was accepted by a small segment of the academy in his homeland of Switzerland. The point is, science has no room for ideas of what should be. One doesn't tell the moon how it ought to look. One simply constructs a model of its orbit. The only driving factor posited (for those entities which act cognitively) is survivial. Similarly, once political science is subject to scientism, it is reduced to description and survival. Economics in a similar fashion has been reduced in many ways to description and profit maximization (which is for the ultimate end of the firm's survival). Where the lack of acknowledgement of the positive/normative diad becomes problematic is with respect to performativity. If we ignore any intentional prescriptive elements in fields such as political science or economics and instead reduce everything to positive analysis, but if this analysis is performative and makes the world be/exist in a particular way, I don't think we can correctly continue without a care for normative aspects in these fields. The result is an a-moral creation of society itself, a performative creation of the political as a domain of raw power and the economic as a domain of pure desire. Neither situation bodes well for human flourishing; one with respect to war and the other with respect to injustice. I see Muhammad Yunus, for example, in his work on microfinance. He says there cannot be a divide between what is and what ought to be, and he has turned finance on its head with the normative goal of justice and poverty relief as an objective. This goal cannot, technically, be scientifically validated. However, with respect to fields such as political science and economics I believe it is exactly such non-scientific aspects which are needed.

(3) Priority of non-scientific knowledge: Having spoken of these problems, I think the writings of philosophers of science such as Thomas Kuhn become particularly relevant. Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is a well known book, and countless parallels exist among the writings of Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, Michael Polanyi, and Karl Popper (among others). The basic idea concerns Lyotard's notion that science is largely about the scientific community. Kuhn suggests that this community operates according to a specific paradigm during times of "normal science." This paradigm directs which questions are asked (and which are inappropriate), what methodologies are used, and what terms/ideas are used to interpret the outcomes of experimentation. This phenomenon gives the group a conservative nature, such that outlying ideas, results, questions, and methods are often ignored by the community as a whole, or dismissed outright. Only when science reaches a "crisis" are these outliers given a chance to enter the mainstream and direct/influence future research and analysis. In short, if Kuhn and many others are correct, there is a strong tendency toward homogeneity in science itself.

Now suppose that scientism extends this strong demand for homogeneity into other fields. We can perhaps understand the need for homogeneity in the hard sciences. After all, if we had hundreds of different sciences accepting hundreds of different explanations for electric currents, for example, our technologies would largely be incompatible, and our very pursuit of knowledge with respect to electricity would be hindered. We can accept homogeneity as long as it works because we know that electricity works the same in New Zealand, Tajikistan, Botswana, Mississippi and Chile. If a theory works in one place, it should be acceptable in others. If theories are unified, it allows for more efficient progress technologically, and for more coherent discussions on science globally.

Suppose, however, that we allow scientism to push such homogeneity in the soft sciences. First, we have the obvious problem that not all cultures, societies, and humans operate the same way. Biologically, of course, the human body is fairly similar across cultural lines. However, psychologically and culturally there may be a huge difference between an Irish factory worker and a Kenyan tribesman. The nature of the society in which each lives will leave a specific imprint on culture, society, and psychology. Even if we analyze two very similar societies' individuals, say an Irish factory worker and a Russian factory worker, there are likely to be tremendous differences as a result of cultural history, societal ideals, and language.

Given this diversity, scientism has a problem. The same electric current works the same way in the United States and Japan, so we have no problem with a homogenizing tendency in the hard sciences because the object of study is uniform and the benefits of homogeneity are obvious. However, if we extend such scientism in a field such as psychology, we may have problems. Each culture has culturally determined psychopathologies, for example. In Japan the hikikomoro is widely prevalent. In the United States, cutting is much more common. Each society likely has a different answer to the question of "what is health?" with respect to mental health. This normative difference cannot even be addressed by scientism in the field of psychology. In brief, science offers a strong tool to psychology, but reduction of psychology to nothing more than science eliminates the tacit knowledge/skill of the counselor, and the diversity of the individuals counseled. In fact, there is a grave risk of reducing psychology to pharmacology. Homogeneity in physics makes physics more efficient, but in psychology it makes psychology less efficient.

A second problem with the nature of the paradigm and scientism is in respect to the positive/normative divide. Take as an example global capitalism and the "Washington Consensus." Scientific approaches to economics, through a homogenizing tendency, are seeking to globalize a particular market and system of market analysis and participation. In terms of positive analysis (which scientism reduced economics too), this is a valid aspiration. Arguably, in terms of GDP and per capita income, the globalization of capitalism is beneficial from a dollars per person perspective. However, we must recall the issues of performativity and the necessary underlying normative elements of the social sciences. In terms of economics, it seems clear that there is an underlying critical anthropology in economic theory. Smith and Ricardo and Mills and other early economists were aware of this fact. However, after the advent of marginalism and and scientific approaches to economics, this aspect was dropped. To be sure, the "Washington Consensus" still embodies a particular anthropology which envisages individuals as consumers driven primarily by utility maximization under the guise of a specific rational capacity. The market requires such consumption, utility maximization, and rationality. Of course in promoting positivist analysis and policies of global capitalism, the normative anthropology is assumed. Wherever global capitalism is present, there is a tendency to colonize indigenous identity, culture, and society with the normative model of capitalism anthropology. This is the argument of the post-development advocates, at least. And so, the failure to acknowledge the normative elements of a social system leads scientism to create fields of political science and economics which are colonizing in nature, and which have no open discussion of the very principles of this colonial effect. The paradigm itself has priority in creating the social realities in its own image through latent anthropological elements. Where did these anthropological elements come from? Are they vestigial remnants of 18th and 19th century idealism, or are the the arbitrary constructs of a system unconcerned with the normative consequences of its performance? Scientism refuses to address these questions because they are not testable, certain, or falsifiable. And so it proceeds on without a whim to the homogenization of the cultures it comes into contact with. It's the McDonaldization of the world, to use a popular neologism.


Theology as a Resistance to Scientism

The objections I have raised above to scientism need not be specifically Christian. Indeed, they are merely a deployment of the recent discoveries of post-modernity, post-colonialism, post-structuralism, and post-development economics. In a world of posts, it is easy to imagine a world that is post scientism. In many respects, I believe my rejection of scientism would hold even if my faith in Christianity declined. However, if I am honest it must be immediately clear that I reject scientism partly as a result of my own Christian convictions.

Theology is certainly not scientific (certain ambitions of Alister McGrath notwithstanding). It is neither testable nor falsifiable, and it is not dependent upon autonomy. Indeed, to be a theologian one must be intimately connected both with the human nature which is studied in existential theology and theological anthropology, and with the God which is studied in pneumatology, Christology, and the metaphysics of the Trinity. Theology rejects the Cartesian certainty of science and replaces it with the functional equivalent of tacit knowledge. One knows one's own nature tacitly, and though this ontology and existence are not readily communicable, they both are known in a way that shapes an emerging theological anthropology. The doctrines of sin and the image of God are known as much in the tacit knowledge of human nature as unavoidably fallible and potentially great as they are in the propositional statements of Paul. I know myself to be a sinner and yet I know not how to fully communicate this fact. Similarly, a theology of the Trinity is not falsifiable nor testable nor even autonomous. Rather, such a theology is an elaboration of the religious experiences of the universality, immediacy, transcendence, and monadic plurality of God. Such an experience is known as a certainty, and is not communicable nor transferable. Evangelism as communication of a set of propositions ultimately fails. Instead, evangelism leads one to relate to the Gospel-as-Person (Jesus Christ) or it does nothing.

In short, in rejecting scientism I want to be clear that I am not rejecting science. Theology is a different domain from science altogether. In the past (and present) this has often been forgotten, but many Christians have remembered this truth. Rather, in rejecting scientism I am rejecting the claim that all knowledge is known in certainty. Instead, I believe a tacit knowledge is intrinsic in any analysis of the social sciences. When the critical anthropology which I discussed above was made an integral part of the growth of capitalism, it was because of the efficacy of the non-scientific arguments of Locke, Smith, Mills, and others. These arguments were not falsifiable nor certain, but they caried the day and shaped nascent modernism in such a way that all positive promotion of the ideals of modernity today is irreparably a promotion of the ideals of the liberal critical anthropology. In rejecting scientism, I am merely asking that alternate voices and alternate tacit knowledges be given a chance to leave their mark on the positive performance of theory. Why must liberalism be given exclusive rights to defining the ignored normative aspects of the social sciences? Theology is not science, but functionally it is the equivalent of the liberal modern metanarrative. (By the way, liberalism in this sense is not the same as "democrat" or "not-conservative." It is a technical name for a school of thought).

I believe that metanarrative is the driving force behind the social sciences. When performativity occurs, it is the utterance of a narrative held subconsciously by the social scientist. When realities are socially constructed, the grand vision of the society which constructs these realities necessarily shapes them in a fundamental way. Scientism leads to postmodernism in attempting to deny the validity of the meta-narrative as knowledge, and yet scientism perpetuates an un-named meta-narrative through its performativity and through the homogenizing tendencies of the scientific paradigm. A rejection of scientism required admission of this reality, and discussion of the uncertain, nonfalsifiable nature of the metanarrative.

Christianity as a metanarrative will be viewed differently by different groups. To the secularist, theology is the lie upon which western culture was built. It was dismissed as a lie, but it is yet to be replaced with another. This is because much of the ignored metanarrative of modernity is in fact built upon Christian theological assumptions (so say the promoters of Radical Orthodoxy). In this respect, Christians have incentive to call the subconscious narrative to the forefront in order to demonstrate the paradoxes of a post-Christian narrative in the West. Scientism refuses to discuss non-scientific knowledge to construct a new narrative, and it refuses to fully abandon metanarrative insofar as it perpetuates homogenization through the communitarian nature of the paradigm, and insofar as it is performative when directed toward socially constructed entities. Scientism is the gag order on the question of the telos of society, but it is the simultaneous conservative fortification of the existing metanarrative as fact. Yes, to the secularist theology was a lie left abandoned, but to the theologian, scientism is the perpetuation of a heresy and Christianity is the truth upon which truths are built. I'll conclude with a brief note on the nature of this truth.

Theology is about revelation. Theology touches on identity, culture, ethics, justice and personhood in ways that can never be scientific. However, if the reality of the normative is admitted, if tacit knowledge is acknowledged, and if performativity is directed instead of subconsciously promoted, theology will find itself with a voice in a multicultural world. Who is to say that a theologically informed meta-narrative is inferior to a liberal or a marxist or any other metanarrative? Such scientific certainty cannot be known, but the tacit knowledge of each individual, which is developed in an unutterable way, will result in particular metanarratives being accepted. Christianity claims its narrative is given by God. As such, the performance of the narrative is not arbitrary. Instead, as the theoretical aspects of theology are manifest through performativity, the individuals are shaped into the image of God. Theology is a performative co-creation with God. It is the words spoken to help ensure the re-creation of humans and human society into the kingdom of heaven. In rejecting scientism, I do not reject science. Nor do I seek to restore Christendom. Those days are over. However, I do hope that the days of a private religiosity are over as well. Public theology applied only to the Church as one culture among a multi-cultural world is my hope, and the witness possible through such a pilgrim society is, I believe, the Church's call and its only hope of survival. Both the imperialism of the religious right and the accomodationism of the mainstream church are no longer acceptable in the multicultural postmodern world.

[McCulloch]

I am not sure whether theoposis' observation of the trend toward scientific methodology is considered to be a bad thing. For example, in the field of economics, is it not better to have testable models than philosophical discussions. Another example is medicine. Even in the early 20th century, there was less science in the medical field than one might suppose. In fact, I cannot think of a field of human knowledge that has not benefited when science is applied. Is that Scientism?

To me, the fields which are still not scientific are not completely worthless, it is just that they are necessarily subjective and unproven. Music appreciation, for example. We have little in the way of science to prove that Sergei Rachmaninoff's Piano Concerto No. 3 is a greater work than Keith Emerson's Piano Concerto No. 1, but I don't think that anyone would argue the opposite.

I do agree that feedback and non-linearity can affect the results of scientific research, especially in areas of human behavior. This has been and will be a continuing challenge to these sciences. I don't believe that this is a reason to doubt the scientific method however.

If, by scientism, theoposis means abandoning the imaginative and creative process whereby hypotheses are dreamed up, then by all means, scientism is a bad thing and to be rejected by all who value science. However, I disagree with him and with Polanyi, that folk wisdom and hypothesis should be elevated to the stature of knowledge.

I disagree with the idea that science has no room for ideas of what should be. I strongly believe that this area is far to important to humanity's future to be left to faith, folk wisdom, guesswork and hunches. Unfortunately, to many practitioners of science the maxim of that which can easily be measured becomes most important affects what gets put under the microscope. Normative goals are dreadfully difficult to measure, so the science will be not without significant challenges.

And my nomination for understatement of the year: Theology is certainly not scientific. (Well maybe "I'm verbose" too.) I agree that not all knowledge is known with certainty, but to me, science is the only valid way to reduce the level of uncertainty in our collective knowledge.

[EduChris]

...Scientism is the gag order on the question of the telos of society, but it is the simultaneous conservative fortification of the existing metanarrative as fact...

Agreed. Scientisim is just another manifestation of the will to power.

...the tacit knowledge of each individual, which is developed in an unutterable way, will result in particular metanarratives being accepted...

Is this another way of saying that people tend to believe what they want to believe, per Freud's pleasure principle?

...as the theoretical aspects of theology are manifest through performativity, the individuals are shaped into the image of God. Theology is a performative co-creation with God. It is the words spoken to help ensure the re-creation of humans and human society into the kingdom of heaven...

Agreed. As we speak and do, so we become and believe.

...In rejecting scientism, I do not reject science...

Yes, but how does one convince the die-hard adherents of scientism of this fact? The will to power is so strong that it inevitably interprets all other claims and all other voices through its own self-validating, self-perpetuating grid, so that any questioning of scientism automatically becomes marginalized as "irrational."

...Public theology applied only to the Church as one culture among a multi-cultural world is my hope, and the witness possible through such a pilgrim society is, I believe, the Church's call and its only hope of survival. Both the imperialism of the religious right and the accomodationism of the mainstream church are no longer acceptable in the multicultural postmodern world.

Agreed. What sort of public witness can the Church provide as an antidote to scientism?

[theopoesis]

...the tacit knowledge of each individual, which is developed in an unutterable way, will result in particular metanarratives being accepted...

Is this another way of saying that people tend to believe what they want to believe, per Freud's pleasure principle?

Freud likely relates to what I am discussing, but I wasn't thinking about him. More, I was referring to something like the psychological phenomenon known as "online processing." According to this principle, individuals interpret data and make judgments without necessarily being conscious of these judgments or without remembering why they came to the conclusions they did. Thus, individuals may have very good reasons for what they believe, but they cannot speak about these reasons and the knowledge itself is often subconscious (hence unutterable). On the other hand, reasons might not exist and Freud's pleasure principle might come into play.

...In rejecting scientism, I do not reject science...

Yes, but how does one convince the die-hard adherents of scientism of this fact? The will to power is so strong that it inevitably interprets all other claims and all other voices through its own self-validating, self-perpetuating grid, so that any questioning of scientism automatically becomes marginalized as "irrational."

The proponent of scientism's accusation of irrationality is equivalent to the Orthodox claim of heresy. Our ability to convince will be proportionate with our ability to overcome the tendency to dismiss as heretical. If we dismiss and ignore, then we do not invite and demonstrate. If our beliefs are critically linked with our community and society, then any exile of the heretic is necessarily an alienation of our own ability to witness. Instead, we must insist upon dialogue even when we meet only condemnation. That dialogue must remain resolute in repudiating that which is theologically unsound, but we would do well to remember the early church's conviction that schism was a greater sin than heresy. In theory, if our doctrine is made manifest in an appropriate way, we will be shown to possess that which we claim to hold - a metanarrative of divine origin guiding us to love, virtue, justice, and truth. None of these virtues is intrinsically opposed to science, but may perhaps be opposed to scientism.

On a slightly more practical level, perhaps we could manifest love toward scientists and evolutionists, instead of divisive condemnation. We could possess virtue in accepting truth wherever it leads us, but refuse to dissimulate the principles underlying any paradigm of truth. We could possess a justice that employs scientific advancement toward the amelioration of poverty, disease, and suffering, but which never condones exploitation through the pornography industry, the manipulation of markets, or the destruction of environmental degradation. We can possess the truth of God's omnipresence and sovereign interaction in this world, without simultaneously dismissing the truth to be found in science. God heals through prayer, of this I am sure. But that is no reason to refuse the healing available through medicine. Each of these manifestations of the realities which theology creates performatively would offer relief to scientists, though such relief might bot go so far as to eliminate scientism or any of its proponents who wished to continue to dismiss us.

...Public theology applied only to the Church as one culture among a multi-cultural world is my hope, and the witness possible through such a pilgrim society is, I believe, the Church's call and its only hope of survival. Both the imperialism of the religious right and the accomodationism of the mainstream church are no longer acceptable in the multicultural postmodern world.

Agreed. What sort of public witness can the Church provide as an antidote to scientism?

I've got an entire series of books I would like to write on the subject. I've applied to a Phd in order to begin work on them, too. Ideally, such work will be made manifest in concrete, visible actions among the Church community. For now, I can only outline what I consider to be key points.

(1) We must refuse to ignore the normative implications of positive study. We cannot be placated with what is, but must perpetually envision what, through God's grace, might be. In concrete terms, this means refusal to accept the economic realities of our day as "natural." Natural unemployment, natural inflation, the natural interest rate. I am convinced that such mechanisms are intrinsic to the society that we have constructed for ourselves, but not intrinsic to society in itself. Furthermore, a system built upon millionaire CEOs and minimum wage laborers is only really necessary because we have allowed it to be. If we buy into the myth that it takes a huge salary, substantial bonuses, ridiculous benefits, and massive stock options to bring in a top CEO, we then legitimate the salary of said CEO as a result of market equilibrium and the "natural" forces of supply and demand. But that individual's salary is only guaranteed through equilibrium, because we have first allowed him to accept the belief that it is just to own a private jet and adequate stock options when millions do not own a private bed or adequate meals. We have allowed the normative anthropology of the meritorious CEO to replace the theological anthropology of the cruciform Christ. And the worst part of it all is that we deny the existence of such normative aspects within the system we have constructed. Christians must refuse to buy into the myth of private faith, public lives while simultaneously avoiding the desire to colonize the public. I am not calling for a return to Christendom, but I refuse to be silent on public matters which critically shape the private/individual consciousness. A true public theology would guide a Christian CEO to an appropriate understanding of identity, justice, and economic interrelations to voluntarily seek a modest salary while redirecting the substantial gains offered to him toward those employees who would most benefit from it. And yet, we accept our salary as due us, our preaching as irrelevant to questions of economy, and our identity as a capitalist who happens to attend Christ Church. This is not a robust public theology. It will never do.

(2) The problem with scientism is the mode in which it operates. It assumes pure certainty, and seeks to make illegitimate whatever fails to contain such certainty. Our response to scientism is not to reformulate our positions in its image. Rather, we ought to accept the humility appropriate with faith. We have the Scriptures which we can trust, the guidance of the Holy Spirit, the Sovereign direction of God, and the overwhelming tendency to muck it all up through sin, apostacy, idolatry, and ignorance. We cannot stand in contrast to scientism by attempting to be more certain, which is itself a poor simulation of science (in such a way we only show we have less to be certain of. Theology, after all, did not make the satellite or the automobile). Instead, we stand in contrast to scientism through the open humility of faith seeking understanding. We proclaim the intrinsic value of human life created in God's image, but we humbly persist in acknowledging our own inadequacy rather than assuming our own infallibility. In such a way we resist the reduction of human life to materiality and nothing more, but we simultaneously resist the certainty of our own value and virtue. We proclaim the need for justice in accordance with the kingdom of heaven, but we simultaneously reject the certainty which claims to know what, precisely, such justice would look like in Barundi or Lebanon or Nepal. Our charity and missiology must include the humility of listening to the needs of others becoming as if we are one of them (as Christ became one of us through the incarnation), rather than the certainty of a one-size-fits-all application of a solution we designed in an office in Omaha. And so forth and so on. Science is (relatively) certain about what the world is. We are only certain about what it might and will be. Our progress toward that end must be undertaken prayerfully, humbly, and cautiously and yet with a reverent abandon.

(3) We must have a voice. In his letters, Paul speaks theologically on matters as divergent as intercultural relations, imperial occupation, and household relations. Our few spokesmen on such issues are of the Pat Robertson and Jerry Fallwell variety. The response of the less conservatively inclined is to remain silent on such issues. But we could do well to learn from our brothers around the world who, through liberation theology, dalit theology, and so forth are applying the core truths of the faith to the realities of our day. Yet, perhaps we should not make theology peripheral to said project. We do not replace preaching the gospel with social activism, but neither do we reduce the gospel to something irrelevant to society itself. In my opinion, any individual who graduates from seminary who cannot speak of how the Trinity relates to homelessness, the incarnation to spousal abuse, or pneumatology to depression is just as unfit to minister as a graduate who is uninformed about the Trinity, the incarnation, or pneumatology itself. In times past, theology was always linked with the social. Hence, for example, John Chrysostom's works on poverty as well as on liturgics. Today, our choices seem to be society or theology.

That's a start, but it's going to take a lot more.

[theopoesis]

I am not sure whether theoposis' observation of the trend toward scientific methodology is considered to be a bad thing. For example, in the field of economics, is it not better to have testable models than philosophical discussions. Another example is medicine. Even in the early 20th century, there was less science in the medical field than one might suppose. In fact, I cannot think of a field of human knowledge that has not benefited when science is applied. Is that Scientism?

I don't think that is Scientism. Scientism is the exclusive extension of scientific methodology. Medicine is certainly benefitting from science, but I am resisting the trend to go so far as to remove a Doctor with her intuition (i.e. uncertain knowledge) from the equation. (Also note that medicine relates to a hard science, and my concern is mostly over the soft sciences.) Similarly, I think there is huge benefit to marginal analysis in economics, but reducing economics to an analysis of margins alone eliminates many important non-scientific aspects of study of the economy.

I disagree with the idea that science has no room for ideas of what should be. I strongly believe that this area is far to important to humanity's future to be left to faith, folk wisdom, guesswork and hunches. Unfortunately, to many practitioners of science the maxim of that which can easily be measured becomes most important affects what gets put under the microscope. Normative goals are dreadfully difficult to measure, so the science will be not without significant challenges.

Normative goals may be measured, but I do not see how they can be articulated in a falsifiable, testable, autonomous fashion. How, for example, would we falsify or test the statement, "Utility should be the evaluative principle in economics"?

And my nomination for understatement of the year: Theology is certainly not scientific. (Well maybe "I'm verbose" too.)

At least I finally started posting in the Random Ramblings.

I agree that not all knowledge is known with certainty, but to me, science is the only valid way to reduce the level of uncertainty in our collective knowledge.

I might even agree with this statement.

[Slopeshoulder]

A major contribution and superbly done.
Anyone who doesn't get this and take it seriously must be willifully blind or belligerent.

That doesn't mean that every has to become an orthodox christian or even a theist, but maybe we can let the scientism go?

[fewwillfindit]

However, I do hope that the days of a private religiosity are over as well. Public theology applied only to the Church as one culture among a multi-cultural world is my hope, and the witness possible through such a pilgrim society is, I believe, the Church's call and its only hope of survival.

Not to reduce your entire treatise down to one snippet (I read and absorbed every word), but are you going to expound on the above quote at some point? If so, I will leave my questions for later.

[theopoesis]

However, I do hope that the days of a private religiosity are over as well. Public theology applied only to the Church as one culture among a multi-cultural world is my hope, and the witness possible through such a pilgrim society is, I believe, the Church's call and its only hope of survival.

Not to reduce your entire treatise down to one snippet (I read and absorbed every word), but are you going to expound on the above quote at some point? If so, I will leave my questions for later.

I haven't planned a long post on the subject. Feel free to ask questions, critique, or what have you. Since this is a random rambling in response to a specific request, we need not take the form of a debate. Questions can be helpful for discussion. Or you can even post a counter-perspective, if you so desire, without fear of us starting a major ruckus. I think often it can be a good thing to read various perspectives without the need for debate.

[fewwillfindit]

However, I do hope that the days of a private religiosity are over as well. Public theology applied only to the Church as one culture among a multi-cultural world is my hope, and the witness possible through such a pilgrim society is, I believe, the Church's call and its only hope of survival.

Not to reduce your entire treatise down to one snippet (I read and absorbed every word), but are you going to expound on the above quote at some point? If so, I will leave my questions for later.

I haven't planned a long post on the subject. Feel free to ask questions, critique, or what have you. Since this is a random rambling in response to a specific request, we need not take the form of a debate. Questions can be helpful for discussion. Or you can even post a counter-perspective, if you so desire, without fear of us starting a major ruckus. I think often it can be a good thing to read various perspectives without the need for debate.

I guess I'm wondering what you mean by "public theology," "Church as one culture," "private religiosity," "pilgrim society" and "only hope of survival." This verbiage begs many questions.

Do you feel that the Church is in danger of extinction? If so, do you envision a new breed; an ecumenism of sorts, with unified doctrine and global solidarity? If so, how would such a daunting undertaking be implemented?

[theopoesis]

I guess I'm wondering what you mean by "public theology," "Church as one culture," "private religiosity," "pilgrim society" and "only hope of survival." This verbiage begs many questions.

All of these phrases speak to the need of a new form of theology and ecclesiology in the contemporary world. By "new" I do not intend to suggest new content or the abandoning of old content, as is the proposal of many today. Rather, I intend to point out several realities of our world. First, theology is currently considered relevant only/primarily to discussions of God, salvation, and personal piety. These elements must remain core components of Christianity and theology, but in a world where churches can speak to believers one or two times a week, but education, business participation, television commercials, movies, and the press continuously inundate the believer with non-Christian messages I merely wonder which is more formative: the sermon or the society. If theology cannot speak to such public matters, it will find it continues to have decreasing influence on its members, IMO. Those living in the information age will find a Church devoid of information. Already, we find a strong correlation between evangelicalism and the support of the American ideal - democracy, free market capitalism, technological dependence, and personal autonomy of choice. Did evangelicalism adopt such opinions through theological analysis, or through the influence of society? Which allegiance runs deeper: the state or the church? In many churches I have attended, these lines are not so clear, and pastors are reticent to preach on anything that affects the wallet, the voting booth, the neighborhoods one lives in, or the way one works in one's job.

We have seen attempts to link state culture with theology. In Germany (Troeltsch for example), this took the form of a clam that German culture was the epitome of Christian culture. In the United States, this takes the form of the myth of the "Christian nation" - America was and is intended to be Christian. In Germany, this led to a catastrophic linking of German ideals/objectives with superficial theology. In America, this has led to the power struggles over the US government and attempts at legislative morality. But we must remember the gospel - what the law was powerless to do, Christ did. Modernism is too multicultural for a monolithic Christendom. Therefore, I say the church must be "one culture" in order to assert that we must have our own culture (and this must extend well beyond the kitsch of Christian t-shirts and moderately tolerable Christian hip-hop), but to reject the claim that we are to be the culture.

As such we must throw off the "private religiosity" of a Christianity that says you can be identical to those around you except for waking up early Sunday mornings and reading the Bible and praying on your own private time. We must (1) address public needs/injustices (racism, mass incarceration, globalization, environmental degradation, wars, drug use, rising social stratification, etc.) and (2) promote an alternate vision for the community (rejecting the isolation of suburbia and the homogenization of gentrification or social sorting in favor of the body of Christ, which is intimately connected, which transcends "jew/gentile", "barbarian/scythian", and so forth because we are "one in Christ", and which has the purpose of blessing the communities around it instead of profiting from them). As such, we find ourselves arriving at a "pilgrim society." This seems a bit ironic given the statistical dominance of Christianity, but given the declining influence on such Christianity and the likely reluctance to change the status quo, I imagine a radical movement of the sort I believe we need could only draw smaller numbers to its use. Such a group would be pilgrim because it would avoid the purposes of the world as if on a pilgrimage for holy purposes, pilgrim because it could never really be at home among the world as it is, and pilgrim because it must refuse to become an empire (though some public interaction on issues such as abortion, for example, could certainly be valid). As a foot note, such a pilgrim society would need to reject the modernist mode of knowing: scientism.

I worry this is our only hope of survival, but I do admit that such language wrongly downplays our dependence upon God. He is our only hope of survivial, but I merely wish to point to what I consider the drastic nature of the situation.

Do you feel that the Church is in danger of extinction? If so, do you envision a new breed; an ecumenism of sorts, with unified doctrine and global solidarity? If so, how would such a daunting undertaking be implemented?

The Church is in danger in the USA and Europe. Statistical analysis of public perception of Christianity shows a marked decline in the witness of the church (David Kinnamon's UnChristian). I've worked with several campus ministries, college ministries through churches, and youth groups. In each situation, I see the reality of college as a de-Christianizing influence. This is partly because youth groups seem to build a shallow faith which minimally reaches private matters and ignores must public ones, and because Christianity is not speaking to the issues which are discussed on University campuses today (or, at least in NC). Christian Smith has done a study in which he suggests most American Christians are really moralistic therapeutic deists. I think this is a fair assessment. Look at any index: Doctrinal literacy, a cruciform ethic, tithing. I think most indicate problems in the Church. If we turn to Europe, we see a ruin of a once powerful body, and I believe this is largely because of the failure of the European Church to find a role in a multi-cultural, modernist society. We could easily follow the same path.

Is Ecumenism the answer? Likely not. To be sure, there must be more unity than there is. We can't divide on what sort of worship music we have (though the issue is vitally important in terms of establishing an autonomous culture where worship is differentiated from "entertainment" or "consumption"). On the other hand, to be a unique culture we must have a unique language or narrative, and such aspects require distinctive and clear doctrine. Many churches and denominations are not in a position to be able to join a doctrinally defined group. Those who can should, but the others must be left behind. If we linger too long in ecumenically discussing the course to take and the nature of the culture to be had, we will soon find our ecumenical discussions take place in an empty sanctuary. On the other hand, to be the Church, we must be the body that is "one" just as the Son and the Father are "one." Thus, I propose we seek first to be the Church as a distinctive pilgrim community (and not just a building with a therapeutic message on Sundays), but in seeking we will always find ourselves ecumenically reaching out to invite reconciliation with our brothers and sisters who are willing to actually be the church as well.

So there's my grandiose opinion. If it does not indicate pride, you aren't reading it close enough. As such, it may be a vanity to envisage myself as speaking a message vital to the Church's survival. On the other hand, it may just be a role the Spirit has given me for a time to fulfill. I hope the latter, but we must always suspect the former. All that to say, don't just buy into what I say. Check the Scriptures. Observe culture. Analyze your congregation. And if there is any, cling to the truth in what I've said while forgiving the over the top "verbiage."