Arguments against God

[EduChris]

The thought recently occurred to me that all of the arguments against God seem to be variants of the following logical fallacies:

1) The argument from ignorance

2) The argument from personal antipathy

3) The argument from personal incredulity

4) The genetic fallacy

5) Assuming the consequent (circular reasoning)

Question for debate: Are there any arguments against God which do not fall into one of these five categories?

[Ragna]

The thought recently occurred to me that all of the arguments against God seem to be variants of the following logical fallacies:

1) The argument from ignorance

2) The argument from personal antipathy

3) The argument from personal incredulity

4) The genetic fallacy

5) Assuming the consequent (circular reasoning)

Question for debate: Are there any arguments against God which do not fall into one of these five categories?

I don't know against which "god" you are talking, but simple logical reasoning can prove a God with X usually attributed characteristics to be illogical. Without God being benevolent, omniscient, omnipotent or we being the center of his creation, God becomes just a void name.

Directly about his existence, arguments against God should be similar to arguments against fairies. In this case, the burden of proof is not for atheism.

To more properly address arguments "against God" you should first define God.

[LiamOS]

If you're talking about arguments for the lack of existence of a God, then yes. That said, this is no more the case than arguments for a God.
All arguments which hold on the matter leave us with something which can be interpreted as being a God or vice versa.


As has been raised before me, the definition of God is also central.

[EduChris]

...I don't know against which "god" you are talking...To more properly address arguments "against God" you should first define God...

Here is my working definition of theism:

The belief that there is an ultimate, absolute, necessary and non-contingent Reality which affords the contingent reality of our lives and of the entire universe and to which we humans (individually or collectively) might actually matter in some way, whether by personal Divine response or by Divinely-established autonomic reaction.

...but simple logical reasoning can prove a God with X usually attributed characteristics to be illogical. Without God being benevolent, omniscient, omnipotent or we being the center of his creation, God becomes just a void name...

That's an interesting line of thought. Would you care to explain it further? I've found that most nontheists here have problematic understandings of "omniscience" and "omnipotence," but that obviously counts only as evidence of their misunderstanding of the terms (and not against God, per se).

...Directly about his existence, arguments against God should be similar to arguments against fairies. In this case, the burden of proof is not for atheism.

This appears to be another instance of the "Leprechaun Fallacy," which is itself a failure to distinguish between contingent existence (i.e., leprechauns or fairies) and non-contingent existence (i.e., God). This "Leprechaun Fallacy" is almost always advanced in order to shift the burden of proof, which (in the case of theism vs. nontheism) is an example of the logical fallacy of assuming the consequent.

[LiamOS]

This appears to be another instance of the Leprechaun fallacy, which is itself a failure to distinguish between contingent existence (i.e., leprechauns or fairies) and non-contingent existence (i.e., God). This Leprechaun fallacy is almost always advanced in order to shift the burden of proof, which (in the case of theism vs. nontheism) is an example of the logical fallacy of assuming the consequent.

I'm quite sure that for an entity to exist who cares about human affairs does not follow from any necessary attributes of a non-contingent element.
I'll grant you that it's quite likely that an entity whose existence is non-contingent in some sense exists, but why must that be a Theistic God? That doesn't even qualify as a Deistic God.

[Ragna]

...I don't know against which "god" you are talking...To more properly address arguments "against God" you should first define God...

Here is my working definition of theism:

The belief that there is an ultimate, absolute, necessary and non-contingent Reality which affords the contingent reality of our lives and of the entire universe and to which we humans (individually or collectively) might actually matter in some way, whether by personal Divine response or by Divinely-established autonomic reaction.

So basically, if I understood well, you define theism as the belief in that our contingent (which I think means non-necessary, I'm not really into logic names) existence needs for a divine non-contingent (necessary?) being which makes humans important or meaningful.

The only definition I can drag from your god here is that he/she/it is non-contingent and somehow his/her/its existence makes humans important or meaningful.

This needs the assumption that we are somehow important, which is totally subjective. A disguise for the strong anthropic principle? Fine-tunning?

Atheist arguments against this are the bad design (philosophical), multiverse theories and quantum top-down modeling (physical, scientific). But I feel that any strong anthropic principle is an exaggeration of the weak one.

I still think the burden of proof is for the theist to demonstrate that we are somehow special, without presupposing that we are so because there is a god.

...but simple logical reasoning can prove a God with X usually attributed characteristics to be illogical. Without God being benevolent, omniscient, omnipotent or we being the center of his creation, God becomes just a void name...

That's an interesting line of thought. Would you care to explain it further? I've found that most nontheists here have problematic understandings of "omniscience" and "omnipotence," but that obviously counts only as evidence of their misunderstanding of the terms (and not against God, per se).

My definitions:

Omnipotence is the ability to do anything possible to do, which of course doesn't go against the laws of logic. This ability would include... creating the universe and doing apparent miracles.

Omniscience is the ability to know everything, including the future. This is where a contradiction comes for me: omniscience implies determinism, so either god is not omniscient or we haven't got free will. If god is not omniscient, theism is a bad reasoning because he wouldn't have known humans would exist when he created the universe, unless you believe in some sort of Young Earth theory. So it would have to displace god to a deist position.

Benevolence, which I don't have to define, is really hard to defend for a theist. I've heard that evil actually is a proof for God... and I don't think so. I don't think I have to expand on this, it's not the place here.

Mainly my thought that God is illogical rises from the from the omniscience/determinism duality which forces Deism in (or a determined world, which would also make Deism go over Theism because of the lack of free will.)

I've seen theists trying to deny that omniscience implies determinism. If you are one of those, then this would have to be discussed separately.

...Directly about his existence, arguments against God should be similar to arguments against fairies. In this case, the burden of proof is not for atheism.

This appears to be another instance of the "Leprechaun Fallacy," which is itself a failure to distinguish between contingent existence (i.e., leprechauns or fairies) and non-contingent existence (i.e., God). This "Leprechaun Fallacy" is almost always advanced in order to shift the burden of proof, which (in the case of theism vs. nontheism) is an example of the logical fallacy of assuming the consequent.

So God is non-contingent, he is necessary. This sounds to me too ontological argument . I guess you still have to show why he is so, because you are making the positive statement. If not, please explain to me why I'm assuming the consequent, because I'm not really into logic as I said before.

---

Off-topic, but a little on topic too, after writing this I saw you are in a group called something and "ontological argument". Just curious, do you think the ontological argument is sound? I might start a thread about it if I dare some day soon.

[EduChris]

...if I understood well, you define theism as the belief in that our contingent...existence needs for a divine non-contingent...being which makes humans important or meaningful...The only definition I can drag from your god here is that he/she/it is non-contingent and somehow his/her/its existence makes humans important or meaningful...

Here is a two-part paraphrase of my working definition: 1) God is that which is ultimately necessary for anything else to exist, and 2) humans might matter in some way to this Ultimate Reality.

...This needs the assumption that we are somehow important, which is totally subjective. A disguise for the strong anthropic principle? Fine-tunning?...

I'm not following you here.

...Atheist arguments against this are the bad design (philosophical), multiverse theories and quantum top-down modeling (physical, scientific)...

As far as I can tell, science is a value-neutral pragmatic endeavor that attempts to explain how things work. I'm not sure how this has any bearing at all on the question of God.

...But I feel that any strong anthropic principle is an exaggeration of the weak one...

Can you explain what you mean by anthropic principle? I don't see how it has any bearing on anything I've brought up so far.

...I still think the burden of proof is for the theist to demonstrate that we are somehow special, without presupposing that we are so because there is a god...

I don't think that I've argued that humans are special, although it does appear that humans have unique characteristics. I feel you've gotten ahead of me here, so perhaps you could back up and explain your line of thought.

...Omnipotence is the ability to do anything possible to do, which of course doesn't go against the laws of logic. This ability would include... creating the universe and doing apparent miracles...

Not bad. In my view, God's "omnipotence" means that all power ultimately derives from God.

...Omniscience is the ability to know everything, including the future. This is where a contradiction comes for me: omniscience implies determinism, so either god is not omniscient or we haven't got free will. If god is not omniscient, theism is a bad reasoning because he wouldn't have known humans would exist when he created the universe, unless you believe in some sort of Young Earth theory. So it would have to displace god to a deist position...

In my view, God's "omniscience" means that God knows all things which are knowable. God can foresee all future possibilities, but until some particular possibility plays itself out, it can only be known as a possibility rather than a foregone actuality.

...Benevolence, which I don't have to define, is really hard to defend for a theist. I've heard that evil actually is a proof for God... and I don't think so. I don't think I have to expand on this, it's not the place here...

I think of benevolence in terms of my role as a parent. I want the best for my children, but sometimes the best thing for me to do is step back and let them learn from their mistakes.

...Mainly my thought that God is illogical rises from the from the omniscience/determinism duality which forces Deism in (or a determined world, which would also make Deism go over Theism because of the lack of free will.)...

In my view you have defined omniscience in a way that makes free will impossible. I don't see how this counts as an argument against God (as opposed to an argument that your definition needs a bit of work).

...I've seen theists trying to deny that omniscience implies determinism. If you are one of those, then this would have to be discussed separately...

My definition of omniscience does not imply determinisim--other than that God knows all future possibilities given this particular universe. However, my point in trying to define "omniscience," "omnipotence," and "benevolence" is designed more to show that the non-theistic arguments that use these terms really only work with particular definitions of these terms--and that those definitions are not necessary or even convincing.

...So God is non-contingent, he is necessary. This sounds to me too ontological argument . I guess you still have to show why he is so, because you are making the positive statement...

Per part #1 of my definition, God is non-contingent. You asked me to define "God," and so I did. According to my definition, if something is contingent, it cannot be God.

...please explain to me why I'm assuming the consequent, because I'm not really into logic as I said before...

There are only two possibilities: either theism is true, or else it is not. If we say that theism is not true, then necessarily we are left with the assumption that there is some explanation other than God for the universe (or perhaps there is no explanation at all that is comprehensible to us). But there is no evidence at all for such an assumption. In other words, the burdern of proof does not apply since there is no evidence either way. There is a positive statement being made about the universe's explanation regardless of whether one assumes theism or non-theism.

...Off-topic, but a little on topic too, after writing this I saw you are in a group called something and "ontological argument". Just curious, do you think the ontological argument is sound? I might start a thread about it if I dare some day soon.

I believe Godel's formulation of the argument is sound enough--particularly with the enhancements I made. Basically, in that thread the main sticking point was the definition of what Godel called a "positive property." I believe I not only defined such properties, but also enumerated them.

[Ragna]

...if I understood well, you define theism as the belief in that our contingent...existence needs for a divine non-contingent...being which makes humans important or meaningful...The only definition I can drag from your god here is that he/she/it is non-contingent and somehow his/her/its existence makes humans important or meaningful...

Here is a two-part paraphrase of my working definition: 1) God is that which is ultimately necessary for anything else to exist, and 2) humans might matter in some way to this Ultimate Reality.

...This needs the assumption that we are somehow important, which is totally subjective. A disguise for the strong anthropic principle? Fine-tunning?...

I'm not following you here.

Ok. Then I now reformulate it and still affirm you presuppose there is "something which is ultimately necessary for anything else to exist." Why is it? Things can just exist, and I can't see how it is an explanation, because you would also have to explain why God has to exist without talking about the supposed consequences, saying: "since we exist God must as well" because that would be circular reasoning.

...Atheist arguments against this are the bad design (philosophical), multiverse theories and quantum top-down modeling (physical, scientific)...

As far as I can tell, science is a value-neutral pragmatic endeavor that attempts to explain how things work. I'm not sure how this has any bearing at all on the question of God.

...But I feel that any strong anthropic principle is an exaggeration of the weak one...

Can you explain what you mean by anthropic principle? I don't see how it has any bearing on anything I've brought up so far.

By anthropic principle, specially the strong one, I mean the supposed fine-tunning of the universe for life, specially the development of humans. This has to do with the topic because that is the most common argument to say that we are "special". I was pointing out that some quantum physics interpretations, some of them including multiverses, can explain this without a need for us to be special. Science is neutral but science should never be forgotten, and in this case I was pointing for an explanation science offers to the fine-tunning of the universe.

...I still think the burden of proof is for the theist to demonstrate that we are somehow special, without presupposing that we are so because there is a god...

I don't think that I've argued that humans are special, although it does appear that humans have unique characteristics. I feel you've gotten ahead of me here, so perhaps you could back up and explain your line of thought.

If you haven't argued that humans are special then sorry, all what I've said before was arguing human's speciality.

...Omnipotence is the ability to do anything possible to do, which of course doesn't go against the laws of logic. This ability would include... creating the universe and doing apparent miracles...

Not bad. In my view, God's "omnipotence" means that all power ultimately derives from God.

...Omniscience is the ability to know everything, including the future. This is where a contradiction comes for me: omniscience implies determinism, so either god is not omniscient or we haven't got free will. If god is not omniscient, theism is a bad reasoning because he wouldn't have known humans would exist when he created the universe, unless you believe in some sort of Young Earth theory. So it would have to displace god to a deist position...

In my view, God's "omniscience" means that God knows all things which are knowable. God can foresee all future possibilities, but until some particular possibility plays itself out, it can only be known as a possibility rather than a foregone actuality.

I consider the future knowable, because I'm a determinist, so I don't agree with your definition here. If God created the universe but knew we were only a possibility, then theism is really weak - I still say it would fall to a deism level.

...Benevolence, which I don't have to define, is really hard to defend for a theist. I've heard that evil actually is a proof for God... and I don't think so. I don't think I have to expand on this, it's not the place here...

I think of benevolence in terms of my role as a parent. I want the best for my children, but sometimes the best thing for me to do is step back and let them learn from their mistakes.

Ok, I don't really want to discuss the problem of evil here, but your current definition can't really explain things like the Haiti Earthquake. "Natural evil" can hardly be explained.

...Mainly my thought that God is illogical rises from the from the omniscience/determinism duality which forces Deism in (or a determined world, which would also make Deism go over Theism because of the lack of free will.)...

In my view you have defined omniscience in a way that makes free will impossible. I don't see how this counts as an argument against God (as opposed to an argument that your definition needs a bit of work).

It all goes back if you think the future is knowable. I'm a determinist, so I do. It makes perfect sense to me that if I made something I would know its development, so either God doesn't know the future (I don't care if you still call him omniscient or not) and then he is passive (Deism) or he knows the future and we are determined (Deism as well). This is an argument against theism, not against God. When I'm left with a deist god I would use other reasonings to arrive to atheism, like Ockham's razor. Remember that God itself is not falsifiable, but you just can do reductio ad absurdum with his typical characteristics until it's a void name.

...I've seen theists trying to deny that omniscience implies determinism. If you are one of those, then this would have to be discussed separately...

My definition of omniscience does not imply determinism--other than that God knows all future possibilities given this particular universe. However, my point in trying to define "omniscience," "omnipotence," and "benevolence" is designed more to show that the non-theistic arguments that use these terms really only work with particular definitions of these terms--and that those definitions are not necessary or even convincing.

Again, it's just a name. My position that "knowing future" (if you don't want to call it "omniscience") makes theism deism still holds, due to the reasoning I've put above already.

...So God is non-contingent, he is necessary. This sounds to me too ontological argument . I guess you still have to show why he is so, because you are making the positive statement...

Per part #1 of my definition, God is non-contingent. You asked me to define "God," and so I did. According to my definition, if something is contingent, it cannot be God.

If I say fairies are non-contingent then, according to my definition...? I would still have to prove why I need a non-contingent thing to explain existence.

...please explain to me why I'm assuming the consequent, because I'm not really into logic as I said before...

There are only two possibilities: either theism is true, or else it is not. If we say that theism is not true, then necessarily we are left with the assumption that there is some explanation other than God for the universe (or perhaps there is no explanation at all that is comprehensible to us). But there is no evidence at all for such an assumption. In other words, the burdern of proof does not apply since there is no evidence either way. There is a positive statement being made about the universe's explanation regardless of whether one assumes theism or non-theism.

It's not about two options. It's about you say that the universe was created according to some creation process or to some personified non-contingent creation process (creator) which often implies other characteristics. If you agree God is just a creation process, then God will just be a name for a process, but that doesn't make him non-contingent or all that stuff which is usually attributed to him. The burden of proof is to show how this creation process can be linked to the definitions you might give of God.

...Off-topic, but a little on topic too, after writing this I saw you are in a group called something and "ontological argument". Just curious, do you think the ontological argument is sound? I might start a thread about it if I dare some day soon.

I believe Godel's formulation of the argument is sound enough--particularly with the enhancements I made. Basically, in that thread the main sticking point was the definition of what Godel called a "positive property." I believe I not only defined such properties, but also enumerated them.

Thank you for the link, I promise I'll read it.

[EduChris]

...I now reformulate it and still affirm you presuppose there is "something which is ultimately necessary for anything else to exist." Why is it? Things can just exist, and I can't see how it is an explanation, because you would also have to explain why God has to exist...

Theists and non-theists alike have to stop somewhere, lest our explanations fall into the trap of infinite regress. Theists posit for our universe an ultimate explanation which is "other than" or "beyond" our universe (or any putative multiverse). Non-theists typically posit that our universe (or multiverse) is its own explanation, and that no further explanation is needed. Which of these proposed explanation is more likely? How we could even begin to calculate the odds for either option? At any rate, our universe appears to be winding down and there appears to be nothing about it that would imply or suggest its non-contingence. If our universe is contingent, then either something else (other than our universe) must be non-contingent, or else we are left with the possibility that entire universes simply pop out of nothing for no reason and without any cause. Given that scenario, Occam's razor would lead to solipsism (i.e., a single mind) rather than to an actual universe/multiverse scenario (i.e., billions of minds). And again, in any event it is not at all clear how we could begin to calculate the probabilities for any of these proposals.

...some quantum physics interpretations, some of them including multiverses, can explain this without a need for us to be special...

As far as I know, a multiverse cannot be detected or examined by science, and so it is more of a hypothesis than an explanation. Moreover, a multiverse which is finite simply pushes the question of ultimate origins back one step, without really providing an explanation. But if the multiverse is not finite, then every conceivable universe would necessarily have an infinite number of instantiations--including an infinite number of universes in which a man named Jesus of Nazareth actually comes back to life after having been dead for portions of three days. In other words, a finite multiverse explains nothing, and an infinite multiverse explains too much.

...If you haven't argued that humans are special then sorry, all what I've said before was arguing human's speciality...

I haven't made the argument that humans are special, and for the purposes of this thread I would only care to comment on that topic if it were necessary in order to demonstrate that there exists some particular argument against God which could only be countered by demonstrating the "specialness" of humans.

I will say that there appears to be a qualitative progression from mineral to vegetable to animal to human--but I'm not sure this is relevant to my debate question. Is it relevant? Do you have an argument against God which can only be countered by some demonstration that humans are special?

...If God created the universe but knew we were only a possibility, then theism is really weak - I still say it would fall to a deism level...

In terms of a definition of omniscience, I wouldn't want to rule out the possibility that God might know what God will do, and that God could make a universe with the specific intention of providing space and time for intelligent creatures to help create their own future via the free choices which are available to them.

...Ok, I don't really want to discuss the problem of evil here, but your current definition can't really explain things like the Haiti Earthquake. "Natural evil" can hardly be explained...

I don't particularly care to rehash the argument from evil unless it is relevant in some way to my debate question. However, I will say that most natural evils are compounded by human evil and shortsightedness. Moreover, as a parent I might very well choose to allow my child to suffer provided there were some compensating benefit which could best be realized as a result of that suffering.

...It makes perfect sense to me that if I made something I would know its development, so either God doesn't know the future (I don't care if you still call him omniscient or not) and then he is passive (Deism) or he knows the future and we are determined (Deism as well). This is an argument against theism, not against God...

My point is that God's omniscience does not logically constrain God from creating a universe in which intelligent creatures enjoy the God-given capacity to participate in the creation of their future via the free choices they make from the available options.

...When I'm left with a deist god I would use other reasonings to arrive to atheism, like Ockham's razor. Remember that God itself is not falsifiable, but you just can do reductio ad absurdum with his typical characteristics until it's a void name...

Occam's razor is useful to a point, but it can't be applied indefinitely or else we're left with solipsicm. And beyond that, I believe my thoughts on "omniscience" cast doubt on any necessary preference for deism over theism.

...If I say fairies are non-contingent then, according to my definition...? I would still have to prove why I need a non-contingent thing to explain existence...

If fairies or leprechauns are non-contingent (and I don't know of anyone who actually claims that they are) then what you really have is a specific, particular sort of God. I would argue that the general concept of God must be established as a legitimate option first, and only then can we begin to debate the merits of particular conceptions of God. What advantages does a "Fairy God" or a "Leprechaun God" have over other more established conceptions of God? If there are no advantages, then why not start with discussions of God-conceptions which vast numbers of people have actually found to be useful?

...It's not about two options. It's about you say that the universe was created according to some creation process or to some personified non-contingent creation process (creator) which often implies other characteristics. If you agree God is just a creation process, then God will just be a name for a process, but that doesn't make him non-contingent or all that stuff which is usually attributed to him. The burden of proof is to show how this creation process can be linked to the definitions you might give of God...

Now you are getting to the second part of my definition of God--i.e., the possibility that "we humans (individually or collectively) might actually matter in some way" to this God. And in terms of the debate question I have proposed for this thread, what arguments do you offer in support of the contention that we humans cannot possibly matter to the "ultimate, absolute, necessary and non-contingent Reality which affords the contingent reality of our lives and of the entire universe"?

[Furrowed Brow]

This appears to be another instance of the "Leprechaun Fallacy," which is itself a failure to distinguish between contingent existence (i.e., leprechauns or fairies) and non-contingent existence (i.e., God).

The leprechaun argument is used a couple of ways. [1] Most non believers use leprechauns or fairies or Santa to point out lack of evidence. The argument goes something like: There is no more evidence to believe in God than there are leprechauns. It does not matter that the theist attributes non contingent existence to God. Sure they think God must exist if he exists but there is no evidence therefore there is no evidence to support belief in a non contingent God.

This makes me ponder what you mean when you talk about arguments against God. Pointing out the lack of evidence is an argument against believing in God. It is not strictly an argument against God because there may well be a God, but there just aint no evidence. Non believer folk who use leprechauns as per [1] usually do not say there is no God, they say there is no reasons based on any evidence to believe there is a God. It is true that quite often the non believer moves seamlessly from no evidence to no reason without the explicit qualification but this move is usually an informal matter of phrasing and the point is understood in context.

Pointing out there is no evidence is only a fallacy if applied to concepts which are never a question of evidence in the first place.

Fewer non believers deploy a different kind of argument in addition to the basic there is no evidence argument. [2] This argument says a leprechaun is a fictional character in a narrative. The question of the existence of leprechauns is answered before any search for evidence begins because we already know that like Santa and fairies that we made them up. Some folk might get confused and mistake them for potentially real entities, but that is some folk for you. The argument is the same as someone going to see the last Iron Man movie or the upcoming Thor movie and thinking that what they are watching might have some basis in reality. This argument takes the form that belief in leprechauns/Santa/Fairies or God is a failure to distinguish fantasy narratives from reality. On this view making Santa or God a question of evidence is a category mistake. To then attribute either contingent or non-contingent existence to leprechauns or God is a meaningless attribution because on this view attention to how the narrative is constructed means we should not be treating them as potentially real.

Together the two forms of leprechaun argument form a powerful argument against belief in God. [1] If there is no evidence then there is no evidence and which confirms what we knew already because of [2].

Against [1] a theist might like to argue there is evidence for God and against [2] they might like to argue that God is not a fantasy narrative. But either way we get into the nitty gritty of the argument.

This "Leprechaun Fallacy" is almost always advanced in order to shift the burden of proof, which (in the case of theism vs. nontheism) is an example of the logical fallacy of assuming the consequence.

Theist says to non believer there are reasons/evidences to believe in God. The non believer says there is no good reason to believe what you are telling me. This is the usual stance of a non believer other than a strong atheist. there is no fallacy of assuming the consequent committed here.

If the non believer is saying there is no God then they need to support that claim or admit they are irrational. If the non believer says there is no reason to believe in God then the leprechaun argument used as per [1] illuminates what they mean and where the burden of proof really lies...which is with the theist. If they are using the argument as per [2] then they need to do some work to show why they think God belongs in a fantasy narrative.