Do we have a soul that only God can destroy?

[McCulloch]

While you may consider my statement an opinion, I will also defend it as truth. We have a soul with a consciousness that only God can destroy.

Do we have a soul with a consciousness that only God can destroy?

[JoeyKnothead]

From Post 74:

Do you agree that the ink and paper consist of the same basic particles as we find in the brain?

Pretty much.

If so, would you say that "basic particles" provide, in themselves, the basis for consciousness? Or is it rather the specific relationships between all of these particles that provides that basis?

Things act according to their properties.

In the case of paper, we get stuff that does it one heckuva job being paper. In the case of the brain, we get stuff that does it one heckuva job being a brain.

I find your line of reasoning faulty on the basis of an incomplete set of data. The data we do have indicates that by mucking about the brain, we can alter the state of consciousness.

What data might you present that leads us to conclude paper has consciousness?

I propose none. I propose you can only attempt to say such as, "Well there's particles there, and particles over yonder, so consciousness oughta be in all of it." This is the problem with a comparison of paper and brain. We have a multitude of data supporting the idea that consciousness is a property, emergent or otherwise, of the brain, and I reckon one sheet of paper swearing up and down it does too.

If "particles" + "nothing else" does not equal consciousness, and if "particles" + "something else" = consciousness, then perhaps consciousness derives more from the "something else" than from the particles.

See above, where consciousness can be affected by things we do to the brain, and not one speck of data shows we can affect the 'consciousness' of a sheet of paper.

As an analogy, "rock" + "nothing else" does not equal a sculpture; but "rock" plus "applied artistic skill" = sculpture.

Your problem here then is showing us all how a god's got this great big ol' chisel.

You are comparing the known - "folks'll carve them up some stuff", with the unknown - "and don't it beat all, God's the best of us at it".

In fact, the "rock" is not at all essential to a sculpture. A sculpture can result from "applied artistic skill" plus numerous other substances--

Plenty fair.

--or even without any actual substance, as in the mere imagining of the sculpture.

And we see that many a folk'll imagine them up one fancy God.

[EduChris]

...Things act according to their properties...

Can you explain how this is not a tautology?

[JoeyKnothead]

From Post 77:

...Things act according to their properties...

Can you explain how this is not a tautology?

I present such as a reasoned and logical take, based on the observance of things.

Can you show where it's wrong?

Do you, EduChris, contend that paper is conscious? If not, why the comparison? If yes, please present supporting data for analysis.

Y'all out there, have any of y'all ever seen a sheet of paper hop up and run outside in a rush to get the polebeans in 'fore dark? Have y'all ever seen a sheet of paper exhibit consciousness? Y'all ever try to make you a mule out of paper? How much plowin'd ya get done if ya did?

Yes, paper is composed of a bunch of the same stuff as the brain. That does not mean it's composed of all the same stuff, much less near enough of it that we should conclude it's sitting there being conscious.

Simplistically, and I'm just reminding folks, but atoms combine to make stuff, and upon that making, that stuff is seen to then exhibit properties that were not unique to the atoms in their 'previous state' alone, and are unique from other combinations of atoms.

As I mentioned before, I contend the line of reasoning presented in Post 74 here is faulty. It seeks to compare the relatively simply-composed paper with the relatively complexly-composed brain, based on sharing some details of composition.

Paper does not, best is known, carry on with electro-chemical actions, of which the association with consciousness is well established. Where it does compare to the brain, it does so only in a relatively superficial, and unimportant (consciously speaking) manner.

[EduChris]

From Post 77:

...Things act according to their properties...

Can you explain how this is not a tautology?

I present such as a reasoned and logical take, based on the observance of things...

So apparently the short answer is, "No, I cannot show how this is not a tautology."

The problem, Joey, is that a tautology is not an answer or an explanation.

[JoeyKnothead]

From Post 79:

So apparently the short answer is, "No, I cannot show how this is not a tautology."

And the missing answer, to the now missing question, is can you show the statement...

"Things act according to their properties", to be in error?

Do you contend things don't act according to their properties?

I have the fullest confidence the observer who reads my entire post, of which you present only a snippet, will see that I explained myself well.

The problem, Joey, is that a tautology is not an answer or an explanation.

Then we must conclude you did you some tautulatin' of your own, right there when you failed to answer my questions.

[instantc]

... would you say that "basic particles" provide, in themselves, the basis for consciousness? Or is it rather the specific relationships between all of these particles that provides that basis?

What we observe is consciousness arising from the brain, which consists of physical particles. Occam's razor tells us not to posit causes beyond necessity, therefore you'd need a good reason to suspect that there is more to consciousness than physical matter. Do you have such reasons, apart from the fact that consciousness arising from physical matter may seem counterintuitive to you?

[EduChris]

...What we observe is consciousness arising from the brain...

How do we observe this? Isn't it rather a matter of (indirect) observation and interpretation?

...which consists of physical particles...

How much do we really understand about physical particles? What exactly are they? Will our understanding of such, 200 years from today, bear any resemblance to the theories we hold today?

...Occam's razor tells us not to posit causes beyond necessity, therefore you'd need a good reason to suspect that there is more to consciousness than physical matter...

The best reason is that physical particles seem to be something entirely different than mental experiences. We could look at a particular brain state, but seeing that brain state could not, by itself, describe the mental experience.

...Do you have such reasons, apart from the fact that consciousness arising from physical matter may seem counterintuitive to you?

The main reason is that there cannot be, even in principle, any evidence to show that particles = mental experience. Given that all our experience shows that consciousness can only arise from some prior consciousness, the inference to the best explanation is that particles may be in some way a conduit for some mental experiences, but the conduit is not the same as the mental experience itself.

[instantc]

...Occam's razor tells us not to posit causes beyond necessity, therefore you'd need a good reason to suspect that there is more to consciousness than physical matter...

The best reason is that physical particles seem to be something entirely different than mental experiences. We could look at a particular brain state, but seeing that brain state could not, by itself, describe the mental experience.

Does it follow from here that the brain cannot by itself produce the said mental experience? In other words, are you suggesting that an additional ingredient apart from the physical brain is required for consciousness to arise, or do you merely suggest that the mental experience is a 'non-physical' product of the brain? Particularly, as you seem to be arguing for the existence of a soul, what reasons do you have to favor the former explanation over the latter?

...Do you have such reasons, apart from the fact that consciousness arising from physical matter may seem counterintuitive to you?

The main reason is that there cannot be, even in principle, any evidence to show that particles = mental experience. Given that all our experience shows that consciousness can only arise from some prior consciousness, the inference to the best explanation is that particles may be in some way a conduit for some mental experiences, but the conduit is not the same as the mental experience itself.

Another possible explanation is that consciousness requires such a complex physical structure that we haven't been able to artificially build one yet. If anything, Occam's razor would favor this explanation. Why make mysterious assumptions of non-physical entities until we have found some evidence suggesting that producing a consciousness by physical means is impossible?

[EduChris]

...Does it follow from here that the brain cannot by itself produce the said mental experience? In other words, are you suggesting that an additional ingredient apart from the physical brain is required for consciousness to arise, or do you merely suggest that the mental experience is a 'non-physical' product of the brain?...

Mental experience is certainly something--it is in fact the most real thing any of us can ever know. And mental experience is not physical--it has no weight, no mass. The fact that the non-physical is present within this universe tells us that "physical stuff" is not all there is to reality. As an analogy, a marble statue is more than mere "physical stuff"; with out the design, it is just another hunk of dead stone.

...Particularly, as you seem to be arguing for the existence of a soul, what reasons do you have to favor the former explanation over the latter?...

Mental experience is simply not reducible to physical structure. In the same way, a message cannot be reduced to mere ink and paper.

...Another possible explanation is that consciousness requires such a complex physical structure that we haven't been able to artificially build one yet. If anything, Occam's razor would favor this explanation...

Occam's razor tells us not to multiply entities unnecessarily. It does not tell us to multiply assumptions arbitrarily.

...Why make mysterious assumptions of non-physical entities until we have found some evidence suggesting that producing a consciousness by physical means is impossible?

How do you propose to prove that consciousness can or cannot be produced by strictly impersonal causation?

[McCulloch]

Mental experience is certainly something--it is in fact the most real thing any of us can ever know. And mental experience is not physical--it has no weight, no mass. The fact that the non-physical is present within this universe tells us that "physical stuff" is not all there is to reality. As an analogy, a marble statue is more than mere "physical stuff"; with out the design, it is just another hunk of dead stone.

Patterns can and do emerge without design. Mental experience is no more than a complex pattern of neurons, shaped by experience and evolution. There is no need to postulate a non-physical reality.

How do you propose to prove that consciousness can or cannot be produced by strictly impersonal causation?

No need to prove anything yet. It is reasonable to believe that consciousness can be produced by strictly impersonal causation, if one assumes the biological truth of evolution. Bacteria are not conscious, are they? Given that it is conceivable that consciousness can be produced by impersonal causation, and that there is no evidence of a non-physical reality, it would seem that the burden of proof would lie with those who claim the existence of a personal creator.