MaryAnn, Ginger, the IRS, Beliefs, Choices & Consequence

[mrmufin]

I've been reading and participating in various online religious debate forums for a few years now, and many times I've heard Christians state, in one form or another, that we non-Christians have a "choice" in whether or not to believe in God, the Bible, and the veracity of scriptures. Statements of this type often stem from discussions about omnipotence and free will and eternity in either heaven or hell. Try as I might, I'm unable to fathom that my sincerely held beliefs (or lack thereof) are at all chosen. To put some boundaries on what beliefs and choices are, I'll offer their respective definitions upfront, as provided by Webster's New World Dictionary and Thesaurus:

belief: 1 conviction that certain things are true 2 religious faith 3 trust or confidence 4 creed or doctrine 5 an opinion; expectation; judgement

choice: 1 a choosing; selection 2 the right or power to choose 3 a person or thing chosen 4 the best part 5 a variety from which to choose 6 an alternative

I'll present some examples of what I would and would not regard as beliefs, as well as why I regard them as such, in an attempt to clarify my position and try to avoid tangential issues about whether or not a given proposition qualifies as a belief.

I believe that MaryAnn is more attractive than Ginger. This is a belief; it conforms with the fifth definition of belief provided above as an opinion and judgement. It also defies independent and immediate verification until such time as an objective means of evaluating attractiveness is established.

I believe that my car will start the next time I need to drive somewhere, even though it's been running kinda crappy lately. This qualifies as a belief since it is a statement of confidence about a future event.

In contrast, I do not need to believe that the New York Mets won the 1986 World Series. The games are over, the scores are final, their win is a fact and remains as such regardless of religious affiliation, political party, sexual orientation or any amount of love for the Boston Red Sox. Nor do I need to believe that my car started successfully last Thursday; no confidence, trust, conviction, faith, doctrine or opinion is required.

I'm not suggesting that beliefs are either innate nor final, but changing sincerely held beliefs requires additional compelling data. For example, if Sherwood Schwartz released some old episodes of Gilligan's Island which portray MaryAnn as a vindictive, back-stabbing bitch and Ginger as a non-pretentious, considerate gal with a deep interest in mathematics and a love of Beethoven's piano concertos, my belief about who is more attractive may very well change. (As well, that change in belief would be fully compatible with my fetish for green-eyed redheads. )

What constitutes a choice can get a bit more difficult since some choices might have considerable consequences. If I go to Baskin-Robbins, I can choose from a variety of ice cream flavors which I find equally appealing (coffee, strawberry cheesecake, mint chocolate chip, orange cream) as well as some which I find less appealing (vanilla, chocolate, bublegum) with little or no negative consequence. As the potential for negative consequences increases for a particular selection, I consider my choice in a given matter to be diminished. For example, I can "choose" not to file a tax return with the IRS, but doing so means weighing the potential consequences against the potential gain by not filing. By my measure, I regard the penalties for not filing as having a greater negative consequence than filing, and Congress and the IRS have stacked the deck in such a fashion as to make a highly persuasive case for "choosing" to file tax returns in a timely fashion.

As well, there are some things which I definitely did not choose: my eye color, my sexual orientation, my skin tone, etc.

Based on its scriptural depictions, as well as the statements of believers in such, hell doesn't sound like a very fun place. Per the statements made by most Christians, hell is my ultimate destiny due to my lack of belief in a particular god. I don't make it into heaven just by being a nice guy; I need to choose Christ as my savior, yada yada yada. And there's the rub: I don't think I can choose what I sincerely believe. I may have all the alleged free will in the Universe, but try as I might, I'm as unable to "choose to believe" in a particular god as I am unable to choose to believe that Ginger is more attractive than MaryAnn.

So here's the question: Are beliefs cognitive or volitional functions? My position, as I've attempted to demonstrate, is that sincere beliefs are not volitional. If your position is that beliefs are chosen, I'd certainly appreciate a demonstration or two to support your claim.

For us non-Christians, our beliefs are not necessarily final. However, changing those beliefs requires additional compelling data; without such, we are destined to eternity in hell as a result of unconvincing evidence. Should not an all-powerful god have the capacity to provide sufficiently compelling evidence to alter my beliefs? Or has God, like Congress and the IRS, stacked the deck in advance against me?

Regards,
mrmufin

[ST88]

It gets more complicated, though. It is possible to say "I choose to believe that the ending of The Great Gatsby is actually a hopeful view of how the American future is a limitless horizon." Or: "I choose to believe that 'Gilligan's Island' is a morality play where the characters represent the deadly sins."

These fall under the 5) definition of believe. In this case, it is strictly an opinion. I ask you this: Is it possible to have a genuine opinion about God, or is there always something else at work? I'm piggy-backing my question on your excellent analysis of the situation: Opinion implies that you have some choice in the matter, but true belief implies that you do not.

If true belief requires something other than choice, then where does it come from? And if additional compelling data can change belief, then could it be constituted as a belief?

Example: A certain population in Iceland believes that there is an entire world of elves -- hidden people -- that lives inside boulders, one of which was perched on a hillside. The Icelandic government tried to remove or destroy the boulder, claiming that it was a hazard to the town below the hillside, but ultimately decided not to in order not to offend the believers. Aside from the question of how in the world did these beliefs get started, is there any way to change the beliefs of this population?

I understand what you're saying about not being able to choose what you sincerely believe. But if what you sincerely believe is based on evidence or possible future evidence, could it be said that it is possible to have any beliefs? Or all they all -- as explained by your possible experience with Ginger & Mary Ann -- just choices based on perceptions?

[Hannibal]

I've been reading and participating in various online religious debate forums for a few years now, and many times I've heard Christians state, in one form or another, that we non-Christians have a "choice" in whether or not to believe in God, the Bible, and the veracity of scriptures. Statements of this type often stem from discussions about omnipotence and free will and eternity in either heaven or hell. Try as I might, I'm unable to fathom that my sincerely held beliefs (or lack thereof) are at all chosen.

I agree that belief does not appear to be a choice. If I were to be tossed off the empire state building, it would certainly be preferable to imagine that I had a parachute on my back, and had I a choice, I might believe it as well.

I believe that MaryAnn is more attractive than Ginger. This is a belief; it conforms with the fifth definition of belief provided above as an opinion and judgement. It also defies independent and immediate verification until such time as an objective means of evaluating attractiveness is established.

you are a man of taste

In contrast, I do not need to believe that the New York Mets won the 1986 World Series. The games are over, the scores are final, their win is a fact and remains as such regardless of religious affiliation, political party, sexual orientation or any amount of love for the Boston Red Sox. Nor do I need to believe that my car started successfully last Thursday; no confidence, trust, conviction, faith, doctrine or opinion is required.

I'm not suggesting that beliefs are either innate nor final, but changing sincerely held beliefs requires additional compelling data. For example, if Sherwood Schwartz released some old episodes of Gilligan's Island which portray MaryAnn as a vindictive, back-stabbing bitch and Ginger as a non-pretentious, considerate gal with a deep interest in mathematics and a love of Beethoven's piano concertos, my belief about who is more attractive may very well change. (As well, that change in belief would be fully compatible with my fetish for green-eyed redheads. )

belief is obviously related to reality, even if the connection is not purely veradical.

What constitutes a choice can get a bit more difficult since some choices might have considerable consequences. If I go to Baskin-Robbins, I can choose from a variety of ice cream flavors which I find equally appealing (coffee, strawberry cheesecake, mint chocolate chip, orange cream) as well as some which I find less appealing (vanilla, chocolate, bublegum) with little or no negative consequence

It is clear to me that even situations where we have the appearance of free 'choices" that the situation is actually constrained and limited. In baskin robbins, my choice is pretty much limited to ice cream. I am limited by whether I can digest ice cream. My temperament, my physical body and my life experience dictate to a great degree what my 'preference" is - making "choice"

Furthermore, if we want to get more metaphysical, there are a multitude of other restraints: the fact that we exist, the fact that life exists, the fact that biological organisms "eat", the fact that we live in america, or a nation where there is a baskins robbins, the fact that we are healthy enough to walk to the store, the fact that we have money.....

this is just a brief review... the actual number of restraining variables is probably quite high.

This makes a mockery of the concept of "choice".

In the matter of religion, the same sort of variables apply. For example, if we all lived in Iran, the 'choice'e would concern Islam.

For us non-Christians, our beliefs are not necessarily final. However, changing those beliefs requires additional compelling data; without such, we are destined to eternity in hell as a result of unconvincing evidence. Should not an all-powerful god have the capacity to provide sufficiently compelling evidence to alter my beliefs? Or has God, like Congress and the IRS, stacked the deck in advance against me?

Regards,
mrmufin

well put. If an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent god exists, he both can, and must make himself known, so that we can make the choice.

Choices require a belief that the options exist.

[mrmufin]

It gets more complicated, though. It is possible to say "I choose to believe that the ending of The Great Gatsby is actually a hopeful view of how the American future is a limitless horizon." Or: "I choose to believe that 'Gilligan's Island' is a morality play where the characters represent the deadly sins."

Would the meaning of those sentences change any if the words choose to were omitted? Why or why not?

When presented with the proposition, "Gilligan's Island is a morality play wherein each of the castaways represents one of the seven deadly sins," one either finds it plausible or implausible, for whatever reasons. Not to offend the Gilliganists, but my gut reaction to the proposition is, "plausible, but not very probable." I don't think I have any choice as to how much deflection my rigorously calibrated skeptometer pulls in response to a proposition.

I ask you this: Is it possible to have a genuine opinion about God, or is there always something else at work? [....] Opinion implies that you have some choice in the matter, but true belief implies that you do not.

I really don't know how individuals come to their beliefs or opinions about any particular god(s), though I'm pretty sure that at least a majority of believers are sincere --er, are being genuine-- when stating their beliefs. However, I don't see any correlation between the sincerity of a belief and the reality of the same.

If true belief requires something other than choice, then where does it come from?

I think that probably varies quite a bit, but if I had to fathom a guess, I'd say it has a lot to do with culture, tradition, environment, upbringing. When informed of things by trusted persons, the default response is often, "I believe you." Being told something is true by trusted persons may also make it difficult for believers to change or relinquish beliefs.

And if additional compelling data can change belief, then could it be constituted as a belief?

Absolutely. For example... I'm somewhat embarassed to admit that for most of my life, I believed that the portrait on the US dime was of Dwight Eisenhower. Yep. Nearly forty years had passed before I looked at the damn coin close enough to realize that it's definitely not Ike.

Aside from the question of how in the world did these beliefs get started, is there any way to change the beliefs of this population?

What was the name of Schrödinger's cat? Open the box, move the rock, collapse the wave function and evaluate the data. The cat is either dead or alive; the elves are either there or they're not. If

A broader question is, "Should their beliefs be changed?" If their beliefs result in behavior which becomes detrimental to their survival, take a bulldozer to the mountain and drive out the gnomes before they tamper with the food supply. To sincerely attribute accidents to meddlesome elves is a bit... well, silly, in my opinion. However, I put that silliness on an even footing with the tale of the talking serpent.

The other side of that is, "If the data is contrary to your belief, opinion, conviction, doctrine, does your belief change accordingly? Or are only the goalposts adjusted?

I understand what you're saying about not being able to choose what you sincerely believe. But if what you sincerely believe is based on evidence or possible future evidence, could it be said that it is possible to have any beliefs? Or all they all -- as explained by your possible experience with Ginger & Mary Ann -- just choices based on perceptions?

I regard many of my beliefs as a fairly trivial set: I believe that James Dean was cooler than Elvis; the Beatles were better than the Stones ever were or could be; Jeopardy trumps Wheel of Fortune; Homer Simpson is much funnier than Fred Flintstone; etc. Opinions, one and all. Clear, unabashed opinions, subject to revision, should the evidence appropriately impact me.

Where things get fuzzy --and I suspect this is true for many of us when our beliefs are honestly interrogated-- is determining the boundaries between our sincerely held beliefs and reality.

A common denominator in all the definitions of belief is that all seem to defy immediate and/or impartial evaluation. Once I looked closely at the US dime, I no longer had to believe whose portrait it bears. Anyone can easily tell that it's Dennis Hopper.

Regards,
mrmufin

[mrmufin]

you are a man of taste

Hey, hey... let's not be jumping to hasty conclusions. To a hungry grizzly bear, I might taste pretty good; other opinions, I'm sure, will vary.

It is clear to me that even situations where we have the appearance of free 'choices" that the situation is actually constrained and limited. In baskin robbins, my choice is pretty much limited to ice cream. I am limited by whether I can digest ice cream. My temperament, my physical body and my life experience dictate to a great degree what my 'preference" is - making "choice"

Furthermore, if we want to get more metaphysical, there are a multitude of other restraints: the fact that we exist, the fact that life exists, the fact that biological organisms "eat", the fact that we live in america, or a nation where there is a baskins robbins, the fact that we are healthy enough to walk to the store, the fact that we have money.....

this is just a brief review... the actual number of restraining variables is probably quite high.

This makes a mockery of the concept of "choice".

Not really. Those of us who are alive, human, hungry, sufficiently lactose tolerant, have a few dollars, and are within a reasonable vicinity of Baskin-Robbins still get to choose from thirty one flavors once we've arrived at the store. Apparently there are enough of us that meet that criteria to keep the Baskin-Robbins franchises afloat.

The constraints on choices don't make a mockery of choice. Just because our neighbor's Rottweiller won't be on the November ballot and citizens of other countries won't be voting in the election do not --in and of themselves-- make a mockery of the choices. However, a ballot option of "None of the Above" would certainly make things interesting.

If an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent god exists, he both can, and must make himself known, so that we can make the choice.

When the evidence is sufficiently compelling, is still possible to choose otherwise? Could you choose to believe that the Sun is extinguished each night and relit in the morning? Really! That's what happens!

Choices require a belief that the options exist.

Yes; and valid, well-informed choices require the existence of real stuff to choose from. While the existence of numerous religions and their many and varied sects is prettyeasy to verify, their respective gods are a bit more elusive. Once we have the data; once the score is final; once the car starts; once the box is opened-- the belief is either validated or falsified. Or the goalposts are adjusted. Or another sect or denomination forms. Or...

Regards,
mrmufin

[Hannibal]

It is clear to me that even situations where we have the appearance of free 'choices" that the situation is actually constrained and limited. In baskin robbins, my choice is pretty much limited to ice cream. I am limited by whether I can digest ice cream. My temperament, my physical body and my life experience dictate to a great degree what my 'preference" is - making "choice"

Furthermore, if we want to get more metaphysical, there are a multitude of other restraints: the fact that we exist, the fact that life exists, the fact that biological organisms "eat", the fact that we live in america, or a nation where there is a baskins robbins, the fact that we are healthy enough to walk to the store, the fact that we have money.....

this is just a brief review... the actual number of restraining variables is probably quite high.

This makes a mockery of the concept of "choice".

Not really. Those of us who are alive, human, hungry, sufficiently lactose tolerant, have a few dollars, and are within a reasonable vicinity of Baskin-Robbins still get to choose from thirty one flavors once we've arrived at the store. Apparently there are enough of us that meet that criteria to keep the Baskin-Robbins franchises afloat.

We are talking about two different things here. I am speaking more metaphysically (In the first kantian sense) to the parameters that shape choices and limit them to the point that the basic idea of 'free will" is questionable.

The point is that there are so many parameters beyond our control that the idea of "choice" appears to rather silly. Our biology, our past experiences, our temperament, the fact that we are biological entities in the first place, the fact that we consume.

It seems that we have a very restricted range of options that we "choose" from - And no, I am not speaking of strict determinism. Even if there is a 'free will" it exists within certain parameters.

If an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent god exists, he both can, and must make himself known, so that we can make the choice.

When the evidence is sufficiently compelling, is still possible to choose otherwise?

Of course, which makes it odd that such a god does not provide adequate evidence for all.

[ST88]

Would the meaning of those sentences change any if the words choose to were omitted? Why or why not?

When presented with the proposition, "Gilligan's Island is a morality play wherein each of the castaways represents one of the seven deadly sins," one either finds it plausible or implausible, for whatever reasons. Not to offend the Gilliganists, but my gut reaction to the proposition is, "plausible, but not very probable." I don't think I have any choice as to how much deflection my rigorously calibrated skeptometer pulls in response to a proposition.

Ah, but there's the rub. The difference between choose to believe and just believe may just be semantics. If so -- that is, if the choice to believe equals belief -- then we can cancel out each belief and we are left with choice. But if choose to believe implies something different, what exactly is the difference? Is it really gut vs. brain? Making a conscious choice about what to believe requires the same amount of proof as actually believing -- namely, very little. In both cases, something "resonates" with you, causing you to feel something is right or should be right. In either of these cases, any amount of proof to the contrary is not going to sway you. Your skeptometer, I'll wager, does not run on such vagaries as "conflicting opinion" on the subject of Gilligan's Island, but rather on your intellectual estimation of the theory.

Your belief that Mary Ann is better looking is necessarily subjective (not that I disagree). But what does it say about the belief that it could be changed if you learned something else about Ginger? I know this was a missive in your post, but it's interesting. In this case, the belief goes not to an external truth, but to an internal one, meaning that your belief does not extend to some higher truth about which one is more attractive. My question can be extended: is an opinion about the subjective qualities of something/one a belief? I submit that it can only apply to the objective qualities. (e.g., "Ginger exists")

But as to your original question, if beliefs are not volitional, then they must be some kind of pre-volition, or pre-knowledge ideas that have little basis in reality except the childish idea of the things other people know, like you say. But does this mean that true believers who convert in adulthood are only kidding themselves, or are possibly childish in their views? There's a good joke about Nancy Reagan, who, when they met with the Carters as they were leaving the White House, said to Roslyn Carter (presumably trying to be civil), "I understand you're Baptists. I'm a born-again Christian." Roslyn replied, "I got it right the first time, dear."

Is it wrong to assume that Nancy had a legitimate conversion in later life? Can mid-life conversions ever be trusted?

The volitional aspect of belief, I think, is poorly understood and has to do with a general unresolvedness inherent in our species. That is to say, back when humans were nomads and natural selection was still a player in the human species, those tribes that had some kind of religious faith (or "awe of nature") tended to survive better than those who didn't. If you respect nature's power, you're more likely to realize when something is a threat to your existence, and if there's someone who's telling you that there is an invisible superpower on your side in a battle, you're more likely to fight harder. This puts us outside of nature, and we become either an antagonist or a willing servant. This evolutionary remnant is now that feeling of wonder we get when viewing, for example, the Grand Canyon, or a multi-colored sunset. For some people, this wonder has been translated to a feeling of being "lost" without some kind of guide provided by nature, or, more formally, "God". And the unresolved feelings of being "outside" of nature yet still within it become expressed as a one-ness with another being outside of nature -- as we understand and perceive it. In this case, the choice has to do with how these feelings are expressed and which ideas in the outside world connect with them.

Difficult to explain as it is, it may be similar to how we react to comedy or to art in general -- either you connect with it or you don't.

The other side of that is, "If the data is contrary to your belief, opinion, conviction, doctrine, does your belief change accordingly? Or are only the goalposts adjusted?

Of course, you must blame the data on science for being inexact.

Where things get fuzzy --and I suspect this is true for many of us when our beliefs are honestly interrogated-- is determining the boundaries between our sincerely held beliefs and reality.

A common denominator in all the definitions of belief is that all seem to defy immediate and/or impartial evaluation. Once I looked closely at the US dime, I no longer had to believe whose portrait it bears. Anyone can easily tell that it's Dennis Hopper.

I believe this is again that 5) definition of belief. I don't know that this definition really applies as the same word as the rest of them do. It's sort of halfway between an opinion and an unsupported fact. What do you believe is behind door number 3? for example. Is that really a belief? Or are we talking about homonyms, one of which is a stand-in for opinion or best guess?

[otseng]

f an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent god exists, he both can, and must make himself known, so that we can make the choice.

Choices require a belief that the options exist.

But if God conclusively made himself known, then is there a choice in believing as mrmufin pointed out in the first post? If God removed all doubt, then can one honestly make a "choice"?

Of course, which makes it odd that such a god does not provide adequate evidence for all.

There could be a number of explanations. Perhaps some people choose not to see the evidence. Or perhaps some choose to avoid the evidence.

Where things get fuzzy --and I suspect this is true for many of us when our beliefs are honestly interrogated-- is determining the boundaries between our sincerely held beliefs and reality.

Hopefully, logic and truth can determine the boundary between beliefs and reality. When one is presented with truth, then rationally it should be enough to change a sincerely held, but false, belief.

But, that is not the case. Even if one is presented with the truth, there are many other factors to prevent someone from choosing to deny one's belief. Here is a simple example. If you ask people how many states are there in the United States, what would people say? They would most likely reply, "Are you stupid? 50 of course." But, is it really 50 states? The reality is that it is not. There are only 46 states. 4 of them are commonwealths. But will this newfound knowledge change peoples' beliefs? They will probably respond with, "I don't care that there are 4 commonwealths. I'm still goiing to say that there are 50 states in the US."

[mrmufin]

Ah, but there's the rub. The difference between choose to believe and just believe may just be semantics. If so -- that is, if the choice to believe equals belief -- then we can cancel out each belief and we are left with choice.

What if the proposition about the castaways each representing one of the seven deadly sins was never directly presented? Perhaps a careful and consistent observer of Gilligan's Island with an intimate knowledge of the seven deadly sins may be projecting something onto the series which may (or may not) be valid. I don't see any choice in this case. On the other hand, when presented with the described proposition, one who has not previously considered its plausability may have a degree of choice in whether or not to believe it. In these cases, there are probably a variety of reasons why the belief is adopted (general credibility of proposer, context of proposition, source of proposition, etc.) which have little or nothing to do with the accuracy of the statement.

But if choose to believe implies something different, what exactly is the difference? Is it really gut vs. brain? Making a conscious choice about what to believe requires the same amount of proof as actually believing -- namely, very little.

Granted, very little evidence may lie underneath our beliefs. Whether or not this is a gut vs. brain belief should at least be contingent on the consequences, if any, of maintaining a belief. In the broad scheme of things, my belief (or opinion) that Barry Goldwater was the last decent Republican US senator probably won't have any severe consequences. However, if I'm sitting on the jury in a capital case, I'd better turn on my brain and try my best to honestly evaluate evidences and defenses before forging a specific, final belief.

In both cases, something "resonates" with you, causing you to feel something is right or should be right. In either of these cases, any amount of proof to the contrary is not going to sway you.

I agree, and that's an excellent way of phrasing the matter: something resonates with you. Hopefully, that resonance does not impair perceptions of evidence when the consequences may be severe.

Your skeptometer, I'll wager, does not run on such vagaries as "conflicting opinion" on the subject of Gilligan's Island, but rather on your intellectual estimation of the theory.

Perhaps one day I'll start a thread regarding skeptometer calibration processes and various reference points.

Your belief that Mary Ann is better looking is necessarily subjective (not that I disagree). But what does it say about the belief that it could be changed if you learned something else about Ginger? I know this was a missive in your post, but it's interesting.

<nitpick>
Actually, my belief is that MaryAnn is more attractive than Ginger, as opposed to better looking. If my belief was based purely on physical appearances, my belief would likely vary with my mood. Heck, I wouldn't throw either of them outta the sack, though I might have a tough time taking Ginger seriously anyplace else. For me, attractiveness goes way beyond pretty.
</nitpick>

That my beliefs are subject to change based on additional compelling evidences only suggests that the beliefs are not necessarily final. Or, we could just turn the question around: If additional compelling evidence is presented which conflicts with and/or creates reason to doubt my beliefs, why would I continue to adhere to those beliefs? Again, if the stakes aren't high, it doesn't much matter. When a defendant's future is on the line, careful evaluation of evidences, as well as being able to state what aspects of the evidence are or are not personally persuasive is crucial.

In this case, the belief goes not to an external truth, but to an internal one, meaning that your belief does not extend to some higher truth about which one is more attractive. My question can be extended: is an opinion about the subjective qualities of something/one a belief? I submit that it can only apply to the objective qualities. (e.g., "Ginger exists")

Hmmm... I suppose some could opine --or believe-- that the Red Sox played all-around better baseball, had snappier uniforms, and that they're might have been some questionable calls by the umpires which affected the outcome of the 1986 World Series. On the other hand, I don't think anyone really needs to believe --or have an opinion about-- whether or not that the New York Mets won the series. Based on how you phrased your question, I'm honestly not sure whether this qualifies as concurrance or dissent.

But as to your original question, if beliefs are not volitional, then they must be some kind of pre-volition, or pre-knowledge ideas that have little basis in reality except the childish idea of the things other people know, like you say. But does this mean that true believers who convert in adulthood are only kidding themselves, or are possibly childish in their views?

I think this comes back --at least in part-- to sincerity of belief. I don't like to paint with such a broad brush about adult converts: some may be sincere and honest in their beliefs, others may not. Some may ask questions in an effort to find emotionally appealing answers; others may accept answers with little questioning; others might be discomforted if the answer is, "I don't know."

There's a good joke about Nancy Reagan, who, when they met with the Carters as they were leaving the White House, said to Roslyn Carter (presumably trying to be civil), "I understand you're Baptists. I'm a born-again Christian." Roslyn replied, "I got it right the first time, dear."

Ha!

Is it wrong to assume that Nancy had a legitimate conversion in later life? Can mid-life conversions ever be trusted?

I think midlife conversations can be trustable; heck most of the Christians in my family were not born-again until middle age, and I have no reason not to trust the sincerity of their beliefs. What I do not find plausible is that their beliefs have any basis in reality.

I don't know that this definition really applies as the same word as the rest of them do. It's sort of halfway between an opinion and an unsupported fact. What do you believe is behind door number 3? for example. Is that really a belief? Or are we talking about homonyms, one of which is a stand-in for opinion or best guess?

What's behind door number three may constitute a belief until such time as what actually is behind it is revealed. For whatever reason --or lack thereof-- my selection of door three rests on the hope that it hides the new Cadillac or the trip to Paris, rather than the golf clubs or year's supply of sauerkraut. Then again, three might just be my lucky number.

Regards,
mrmufin

[mrmufin]

f an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent god exists, he both can, and must make himself known, so that we can make the choice.

Choices require a belief that the options exist.

But if God conclusively made himself known, then is there a choice in believing as mrmufin pointed out in the first post? If God removed all doubt, then can one honestly make a "choice"?

Exactly. Even when intangibles are considered ("I believe my mother loves me"), if the belief is sincerely held, I am simply unable to choose to believe something to the contrary and remain sincere.

Of course, which makes it odd that such a god does not provide adequate evidence for all.

There could be a number of explanations. Perhaps some people choose not to see the evidence. Or perhaps some choose to avoid the evidence.

Or perhaps we have different standards for evidence (which an omniscient god should already know). Or perhaps there is no evidence (which an omnipotent god should be able to change). Or perhaps the god believed in does not exist outside of the mind of the believer (which may be consistent with the empirical data).

Hopefully, logic and truth can determine the boundary between beliefs and reality. When one is presented with truth, then rationally it should be enough to change a sincerely held, but false, belief.

Hopefully; but could the distinction between belief and reality be a matter of simple semantics? "I believe that my mother loves me," is a true statement. "My mother loves me," may or may not be true, though I believe that it is true.

But, that is not the case. Even if one is presented with the truth, there are many other factors to prevent someone from choosing to deny one's belief. Here is a simple example. If you ask people how many states are there in the United States, what would people say? They would most likely reply, "Are you stupid? 50 of course." But, is it really 50 states? The reality is that it is not. There are only 46 states. 4 of them are commonwealths. But will this newfound knowledge change peoples' beliefs? They will probably respond with, "I don't care that there are 4 commonwealths. I'm still goiing to say that there are 50 states in the US."

Not really. It's not that I don't believe that the US has four commonwealths; I was already aware of that. In this case, an argument for context can be made. If we had just learned in history or geography that the US consists of forty-six states and four commonwealths and the question appears on the chapter test, the answer is, "Forty-six states and four commonwealths." In casual conversation, if we respond, "fifty US States" and we're called on a technicality, most of us won't argue or dispute the call. Though some might request an explanation of the distinction between states and commonwealths.

Regards,
mrmufin